We make Chevrolet vehicles, but what you do with them makes them so much more. You make them mobile offices, your kid's personal taxi, a concert shuttle, your hockey equipment locker, your recording studio. We make a Chevrolet, but you make it a Chevy. Discover yours at chevrolet.ca Why begin our final episode by talking to a particle physicist? You don't usually find part of your physicist walking in the streets or in general. There aren't that many. Before we are, you know, other things, we are family members and we are citizens of this place. So it's not about the title, it's about how you care about this place. This is Shikma Brest. We met her briefly last episode, but we should get reacquainted. A former professional basketball player who was good enough to make Israel's national youth team, she then pivoted her career, as one does, enrolled in the Technion, received a PhD in particle physics, and joined the faculty of the Weizmann Institute.
a globally recognized research institution ranked alongside MIT, Stanford, etc. Oh, she's also an active researcher at the CERN Particle Accelerator in Switzerland, where she researches the Higgs boson, which is way too complicated a concept to explain here. In other words, briefly, Shikmah Bressler is a busy and brilliant woman with a lot on her plate. So how did she become the de facto leader of Israel's protest movement? So for me, everything started by mistake on March 2020. It was the first days of the first COVID lockdown.
It relates a lot to what is happening right now and what was happening in 2023. But basically in March 2020, Israel was after the third elections in a row, meaning we had no elected government. We had just like some sort of a continuous form where Netanyahu was prime minister. He was nominating ministers just based on personal needs and political reasons and not related to, you know, the skills and whatever ideology. We should pause right there because the timeline matters here and it matters a lot.
Ask most casual observers of Israeli politics and they will tell you that the mass protests started right after and as a direct result of the judicial reform announced in January of 2023. But that's simply not the case. Bressler's movement got off the ground three years earlier, calling itself the Black Flag Protest. Their early demands were a bit fuzzy and had to do mainly with the chaos-sweeping Israeli politics in those years. Because of Israel's precarious political system, Israelis rushed to the ballots in April of 2019, then again in September of 2019.
then in March of 2020, then again in March 2021, and finally in November of 2022, with that fifth and final election, finally giving Benjamin Netanyahu the majority he needed to safely govern. In part, Bressler and her colleagues were responding to this chaos. With the Knesset convening and dissolving at an alarming rate, they were worried that Israeli parliamentary democracy was teetering on the verge of something dark and terrible. COVID and its restrictions, of course, hardly made it any better. But it wasn't just sensitivity to procedure that made Bressler and her colleagues take to the streets. It was a far more primordial fear, as many of them described it, that the country was being taken in a direction that, to them, felt strikingly similar to an earlier period of Israeli radicalism.
There were people who formed a couple of months earlier what they called the Black Flag Group. They went against the decision of who was back there, the Minister of Education, Rav Rafi Peretz, who joined forces with Bengvir for the first time, bringing Kahanism idea into Israeli Ministry of Education, which was awful. So they formed Black Flag groups, and when we asked people to join us with Black Flag to the parliament, they joined us. Kahanism is a word you hear often when you talk to members of the protest movement. It refers to the ideology of the late Rabbi Nair Kahana, a Britain-born rabbi who moved to Israel in the 1980s and formed a right-wing party named Kach. Kahana briefly held a Knesset seat before his party was deemed illegitimate by the court, judged to hold views incompatible with Israel's commitment to remaining a Jewish and democratic state. You could easily get lost discussing the intricate points of Kahana's belief system, his prognostications, and whether or not contemporary Israeli politicians on the right hold his exact set of radical views.
But you don't need to engage in any of these complex conversations to understand something much more profound and, depending on who you ask, much harder to ignore. Bressler and her fellow protesters took to the streets because Israel was changing in front of their very eyes, becoming a country they no longer recognize and governed by elected officials whose ideas they could not stomach. Like every complicated societal shift, this one too is, well, complicated. But if you're trying to understand what's going on, consider the following number. Four, that's the percentage of Haredi Jews out of the total Israeli population in 1980. By 2009, that number jumped to 9.9%, and by 2017, it reached the 12% mark. That number currently stands on 14.3%, and the unimprovably named Sergio de la Pergola, Israel's premier demographer, estimates that by 2050, the Haredim will make up a full quarter of all Israelis.
Add to that the 33% or so of Israelis who already define themselves as somewhere on the spectrum between Masot-i, or traditional, and Dati, or religious, but not Haredi, and you have a pretty good picture of a wide-scoped societal shift. And the shift is fast-moving. Late last year, the Jewish People's Policy Institute surveyed young Israelis and asked them to describe their religious and political views. More than 50% responded that they are growing considerably more right-wing, and more than 35% described themselves as mitchazgim, or growing stronger, a term suggesting increased religious observance. Truth be told, you don't really need any survey at all to tell you that. Just listen to Israeli radio. Not long ago, the number one pop song in the country was Misha Hupam by Ivry Lidham. He's one of the country's most popular stars and was the first mainstream Israeli artist to come out as gay. His song sounded like this. Today, the most popular pop song in Israel sounds like this.
In case you've been paying very little attention to Israeli culture, this is Sasan Ephraim Shaulov's Hashem Itbarach, overwhelmingly voted by Israeli radio as the most popular song of 2025. The refrain, Hashem, blessed God, always loves me and wants nothing but good things for me. So even if you strip away all of the specific gripes about this politician or that, about Bibi and his legal troubles, or about Ben Gavir and his radical views, or even about larger societal issues like whether or not the Haredim should serve in the IDF, you are left with an inconvenient truth. Israel is at a crossroads. And the main question is, what is Israel all about? The man posing the question hopes to become Israel's next prime minister. He previously served as the IDF's deputy chief of staff and now heads the Democrats, a new opposition party aiming to do what so many have failed to achieve for nearly a decade now.
and win back power for the center left. His name is Yair Golan. And you may remember him as the very first voice we heard at the top of episode one of this show. To hear Golan say it, Israel is not only at a crossroads, but also sort of on a verge of a civil war. Is Israel, you know, a homeland for all the Jewish people, including reformed Jews and conservative Jews, and at the same time, free, egalitarian, and democratic state? Or it's something else. The homeland of the Israelis alone. And a place where there is a good Jew and...
less a good Jew. What Teir Golan is describing is in many ways the argument driving the protest movement. Is Israel both a democratic state and the ancient homeland of the Jewish people? Or is it, as many in the country fear, beginning to tilt towards something else, a state more deeply shaped by religious and nationalist forces where liberal life may have less room to flourish? and a place where you have different sects and a place where you have no democracy and no human rights and nothing from the true democratic structure that was built along centuries in the world. What is Israel all about? Because there are people in Israel who think that Israel should be an extremely religious country. Theocracy. Are we in the cusp of a civil war? Not necessarily. We are approaching a very decisive moment. By this decisive moment, we can rebuild ourselves in a better way.
And we can destroy ourselves entirely. How should Israel rebuild itself? We could dive into questions of planning or specific policies. But the specific policy proposals, let's be honest here, don't really matter all that much because Israeli politics at the moment is a game of perceptions. And politicians like Golan and citizens like Bressler see the rise of a right-wing government backed by the religious parties, and they are afraid of a slow but certain slide into theocracy. Here's Bressler again. We are on a crossroad. And...
This crossword kind of, you know, we need to make a decision. And the underlying stream could take us in two different directions. So on one hand, we have those people who want Israel to be Jewish, democratic, liberal state. And on the other side, there are those people who got a lot of power in current ministry that want to take Israel to be, I would call it, like a jihadistic dictatorship. Jihad is there, but it's Judaism. These are the two different identities that Israel can pick up. The majority of Israelis, clearly the majority of Jewish worldwide, wants Israel to be a liberal, democratic state, Jewish.
democratic liberal state. But the other group, you know, got a lot of power in Israel administration, in Israel decision-making. And this is the battle that we are seeing. So when people were marching, you know, week after week and walking in 40 degrees to Jerusalem, what we had there, I think, kind of shaped the protest by showing that what we have is basically a battle on our own, you know, identity. What they are trying to change is our identity.
What they are trying to change is our identity, is a sentiment you hear a lot on both sides of this debate. We heard it from the Cherut Center Zamiyad Cohen, who argued that once upon a time, not so long ago, even people on the Israeli left understood that promoting the state's particular Jewish character was a national priority until the courts came and changed all that. And so, while both sides are talking about identity, for Amyad Cohen, it's about something even more basic. The core debate is, why are we here? And is it only because there's antisemitism? The second, there's no more antisemitism, we can cancel the state? And how strong do we keep and fight for the identity of the state? And does it try to achieve anything aside of the existence of the state? There is this kind of slogan that people love to say, Jewish and democratic. There's no democracy in the Declaration of Independence. There are the specific values of...
equality for all the people who live in Israel. We agree for equality, religion, and national. But this is a Jewish state that promotes Jewish values as the prophets articulated in the prophecies, in the religious Jewish prophecies. That, Cohen added, doesn't mean, of course, that a Jewish state is one in which halakhic rulings trump parliamentary procedures, like the jihadist nation Bressler said she fears might materialize. Nor would an Israel governed by Yair Golan strip itself of its Jewishness and become some deracinated cosmopolitan progressive outpost. That is the truly fascinating and honestly truly terrifying thing about the current Israeli debate.
Both sides realize that their nightmare scenarios are, hallelujah, not very likely to materialize, which leaves both sides with an even more difficult challenge. Namely, answering the question Zionism has been trying to answer since the very first, why are we here? Here again is Moshe Kopel. When this country was founded, even before the country was founded, when the Zionist movement began, there were many different reactions to it, right? Most of the gung-ho Zionists at the time were rebelling against religion. They were rebelling against the quietism of diaspora Judaism, right? They were rebelling against what they saw as a desiccated form of religion. And they wanted to overcome it. They wanted to replace it with something more robust, with something active, right? And in short, they were going to replace religion with nationalism. They were going to replace the passivity of religion with the activism, right, of Zionist nationalism.
some kind of cultural, civilizational, dare I say, religious basis suddenly becomes very thin. Why should I be an Israeli nationalist? I mean, you know, like, Thailandese are, you know, believe in Thailand, you know, Canadians, you know, are loyal to Canada. Like, what's, like, what's so special, right? You know, and the answer is maybe not that much, okay? You know, maybe nationalism divorced from religion becomes a little bit thin. So now we hope you get it.
Now you understand what's truly at stake and understand also that even if we settle the dispute about how to elect judges or how many Supreme Court justices it should take to override this decision or that decision, we would still be nowhere close to solving our problem. Because our problem is this. One side believes, as Professor Yanivos Naiz so eloquently put it, that Israel should strive, in theory, but maybe even also in practice, to join the EU and become just another normal nation. That it should be to its citizens what Holland is to the Dutch, an entity that makes laws and passes regulations and is governed by experts. And the other side believes, like Moshe Koppel just explained, that this attitude is precisely the opposite of everything Zionism has preached for a century and Judaism has preached for millennia, that the Jewish state is not like any other, that it is special and that it came into being and remains in existence because it is predicated on the ancient biblical promise God made to the Israelites. And if you believe that, well, you're going to want to make sure that your state, democratic and Western as it may well be, also spends some time and energy exploring the meaning of that ancient promise and what could be done to bring it to life.
So where does that leave us now? What are Israelis doing in Israel? Are they just living there in the exact same way that Canadians live in Canada or Thais in Thailand? Or is there something else going on, something more special? And if it's the latter, what exactly does it mean for the future of the state?
These are not random questions. They're the very same ones Zionism has been asking since the very first, because another way of asking all these questions is simply this. What, pray tell, is Zionism? Ask any seventh grader in Haifa, say, and they will tell you something like this. Zionism is an ideology forged in the 19th century and advocating for the building of a national sovereign state for the Jewish people in their indigenous homeland in the land of Israel. This, at least, is what you would get from most textbooks. It's perfectly anodyne, completely understandable, and absolutely wrong. Why? Let's play a game.
Imagine walking up to your average Italian in Rome or Milan and asking if she sees herself as a Garibaldus. I've conducted this experiment numerous times, and I'm pleased to report the question merits little more than blank stares, because the ressortimento, or the reunification of Italy from disparate fiefdoms into one cohesive nation, was completed 152 years ago. In other words, the 19th century movement to build a national sovereign state for the Italian people in their indigenous homeland of Italy is history. It's not the stuff of lively debates, let alone the building blocks of political, emotional, and spiritual identities. And yet, here we are, 75 years after Zionism achieved its intended purpose and built that modern homeland for Jews in Israel. Here we are, with an Israeli army feared around the world, Israeli TV shows watched all over, and an Israel that is no longer a cowering adolescent nation, uncertain about its survival, but a powerhouse in the making. If it was merely a sovereign state Zionism had wanted, Mazel Tov, mission accomplished. Why then do we continue?
to call ourselves Zionists. Why does the term still resonate? Because this confusion, the very same confusion that's leading different Israelis to have such radically different visions of their country and their place in it, is a feature, not a bug. It's right there at Zionism's birth, evident in the disparate and widely divergent views the movement's founding fathers put on display from the very first. What problem did Zionism set out to solve?
Ask Leo Pinsker, and he will tell you that, as men, we too wish to live like other men and be a nation like the others, end quote. A vision that sees Jewish history as one of those plain wooden puzzles toddlers enjoy with just one big piece, statehood, laying smack in the middle. which, alas, was news to Theodor Herzl, who defined the problem very differently. No one, begins his thunderous essay, the Jewish state, could deny the gravity of the situation of the Jews. Wherever they live in perceptible numbers, they are more or less persecuted. Their equality before the law, granted by statute, has become practically a dead letter. A state, therefore, is not a right but a remedy, a life raft to safety and little more. And what might that future state look like?
A.D. Gordon, the patriarch of labor Zionism, would have sketched a muddy Eden redeemed by booted farmers whose pruning and hoeing eventually inspired a politics of poetic peace. Echada Am, of course, would sneer and scoff, bellowing that huddling on a patch of land merely delivered a state of Jews, not a Jewish state. Only Hebrew argued this great founding father of Zionism and robust cultural creation could redeem us. The so-called political Zionists found Echad Ha'am's ideas not only misguided but outright delirious, denouncing anything and everything that didn't lead directly to diplomatic negotiations and the purchasing of vast tracts of real estate. To which the revisionists responded with snubbed noses as the territorial solutions they favored were on the audacious, not practical side, and which left the religious Zionists wondering if comedy was possible with such a gaggle of disagreeing dudes who had no working knowledge of or patience for anything that smacked of observance. Did that previous sentence give you something like whiplash? Hallelujah.
You now have a taste of Zionism's strange and persistent power, the perpetual discord that is its source of renewable energy. Unlike the American founding fathers who disagreed bitterly about matters big and small, but who shared a more or less coherent vision of what sort of republic they were fighting to build, the first Zionists painted radically different pictures of the eventually all too promised land. The quarrels started long before there was even a land or a promise to quarrel about. In 1903, addressing the Sixth World Zionist Congress, Herzl presented the infamous Uganda Plan. Irony being the Jewish people's only real natural resource, the Uganda Plan was neither a plan, it was at best a very tentative proposal, nor did it involve Uganda. The British government was merely floating the remote possibility that some Jews may welcome a limited measure of autonomy over roughly 5,000 square miles in Wasingishu, Kenya.
Herzl introduced the proposal timidly, taking care to note that he didn't see Africa as a permanent replacement for Israel, that he wasn't too rosy about the proposal's practical prospects, but that he believed that, this being the first time in millennia that a major world power had collectively negotiated with the Jewish people, the least the Zionist Congress could do to show gratitude to His Majesty's government was dispatch a few gens to take a look-see. Almost immediately, Herzl and his supporters were accused of the bitterest betrayal, with a strong faction of mostly Russian Jews rising to declare in very breathless tones that Zionism was only interested in, you know, Zion. The plan faltered, as sadly did Herzl's heart. He would die within a month, aged 44. But the discussion of the Uganda plan remains robust, rowdy, and instructive because it helps us understand what it is we really talk about when we talk about Zionism.
The snarling Zionists who opposed checking out Uganda did so not because they believed Herzl's plan to be impractical, but precisely because they realized it was all too practical. The bearded statesman wanted to score points with the West, to build coalitions, to leave no option unturned. The hotheads who shouted him down knew better. Zionism they believed wasn't just a blueprint for national revival or a guide to collective survival. It was simply a new name for very old yearnings. The very same Jews continued to express thrice daily.
when they prayed for their eventual return to Jerusalem and the rebuilding of the temple. And for the first 30 or 40 or 50 years, they could easily express these yearnings in practical and not at all religious ways by building the nation and its institutions. But once the nation stood, once wars were fought and won, once a strong economy was established and a comfortable life delivered, they, or more accurately, their children and grandchildren, found themselves right back at square one, having fierce arguments about what this state really ought to be. Some, like the descendants of the socialist and secular pioneers who deserve so much of the credit for willing Israel into existence, now wanted it to be a more or less normal secular state, one in which Saturday feels no different than Wednesday, one that looks a lot like the vision of Vienna on the Mediterranean that so excited Herzl more than a century ago. Others, many of them more religiously observant, wanted a nation that sees Jewish identity and education, not another billion-dollar startup or even a sophisticated new cyber-defense system, as its top priority.
Neither side trusts the other, just like the Uganda plan's advocates reviled its vocal detractors. And that is precisely the point. Because Israel is a covenantal nation. And the covenant, just ask Abraham and Isaac and Jacob and Moses, has to be repeatedly renewed. This is what we're seeing unfurl right now. Israel is now living through a moment of re-founding. But this time, it has to fight not for its existence, but for its character.
And the fight, sadly, isn't going to be pretty. One side, as we promised you right in the beginning of the show, is going to win and the other is going to lose. One side is going to wake up one morning and feel that it no longer recognizes the place, while another will wake up that same morning beaming at how wonderfully the place has grown. It won't do either side, or for that matter anyone else, any good to look at this struggle in catastrophic terms or warn against doomsday scenarios unlikely to ever come to fruition. Instead, it would do us all good to listen to both sides as they speak, shout, and weep. If we do, maybe, just maybe, we'll be able to once again pull off the same miracle the early Zionists somehow achieved and stick together not despite our differences, but because of them, with the most vibrant and appealing version of national Jewish life prevailing.
Roughly, I think that what the state of Israel is meant to do is give Jews a sense of being at home. That is, instead of being paranoid about persecution or about assimilation, they just feel comfortable. And if they feel comfortable, then, you know, they, we, can develop our culture, our civilization, our law. in a very natural way. In order for this to work, we have to have complete freedom. Everybody, every Jew, every individual, every community, and by the way, every non-Jew who's a citizen of the state of Israel as well, should have the freedom to develop their culture and civilization as they see fit. I think in the end, if we do this, the most fit version will win. I'm willing, not only willing, but absolutely eager to give every community and every individual the freedom to develop their own version of Judaism or none at all as they see fit. And let the most fit one win in the end.
And all those who participated in this series. For more information about this and all other tablet podcasts, please visit tabletbank.com slash podcasts. We make Chevrolet vehicles, but what you do with them makes them so much more. You make them mobile offices, your kid's personal taxi, a concert shuttle, your hockey equipment locker, your recording studio. We make a Chevrolet, but you make it a Chevy. Discover yours at chevrolet.ca.