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Dec 10, 2015 12 min

Grant Newsham on Improving Amphibious Capabilities

from CNAS Podcasts Hosted by Center for a New American Security

Grant Newsham, Executive Director, Corporate Security Morgan Stanley Japan, discusses how to improve amphibious capabilities with U.S. allies and partners.

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Grant Newsham on Improving Amphibious Capabilities

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Hello, I'm Patrick Cronin, Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for American Security, and we're here in our continuing series of podcasts in support of our Alliance Requirements Roadmap Project, thinking through ways that the United States and allies like Japan can strengthen capacity of countries throughout the region. And today we're joined by Grant Newsham, who's been doing some of the most forward-thinking on how to improve amphibious capability with U.S. allies and partners. He's done it directly with Japan in terms of exercising and thinking through the analysis of what is possible, but he's also laid out some very intriguing ideas with respect to building regional capacity.

So, Grant, welcome to this podcast. Okay, thanks very much, Patrick. Glad to be here. So, broad question, just in terms of reminding our listeners, what is the role of amphibious power in security today, especially in the Asia-Pacific?

Well, amphibious operations, amphibious capability, there's really nothing more than combining sea, ground, and air capabilities into one package and being able to move it around over the ocean and being able to move it from the sea from ship to shore, doing something once to shore, and then going back onto the ships and going somewhere else. The geography of the Asia-Pacific region with a lot of ocean, a lot of islands, and a lot of coastline is, in fact, perfectly suited for this sort of capability. And one of the areas that all countries in the Asia-Pacific region has to be concerned with is humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. How does amphibious capability assist with the potential response to disaster?

Well, if your disaster has happened anywhere close to the coastline, and they usually do in the Asia region, that dealing with it from the sea is always the most effective way. On land, you've got destroyed infrastructure. There's not much to work with. That's where your injuries are, your damage.

If you can come from the ocean, you can bring large numbers of people. You can bring supplies, equipment. You can bring craft to use from ship to shore. You can use helicopters.

You can get into the stripping zone. Obviously, approaching from the sea, you have no obstacles. Additionally, you have some benefits of not if you can operate from the sea, and therefore the relief force is not a burden on the local populace that's trying to survive. There's a long history of successful amphibious humanitarian assistance disaster relief operations going back decades.

A couple of prominent ones were the two sea angel exercises that were done in Bangladesh in 1991. Another one around 2006, and these were both conducted by US Marine, US Navy amphibious units, and it's estimated that these probably saved about a quarter million lives, and in each case, without the ability to come from the sea, it really would have been impossible to have any sort of effective disaster relief. And taking a country into well, Japan, I mean, even back in March 2011, with a triple disaster, were there not repercussions from Japan's lack of capacity and amphibious movement and capability? Yeah, about 3,000, 4,000 dead people.

What happened there was that the Japanese Navy got up to the disaster zone in Tohoku very quickly, but they found once they got there, they couldn't close that last kilometer from ship to shore. They had no way to get into the affected zone. They didn't have the equipment. They didn't have the amphibious vehicles.

They didn't have the know-how. They weren't able to operate jointly with the Japanese Army and the Japanese Air Force to conduct coordinated disaster relief. As a result, they just floated offshore. Well, probably in the first 24 to 48 hours, I would estimate 3,000 to 4,000 people who could have been saved were allowed to freeze to death.

And this was the result of Japan not developing an amphibious capability. And that's beginning to change in part because of you. But could you just explain very briefly what we have done with Japan over the last few years to improve their amphibious capability? What we've done, it's striking actually how fast Japan has come from the standing start within about three years to having a rudimentary amphibious capability where they can bring together several Japanese Navy ships, put Japanese Army troops aboard with their helicopters, with their equipment, and go conduct exercises.

For example, as far away as off the coast of Southern California. And this, really one of the genesis of this was the failure up in Tohoku. The Marines and the U.S. Navy have been very helpful instrumental in assisting the Japanese and teaching them and suggesting things, encouraging them.

And I've noticed one very good example of how fast the Japanese have come along is in November 2014, after the, or it was 2013, excuse me, the typhoon in the Philippines, Hayan, that's right, typhoon Hayan, which led to Operation Damayan. The Japanese, on the drop of a hat, brought together three Navy ships, about 1,000 ground self-defense force troops, and sent it down to the Philippines and were useful. And that's quite something to come that far in about three years. There's a long way to go, of course.

Well, these humanitarian assistance disaster relief operations are sometimes considered to be on the low end of the operational challenge. At the other end of that spectrum, of course, is how to counter the rising capabilities that we sometimes dub anti-access area denial, especially precision-guided munitions, but also next-generation aircraft, undersea warfare, ballistic cruise missiles, and a series of cyber and space capabilities that are forcing U.S. power projection capabilities farther and farther offshore in the Asian mainland and outside of the first island chain. How does amphibious warfare capability help counter this A2AD challenge?

Well, Patrick, an amphibious capability gives you a very useful part, a useful tool to use in a counter A2AD strategy. And there's a couple ways that amphibious forces are particularly useful. And also remember that these are mobile forces that can move around freely by sea, can smoothly go from ship to shore and do things. But there's two main ways.

And one of these, the first one, is it can prevent the further outward movement of Chinese A2AD capabilities as far as the first island chain and distant territories beyond the Chinese mainland. You really, in order to, it's still a truism that you have to sometimes seize and occupy territory. You can either be taking it from somebody, you can be getting there first to deny it to somebody. You may also want to take territory for your own forces to use it for further offensive operations.

And it's a truism that only ground forces and the kind of ground forces that amphibious forces can provide are sometimes necessary to actually take and hold territory. That bit of warfare really hasn't changed much. So that's one way that amphibious forces are useful for stalling the further outward movement of A2AD by the PRC. But another very useful role that these forces play is that in helping to enforce our own A2AD system, it's often forgotten that A2AD works both ways.

And U.S. and partner nations are quite capable of setting up their own A2AD networks, which would forestall and certainly make life difficult for PAC forces. And amphibious forces can be very useful if, for example, occupying key terrain and then employing a handful of specific types of weapons that are very well suited for A2AD operations. This could include anti-ship cruise missiles, HIMARS, rocket artillery, which can be adjusted for in an anti-ship role.

They can do air defense over a quite extensive range with smart mine technology. Amphibious forces operating from the land can operate, can actually set up very sophisticated mine fields. And additionally, there's even an anti-submarine role which amphibious forces can play. Keep in mind that you can move these systems around, and that's one of the benefits of being amphibious.

And when they're hard to detect in the first place, and when you move them around, they get even harder to detect, so from an enemy's perspective, it's very difficult targeting-wise. Well, and geographical dispersal is indeed, many people see it as a key to future strategic leverage and strength, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. When you think about other U.S. allies or potential partners in the Indo-Pacific, you mentioned that Japan has learned so much and come so far in a short period of time.

But what about others like Australia, India, but also in Southeast Asia, Philippines, Vietnam, or Thailand? What are some of the strengths and capabilities that they bring to amphibious capability? Can they actually learn to do enough to be helpful in countering A2AD? I think that they can.

You'll find that many of the nations in Southeast Asia and Asia, the ones you've mentioned, they all have a certain degree of amphibious capability. And sometimes it ranges from rudimentary to actually fairly sophisticated. The Indonesians actually have a surprisingly good amphibious capability. The Philippines have got a long ways to go.

The Australians will, within a year or two, will have something like a small U.S. Marine expeditionary unit that operates from Australia's new amphibious ships. These, and India as well, has a basic amphibious capability. And once again, their terrain cries out for that sort of thing.

To actually get to the point where they can operate in an A2AD role, either against, to forestall an enemy or actually as part of an allied or a partner nation A2AD system, that's probably going to take them a little while. Some of the equipment, the sort I mentioned, has to be obtained. You have to figure out how to use it. There has to be a strategy for using it.

But in most of those cases, if a concerted effort is made, and if there is interest on both sides, that it should be possible to integrate these into an informal A2AD network. And you'll find also that some places, for example, Vietnam, whilst they may not be integrated into anything, if they were to have anti-ship cruise missiles, for example, that causes some problems for somebody encroaching into Vietnamese waters. So there's a long way, it varies from country to country, and there's a way to go. But this is something with the right equipment and the right ideas that it would be possible to get to be part of an A2AD structure.

Grant, thank you so much for this primer on amphibious power as we think about the alliance requirements roadmap project. Thanks very much.

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