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Episode 63: Dr. William Bernstein on TIPS, asset allocation, and four deep risks, host Rick Ferri episode artwork

Oct 29, 2023 45 min

Episode 63: Dr. William Bernstein on TIPS, asset allocation, and four deep risks, host Rick Ferri

from Bogleheads On Investing Podcast Hosted by bogleheads

Dr. William (Bill) Bernstein is a retired neurologist, author, investment adviser, and financial historian. His research is in the field of modern portfolio theory and economic history. Bill has published extensively on investing and economic history, including eight books and numerous articles. He holds a Ph.D. and an M.D. Bill is a repeat guest, first appearing in Episode 13. In this episode, we discuss Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS), asset allocation in today's uncertain world, four deep risks, and the cost of income inequality. This podcast is hosted by Rick Ferri, CFA, a long-time Boglehead and investment adviser. The Bogleheads are a group of like-minded individual investors who follow the general investment and business beliefs of John C. Bogle, founder and former CEO of the Vanguard Group. It is a conflict-free community where individual investors reach out and provide education, assistance, and relevant information to other investors of all experience levels at no cost. The organization supports a free forum at Bogleheads.org, and the wiki site is Bogleheads® wiki. Since 2000, the Bogleheads' have held national conferences in major cities around the country. There are also many Local Chapters in the US and even a few Foreign Chapters that meet regularly. New Chapters are being added on a regular basis. All Bogleheads activities are coordinated by volunteers who contribute their time and talent. This podcast is supported by the John C. Bogle Center for Financial Literacy, a non-profit organization approved by the IRS as a 501(c)(3) public charity on February 6, 2012. Your tax-deductible donation to the Bogle Center is appreciated.

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Episode 63: Dr. William Bernstein on TIPS, asset allocation, and four deep risks, host Rick Ferri

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Welcome everyone to the 63rd edition of Bogleheads on Investing. Today we're welcoming back to the program Dr. Bill Bernstein. He has written four books on personal finance and four books on economic history. Today we're going to be talking about his current views on the markets and the economy, and speaking about his updated book, The Four Pillars of Investing.

Hi everyone, my name is Rick Ferri and I am the host of Bogleheads on Investing. This episode, as with all episodes, is brought to you by the John C. Bogle Center for Financial Literacy, a nonprofit organization that is building a world of well-informed, capable, and empowered investors. Visit the Boglecenter at BogleCenter.net where you will find a treasure trove of information, including transcripts of these podcasts. Before we get started today, I have a couple of items.

First I'd like to thank John Luskin for covering for me for five months as I went on a sabbatical up to Alaska. My wife and I dragged our camper from Texas for 20,000 miles, all the way up through the U.S. Rocky Mountains into Canada, through the Canadian Rockies up to the Alcan Highway to Dawson City in the Yukon, then across the top of the world highway over to a little town called Chicken, Alaska, and then spent two months touring around in Alaska, going everywhere where there were roads, and only about one quarter of Alaska has roads.

We made it all the way up to the Arctic Ocean and put our feet in the water, got to see the Alaska pipeline that went all the way up to Pudo Bay and stops at Dead Horse, which is where the oil facilities are. And I have to tell you that it is pristine up there. If you have this idea that somehow there's oil leaking all over the place, forget it. It is not true. The oil companies and the government and the Native Americans who own the land do an outstanding job of keeping the environment 100%.

People have asked me, how was the trip? And the answer is the beauty of this place is vast, the mountains, the forests, the tundra, snowfields, glaciers, thousands of waterfalls and thousands of square miles of wilderness, where there are no roads and literally untouched. And it's not just Alaska, it's the Yukon Territory in Canada, Western and British Columbia, and the Rocky Mountains in Alberta. It's just a beautiful part of the country, a beautiful part of the North American continent. Anytime you get an opportunity to go up there and take a look around, I definitely recommend it.

And I also recommend going in the summertime because in the winter, it's 20 to 40 degrees below zero most of the time. We got back to my home in Texas at the end of September, just in time, for the annual Bogleheads Conference that was held in Bethesda, Maryland. And this was a huge success. It was the largest conference we've ever had. There were 510 knees, 30 fantastic speakers, all of the speakers donated their time.

No one has paid many people, including some speakers, bought tickets and donated them to people who otherwise would not have been able to attend. The committee chair this year, as was last year, was Christine Benz, who is also the current president of the Bogle Center. And she did a wonderful job. To name a few of the speakers, there was Howard Clark, Charlie Ellis, Jerry Riley, Vanguard, who is responsible for managing about $4 trillion in equities, including the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index Fund, the largest mutual fund in the world. Washington Post columnist Michelle Singletary and her family, Jonathan Clemens, and many others, including my podcast guest today, Bill Bernstein.

All of these sessions were recorded. YouTube videos will be available soon on BogleCenter.net. Next fall, around the same time, sometime in October, the date is yet to be announced. The conference will be held in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and I hope to see you all there. Our guest today is Dr. Bill Bernstein. Bill is not new to the Bogleheads or this podcast.

He was a guest on the show about four years ago. And whenever John Bogle was around Bill, it would refer to him as the smartest guy in the room. And for good reason. Bill holds a PhD and an MD and has had a long career as a neurologist, now retired. When he was looking for the best way to invest his own money, he became disenchanted with the sales mentality of the financial industry and started a scientific quest into the markets and how they worked.

That ultimately led Bill to low cost indexing and Vanguard and co-founding an investment management firm called Efficient Frontier Advisors. Bill then began to write first he had a blog and then he became a leading author. He's written eight books in total, four investment books, the Intelligent Asset Allocator, the Four Pillows of Investing. Now in its second edition, the Investors Manifesto and Rational Expectations. He's also written for Economic History Books, The Birth of Plenty, A Splendid Exchange, Masters of the Word, and The Delusions of Crowds. I will also add that Bill has written several small,

self-published books. Some of them are available for free on Amazon. He has also authored and co-authored numerous peer-reviewed articles for financial journals and his work won him the prestigious James R. Verdon Award from the CFA Institute in 2017. Today we're going to talk about the past, the present, and what the future may hold. I remind listeners that the opinions given by Bill are

his own. Each of us needs to look at our own goals and our own circumstances and determine which strategies and investments are right for us. With no further ado, let's welcome Bill Bernstein. Welcome to the podcast, Bill. Thanks for everything you do for the Bogle Hands. You were at the last conference. You were

a big hit at the conference. You always are. You had a big long line for people to sign your books. You've been going to the Bogle Heads conferences for many, many years. Jack Bogle attended almost everyone and the only one he couldn't attend because he was in the hospital. He talked to the

group from his hospital bed. We have a little different agenda now. Tell us a little bit about your experience at the new conference now that Jack is no longer with us. Well, one of the main reasons why I come to the conference is just because Bogle Heads are such nice people. It's just a very pleasant experience. That really doesn't change with the speakers.

Now, obviously everybody was concerned with the passing of Jack that the experience was going to change. And of course, it did. But thanks to you and to Christine and the big roll of decks is that you have. You were able to acquire some absolutely spectacular speakers and panellists and almost every single one of them knocked out of the park. So it was a very rewarding experience because of that. Thanks for saying that. It was certainly a team effort.

A lot of people put in a lot of time to put these conferences together and appreciate your comments on that. One of the big items in the conference that seemed to be talked about in almost every session was inflation protected securities tips. In fact, it was so popular that one of the panels decided that they weren't going to talk about tips that it couldn't be mentioned. It was banned from the panel. That's how much this was mentioned. I know that you're a fan of tips.

Can you tell me, number one, why you're a fan and also how one might implement tips into their portfolio? Well, because there's no other asset that nashes your assets and your liabilities quite so precisely. So let's say that you decide that you need $30,000 of real spending power in the year 2051. However old you're going to be then, you can buy a tips that ensures in 2031 and know exactly how much spending power you're going to have when that bond matures. There is no other asset that you can say that about. You certainly can't say that about stocks and you certainly can't say that

about nominal bonds either because if there's bad inflation, you're going to see the real value of that nominal bond turn basically into funny. So that's the advantage. Now until about a year and a half ago, tips weren't a very worthwhile proposition because their yields were so low. In fact, there was a point about two years ago when the yields were strongly negative across the board. So if you bought $1,000 worth of tips at that point and they were maturing in 10 or 20 years, you were guaranteed to get $80 to $90 cents on the dollar of spending power, which didn't seem to be a very good deal. Now real yields are approaching two and a half percent. So if you buy

a 30 year tips, you were going to get $2 of spending power in 30 years for every dollar you put in now. And that's a heck of a deal that's at that near historically high yield. So a lot of different ways to buy tips. You can buy individual securities, you can buy a tips fund short term or intermediate term, or you could buy this new product that we've been hearing about called iShare Bullet Share Tips, which basically are tips put into a portfolio or an ETF that mature in one year. And then there's another ETF that tips that mature in two years and so forth. So you could build this latter of

instead of individual tips, Bullet Share. How do you feel about these? Well, the Bullet Share is, unless I misunderstand and don't make a bit of sense to me, why would you buy one or two bonds that mature in a given year? And I could be on 20, 30 or 20, 32. It's only one mature in each year.

So why would you buy a fund that only owns one bond when you can buy the bond yourself for zero expense? Doesn't make any sense. So there's basically two ways to diffuse your retirement expenses with tips. One is simply to buy tips that mature in every single year that you're going to be retired. That's not quite possible because there's a gap between 20, 34 and 20, 39. There are no tips

that mature. Now you can buy an excess amount of them in 20, 33 and in 20, 40, which pretty much does the same trick. And of course, you really don't have to own tips for all 25 of those years. You can skip years, a couple of years in between the tips. So you only have to own 86 or 7 or 8 of them.

But that's still a lot of work. The other way to do this is to buy a mix of tips funds. So let's say you think that your retirement is going to last 30 years. Well, you want the average maturity. Of your tips funds to average out to about 15 years, half of that. So you would buy a bit of

a 20 year fund and there's only one. And unfortunately, that's offered by 10,000. That's got 20 basis points expense. So that's just a little steep. Or and then you could buy a short term tips fund for a couple of basis points or a couple of ETFs that do that. And you mix and match those two. You

try and average out way out the securities to 15 years. And then of course, you have to rebalance that once every couple of years to keep the maturity right. So neither way is perfect. Neither way requires a little bit of work. I prefer the latter because that's fine. You buy it in and

even if you can tell up the bench up, even tell your executors and your kids, Hey, this is how you pay my expenses when you're too sure they don't have to do anything except collect the principal when they mature. Billy recently released the second edition of the four pillars of investing and probably one of your best selling books. Could you review for us what those four pillars are and perhaps what the most important of the four pillars are? Well, four pillars is simply the theory of investing. So the connection between risk and return and market efficiency, the knowledge that you're not going to be able to trade individuals, talk from bonds, particularly well. And the trick is not

to trade and you avoid trading by buying passively managed funds index funds, whatever you want to call them. So that's the first pillar. The second pillar is the history. And that's probably the most important pillar because markets become a billionth in your fort from time to time and markets more importantly become panicky from time to time. And it's important to know what that looks like.

Not necessarily so you can time the market because that's nearly impossible to do. You do that simply so you can keep your discipline and stay the course and say to yourself, yeah, you know, I've seen this movie before and I know how it ends either on the upside and the downside. The third pillar is your own psychology. The problem with human beings is we didn't evolve to deal with a 40 or a 50 year planning horizon. We evolved, you know, on the plains of the southern giddy dealing with a time horizon or a risk horizon that was measured sometimes in seconds. And so we are psychologically

ill equipped to deal with the long-term risks and returns that are involved with finance. So learning how to handle that is the third pillar is very important. And then finally, you have to learn how to deal with the financial services industry, which in many cases is, you know, the metaphorical equivalent of a war zone. There are people out there who are out to get you and transfer your wealth from your name to theirs. You have to know how to deal with those people in those institutions.

In your book, you get into a detail about the equity risk premium. And this is the excess return for taking the risk in the stock market over the risk free rate. And I'm assuming in your book, you're using T-bills as the risk free rate. Yeah, that's really the classic one. You can also use, you know, longer bonds and especially tips as a risk free rate as well. But most people use

the 30 day treasury bill. And given that 30 day treasury bills currently are yielding 5.3% of the moment, what would you suppose the equity risk premium is over that, say, over the next 20 or 30 years? Well, you can calculate out what the expected return of stocks is. And you can also look at historical returns. And you can not only look in the United States, which is the winner, or just about the winner of all the 20 or 30 nations that we have long-term records for. And the equity

risk premium seems to be no matter how you look at it. I don't know if you're calculated, somewhere in the vicinity of 4%, mighty 3%, mighty 5%. So if T-bills are yielding 5%, maybe you should expect perhaps 8% from stocks. Now, the problem with using the T-bills is that it's yielding 5.3% right now. I'm willing to bet that it won't be yielding that much three or four years from now.

And so that may be an overestimated, better estimate might be a thing in real terms and say that, yeah, it was a 2.5% tip-sealed across, in real tips yield across the yield curve. So maybe you should expect 5.5% or 6.5%, real return from stocks, not normal return, but after inflation return from stocks. So if you were looking, say, for 5.5% to 6.5%, real return from stocks and you can get risk-free 2.5% in tips. Then you're really talking of 2% to maybe 3% equity risk premium over real interest rates today. Yeah, I'm saying 4%, 6.5% for bonds and tips and maybe 6.5% for stocks. So

6.5% of these 2.5% inflation has my percent model. Oh, okay. So it's actually quite high. Yeah, I think that's right. And one of the things that people kept asking me two years ago was, what do I do about low yields? And the answer is you've got a great big loaded portfolio because

yields are so low, because when yields are low, asset prices rise. So be careful what you wish for. If you ever do get to the point where you have much higher yields, your portfolio is going to be considerably smaller, especially on an inflation-adjusted basis, indeed, which it is. Okay, stocks are down from where they were two years ago. And bonds, depending upon your duration, have gotten absolutely creamed over the past two years. I think the long treasury of 30-year treasury is down about

half from where it was two years ago. So let's talk about life in a 5% yield world. Some people would argue that stocks have not yet adjusted for a 5% yield on the 10-year treasury. And real estate has not yet adjusted for this higher, for longer interest rate environment. Well, that's certainly a possibility. But I also believe that the markets,

the overwhelming majority of the time, are very efficient and they reflect the proper level of prices. And I'm not willing to expect very often that the market is wrong about valuations and expected returns. And I'm certainly not willing to get back right now. The one thing that I think it's needs to be pointed out is that U.S. large-cap stocks are trading in multiples that are historically significantly higher than they have. So maybe their expected

returns are lower. But there are other asset classes, equity asset classes that are very reasonably priced. Small value stocks are very reasonably priced. Right now, foreign stocks are very reasonably priced. Merging market stocks are very reasonably priced. And even real estate stocks, which have taken

some real losses over the past year or so, are not unreasonably priced as well. So I think if you look beyond the S&P 500, I think that there are very reasonable places to get expected returns. And when you talk about expected returns, you have to realize there are very large cover bars. I say 6.5% when anybody says that there's a 6.5% expected return. On stocks, over the next 30 years, it's quite possible that we'll see a negative return, negative real return, it's quite possible that we'll see 11% the over term. You just don't know. The best you can do is go with the central

estimate. There's been a lot of media bashing of the classic 6040 portfolio, 60% in equity, 40% in fixed income. It was an article in the Wall Street Journal. The other day, I talked about how this had the worst year it's had in decades. And some people, primarily active managers, talk about how the 6040 portfolio is not the right portfolio for today's environment. What's your

take on it? The person who wrote that article should wear a sandwich board that announces that they have risk aversion, myopia. Because something has a bad return over a one year period. It doesn't mean that it's a bad strategy. A 6040 stock on portfolio is a superb long term investment strategy.

And simply because it has a bad year is absolutely no reason to abandon it. In fact, one of the things that separates out the weak from the chaff, if I can be sexist, the men from the boys or the women from the girls, if you will, and investing, is how they respond to a bad year for their strategy. All strategies are going to have bad years. And 2022 was a bad year for the 6040 portfolio. But it was a superb 30 years. And normally I tell people that the idea that a 6040 portfolio

is will prevent a loss is wrong. It's never that's never been what people have said about a 6040 portfolio. They say that it reduces the probability of a large loss, but it doesn't eliminate the probability of a large loss. And I think that last year we saw that, stay the course time with the 6040 portfolio if you have one. Yeah, you shouldn't give a respiratory about a bad year every now and then what you care about is how you've run over the past 30 years. There's a lot of terminology out there in the investment world that to me,

I think is designed to confuse investors rather than help them. And one of them is called optimization. This idea that you can look back in history and look back at the markets historically, and you can optimize your portfolio with the correct percentages in each asset class. So that going forward, you have an optimal portfolio. How realistic is optimization going for looking forward?

It's beyond being impossible. It's almost a cruel joke. Probably the worst way to design a portfolio is to look at what's done the best, but what asset allocation has done the best in the past. And then in a cap going forward, you know, more above it, I think it's very famously saying that if you could get to future optimal portfolios from past results, then librarians would be a well-precious people. There's another tool out there that's used by advisors a lot and it creates a lot of squiggly lines on paper and puts a line through the middle of it all. It's called Monte Carlo

simulation. And I'm skeptical on whether advisors should be using Monte Carlo simulations to determine the 5% probability that the clients will be living under a bridge and eating dog food. How do you feel about use or overuse of things like Monte Carlo simulation to determine what might be an again, optimal portfolio for retirement? Well, I would never use Monte Carlo simulations for that. What I would use them for is to try and get some sense of the probability of, you know, how likely you are to leave a quest for the opposite and how likely you are to run out of money.

And even then, it's not a terribly useful tool. You know, the financial economists have this entity. They want to reduce financial systems to the accuracy and the precision of an airfoil or electrical current and electrical circuit. And you can't do that, all right? It's just, you know, it's just an impossible thing to do. The systems are too dirty. Now, my favorite sort of hobby course

is when somebody, you know, looks at Monte Carlo simulation and says that the ads of, you know, portfolio success are 95 or 98 percent. So there's a two or five percent chance of failure. Well, heck, you know, if you look at human history over the past couple of millennia, you see that societies usually don't survive for more than 500 years. So if you have an 80-year lifespan, it means you have about a one in six chance of living through a catastrophic situation that is going to completely destroy your savings. So no one, no one in this quadrant of the galaxy can be guaranteed a 95 or 98 percent chance of success for simple historical reasons. You know, there's really, there's really

really only one truism, which is that the more you save, the less you spend, the safer you're going to be. And you really can't say much beyond that. You have several other small books that you wrote, in addition to the eight big books, if you will. In fact, some of them are free on Amazon. People can download for free. One of these books that you wrote was called Deep Risk, How History Informs

Portfolio Design. What did you mean by Deep Risk? Well, it's no deep risk is you have to know what shallow risk is. Shallow risk is the risk that everybody thinks about. Okay, it's having a bad year.

It's 2022. It's having a bad day. For example, in October 1997, when the markets lost almost a quarter of their value, that shallow risk. Shallow risk almost always recovers. And that's not a risk that is going to get you. The risk that is going to get you as an investor is a prolonged period,

the last key perhaps a generation of negative real returns, because that's the sort of thing that can absolutely bless your retirement to Smith and Reens. So let me give you an example of Deep Risk. The Japanese stock market over the past three, three years, which has lost something like two-thirds of its value in inflation adjusted terms. The Japanese investor who depended on stocks for a retirement beginning in 1990 was probably eating cat food within 10 or 15 years. That's deep risk. Deep Risk is what happened to bonds, US bonds, between 1940 and 1980. Again, they lost even with

reinvested interest, about two-thirds or at least 60 percent of their value. That's enough to destroy anybody's retirement plans. And so what are the things that cause deep risk? It's not having a bad day or a gag year in the stock market. The things that cause deep risk are first and foremost inflation.

When you look at financial history, inflation is almost endemic. It is rare to see a nation that avoids hyperinflation at any point. We've more or less avoided, but all of the said needs were a rough patch. The Swiss have avoided, but not yet avoided, but very few other nations do that avoid, avoid, severe inflation. That's the most common deep risk. And it's also the one that is

the easiest to mitigate. We'll talk about perhaps how to mitigate that in a minute. The next risk is deflation. Deflation is extremely rare and it's easily curable. Kind of presses, governments have printing presses or at least less than you do. And so it's relatively easy to avoid deflation.

Deflation rarely lasts for a very long period of time. There's confiscation going and taking your assets either through excessive taxation or through downright confiscation has happened in, the Communist countries and after their revolutions. And then finding the fourth risk is destruction, which is war civil disorder. So to take them in order, inflation is the one you can do the most about. Deflation is rare. You probably don't have to worry about it. Confiscation, you have to

flee the country, which is not an easy thing to do. And destruction beyond how do you go supply of can't go to the end. There's not a lot you can do about it. And even if you have a can goes in the end or you may not be able to do anything about it. So the rational investor I came to the conclusion that book tries to do the best that they can to mitigate inflation. So here we are

at a point in history where we have a $33 trillion national debt continue to rack up a trillion dollars a year in excess debt. No end in sight for this. The only way we could possibly begin to pay this back is through some sort of confiscation. We have to pay more taxes. Would you agree with that?

Gosh, you did a really good job of channeling Ron Paul. How do you mitigate that? If you really worried about that risk. When there are several different strategies, which you can apply simultaneously, number one is in the long term, equities are not a bad hedge against inflation, not a perfect hedge against inflation. But when you look outside of the US at the nations that have the very worst inflation, places like Chile, places like Israel, even by marginality, stocks actually held up pretty well throughout the severe inflation. Why? Because stocks are a claim on real assets. They produce

products that can be priced according to inflation and in real currency they have real assets that they can sell. So they're not a bad way to do that. Now there are some kinds of stocks that do especially well with inflation. One of them is value stocks. Value stocks tend to be over leveraged and that leverage melts away and goes straight to the bottom line with inflation. Commodity is producing

stocks. I'm not a big fan of owning commodities or commodities futures, but oil stocks, gold stocks, base metals producers all do very well with inflation. We've already talked about tips, tips by definition are going to do well with inflation. But when I ask the class, interestingly, it really doesn't do that well with inflation. When you look at it through a broad enough lens is gold. Gold

did pretty well in the US and the 70s with inflation. But in any other period in any other country that had sitter inflation, it didn't do that well. In fact, curiously, out paradoxically, gold does best with deflation. And the reason for that, if you think about it, is fairly obvious, which is that financial addicts, when people lose faith in the financial system, tend to be deflationary. And it's not that gold does well with deflation per se, but gold does well with financial addicts and financial, financial, financial, tax tend to be deflationary. Notice that during the COVID crisis

that the price of gold went up significantly when that began. And then once we had the recovery from that and inflation started coming back, the price of gold did not continue up because it had already gone up. So just recently, your theory about gold is correct. Let's get on to another topic. You were speaking with meb favor recently on a podcast and he was asking you what you thought you might start working on next. And one of the answers that you gave to him was you were very interested in why

some countries became wealthy and some countries did not. What was the key factor of what you found in this research so far as to why some countries gain wealth and others do not? Well, the question is why have the Northern Europeans done so well economically and why, by the way, how their securities markets done generally much better than other countries? You know, when you look at the highest returning equity markets around the world in the past century and a quarter, you're looking at the United States, the UK, Australia, and the Zealand, Canada, all being near the top of the West, Sweden and Switzerland have also done well. And what characterizes those countries? Well,

it's, you know, the usual things will look depends on the judiciary, but also it's what sociologists call radius of trust, okay? In other words, if you drop your wallet in the park or on the street, one of the odds of you are getting it back. And it turns out that some cultures have higher, a higher radius of trust than other cultures do. The reasons for that are well beyond the the end of this podcast, but it has to do with culture and the other really interesting thing as it has to do with marriage prescriptions in Northern European countries, because if you can't marry your second or third or fourth cousin, it means that you have to leave the town that you were born to find a mate, as a lot of English people in Northern Europeans had to do at one point or or another. And when you do that, you learn to trust other people and much of the people in your family and your clan. And that, you know, follows through in terms of economic growth. So higher

the radius of trust, the longer the radius of trust in society, the more prosperous it is. I don't want to get to write that book, but it would be a fun book to write. One of the things that you mentioned was things that break up that trust and what causes that trust to erode over time. Well, that's another interesting subject. That would be the second part of the book, which is that societies that have to become prosperous and stable tend also to acquire layers of special interests that tend to choke off the economy. So all you have to do in this country is look at the

power of the medical industrial complex that is resistant to any change or reform and a new state of resending close to 20% of our GDP on medical care. And yet our health care statistics are, if anything, a little worse than they are in countries that have the medical industrial complex isn't quite as powerful. If you're an American diabetic, you are three times more likely to get an amputation as an English diabetic, well, simply because our medical system is so dysfunctional. You know, you can also look at the military industrial complex and you can look at congressional privilege as well. One of the reasons why the Congress is so kind of the dysfunctional simply has to do with the capture of special interests of the legislative process.

One of the other things you mentioned is that as a country becomes wealthier, or the wealthier that society gets, there becomes more inequality. And that also leads to distrust. Yeah, I'm seeing that right now. I mean, half of the people in this country, the United States couldn't come up with $400 for a car repair without going into death. And that's the sort of, again, that's the sort of inequality when you see special interests gain power. I mean,

if you're a hedge fund, a billionaire hedge fund manager, you're liable to have a marginal tax rate that is lower than legal secretaries. You wrote a paper called The Myth of Dynastic Wealth, The Rich Get Poor, and the co-authors were Robert Nott and Lillian Wu. Within society, people seem to want to target very wealthy people. The rich don't pay enough in taxes, and they need to pay their fair share and so forth. As if families are accumulating wealth, and that wealth will never go away, but in fact, I'd like you to talk about this paper. You wrote

it some time ago, but I found it fascinating that wealth doesn't really stay with the same people, generation after generation. It gets dispersed, so like, sand passes on a beach, get watched back out to the ocean after a few times. The paper looks over a time period that is not just a generation or two, but over several generations. So the classic example of that is the Vanderbilt family. There was a get-together with Andrew Dilts in 1970, and it was not one millionaire in the group, and how did that happen? So over the very long term, you're looking at centuries now, the wealth tends

to migrate out of the wealthiest families. And the reason is just it's just simple exponential math. I mean, a very wealthy couple is going to have two children and four grandchildren and eight great grandchildren. And by the time you get to the 6 to 7th generation, you're just going to have wealth to go around, particularly as the successive generations get lazier and softer and tend to blow the money and sue each other over and over their inheritances. So over very long periods of time, wealth does dissipate, but we don't have any real financial wealth in this country. There are no families whose wealth goes back, you know,

in time the revolution, and very few families whose wealth goes back to save the time of the civil war. Now, that said, there is a norm of inequality from generation to generation, perhaps I'm getting a little too political here. Whatever people complain about affirmative actions, I remind me what affirmative action really looks like. Affirmative action is when your father is a business banker and your mother is a radiologist, and you take 14 advanced placement courses by the time you're in 11th grade, or 12th grade. All right? And that's what real affirmative action

looks like. And so from, you know, over two generations, we have real inequality and we have real lack of social mobility. But the one thing we don't have, and that's a real problem, the one thing we don't have to worry about, I think, is one or two families taking over the wealth of the entire country. That's not going to happen because that wealth does tend to dissipate over very long periods of time that over periods of less than say 50 years or 60 years, I can worry about it. Well, one of the things we have in this country is in a state tax to take 40% of wealth over, call it 25 million for a married double. And basically, the government takes it unless you give it to charity.

So that also puts the money back into the system, it puts it back into other people's hands. And again, I always like to think of it as sand castles that wash out to the sea over time. I agree with you. I don't think we have to worry, you know, 200 years ago, our musk kids are going to be running the country. That's not the worry. The worried I have are the

short term effects of inequality. I worry, for example, that in the United States, if you were born in the bottom quintile of socioeconomic status or wealth or income, the odds of you making it to the top quintile, from the bottom 20% to the top 20%, are about 5% or 6%, all right? Whereas in a perfectly mobile society, you should be 20% down. It's going to be in the Indian world in Europe. That's about 14%. In Arkansas,

it's about 3% or 4%. In Silicon Valley, it's about 13%. It's almost it's about the European level. So I worry about our lack of social mobility, which is to do wealth inequality. And is this all going to be the subject of a book?

Probably not. Other people have written about it for more eloquently than I'm ever going to be able to have a person who I pay attention to is John Cheddy, who's at Harvard University, who's in Congress. And Angus Deaton has written a very fine book on the subject. He's actually written two books. One is Death of Despair, which touches on it. And the other is his more recent book,

which is Economics in America, which is basically a biography, but he touches on a lot of these self-same subjects. And he's well worth reading if you really want to deep dive into the issue. One last question for you, and I'm doing it on behalf of Jonathan Clemets because he interviewed you at the conference and he did not get to ask this question because there were so many other questions. So I'm going to ask it on his behalf. You just jumped into an Uber. The driver is clearly

both intelligent and uninformed about personal finance. He finds out that you're an expert in personal finance and he asked you for advice. You have time to make five points before you get to your destination. What would you recommend to this Uber driver? Well, I knew it was five points where a week ago when I was prepared for Jonathan. I'll be my best to recall five, but I barely

get through the floor. The first one is to save 15% of your before tax salary if you at all can, and to the seconds to keep your expenditures down. The third is to not trade stocks and bonds, who invest passively. When you trade stocks and bonds, to imagine that you're playing tennis against invisible opponents. All right. And to realize that the personal genocide of the net

isn't from Dennis from Peoria, who was put there for you to trade with and make you rich. That person on the other side of the net more likely is Serena Williams or investment Harvard of Serena Williams. The first thing that I would tell my metaphorical Uber driver is to ignore your friends and family because almost invariably they're going to give you poor advice to stick to more reliable sources of information. And then the fifth thing is to avoid the headlines. The headlines are very useful. The economic headlines are very useful because it's above the floor that it's

in the headline. It's already been handed into the price. So it's worthless information. And if some things in other words, if something is in a headline, then you don't have to worry about it because the price is already completely reflected. So I think I got five things.

You did. And I would say that the headlines are interesting because today, as I was reading the Wall Street Journal, the headlines were individual stock investors outperformed the market. I don't know if you caught that story or not, but I went in there and it talked about how many people own Apple stock and Google and Amazon in their own accounts and how they have outperformed. Now I review literally hundreds of portfolios for individual clients every year. And I have to tell you, I have not seen this, but apparently the Wall Street Journal has. Did you read that article?

Actually the article and they quoted a research outfit that I have never heard of before. And we both are fairly familiar with the finance literature. There are literally hundreds of studies that show just how poorly individual investors, whether they invest in individual stocks or mutual bonds, they almost always underperform. And they underperform in direct proportion to how frequently they trade. So the fact that somebody somewhere came up with a study that shows the opposite, I would not just take a pinch of salt or even a thimble pole salt. I would want to buck

and salt the best. Well, thank you so much again for joining us on Global Heads on Investing. Your insights are always interesting. I have to go back and listen to this three or four times, so I'd catch everything that you say. And thank you again for also for speaking at the Global Heads conference and hope to see you there next year.

Rick, I hope to see you next year and I look forward to doing this again with you. This concludes this episode of Global Heads on Investing. Join us each month as we interview a new guest on a new topic. In the meantime, visit boglesentered.net, bogleheads.org, the bogleheads wiki, bogleheads twitter. Listen, lie to Bogleheads Live on Twitter Spaces, the Bogleheads YouTube channel, Bogleheads Facebook, Bogleheads Reddit. Join one of your local

heads chapters and get others to join. Thanks for listening.

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