Episode 139 - Unpeeling the Layers of the Deponent's Memory

According to current cognitive psychology and neuroscience understanding, our memories are multilayered constructs composed of personal experiences and information acquired from external sources. So, when questioning witnesses about their recollections, it's crucial to understand what those layers are made up of. Is it purely personal recollection? Does it include what they were told by others? Does it include what they were told when their lawyer prepped them for the deposition? Examining the underlying sources or layers of the deponent’s knowledge helps identify the individuals and documents that influenced and possibly biased what the witness says.Be sure to click through to our home page if you don't see the complete list of cites in the show notes. And - please - leave us a 5-star review wherever you hear this podcast? It's a free, fast, and incredible way to thank our production team for the research and time spent producing this free resource for you. Our whole team thanks you!SHOW NOTESIn re FirstEnergy Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 2:20-CV-03785-ALM-KAJ, 2024 WL 1984802, at *14 (S.D. Ohio May 6, 2024) (“Seemingly, FirstEnergy argues that all facts about the internal investigation are privileged or protected because, at some point, these facts were communicated by lawyers to various individuals. Time and again, courts have rejected this type of argument. While communications between attorneys and clients are privileged, facts are not. Humphreys, Hutcheson and Moseley v. Donovan, 755 F.2d 1211, 1219 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 395). And facts do not become privileged or protected because they were provided to witnesses by attorneys or acquired in anticipation of litigation. See, e.g., Protective Nat. Ins. Co. of Omaha v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 137 F.R.D. 267, 280 (D. Neb. 1989) (“There is simply nothing wrong with asking for facts from a deponent even though those facts may have been communicated to the deponent by the deponent's counsel.”); United States v. BAE Sys. Tactical Vehicle Sys., LP, No. 15-12225, 2017 WL 1457493, at *5–6 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 25, 2017); Basulto v. Netflix, Inc., No. 22-21796, 2023 WL 3197655, at *2–3 (S.D. Fl. May 2, 2023) (“[F]act-oriented discovery is permitted even if the witness learned about the facts from her attorneys.”); Clear Cast Grp., Inc. v. Ritrama, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-169, 2011 WL 13334451, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 15, 2011). So too here. Facts related to the internal investigation are not shielded simply because they were funneled through attorneys to witnesses”)Protective Nat. Ins. Co. of Omaha v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 137 F.R.D. 267, 278–79 (D. Neb. 1989) (citing Sedco Intern., S.A. v. Cory, 683 F.2d 1201, 1205 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017, 103 S.Ct. 379, 74 L.Ed.2d 512 (1982) for the proposition that “No contention can be made that the attorney-client privilege precludes disclosure of factual information. The privilege does not protect facts communicated to an attorney. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395–96, 101 S.Ct. 677, 685–86, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981). Clients cannot refuse to disclose facts which their attorneys conveyed to them and which the attorneys obtained from independent sources. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508, 67 S.Ct. 385, 392, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947); 8 J. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 2317 (McNaughton rev. 1961).State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. New Horizont, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 203, 214 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (quoting In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 237 F.R.D. 373, 384 (E.D.Pa.2006) (“ ‘[T]here is simply nothing wrong with asking for facts from a deponent even though those facts may have been communicated to the deponent by the deponent's counsel.’ ” (quoting Protective Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 137 F.R.D. 267, 280 (D.Neb.1989))).)State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. New Horizont, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 203, 215 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (“Contrary to State Farm's contention, the mere fact that counsel for State Farm may have provided such information to the witness in preparation for the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition does not convert the information into attorney work product. Were State Farm's logic followed to its full extent, anytime an attorney is involved in preparing a Rule 30(b)(6) witness, such preparation would be futile because the witness would inevitably be precluded from testifying to anything learned from the attorney. Were this the rule, every Rule 30(b)(6) deposition in which an attorney was involved in preparing the witness would be doomed from the start”)Palmisano v. Paragon 28, Inc., No. 21-60447-CIV, 2021 WL 1686948, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2021) (“Thus, while the privilege applies when a questioner directly asks a deponent about discussions with counsel, the “attorney-client privilege simply does not extend to facts known to a party that are central to that party's claims, even if such facts came to be known through communications with counsel who had obtained knowledge of those facts through an investigation into the underlying dispute.”)Thurmond v. Compaq Comput. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 475, 483 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (requiring disclosure of facts defendant “only learned through communications with counsel”)Kansas Wastewater, Inc. v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 217 F.R.D. 525, 528, 532 n.3 (D. Kan. 2003) (“It is well established that a party may not withhold relevant facts from disclosure simply because they were communicated to, or learned from, the party's attorney.”).Elizabeth Loftus, prominent figure in the study of human memory, particularly on malleability of human memory and misinformation effects. Loftus, E.F. (1975). Leading questions and the eyewitness report. Cognitive Psychology, 7, 560–572; Loftus, G.R. & Loftus, E.F. (1976). Human Memory: The Processing of Information. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum Associates; Loftus, E.F. & Doyle, J. (1987). Eyewitness Testimony: Civil and Criminal. NY: Kluwer; Loftus, E.F.; Hoffman, H.G. (1989). Misinformation and memory: The creation of memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 118(1), 100–104.Daniel Schacter, research on the “seven sins” of memory and the constructive nature of memory. Books include Searching for Memory: The Brain, the Mind, and the Past (1996); Forgotten ideas, neglected pioneers: Richard Semon and the story of memory. (2001); and The Seven Sins of Memory: How the Mind Forgets and Remembers (2001)Charan Ranganath, Why We Remember: Unlocking Memory’s Power to Hold On to What Matters