I'm Roger Baker, Executive Director of the Stratfor Center for Applied Geopolitics at RAIN, a global center of excellence for geopolitical intelligence and analysis. Learn how you can put geopolitics to work for your organization at rainnetwork.com. Welcome to the RAINN Insights Podcast. In this podcast, founder and chief collaborative officer of RAINN, David Lawrence, interviewed Scott Atran. Scott Atran is an anthropologist and psychologist who studies how cognitive constraints and biases and cultural preferences and values shape social structures and political systems. He is co-founder of Artists International and the Center for the Resolution of Intractable Conflict at the University of Oxford, research professor at the University of Michigan's Gerald Ford School of Public Policy, research fellow at Oxford University's Changing Character War Center, and advisor to the UN Security Council on Counterterrorism and Issues of Youth, Peace, and Security.
His work and life have been spotlighted on television, radio, internet, blogs, and podcasts, and in the popular and scientific press, including featured cover stories of the New York Times Magazine, the Chronicle of Higher Education, Nature, and Science. Scott, first, many thanks. It really is a very, very special privilege and honor to be able to have a conversation with you and noting the coincidence that we are speaking on September 11th. and for the benefit of the audience, which we'll have your full bio, but there isn't anyone that I and many of my distinguished colleagues are aware of who has been more thoughtful about the world, the geopolitical risks, the types of...
we'll call it information wars that are being waged, the misconceptions about what drives human behavior and geopolitical conflict, then Professor Scott Atron. So thank you again for joining us. And I'll also add, I've likened you to the legendary investor John Templeton and the legendary investor Warren Buffett, who purposely located themselves away from the fray of New York, the Beltway, the echo chambers, and found that it's very, very helpful to the clarity of their thinking and their perspective and avoiding what I'll refer to as relying on the false sirens that often go off. And so in many respects, your work from the south of France and from Barcelona and elsewhere, I know has given you even greater perspective. So thank you again for joining us. Thanks for having me and good to be here, David. Good to talk to you again after so many years.
Scott, as you know, we have a great audience with both broadly the broad public leaders and private and public sector institutions and the boards and C-suites of the NASDAQ. And I thought sort of your insights and your work, particularly relevant to how institutions need to think about the world and the changing nature of the risks and maybe correcting some of the great misconceptions under which we all operate. And so what I'd like to do is really just stand back and give you the floor and maybe. just ask you to sort of speak about how you're viewing the world today and the types of issues and risks that not only governments face but institutions and communities and in particular i was reading with great interest some of your recent work on basically the erosion of trust broadly within our society trust in institutions trust in each other let me just sort of stand back and maybe you can give us an update on your recent work and some of your recent perspectives about the world
Well, I've always thought, ever since I was a little kid, that nuclear war, of course, was the greatest danger facing humankind. Certainly more immediate and possibly even more devastating for human beings themselves than something like climate change. And I think that the competition between nations for nuclear weaponry now is reaching a critical state, and I'm very worried about it. Just to give you some background on it, my father was Director of Weapon Systems Development for Western House Corporation, and in October of 1962 he was taken away. and asked whether phantom jets armed with spiral missiles could knock down intermediate soviet ballistic missiles and the answer was no i asked my father world war ii veteran just passed away a couple months ago um that is they're going to be in nuclear war and he said about 20 to 30 son which i thought was very good i'm happy about my knowledge of percentages at the time but now i see was terrible statement on on what was transpiring in the world and i see that
closer and closer to coming to happen now. I mean, we were pretty lucky then. Luckily, there was a Soviet subcommander, Vassily Archipov, who refused to launch nuclear torpedoes against a Navy destroyer and possibly save the world at the time. But I see the possibility for such things happening more and more. Another thing that troubles me greatly is the sort of centennial legacy of fascism and the revival of far-right extremism. This November, we will be celebrating. That's not quite the right word.
the centennial of Hitler's beer hole push, which was motivated by Mussolini's march on Rome the year before. And we're seeing now a revival of that type of situation, that type of ideology. Today, liberal democratic values increasingly appear to be losing ground as the middle class, which is the mainstay of liberal democracy, shrinks. In a world values survey, the majority of Europeans less than 30 years old think that living in a democracy is not necessary or even absolutely important. In a recent U.S. survey, about half of Americans lack faith in democracy. More than one-third of our young people with high incomes approve of military rule, presumably to arrest the growing social agitation tied to the vast income inequality, which has now surpassed the 19th century's Gilded Age. And, of course, we're plagued by things like political polarization and unrelenting problems of cultural assimilization, racial integration, and lack of consensus in this era of identity politics. One interesting thing is the left has abandoned what was formerly the privileged class of revolution, the white.
white male proletariat for other groups. And the white male proletariat, of course, has gone over now to the far right to a large degree. Most Americans now see democracy in jeopardy, but only 7% consider it worth saving as an election priority. The share of our young adults saying the U.S. stands above other countries has continued a significant decline over the last decade or so. Support for the presidency, Congress, Supreme Court, and other democratic institutions has hit historical lows. And the liberal democracies and far-right governments have risen all across Western Europe.
For the first time since Mussolini, a far-right government has become the strongest political force in Italy, the second largest in France, the third most powerful in Spain and Austria, a viable force in Germany. Far-right parties now wield power in ruling coalitions in Sweden, the opposition in the Netherlands, effectively ruling Hungary and Poland. And although these political formations reject an overtly fascist philosophy, they borrow many of the exclusionary ethno-nationalist elements first popularized by fascism and Nazism, and they embrace a decidedly liberal agenda. Our politicians and our press are using words like... criminal and traitor and idiots to demean political opposition in our own country, and dehumanizing words like scum, filth, vermin to dehumanize, which is a reliable precursor to increased violence. So these are the things that worry me now. People like Francis Fukuyama think that democracy, well, he's a sort of Hegelian who believes that history has a real meaning to it, who believe that democracy will eventually triumph over authoritarian-type regimes.
for two reasons. First, the concentration of power in the hands of a single leader at the top, all that guarantees low-quality decision-making and over time will produce truly catastrophic consequences. Second, the absence of public discussion and debate in strong states and of any mechanism of accountability means that the leader's support is shallow and can erode at a moment's notice. The first point, you might say, is exemplified by Russia and its leader, Vladimir Putin, whose political and military miscalculations in invading Ukraine not only indicate poor intelligence on Ukraine's will to fight, the U.S. also made similar misjudgments, but more importantly, inability to acknowledge mistakes and the fury instills in those around him to even inform him of what has and is likely to happen.
Also, the increasing concentration of power and decision-making in China's Xi Jinping, who's poised to rule his nation longer than anyone since Mao, has also produced potentially serious errors in judgment on important issues, for example, the enduring economic and social toll following zero COVID policy. Although in a conversation I had with George Soros some years ago in Budapest, he argued that there were intrinsic problems in the Communist Party rule, which made the economic long-term of China very doubtful. That, I think, is coming to pass. So my principal concern is, in the meantime, while we wait for the inherent weaknesses of authoritarians and the inherent strengths of Democrats to play themselves out, although I must say I'm skeptical about that point of view, we have to address some critical psychopolitical challenges of our age, like how in the here and now can the unalienable rights of individuals be maintained in an open and competitive political system of mutual tolerance and respect, and which is able to secure devotion to values that are resistant to other devoted but malign actors.
What sort of intimate counter-engagement, rather than socially disembodied counter-narrative, is most apt to persuade people that democratic values and deliberations will triumph in the end, rather than the messianic conquest of the heart with faith, sacrifice, and the promise of great rewards, given that free and fair elections, which are the affordances of science and the affordances of science for health and happiness and the protection of individual rights under law, are obviously... Not enough. And again, as this centennial of the rise of fascism and Nazism is in front of us, I'm reminded of George Orwell's review of Hitler's Mein Kampf. Anybody can look it up on the internet, it's only one page, but as with Oral, always, it's fairly profound. He says the situation in Germany, and I'm sort of paraphrasing, with its 7 million unemployed was obviously favorable for demagogues. But Hitler couldn't have succeeded against so many rivals if it hadn't been for the attraction of his own personality. He grasped the falsity of the hedonistic attitude of life.
Nearly all Western thought since the last war, meaning First World War, certainly all progressive thought has assumed tacitly that human beings desire nothing beyond ease, security, and the avoidance of pain. Hitler knows that human beings don't only want comfort, safety, short working hours, hygiene, birth control, and in general common sense. They also at least intermittently want struggle, self-sacrifice, meaning in life, even danger, not to mention drums, flags, and loyalty parades. However, they may be as economic theories. Now, fascism and Nazism are psychologically far sounder than any hedonistic conception of life. And that's what I'm worried about today, especially the movement of young people towards the far right and some towards the far left. And let me just sort of end with a telling anecdote. During a showing of Lenny Leifengstall's visual pain to Nazi socialism, The Triumph of the Will, in New York Museum's Modern Bar, Charlie Chaplin laughed, decided to make the Great Dictator. But French filmmaker René Claire was terror-stricken, being a European, fearing that if it were shown more widely, everything in the West would be lost.
So let me end it there for the moment. Scott, thank you for that very, very sobering overview. And what I'd like to follow up with is these things don't happen overnight. The root causes of this sort of confluence of issues. And then relatedly, I was waiting for you to sort of drop the term social media and our expanding technology portals as being a source of concern in terms of how these ideas can spread and the contagions that can spread around the world. That quote that's attributed to Mark Twain, I don't know whether he said it or not, about alive being able to circle the globe before truth puts its shoes on or whatever. And so I'd like to probe you on sort of how this all has come to pass, and then also how to think about the technology portals that are now available. Okay, so let me give a little background of the way I think about this. So the notion of disinformation or disinformatia was invented by Joseph Stalin.
when he was Commissar of Nationalities from 1917 to 1922. And he conceived of disinformation as a way of undermining whatever traditional beliefs there were in the countries that communism was interested in taking over in order for communist regimes to be installed. After World War II, the Soviet Union invested more money and manpower in disinformation operations than they did in their entire military, believe it or not, because they realized that they would never surpass the United States and its Western allies in technology. And so by using disinformation and malign influence operations, you could undermine, disorient, disrupt chains of commands, and actual use of weapons and violence wouldn't be necessary. Of course, around 1952, 53, 54, the United States began ramping up its own disinformation campaigns. One of the most telling, of course, was the coup in Guatemala, in which the United States recognized quite clearly that the government of Arevalo, the father of the current president-elect, was by no means a communist, and an internal report said he was quite against communism.
But nevertheless realized that for their own corporations to remain in control, they would have to introduce an information disinformation campaign that was quite successful. Well, all of this was part of the Cold War, and that went into abeyance after the fall of the Berlin Wall. But around 2006, 2008, Putin decided to ramp that up again. And now, for example, just in St. Petersburg, we found 6,000 people just in one set of buildings working on disinformation. In China, you've got...
tens of thousands working 24 hours, the way they work on the line of influence operations is to understand and prey upon those values, especially those sacred values that people hold dear, and argue that those values are being challenged, upset, violated, and that they are there to defend them. And we've seen within the last decade and a half this same set of strategies taking hold in the United States. And with information media, the rounds of malign information now pass much more rapidly than they ever did before. So history has sped up to an incredible degree. That, of course, in conjunction with 24-7 news reporting and the fact that the news is no longer a public service but is an economic game that works upon its own values, notably...
violence and sex as the things that sell the most. And so we find in social media, as in what was once the public service of the news media, even in the Western world, information built on an almost hysterical attempt to persuade people in whatever opposition they are that one's own values are being threatened to an existential degree, that the others have to be destroyed. And of course, what social media enables that was never possible before is that people don't have to commit themselves physically. They can engage in the gains of social media without suffering the costs, as responsibility can be denied because the sources of information need not ever be attributed to one person or one institution or another and can remain anonymous. Also, we find that in social media, algorithms are...
Algorithms for participation and for sales are maximized when polarized, antagonistic, and even violent rhetoric is maximized as well. Now, of course, the social media companies, the big platforms, didn't intend this, but that's the way it so happens that it works. And it works whether it's vKontake, which is controlled by the Russians, or Google, or Facebook, or Twitter, or Reddit, or TikTok, which has a huge Chinese influence, or any of these other platforms. And perhaps the biggest problem we face now is the notion of free speech itself. I mean, free speech emerged in England in the 16th and 17th century as a way of opposing absolute power of the monarchy and eventually of the noble class as well. But free speech was always, in a sense, edited and surveyed by an educated elite, at least in the West, and that's no longer the case. And when you have free speech that is allowed to, or that favors, polarized, antagonistic, adversarial, and even violent rhetoric,
then we have a very difficult situation, a situation in which we have free speech, free democracy, leading to things like tyrannies of the majority and mob rule. Now, the founding fathers in the Federalist Papers tried to deal with this. They figured, especially in Federalist Paper No. 10, when Madison says, look, the biggest problem facing the development of a democracy in what we would call today an open society is the problem of factionalism and political parties. And what can we do to avoid this? Well, the solution at the time was to build a city that belonged to none of the states, none of the former colonies, and to force the people who represented their states, the former colonies, to meet in a neutral place that belonged to no colony, and to debate one another without being able to go back to their home base, where they would be influenced at the moment by their home population. And so, through deliberation and analysis, be able to come to some kind of democratic consensus.
Well, that worked more or less for a time, but that's no longer applicable today. And to tell you the truth, no one knows what to do about it. How do we prevent free speech from devolving into violent mob rule? And Scott, if I can just maybe add, because I've heard you, I've read and heard you speak before, but when it comes to the portals of our technology, there's also a component here of a profit model. sources of news and information, is that what often drives the topic and the narration is the question of whether something can be monetized, and monetized whether with advertising or through a following, holding oneself out as a so-called influencer. And I'm just curious how you think about this for-profit model. I think it was Kara Swisher who said,
I'll clean up the language, that you're F-U-C, blank, blank, blank, if you don't understand the profit motive. Profit motive is fine and dandy as long as it's accompanied by something else, namely a value for who we are and what we represent in life. If you have simply a profit motive, then... sort of willy-nilly, whatever it is that generates profits will be adopted without any kind of filter. And that's sort of what's happened with social media. Again, it wasn't in the original interest of social media companies and platforms to encourage algorithms that maximized violent and hateful rhetoric. But that turned out to be the most profitable because it produced the greatest engagement and the most consistent and powerful bubbles on the Internet.
And now, of course, there are ways to manipulate that, all sorts of ways. I mean, we have a company, Artis Magi, Artis International, which works with the United States military combatant commands to try to work against this. But what we see is within, for example, one second, we can have literally up to a million bots and semi-bots, that is, sort of sock puppets, involved in pushing antagonistic rhetoric on almost any subject. And so without control of these algorithms themselves and these social media spaces, and letting just the profit motive alone guide, there's no blocking to it, whatever. Now, of course, there's rhetoric and there's intermittent talk about things we must do to make sure that things don't go out of hand. But because of the political polarization and the competition between the companies themselves, nothing is done about it and nothing will be done about it for the foreseeable future. Although Europe, I must say, is beginning to wake up to the fact. I think the best way to get some movement on this is to...
convince the people who work for these companies and control these companies to ask themselves who we are and what do we stand for other than simply making money. And I'm sure each has an answer, an answer that means something to that person or that organization. But the important and necessary thing is to come to some kind of consensus about what those answers might be, other than simply family, which everyone can agree on, or most everyone can agree on, is important. So Scott, one of the observations that I and others have made, and I'll tie this into your points about the erosion of institutional trust, is that increasingly people are looking towards corporations to solve the world's problems, almost with the realization that the political process is so flawed and broken that it is easier and it will be far more effective to bypass it altogether and to begin to petition companies and their boards and their management, whether it's through.
proxies or demonstrations or economic boycotts or social media reputational harm. And I'm curious whether you've observed that phenomenon, whether it's about climate change or it's about environmental issues, labor practices, employment practices, reproductive rights, campaign contributions, et cetera. And I'm just curious whether A, you've observed that and B, maybe you could unpack that phenomenon because it does feel as though People are saying, you know, we've tried to work the political process. It doesn't work. It's not fast enough for us. And we seek sort of more responsiveness and points of least resistance within the corporate world. Well, I see two centripetal forces. One is the one you're describing, where because of the lack of trust and decline in belief in the political systems, especially in the West, belief for trust in corporations has been the default.
And the other is increasing tribalism, where it's not corporations, but where it's some ethno-nationalist or socio-demographic group that works like an extended family to instill trust. And let me unpack this a bit. There are two very different conceptions of trust. One is a sort of managerial trust, which is involved with corporations, between managers or workers, or between workers themselves or managers themselves. And that involves typically notions of honesty and competence.
and benevolence even among managers and towards the workers and towards society in general. But that's not the kind of trust within a family, for example. The kind of trust within a family is no matter how dishonest or even incompetent you are, that person will have your back when push comes to shove and even defend you with their lives if necessary. They're very different. The second one, the one tribal trust, was the kind of trust that dominated the world until the rise of corporations and individualism from 14th century England especially on.
nepotism, cronyism, which are now universally regarded, and especially in a corporate sense, but also in a political sense, as evils, generally considered by most of the world and still considered by a large part of the world as good because they rely on the sense of tribal trust and solidarity. So I think that as the political systems fragment, what we're finding is both an increase in reliance all across domains. on corporate, from health to garbage collection to railroads and universities in the private sector, especially the corporate sector. But at the same time, I'm increasing reliance on this old tribal ethic that's becoming more entrenched in our societies as globalization itself collapses. It reminds me, in a sense, of what happened
after the Napoleonic Wars. From the Congress of Vienna in 1814 to the outbreak of World War II, of World War I, excuse me, 100 years later, you had all of the trappings of globalization that we had after World War II. The only countries that really needed passports even were Russia. In Turkey, there was movement of capital and labor across national boundaries. Wealth increased dramatically. We had the growth of an industrial society where muscle power and wind power had been the mainstay of human production for the previous 200,000 years, and all of a sudden it became machines. And it wasn't until the 1990s that capital flows and freedom of movement again equaled that of what was going on in the world in 1912. But then you had a sudden collapse of the global system.
between 1912 and 1914. And what we're seeing now, again, is a collapse of that system. I don't know how corporations are going to manage this. Right now, they're playing it sort of by ear. They've still managed, as was the case of the outbreak of World War I and World War II. I mean, we're not yet at that point, of course, more like the 1920s, where corporations have managed to keep functioning, producing, and even developing consensus across national boundaries. But I don't know where that's going to go, given this fragmentation that I see.
I'm of the personal view that these lines between private and public sector are too often falsehoods, that there is a broad common interest, and that the ability to solve some of our most fundamental problems have to be undertaken by both the public and private sectors. Well, this was certainly clear to me and probably the entire world at the onset of World War II. In 1939, when World War II broke out, the United States was 39th in terms of military capacity. It only had 179,000 troops. And the Germans made the same mistake as they had in World War I, as did the Japanese. That is, they had corporate and economic power, but their military and government power was fairly weak. At least they thought it was.
But yet, within a few years, America was outproducing the entire world. That is, there was more military capacity produced by the United States than the rest of the world combined by the end of World War II. And that was the result of the government working hand-in-hand with private industry to produce what was probably the greatest push in economic production in the history of the world, even until today. And apropos of that, maybe there's an extension of that analogy to the pandemic and some of the response to the pandemic, including the vaccine development, etc.
And so as you think about what's ripping apart the fabric of the world and the fabric of our U.S. society, how do you think about corporate responsibility and how companies should be thinking about their missions and efforts and why this actually ties into actually what I'll refer to as corporate purpose? And I purposely am not using the term ESG because I don't want to get caught up in that debate, but just in general about corporate responsibility, the role of corporations in the world. and these fundamental issues that really transcend public and private sector lines. Well, one, I think, historical and good historical analogy is what happened again in England from the 16th century on. That is, England was basically a corporate society. I mean, people like Marx and even Weyler and Polanyi made a mistake in thinking that England was a traditional peasant society. By the 14th century, England had mobile land and labor.
People were moving all about. They were selling their labor and their land on open markets. And a political culture developed of corporations that drove the Industrial Revolution, which created the greatest wealth and beneficence, actually, in the history of the world to that time. And within this political idea, a corporate consensus developed about what kind of society would be best for most people. And that's where our own libertarian sort of philosophy of...
political and economic activity mostly comes from. What I think we're lacking now is a faith and belief in what particular values we want to stand for. Again, I say, you know, making money may be fine and dandy, but that alone isn't going to do it. You have to believe in something of value that will transcend not only your own money making, but in a sense will transcend your own lifetime. What are the things that corporate America can help people believe in, that makes life really worth living, other than just doing things like digging iron out of the earth to kill one another, or even building more and more buildings. Or even having, as Orwell said, just health care and safety. People need and want more. Now there are, of course, people, and I think people like Buffett and John Templeton, those that you mentioned, did have a belief that there were values intrinsic to humanity that a corporate culture could advance.
But I don't see that right now as widespread or consensual. You know, the things that have driven humanity across the ages to build civilizations, to engage in their greatest efforts and exertions, not only in peace but in war, have not even been for family and friends, but have been for transcendental values. And the question is, what are the sorts of values that will keep our civilization going? Civilizations don't naturally rise and fall. There are natural periods where civilizations have to collapse. Civilizations collapse because they don't believe in their values anymore. So I think the mission, if you want, of corporate America, of corporations in any open society in the free world, would be in the generation of wealth and safety and good health care and happiness in general and comfort and shorter working hours and hygiene, what do we want to live for?
What is the meaning of life? Is the meaning of life simply... Well, when we fought fascism and Nazism... we had me because there was a direct threat. One of the interesting things I see, we've done, my research team has just finished a whole set of research which we published in the Proceedings of the National Academy on the will to fight. And we did this before the Russian invasion of Ukraine and we did it after and we did it in four continents. And what we found was the will to fight among the Ukrainians before and after, much greater than the Russians per capita, was because they believed that their nation and their history and who they were were being denied.
And that threat motivated them. And that threat has actually revived a faith in democracy, even among young people in Western Europe, to a degree that we haven't seen at least over the last 30 or 40 years. Whether that will endure, I don't know. And whether you need threats... to make salient the values we hold dear, which are often only in the background because they are the things that make the exchanges in society possible at all and are taken for granted. Whether threats are needed, I don't know. I'm reminded of that walk in the woods between President Reagan and Premier Gorbachev when Gorbachev asked whether or not there will ever really be peace on Earth, and the response was,
Sure, when the Russians invade, when the Martians invade. I remember that story. Scott, I can't help but really offer my profound thanks for just such a thoughtful conversation and having the benefit of your extraordinary perspectives in mind. I do want to extract maybe the opportunity for a continued conversation and also will reference some of your books. publications and speeches and YouTube now I think there are even some YouTube videos out there and in particular reframing sacred values they sort of a whole landscape that we didn't have a chance to walk with you on this on this call but something that I think will be very very valuable to our audience so thank you again and while you're I know you operate in the academic sector your work for various governments you work broadly in the public interest
It's truly, truly appreciated. And if I had one criticism, I'm just not sure it's heard enough or broadly. And so hopefully this conversation and some of our work with the NASDAQ can help extend your perspectives and your influence. So thank you again, Scott. Well, thanks for giving me the time, David. And good luck on future talks. Okay.