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I'm Mr. Klein. This is the Ezra Conchall. How do you describe Adam Tues?
Adam Tues is an economic historian at Columbia University. He's the author of the excellent Must Read News that are a chartbook. And he's become, I think, a key interpreter and subscriber of the Way the International Finance System Works. He's become a historian or financial president.
Also, I should note a repeat guest on the show. But for the past few months, Tues has been taking the global view of this economic moment rather than the US-centric one that a lot of us are used to. Right now, we are seeing around the world a convergence of forces. We have high inflation, we have central banks, hiking interest rates, we have governments cutting spending and raising taxes.
We have very high levels of dollar-denominated debt. And we've droughts and floods that have been quite a bit worsened by climate change. Some countries amidst all this have already tipped into ecological or political or economic crisis. Many more are fragile.
It's easy to imagine them tipping there. And what's happening now is that richer countries, most importantly the US, are tightening the economic screws. We're doing it. We think we intend on ourselves in order to curb inflation.
But the way we're doing it is putting tremendous stress on the global financial system and on these other countries that are highly exposed to us. We are, in a sense, exporting our own economic pain and our own economic policy elsewhere. And we're doing so with very little discussion, very little awareness of the consequences. I will say listening to twos spin out the way the financial system works and the way everything feeds back into itself and connects to each other and how a problem here that nobody noticed can flap its butterfly wings and create a crisis over there.
It is dizzying. And that, to me, is very much the point. The complexity and connectedness of the global economic system is dizzying and no one, no one, truly understands or holds the information to understand all of it. We sometimes act as our economic policy is a purely domestic matter.
But if that was ever true, it's not now. As always my email as Rapancho at nbytimes.com. Adam twos, welcome back to the show. Great to be here.
For people who haven't been following this all that closely, tell me about just a start here. What's been happening in the UK financial markets in the last few weeks? Well, we saw this spasm, basically. I mean, the UK has been a little bit on the suicide watch, you might say, for a while.
You know, the fundamentals don't look too healthy. The economy has a huge trade deficit. There's Brexit in the background. The Tory party is a little bit, a while we would say, and has been for a while that the Boris Johnson Prime Minister should collapse.
But then, you know, kind of spasm of what appears to be really just downright but rather naive ideological commitment, the neutral government with his trust and quasi-quatting as a chancellor of the Exchessia Treasury Secretary announced that they were doing a mini budget. Now, in the UK, because it's parliamentary system, they've got the majority built in. So when they decide to do this, it actually happens. It doesn't like they have to negotiate with anyone.
And this mini, what they call the fiscal event, they didn't want to call it a budget. So they didn't have to go through the rigmarole of a proper budget. Also, they did any kind of assessment by the Office of Budget Responsibility, which does the kind of assessment of British fiscal policy. This decision to do a tax cut for principally better off people to the June of about £45 billion, which in modern money, given the exchange rate of the pound, is about $45 billion on top of a decision before to do £150 billion in energy price, stabilization, subsidy to deal with the energy crisis, which is rocking all of Europe.
The combination of the two things together, unleashed an almighty panic, kind of temper tantrum type thing in the British, well, currency markets first, the pound sold off very hard, but then much more importantly, in the bond market. The British government bond market is the kind of granddaddy of government bond markets that originates in the late 1600s, so at the time of the Socal Glorious Revolution, the parliamentary constitutional settlement that's set written on its trajectory to being the permanent parliamentary power. And so when the guilt market tremors, it's really quite big news, even though it's modest in size by global standards now, and it went into full on spasm. We didn't quite understand why, but Treasury bonds, especially the long dated ones, 30 year guilt sold off spectacularly.
And that seems to have then unleashed some nasty derivative action, a little bit too familiar from 2008. This involved pension funds who'd aged against interest rate movements. They were then stuck, they then had to offload more portfolios of debt, which threatened to generate a fire sale kind of run dynamic. And before you know it, the Bank of England, which had previously was in the process of tightening, so selling debt it had on its portfolio, all of a sudden ended up having to buy a bunch.
Where we are now is the storm has stabilised the pound is back to where it was before the crisis began, and the Treasury yield as well, which is the inverse of the price for a bond. So people don't want bonds, they sell them, the price goes down, the yield goes up. So the yield is now back to where it was before the crisis as well, which means the Bank of England's buying has stabilised the guilt market as well, but that we could have gotten as close as we did. Two eight full on financial heart attack, and this did have the field of 2008 about it, shows you how fragile these systems are in particular, how precarious the situation in the UK is, and the future really of the Tory government from here on in his very uncertain opinion polls, they now like labour by 20 to 30 points.
So I think they're really, they're a flailing government at this point. So there are two ways of reading this. One is that you had some dumb policy mistakes, some weird economic idiosyncrasies, the way the pension funds were hedged, and that wasn't very well understood. But it all worked out, as you say, that the pound is back to where it was, everything is totally fine, no big deal here.
And then there's this other argument, which is more of the argument you've been making, which is what we saw there is a signal of where we are, but more to the point what's coming globally. You write, quote, that we are reaching the point in the monetary tightening cycle in which things begin to break, end quote. And so the idea is that we are now in this context of fragility, and we are changing things, and the changes are having knock on effects we don't anticipate. Can you tell me more about that view that this is an example of something that's now becoming a reality?
Yeah, so there are two different risks in the current moment, I mean, which is worth distinguishing. One is a recession risk, which you might think is the kind of more familiar serious and what's tragic trade off, but nevertheless, it's one that you can contemplate with a degree of calm, dealing with inflation. So you raise interest rates, you take the pressure out of the labor market, you induce some quote, labor market slack, which is really a euphemism for unemployment. I really hate the term labor market slack for the exact reason you put it.
It's very like, you know, Orwell politics and English language kind of thing. It is, I mean, it creates this sort of image of a mechanism, right, that is somehow we're going to add a little bit more play there. So yeah, so that's one vision. What's implied by that is a sort of managerial sense, though, that we've got a clear choice to make a trade off that we know we're on the famous Phillips curve, we can pick our point and then we see it towards it.
However, you imagine the Phillips curve, whatever shape you think you at least are positive there that you have a degree of freedom as one way of looking at our current situation. And that's serious enough, right, because if you think globally, the destiny is of tens of not hundreds of millions of people at stake and the generation that was hit by COVID now has to face the prospect of labor markets closing on them as well, that I mean the young people whose education was so simply disrupted. So that's one side of this story. Then there's another side, which is, in a sense, even more alarming, but a little more obscure, which is that as we raise interest rates, what we're doing is putting pressure on every city.
We're doing pressure on every single joint in the financial system because all of the contracts which were negotiated over debt and credit over the last decade or more were done on the basis of assumptions about inflation, namely that inflation was low and that interest rates would be low as well, but no longer obtained right now in the world in which inflation across the developing economy will be the exception of Japan is around 10% and central banks are responding by hiking interest rates. And so what we're doing is shaking this entire system, which also extends to the poorer countries of the world, the emerging markets, low income countries, which have also bothered in dollars. And so what we're doing is pressuring this entire system by raising interest rates. And we honestly don't know, we've never done as comprehensive an interest rate increases this before.
We've never done this with this level of debt out there. We hear creaking already in this system, right, where people are already under strain. What we saw in the UK guilt market last week in time walk because the pace of the increase in interest rates driven by the seller for bonds was the savage, but we saw there in time walk what is happening across the entire global economy slightly more slowly. And if there are other mechanisms like that, one of the eerie things about this pension fund derivative hedging strategy is that it just wasn't top of stack for anyone in the financial stability community apparently in Britain, it's really striking you would have given the scale relative to the size of the UK bond market.
This was a big event 1.5 trillion pounds worth of debt were hanging on these derivatives contracts. We have to worry at this point also about is it where the adequacy of the regulators, the central bankers to the task of shepherding the system through this historic tightening that we're going through. And when it breaks, then we're in a different world and all of a sudden the pace of events speeds up. So we're in a situation of, you know, it's a little bit more like the pandemic all of a sudden, the chronology is not that of sort of rolling program of tightening over months, but all of a sudden hours and days begin to really count.
Ooh, there's a lot here. So I want to put a pin because we're going to come right back to this question of the adequacy of our knowledge of how the financial systems work of what's happening in other countries. But I want to hold for a minute on something you said that we've never raised interest rates this comprehensively before. We raised them, at least domestically, higher in the 70s.
So tell me what you mean by that. And I'd also like to throw in this question that you've been attentive to. They're also being not just coordinated interest rate rises, but across the world coordinated tightening of government budgets where you're saying spending cuts tax increases. So can you talk a bit about how that plays into it as well?
Yeah, so the epic historical benchmark of monetary policy tightening is for Volcker's tightening off the 1979 when interest rates went above 15%. And we're not in that zone, but the change is considerable. So the change that's been initiated since the beginning of the year. And what's even more impressive is that it's so comprehensive.
So the World Bank, the IMF have been collecting data on this. And really, at no point in the history of the modern international financial system, which we could say dates to the early 1970s. And we use that market because that's the moment at which the dollar was unhitched from gold and 71 by Nixon. And so we enter our modern regime of money, which is a fiat money regime.
So money anchored only really by the authority of the state and the monetary act as associated with the state. So in that modern period, which is half a century old, we have never seen as comprehensive tightening as this. This process did not start, remember with the US, the Fed was relatively late to the party, the ECB is even later to the party. The bank of Japan still isn't tightening.
The tightening this time around actually began in the emerging markets. I think it's leading to call them the periphery. But it began with Brazil, which began tightening quite hard last summer, the summer of 2021, and has swept from there across many of the emerging markets and eventually enrolled the Fed from the beginning of this year. And when the Fed moves because the dollar is so much the dominant currency, everyone else has to follow.
So we're really talking about a global bandwagon, which at this point leaves only the Bank of Japan and the People's Bank of China as central banks, which are loosening policy. If you exempt the British emergency action, which really had nothing to do with macroeconomic policy, it was about keeping the financial markets afloat. And the effect of this tightening, which is unprecedented in its breadth, is compounded by the fact that, yes, at the same time, fiscal policy is tightening. Now, it's important not to misread this.
There is some, which is deliberate, like the inflation reduction act negotiated over the summer, right, between Congress and the Biden administration. That actually sets out too tight in the deficit by raising taxes more than it spends. But from a macroeconomic point of view, you don't need to have deliberate policy decisions to produce a tightening of fiscal policy. You just run off the stimulus programs of 2020 and 2021.
And unless you replace them with new stimulus, which is an implausible idea at this point, you end up with a negative net effect to cycle fiscal shock. And that's very large in the US. So in the second quarter of this year, it was as large as 4.5% of GDP and the third quarter, it's down to about 3.5% of GDP. This isn't a deliberate policy decision, or rather, it's a decision not to pile in on the stimulus of 2021.
Another way of thinking about it is this is what happens when you'll build that better $3 trillion program stalls and you end up with inflation reduction act instead. Under the circumstances, massive fiscal stimulus is no longer called for in America, investment, perhaps, but not fiscal stimulus. But overall, this produces a very negative drag. And this fiscal effect is not confined to the United States.
So again, we're seeing a de facto tightening across the world at this moment. So when you add monetary and fiscal policy together, this produces an enhanced effect. The sum is greater than the parts when you do this combined pressure. A further effect, which is rather important, is the adjustment in exchange rates.
So as the Fed tightens monetary policy in the United States, what we've seen is that the dollar is surged. And the effect of that is to produce a contractionary effect on everyone who's borrowed in dollars was effectively their debt, so increased in value in local currency terms. And that effect then ripples throughout the world economy, because it's about $22 trillion plus in dollar-denominated credit and non-Americans outstanding. So these three different mechanisms, the contraction of monetary policy, the hit to fiscal policy, and the exchange rate adjustment are very negative, you might say, euphemistically, for the economic outlook.
Let's get to that third one, because I think the first two are more familiar to people. When the central bank's tightened, they're making it harder for our money, so economies slow down. When the fiscal authorities, the governments cut back, they were taking the amount of support or stimulus, they were putting into the economy and turning it negative. Instead of putting as many dollars in, they're taking dollars out from wherever they were, or pounds, or whatever it might be.
But this idea that interest rates have this other international effect, that they create currency dynamics and they create races for other countries to tighten. You've been focusing a lot on this, and I don't think this is very well understood, honestly, from talking to people. I don't even think it's that well understood by policymakers, not to mention by me. So can you talk more about that intersection between interest rate increases and their international spillovers?
Yeah, I think it's fair to say that this is something of a puzzle, because we're supposed to live in a world that's emerged a bit since the 1970s, which exchange rates are flexible. And one of the effects of that is it's supposed to render the economic development of the individual countries relatively autonomous of each other in the sense that the exchange rate adjusts in between them. What we see is that, in fact, the dollar functions as something like a currency for the entire world, to the extent that if the US tightens monetary policy, it's as though everyone else did tighten to. And it slows the global economy down.
Now, in practice, because if you do not tighten along with the Fed, your domestic monetary policy, your exchange rate appreciates very dramatically, everyone does tend to track the Fed. So essentially what these statistical correlations are capturing is the reality of a world, which is not just interdependence, but more hierarchically dependent on the United States than the cover of the magazine would suggest. The cover of the magazine says, new global monetary system since the 1970 independent exchange rates, degrees of national autonomy they didn't have before. In fact, though, what we see is a system which tracks the dollar very, very closely.
One mechanism for this is that central banks actually track the Fed's policy, because otherwise you tend to get depreciation. If your currency devalues against the dollar, then you tend to get import inflation, because the goods that you buy from abroad, many of which are denominator. And the other reason you'd be leery about doing this, especially if you're an emerging market or low income country, is that many of your businesses, big businesses, will have borrowed in dollars. Why?
Because your local capital markets aren't big, deep or sophisticated enough. And the US market is there, and hitherto, borrowing on US markets has been cheap relatively speaking. And so what big corporates in the emerging market will do is, if you get, you know, with the help of investment banks in New York and in Europe, on two global dollar markets and borrow there. Now, if your currency severely depreciates against the dollar, and this is a big company which is earning revenue locally, it's probably more of a sudden than the US market.
It's probably more of a sudden is that it has liabilities in dollars which are worth more, and assets or a stream of income, which is in a depreciated local currency. And that's a recipe for financial prices in big corporations. So those effects between them, there's also an effect by way of major commodities. So oil, for instance, is denominated in dollars.
The price of oil tends, however, to vary inversely with the value of the dollar goes strong. Oil tends to sell off. That helps to a degree. But overall, a strengthening of the dollar will often put pretty severe pressure on commodity importers in the short run, because they then say Pakistan this year, Bangladesh or India, the entire South Asian continent, which is heavily dependent on imported energy, has been facing a double whammy.
Or even a triple whammy where interest rates have gone up. The price of commodities has gone up, and they're paying for those commodities in an American currency, which also has gone up. And so that triple effect exerts a very painful squeeze on the bits of the world economy, which are integrated enough to actually be entangled with the dollar system, but not sufficiently strong and resilient to be able to ride this out. And so this crash test that we're applying here, this very severe shaking of the system, is in a sense going to reveal who is on what side of that crucial divide, who can handle the stress and who can't.
So I want to sit on one part of this, which is implicit here. Why when the US raises interest rates? Does it cause the currencies of countries that have not raised interest rates to depreciate? Why should making it more expensive to borrow in America create a problem in the currencies of Brazil or Bangladesh or Chile?
Yeah, so this is a crucial point, and it acts as on the difference between the trade element of the balance of payments and the capital account element, because as America increases interest rates, it becomes more expensive to borrow, as you say, in the United States, but it becomes extremely interesting to lend in the United States, because when you lend, you're going to get a better interest rate for lending. And the way you lend in big markets is not with a bank loan, but by buying or selling bonds, right? So when you sell a bond as a business, you're borrowing, and the person buying the bond is lending you the money, the face value of the bond or whatever you actually buy and sell it for. And so as interest rates go up in the United States, it becomes more attractive for foreign investors to own American assets, because they attract this high interest rate.
And so as people buy those assets, essentially America's exporting assets, if you like, throw in as buy them, and that produces an appreciation of the dollar. The flip side of that is a depreciation of everyone else's currencies, because if you're a global investor and you've got a portfolio, you've got a giant trillion dollar portfolio, and you've got to put that money somewhere, you spread it across the entire world, and as interest rates adjust, you reallocate your portfolio away from the now relatively low interest countries and towards the relatively high interest countries, and that in this case would now suddenly be the United States. So you see these big reallocations in portfolios which drive exchange rate movements. Hi, this is Ashley.
I live in San Francisco with my boyfriend. We would love to officially share my near time subscription with separate logins. We both love cooking, love being in the kitchen, but I'm a 30 minute and under efficient dinner at Gurley. I want a sheep and meal.
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It's why we created the New York Times family subscription to get your own login and Mr. elaborate gets his plus room for two others. Find out more at nytimes.com slash family. So now I want to go back to something you said a few minutes ago, which is that there were these dynamics in UK financial markets that were just not the top of anybody's mind.
Not something that a lot of people understood very well. And to connect that to something more broadly, certainly my read from covering 2008 and financial crisis then and doing more research into past financial crises is the really dangerous thing in financial markets is when one of two things happens. One is that information everybody took as settled and known and made decisions about like housing prices are going up and these bonds are safe. If that information changes all at once and as such, everybody now has to live in a new informational world where their old assumptions don't hold, that often can create a financial crisis.
But the other piece of it is that when something like that happens, when there is a rapid effort to respond to new information or changes, it turns out there's a lot of parts of the financial markets that we don't understand, dependencies vulnerabilities exposures counterparty risk. And so you were saying a few minutes ago that you wonder if our central banks and our regulators have what they need to track all this. And it seems to be the answers, of course, no, this really comes through your work oftentimes to me that the complexity of internationally domestic markets is now so far beyond the capacity of any individual or even any agency or any kind of informational structure that any kind of rapid change is going to expose things nobody was prepared for. And so that creates just like an underlying vulnerability to big explosions.
Is that a kind of fair way of talking through the rest now? Certainly, I would hold hard to agree on the first point, which is that indeed we build institutions to deal with and we make strategic choices of a large size to deal with scenarios and futures as we within reasonable boundaries, think a reasonable and unlikely to emerge. And the scenario which British pensions were hedging against is a scenario in which interest rates went down and that was a historically warranted assumption to make. And so the irony of the current situation is that the strategies that blew up were strategies that were needed in the world, which we no longer currently inhabit where we're suddenly seeing huge interest rate increases.
And that is what they were not prepared for. I don't think you can really blame them for having adopted these strategies in the first place because they were highly exposed, largely private pension funds with open, you know, with large commitments in the future. I think the question has got to be in the UK case, why the bank, the treasury, the financial regulators, knowing that we were heading into an interest rate increase cycle, we're not more attendant to this risk. And it's a reasonable question to ask because we know how anguished the communication between the financial sector and the bank was on Monday and Tuesday before they had to make a decision on Wednesday.
And by all accounts, the bank took a long time to really get it for the penny to drop. And that's not what you would really want in this situation. You would have wanted the central bankers to be on this risk in the right beginning, carefully monitoring it before things got as toxic as they were by the end of Tuesday and as dangerous as they were at that point. So your point about whether or not this stuff can be foreseen, I think I'm less, I mean, I would characterize your description there as sort of conservative liberals are kind of almost a shade of Hayek about it, right?
And so what we do is we have to think about this is too complex for us fundamentally to grasp. We have therefore to face in a kind of rather resigned way the prospect that we're going to be overwhelmed by things that we can't see coming. And so then presumably we either adopt a very conservative stance, which says that we should potentially avoid certain risks as far as possible. Or I don't know, I think we sort of have to shrug and say, well, you know, bad things are going to happen.
We just have to roll with that. I'm not sure I'm willing to settle for that. I think especially with regard to the global financial system, there is, you know, persistent evidence recurring examples of cases where the bank and the British regulators were in fact warned, year out for several years by people who were knowledgeable about the pension system. Of how dangerous this strategy was.
It's not rocket science. The look at the major holders of UK treasuries of guilt and figure out where the risks are to work your way down the tree. My take would be more kind of left progressive radical take, which is to say the systematic reasons as to why we're blindsided by these kind of events. People are actually not trying hard enough.
All the folks that are in these positions are not competent. And for good reason, not competent. In other words, folks who are making money don't want competent aggressive regulators in those jobs and make damn well sure that they're not in those jobs. Information is deliberately not shared.
And that will be my approach until we saw somewhere that had made a very concerted effort to crack down on this kind of behavior. I wouldn't be willing to concede that Modernity is just too complex for us. I think, you know, on balance right now, my guess is simply that this is exactly the kind of crisis you'd expect in the system shot through conflicts of interest. As it is, and it's the conflicts of interest, which is the driver here.
I mean, part of the contrast here and it's a disconcerting comparison. It's one we've talked about before, but so it's on the table already. The contrast is the place like China, which this year and last year is going through what is unprecedented in global financial history, the deliberate efforts to deliver it to the global financial system. And so it's a very deliberate effort to deflate the bubble to end all bubbles, which is the Chinese real estate bubble.
Now, that is being deflated with complete deliberateness. They don't know exactly how all of the thing, you know, how the Jenga towers in a fall that they're having a hard time containing underground they've got problems at the local level, but they brought that thing down deliberately because they thought there was too much risk in that system. And until we see a determined effort by a Western regulator to do something like that, I wouldn't be, I think, willing to concede that this is a problem which surpasses us on grounds of complexity per se. I think it's more likely to be that there just isn't the will out there and there aren't the interests in other words that would drive us towards really firm handed intelligent aggressive regulation of these sectors.
Well, I'm going to copy half that. I think I do have some of the view that these systems are now more complicated than human minds can fully grasp. Although I don't think I'm as fatalistic as where you would take that. But I want to be clear here that I'm talking not so much about the specific thing we just saw in the UK, but of what we saw in the UK is more of a metaphor for the other side of what we're talking about, which is this now global system of pressure coming from global inflation coming from US interest rate increases.
And now spreading out into a lot of economies that we don't understand that well, that we don't watch that closely, that have uncertain relationships to their own political systems or political systems of their neighbors. And as such, that to me is where this gets a little bit frightening that we are playing with systems. I don't even think that we truly pretend to understand, which is maybe a good bridge into what you've been calling the South Asian Poly crisis. Do you want to talk a bit about what you've been tracking there?
Yeah, so this poly crisis is this notion which I picked up when I wrote this book shut down about the 2020 crisis and it's a term originally used, well coined and put into somewhat wider circulation by John Claude Junker, the President of the European Commission at the time of Europe's troubles between 2014 and 2016 and the term it turns out has an interesting genealogy which goes back to 1970s complexity theory. Basically, it's the idea that you can have a crisis and then you can have a poly crisis and a poly crisis is when you have a whole series of interconnected fires which then turn into a general or firestorm or conflagration, which is larger than the sum of its parts. So, if you're not thinking about the worst even then the diagnosis of each individual one of its components would suggest because those components are powerfully interacting with each other, moving fast as well makes it difficult to track. And so at that level, yes complexity theory, you know, you're right as I would point towards the kind of idea which says there are constraints to what we're able to do and understand more importantly about the world.
I guess my invocation of the term is trying to at least point to the fog we need to be navigating through, even if we can't necessarily clear all the fog away. So, I think that's the most useful way of thinking about interactions of crisis. So deciphering the poly crisis a little bit one way is to understand the regional connections between crisis. Maybe this comes out of my background thinking about the EU and the Eurozone which you could describe as sort of a classic regional poly crisis.
So, you can see interactions like that between Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, that entire complex of regional issues, you know, you could refer to that as the West Asian Poly crisis. And so, I think that's the point of the question that I think is the question of the stability of several of the states within what you might broadly think of as the Shatterzone of the British Indian Empire which took in at its height, Burma, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and much of the border region to Afghanistan, which in modern And out of that emerged a series of more or less successful post colonial states, of course, building on long, long historical lineages. And as of this summer, we had a manifest total crisis in Sri Lanka, an ongoing disaster now compounded by this gigantic climate shock in Pakistan and very severe pressure on Bangladesh and that strategic Bangladesh, you know, in the global development narrative Bangladesh is one of the truly bright spots. Right.
So this is a model student, if I may use that language in the development game coming under very severe pressure and what connected all of those. They all have very distinct political histories interacting, of course, through a geopolitical force field that connects Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, for instance, or, you know, India and China around Sri Lanka. But all of them were under the pressure of this triple whammy of rising interest rates accelerating commodity prices, which early in the year were very dramatic and in energy persist. And also the strong bother and those three forces were acting on this cluster of states and we're talking about huge slice of humanity in a rather concerted way and had just to say about a quarter of humanity.
Yeah, this South Asia, I mean, South Asia and East Asia between them, you know, if you monitor those two regions, you're covering close to half of humanity's experience any given moment. Of course, it's hugely asymmetric because India entirely dominates this. But Pakistan and Bangladesh are very, very big countries by any standards. Pakistan, I think, is number five in terms of population, Bangladesh and number eight.
So these are hugely significant pieces of the global jigsaw puzzle and they were all simultaneously being robbed in India by this triple shock and the energy component is particularly dramatic because Bangladesh and Pakistan had been tempted in the gluts days of global energy when, you know, LNG in particular was dirt cheap because there was a natural gas. Yeah, I think with natural gas in global parlance right now, that's a key barrier doesn't figure very much in American politics right now because America has an abundance of gas but LNG is crucial because it's shipable. You don't have to have a pipeline. You can put it in a very, very sophisticated tanker and Bangladesh and Pakistan as in Bangladesh, at least rapidly developing low income countries had fixed on to LNG as a cheap source of relatively clean energy as well as the alternative is either burning diesel or burning coal.
And they were there for blindsided. I mean, really hard by this spasm that we've seen in the global LNG market, shipable, transportable gas as East Asia, the giants to the East and Europe to the West compete for these cargoes, which literally will just turn course in the middle of the Indian Ocean. If the Europeans outbid Bangladesh and that's not hard for the Europeans to do, the tanker just turns around and it goes to Spain, rather than going to Bangladesh. Bangladesh, this extraordinary example of rapid economic development under the sign of globalization in the last 20 years does have this incredible boom in their garment sector.
And this state, which was for the first time really also offering its citizens regular electricity supply, keeping the lights on all the time. So there was an emerging anti sector as well, suddenly faced rolling blackouts and all of the symptoms of dysfunctional emerging market and low income countries. And then looking out down the Indian Ocean to Sri Lanka, there is this terrifying prospect of complete state failure, which would be obviously a great disaster. Anyway, so this is one way of trying to think of this region as being shaken by this global tension.
How do you think about the strength or vulnerability of the Indian economy right now? One of the things that India has going for it is that it's a relatively closed economy. It's not as exposed to global dynamics as a Thailand, for instance, or a Malaysia, which are true workshop economies in the current global economy. India's huge, poor and relatively less exposed.
It doesn't borrow very much. It doesn't have a bond market to speak of. So there isn't much international involvement in Indian debt. It's now rich enough to be able to afford what is its crucial import, which is energy.
It's heavily dependent on imported oil, increasingly also on coal. But it also has a currency reserve, much of it borrow, but nevertheless, on stable terms of over $500 billion. So India can ride out any of the shops. The last time India was in really manifest crisis, financial crisis was in the early 1990s.
So India has moved itself well out of what you might think of as the danger zone for low-income countries. But it is nevertheless subject to buffeting from the outside. And what I think is more important is the question of how dynamic its growth engine really is, because India is sustained right now by a dramatic story of rapid economic growth that came out of the 1990s and really hit its stride in the early 2000s. Growth was up 7, 8, 9 percent.
A barrier's points recently as well. India has outpaced China. But I think there are deep concerns at the structural level about the adequacy of India's infrastructure, the adequacy of its education system, to providing the skills that hundreds and millions of young India needs. India has a huge use-bulge coming its way.
And increasing signs of what you might call a kind of crony capitalism where Prime Minister Modi and the BJP's collect around them, pivotal players in the Indian oligarchy, in a sense almost as a substitute for the absent state. So those oligarchs and their giant business empires will do the job of building the infrastructure that India needs, rather than working away over the long run, building the state capacity, this is the term you hear again and again in India, that would allow it to emulate the sort of things that China has done. The big questions are all about the longer run in India and whether or not there is a growth model that can be sustained over the next two generations, which is what India would need to rise comfortably into the zone of higher-middle income countries. We've talked about the role that interest rate increases in economic policy.
In the US might be playing in adding tension here. You've touched on the weather events to use a very bloodless term in South Asia recently. Obviously, we are a main driver of climate change in over the century. These weather events are related.
Can you talk a bit more about the role, the floods and the rains have been playing in the problems in South Asia? And also what that perhaps implies for the US or Western responsibility? Yeah, I mean, we're seeing it around the world, but South Asia is perhaps the most vulnerable. Certainly when you put it in proportion to population that's exposed, South Asia really is at the absolute crosshairs of climate change.
And it works in a double way there. So on the one hand, you have terrible heat waves and droughts, which have been affecting crops in Northern India. And then on the other hand, you have the appalling, epic flooding in Pakistan, which is undated a third of the country. And this isn't the first time this kind of mega flood has happened in Pakistan.
And for the entire Northern region of India that's in the Ganges and the runoff from the Himalayas, what really has to fear for the possibility of this kind of mega flooding. So those are, as it were, the two types of exposure, extreme heat on the one hand drought and the prospect of inundation through the monsoon, even more extreme than normal. The immediate effect on Pakistan is devastating. And I don't think there's any real doubt that Pakistan is going to have to fundamentally renegotiate its international debt.
There's no way I think that it can continue in what was already a very fragile IMF program. And so there is their immediate linkage to financial crisis. And I think more broadly what this does is to put India in particular in a really severe dilemma with regard to its climate policy in the upcoming COP in Egypt. And it's called in something of a cleft stick because on the one hand, with its developmental ambitions, India could try and do a China and run up a huge fossil fuel intensive industrialization program.
I mean, if it could get the infrastructure sorted, that would be an option for India. The problem is that by doing so, it would exacerbate a problem to which it is more vulnerable than practically any other really large state in the world. And on the other hand, it also alienates the most vulnerable small island nations, which could be India's allies. And so add that to the list of challenges which India has facing it in this current moment.
I mean, not just as it were the issues of political economy and the huge backlog of infrastructure investment and human capital education, other words that needs to be delivered, but also the fact that going forward, it's 20 to 30 year time horizon is shaped by this climate crisis and stand back far enough from this. And you really begin to get a sense of the tragic dilemmas facing the larger emerging and low income countries in the world. And India is perhaps the most dramatic in the sense that much of Africa, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa has not really embarked on rapid economic growth at all in patches in individual countries, but not for the continent as a whole. India really has, and it sees the door to the classic development path slamming in its face.
It's like one of those action movies where the bad guys hurtling towards some sort of door, which the heroes are trying to shut before the villain can get their fingernails around the edge of the door. And they're desperately trying to keep this door closed. And India finds itself a little bit in that position, but the reverse, right? Where the door to the development future is swinging closed in front of it.
And it now has to conceive of an entirely different strategy to go forward because the path to fossil development, even if it embarked on it, you know, it would be disastrous for the planet. And B, it would find itself most likely outflanked by the supercharged green development that China's now embarked on. So it comes into its own, and the Indians speak a lot about this being India's moment. It comes into its own at a moment where we're at some sort of a fork in the road, or in this polycrycytism, which the way forward is completely opaque.
And you and I can argue back and forth about whether complexity is the issue. But what is certainly clear is that the path forward from here, in most respects, political, scientific, economic is unclear. That's precisely the moment in which Delhi feels that history has arrived. So it's really a tragic, I don't think it's too strong a word for this situation.
And it demands huge creativity. And that is another question that certainly liberals that you meet in Delhi puts to is that, can you really imagine Modi and the BJP rising to this challenge? Because it's as big as if you like the non-aligned movement in the 50s and 60s that was trying to shape an alternative for humanity beyond the Cold War. In terms of climate, nothing less than that is what's on India's plate.
Then let me add another dimension of vulnerability here, which has been, I think something we're talking about less here in the West, which is the amount of indebtedness, particularly in emerging markets. Yes, I mean, the amount of indebtedness is in and of itself not that huge because almost the definition of being poor is that you can't borrow as much as you would like. So the total quantity is not that impressive in many cases. And I think the worry is that the debt levels goes back to your diagnosis of the parameters changing.
The debt levels were contracted in a world for low interest rates. And the question is whether any of them are sustainable as interest rates become significantly positive. And maybe we're talking about long-run interest rates in the United States of three to four percent, which means that an emerging market low income borrower is paying eight, nine, ten percent. Whereas right now, those are the kind of rates paid by true frontier market borrowers.
So in that kind of world, what kind of debt is sustainable? And this is indeed a huge question for a whole list of countries. The question is whether any of them are big enough to cause a systemic crisis. If you think of the India's, the Brazil's, the Indonesia's of this world, all of them are robust enough at this point to handle the shock that's coming their way.
So they have done an enormous amount of work in terms of building institutions accumulating foreign exchange reserves have just been developed in success stories over the last generation such that they're robust to this kind of shop. The real question is about the Angola's, the Sri Lanka's, the Pakistan's, which are in a much, much more fragile position. The question, however, from their point of view is also, are they too big to fail? And in the case of Sri Lanka or Angola, they're almost certainly not too big to fail, right?
These are states which would be regional crises, perhaps certainly local disasters. But it's very unclear whether the, you know, this thing would be euphemistically called the global community or the international financial institutions would really muster the wear with all the major support actions in their favor. I mean, one of the things that complicates the current debt situation is not just the level and the poverty of some of the borrowers, but the structure of the debt as well, which has undergone a really dramatic shift in the last 15 years. So the early 2000s began with the debt jubilee, which meant that the lowest income countries had their debts cut.
And that debt was largely owed to a group of governments known as the Paris Club, which is basically Europe, the United States and Japan, who used to do government development lending, almost all of that debt was written off. So what the developing and emerging market countries now do to access funds is they borrow from things like the World Bank, which is a major source of development funding. They borrow from bilateral lending by new lenders, notably the Chinese who emerged in the one-bell one road period in the last 10 years as a lender on a scale of the World Bank. And then they borrow from private markets.
And so part of the problem in dealing with the current debt overhang will be that if things do break, in other words, if a state becomes unable to continue with paying its debts, the question of renegotiating those debts is complicated in a way it's not been before, because there's more private debt. And because the Chinese have a much bigger stake. And because the classic Paris Club lenders, the Europeans, the Americans, the Japanese have precious little influence over the situation and this complicates the situation because the Chinese have a budget. And so the challenge of public private policy banks, which they insist are simply banks and everyone else insists are extended arms of the Chinese government, which the Chinese will or will not, depending on the circumstances, allow to be incorporated into government negotiations.
In any case, this is a situation of complexity. It's not inherent. This is a lack of forebody problem. This is not immensely overwhelmingly complex.
But it's just that interests on the part of the private lenders and the Chinese and everyone else mean that it's very difficult to assemble a clear-cut structure for restructuring all of this debt. So this gives us further reason to be anxious about a world in which interest rates are going up. One of the things I think about sometimes when I read descriptions of poly crises or I look at some of these numbers is that there's this interesting shadow side to it or light side to it. And I'm almost nervous making this argument because it can sound like you're downplaying or could become what will become a lot of human suffering.
But I want to at least open up this question of poly bulwarks, because by the same token that we have a lot of financial and governmental and economic interconnection that creates a lot of vulnerability and climate interconnection and communication interconnection and political interconnection. Some of that ends up being a force in the other direction. I mean, you've talked a bunch of different times here for a bunch of these big countries about the support they might be able to get from the international community, which might buffer shocks at another time would have overwhelmed the country. We've talked a lot about how much richer India and China and for that matter Bangladesh have got it.
And that among other things has also helped them a lot when dealing with things like very rough weather. We're seeing unbelievably bad disasters now, but the death tolls of them, thankfully, for now from what we can tell compared to what we've seen from not even quite as bad weather shocks in the past. It's better than it once was. I mean, it's a really big deal that Bangladesh has something near or it says actually 100% electricity.
And so one of the things I sometimes read when I read your descriptions of poly crises is sort of narrative of vulnerability. There is so much more now that every country in the world, including us for that matter, feels vulnerable to. But there's also more support, more technology, more money, more kind of possible multilateral coalitions. You can get help from China now, which really wasn't on the table 20 years ago.
Is there something to be said not just for a rise in vulnerability and exposure, but particularly when you're speaking outside of the climate context to arise in reaffirming the future. Is there any other things that arise in reinforcement that comes from some of these same dynamics having a positive side? I would disagree with you at all. I mean, I think that was very visible in 2020.
I mean, in two different dimensions. One is that we in early 2020, many of us were on the warpath warning in a sense already then of the sort of crisis that we're warning again about now. In other words, interest rates were going up. Many, many low-income countries were shut out of global financial markets.
It seems the prospect of a kind of rolling disaster. And it didn't happen nor did debt restructuring, however, but the mega crisis that we anticipated did not arise. And many of the emerging market countries actually showed considerable resilience in coping with the crisis. And if you go from the 30,000 feet discussion of government debt to situation on the ground in India, I mean, many people will remember the extraordinary images of the tens of millions of Indian migrant workers driven out of the cities where they live in informal housing, desperately seeking refuge in their home villages as the lockdown was put in.
It was a movement of people that India and the subcontinent hasn't seen since the partition after independence when Pakistan and India violently separated. But the astonishing thing and talking to experts in India recently, the astonishing thing that even critics of the Modi regime admit, even critics of his lockdown policy admit, is that very few people starved, if any. There was malnutrition, there was misery, but in the end, the government and the local authorities and the villages along the way were sufficiently competent, sufficiently capable, and in the case of the villages sufficiently rich to be able to feed people. So there was not humanitarian catastrophe.
And this has to do with overall higher levels of income. And it also has to do with technologies which state like India in a pioneering way is put in place for personal identification, electronic identification, direct delivery of benefits, and so forth. And Indian state has a higher degree of capacity by way of electronic accounts to deliver income, of course small amounts to its citizens than the United States does, almost European states do. And this was the deliberate effort through a leapfrogging, if you like, of the development of various administrative stages of the state to enable Delhi and provincial government in India, the state of the state of the US Federation to target benefits at very low income people by means of electronic tagging and biometric identification.
Now, this is problematic in all sorts of ways, data protection and so on, but it does provide a resilient capacity for the delivery of support that hasn't been there before Bangladesh does far better in typhoons now because it has, you know, will play out. So yes, there is that resilience there. The question that smart folks in India ask themselves is, is this the platform for a progressive narrative of development from here on in, you know, which of course is the side of boosters take that once you equip people with these kinds of means of identification and means of payment and so on, you enable a program of bottom up led development and we've seen some elements of that in East Africa as well in Tanzania and Kenya where cell phone based payment systems are much more common than they are in the West. The question is whether that's the future, which will be a full blown progressivist kind of reading of the situation or whether it could be something rather grim which would be the avoidance of existential disaster.
It would be a kind of adaptation if you like to a world of greater danger successful adaptation up to a certain point, but would also leave you trapped in a kind of techno populist equilibrium which my friends in India describe as cheap rice and cell phones. You know, you basically have an endless stream of electronic entertainment on your cell phone, you know, you're not going to starve, but beyond that, neither the national or the personal level is the much prospect of development in a society with hundreds of millions of poorly educated young men and women entering the world. And women entering the labor market without really the prospect of dramatic economic growth. So we could be in a kind of warehousing dread and circuses kind of model of stabilization.
I mean, I think one way of looking at India is that it is precisely the most grand, I mean, the most dramatic spectacular world historic and scale, you know, project of social stabilization first and foremost in the current moment, which may offer growth prospects, but that's yet to be tested as a proposition. But I want to think about this more on the side of vulnerability because this goes to where I was saying earlier, I caught the half of the Hayakian description, which is, I have this experience, first somebody who's covered now. I mean, I feel like my whole life is a journalist, just one crisis after another. And now I look back and I think of the 90s as a very anomalous period, not of no crises.
I mean, they're obviously dead crises and nation markets and America, but is more relative stability than I have experienced in my political adulthood. But nevertheless, I do often have this sense that I read on any given week about five things that could plausibly become a gigantic international financial economic humanitarian crisis. And most of them don't. And that's not to say none of them do.
I mean, we've lived through 2008, obviously the pandemic was and is like a catastrophic scenario, but that our tools for response do so. And so, I think that our developments do seem somewhat more effective than they have been at other times, our ability to blunt things that could through complexity overwhelm the whole world also seems somehow to be matched by an ability to form coalitions and even with a very, very weak methods of international governance we have take on coordinated actions that keep a lot of things from rising as far as they do. And I'm asking this of you very particularly because your work very much focuses on these questions of poly crisis and the ways in which these crises could build on each other, interconnect to each other and become more than some of their parts. And so, I think that there's such a sense of people and ability.
And then I sometimes step back and I wonder, well, is it actually matched? Is it potentially at this point more than matched looking historically by somehow the opposite? Like, I don't exactly want to call it coordination. But I wonder if our tools have not become somewhat better than we often appreciate.
I do think the system is too complex for people to understand. And yet by the same token, it seems to mostly be working not morally, not as well as it could be, not the utopia. But, you know, as you say, like, it gets a lot better off than it used to be. We're seeing, you know, we didn't see 2020 become the kind of crisis we worried it would become in financial markets.
Is there maybe more room for optimism here than an average reader of the news would assume? I think this is a very valid point. If you go back to the 20th century reference points, you could say, you know, we've avoided another great depression and we could have had one in 2008, arguably in 2020 as well. We've avoided another World War I, World War II style, Total War.
And we've avoided revolution in the catastrophic overwhelming sense of the wave of revolutions after 1917 and notably the Russian Revolution. For better or worse, some people would say we've also avoided, you know, outright modern versions of fascism, which have an apocalyptic politics about them. Do or die, you know, genocidal violence. That type has remained rare if, you know, there haven't really been a straightforward repetition of that kind of politics.
It comes out of massive economic and dislocation and the logic of Total War. So at that level, yes, those nightmares, I think we have to agree, learn to contain more or less effectively and especially on the macroeconomic side. Yes, I think we've gotten pretty good at avoiding great depressions. That doesn't mean, however, that the risks won't repeatedly arise so that our efforts to contain them becomes larger and larger.
And this is, you know, the lesson of 2020 as opposed to 2008, the stuff we had to do in 2020 to contain the fallout from the lockdown shock was not an order of magnitude, but several times larger than what we had to do in 2008. So I think the reasonable question to ask is, you know, are we at a moment at which the culmination of the cumulation of a series of challenges which are not unprecedented individually and which we have some track record of managing in the past, whether those could be cumulating in a way that becomes increasingly difficult to cope with. And I think tensions over Taiwan and Ukraine in the last six months should give us serious pause. I think people who study, you know, the logic of nuclear deterrence, which was well established, a really formalistic and expert system in the Cold War feel that the current situation with regard to US, China, Russia relations is much, much more precarious.
And also, I think we have to reckon with the possibility that the climate crisis, let's use that as a cipher for environmental stress more generally, may be reaching a point, maybe reaching a whole series of tipping points indeed where it poses challenges to us of a type which our societies have never faced. Because that relative success in managing crises, which you quite rightly alluded to the worry is surely that it took place within an environmental envelope, not yet so stressed that it became impossible for us to cope. But we have never lived on a planet as stressed as the one currently and as stressed as it will become in the next decades as population shall we say crests and global growth continues and accumulation of CO2 and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere continues and the attrition of eco-topes and pollution piles up. We simply don't know how that system works.
But I think that is the question whether or not these coping techniques of the 20th century will continue to work, A, in a genuinely multipolar world in which we have many more empowered regional actors of which China is just one, but there are a whole series of regional systems which are all nuclear capable push come to shove, which could escalate into global catastrophes because I medium sized exchange of nuclear weapons will have, we should be clear about this, we'll have devastating impacts environmentally. I mean, at least all our science tells us that. And on top of that, then, as it were, this issue of the environment. Even one step further back than that, let's grant that we do live in a world that's continuously excitable.
Part of the price we pay for this higher crisis management is continuous crisis awareness. So I take your point that the news is continuously full of crisis talk and there's a famous historian of political thought. It's fun. It's fun.
It's fun. Crisis was where the idiom in which modernity expresses itself all the way back to the 18th century. But that doesn't mean that in some sense it's not necessary. Sometimes the fact that I'm paranoid doesn't mean that they aren't out to get me.
In case the fact that we are continuously haunted by crisis doesn't mean that some of those risks aren't at this point on a reasonable assessment accumulating to the point which we should become extremely concerned about ability to go on winning as often as we are right now. I think that's the wager of our generations. I think the idea there that there is also a dynamic relationship that the very fact of worrying about things is sometimes what puts us in a position to do enough that the worries and later seem hyped up is a very, very important one. I think sometimes if we ultimately are relatively successful on climate change, we will learn almost exactly the wrong lesson of it that people will look back and say, oh, the worst didn't happen.
The most important thing is that we are not just environmentalists who are overstating things. But a lot of the reason the worst may not happen if you look at current trends is because enough alarm was put into the system that our technological forces change direction, our policy change direction, our cultures change direction. There is on some level an almost all of the planet effort is not the only thing happening but it is a very real thing happening to change our climatic direction. And on some level too it's working.
And if it works, I think people will not realize sometimes it will work. They will instead say, oh, look, the things that people worried about it for and have degrees didn't happen. But that also brings up a place where I want to look at another historical analogy that we are using quite a lot right now and the way maybe there's another side to it. So in America, the dominant historical analogy of this economic moment is the 70s and 80s.
The stagflation period is the pull over disinflation where he jacks up interest rates incredibly high. He causes 10% even more unemployment that does do enough to break inflation. And central bankers, including Jerome Powell, look back on Volcker as like the central banker, right? And Powell has been referencing him quite explicitly.
But an overlooked dimension of that era is what Volcker's interest rate increases did to emerging economies. And I want to quote here the Harvard historian Jamie Martin writes, in developing countries, the debt crisis that followed the so-called Volcker shock was profoundly traumatic. Across Latin America, it led to a collapse in GDP rising unemployment and skyrocketing levels of poverty from which the region made a slow and imperfect recovery over the lost decade that followed. Even those who claim Mr.
Volcker made the right decision admit that he precipitated what may have been the worst financial disaster the world had ever seen in Latin America. The consequences which were even worse in those of the Great Depression elsewhere. Volcker himself later said Africa was not even on my radar screen. I don't think the Fed right now, if someone understandably, is thinking too much about its effect on emerging economies.
It is obsessed with what its statutory mandate is, which is managing employment and inflation in the American economy. But if there is reason to fear that big interest rate increases could trigger the crisis of the Fed triggered in the 1970s elsewhere, how do you think they should take that into account? How do they balance their responsibility to the United States and our moral responsibility, not to throw the rest of the world into or many countries elsewhere in the world, into depression-like conditions? I think right now on the broader system and the broader concerns of the Fed, the Fed has a mandate for the American economy.
It does not have a mandate as a global hedge fund. You can scratch a Fed person as deep as you like, and all your leather-sea is fundamentally a concern for the stability and health of the US economy. That's their job. I don't think that's merely a legal technicality.
That's their main concern. When and where the Fed acts globally, it does so because it believes that there is a serious possibility of blowback to the US economy from global events. This goes back to the point I was making about which crises in the emerging and low income market world will matter to the society. The Fed's financial crisis in Pakistan does not matter to the Fed, it does not matter to Wall Street.
Even a major financial crisis in India probably doesn't. When an India-centre of Angkor Rajan, who was at the helm in India in 2013, made this case to Ben Benanke against Ben Benanke's prospect of proposition of tightening American interest rates at the time, which unleashed a legal tapered tantrum again, the American central bankers shrug. The countries that enter into their calculus are ones which threaten global financial stability, and you can tell the ones which they take seriously in this respect from the degrees of support they'll extend to them, and the critical indicator here is the circle-swap line system. The swap line network, which extends to Singapore's, South Korea, to Brazil, to Mexico, is there because those are members of the financial system about which the Fed is concerned in a crisis because potentially the scale of a disaster there could have ramifications for systemic players in the American financial system.
That, those support actions, tends to support the stability of the local banking system, notably in Europe, for instance, after 2008. It's a side effect, which is welcome, but it's not the ultimate justification for the Fed's actions. And there is here a systemic issue, there is a huge tension between the de facto role of the Fed and its constitutional, indeed its sociology, its entire purpose. I mean, there is a tension.
The overlap is created by the de facto vulnerability of the American financial system. So the more vulnerable the American financial system is to these kinds of shocks, the more those other bits of the global system become too big to fail, to that extent they become extended and incorporated into the system. Again, to take a point about resilience, though, these networks are spread, right? So the Bank of Japan has a swap line network with a whole bunch of other economies in Asia, which, de facto, therefore, indirectly become part of the US system.
Though the United States was not willing to extend a swap line to Indonesia, for instance, it did create a facility of standing repo facility, which is a facility where you can essentially trade good assets for cash to take account of China and Indonesia. So there is a, it were tacitly, and in quite a deliberately, I think, low-key, below the radar kind of way, the construction of a series of networks, which give resilience to the system, which helped to bridge the gap somewhat, if you like, between the almost logical contradiction between a globalized economy running on the national currency of the United States. Let me then bring things to the Fed and what it believes it needs to do here, because we've been talking about vulnerability elsewhere, but pretty, we're going to be talking about the 1970s in Volcker. The question there that seems to dominate thinking is this question of credibility.
And when the Fed has credibility and people believe prices are not going to rise, they act as the prices don't rise and surprises don't rise. And when Fed loses credibility, they need not only to change the demand curve in the economy, they need to not only slow the economy down, so they aren't buying as much, but they need or they believe they need to do it with such a violence. They also change people's beliefs about the economy. I mean, it's an act of not just economic policymaking, but economic psychological intimidation.
They're trying to cow people into acting with different beliefs about the future. The view at the Fed, the view of quite a few quite loud economic observers right now is that they're really dangerous things if they lose credibility and that they need to act with a lot of force because if they do, they're going to have to do everything even worse in the future. Say what you will about how bad it is interest rates go up to 5%, but it'll be even worse if they go up to 10% or 15% as they did under Volcker. How do you understand the task here?
How do you understand what it takes for the Fed to maintain and not just bring inflation under control, but maintain that slightly ineffable quality that seems to be so crucial to economic action of credibility? Yeah, I mean, I think the idea in and of itself is barely intuitive. Anyone who's been involved in the difficult business of parenting or received parenting will be aware of threats and sanctions regimes and the credibility of such regimes. There's a big difference between your parents saying, do this or else and them saying it and doing it in a way which means you know the punishment will be forthcoming.
And once that credibility is established, then they really only have to start counting to three or something and that by itself will already induce the adjustment in the child's behavior that the parent is looking for. That's the kind of logic that we're talking about here. And with regards to big financial markets, there is a way in which psychology does seem to be the most apt way of talking about it in a sense because you're dealing with a relatively small number of actors who are all relatively similar to each other. And so we are really talking about a sort of social psychological phenomenon where mediated by news outlets and news sources and you can do these sort of quantitative studies of nice sounding optimistic sounding words and pessimistic sounding words as they rippled through the chatter of the financial markets.
And so at that level, this sort of talk makes sense, it seems to me, and you know if you're dealing with bond traders what you want to convince them of is that you know if you raise interest rates a little bit you mean to move them a lot and so then the markets will adjust in a way which means that you don't need to move them too much. You can rapidly get caught up in a whole series of really opaque psychological dynamics in doing this right because once you said you're going to do it and they believe you and then they anticipate you then you never actually have to do it and so is it really a credible threat and so on and so forth. When it comes to broader society I think this entire social psychological talk about credibility and confidence and expectations and so on actually is quite misleading because when we talk about the willingness and capacity of you know market actors in other ways employers and well workers and maybe in some cases historically their representatives trade unions to set wages and prices when we ask you know how credible is the fair then if the fair is credible then people will not rage wages and prices the question you have to ask is who sets wages and prices what empowers them to do so and what are the circumstances under which they make those choices. In the 1970s you know it wasn't so much a matter of psychology as so much bargaining power between capital on the one hand and organized labor on the other and what you were really trying to do was adjust the behavior of distinctly identifiable groups of major trade unions and employers both in United States and Europe and in Japan.
So as to get buying on an adjustment path that would lead to lower inflation and originally those conversations took place behind closed doors sometimes in fact in public between the government and the key decision makers in the economy and it was in a sense when that structure but was called liberal corporatism was abandoned in the course of the neoliberal market revolution that we ended up in this world in which the fed acts on the ground. So the idea was that the idea was to build a world in which the fed acts on some nebulous thing called psychology and expectations to establish its credibility whereas previously what it was about was Jimmy Carter trying to negotiate a deal with the IFL CIO on all the United Auto Workers on what they expected and expected as reasonable in terms of a wage adjustment in relation to tristrangers and they would literally bargain over whether or not they could anchor a wage increase if and only if the government agreed to fix gas prices in a way which was acceptable to the members of the United Auto Workers this was part of the negotiation over whether we're not to liberalized gas prices in the United States. It's the shredding of that world of the destruction of that world which really pushes us into this new era of very kind of vague psychological talk and that for me is also the fundamental element of implausibility about the extension of the 1970s analogy to the present moment because what he ignores is the fact that not the psychological dynamics sort of human nature sort of eternal factors like that but the concrete political institutions the historically given circumstances under which decisions about pricing are made have fundamentally changed. I mean we are seeing in the United States wage adjustment in line with prices and that's what really freaks the Fed out because that tells you that inflationally pressure is broadening but that isn't because of the empowerment of the organized working cars in the United States though of course they have been these dramatic breakthroughs in terms of the organization of high state high profile employees like Starbucks or whatever but that does not make a wage push.
The wage push in the United States has been on an entirely optimistic individual basis driven by the surge out of the labor market workers during COVID and then back into the labor market of course many people just lost their jobs and have to shuffle back in to new jobs and that sorting process generates a much more in the United States ultimately in Europe where we've also had very high levels of inflation by recent standards 10% or so we're seeing systematic attrition over real wages that was the same was true in the United States early on in inflationary push and that just shows that even in Europe where you have higher levels of unionization there isn't that dynamic push that so called wage price spiral which is the real nightmare that lurks behind all of this talk about expectations. I don't know about the actual question of what the political economy of price and wage setting is and to engage with that seriously to my mind we're not actually grasping the nature of this inflationary situation which is quite different from that in its underlying logic from the 1970s. Well let's end by trying to grapple with that seriously but I want to do it less as a philosophical question and more policy one. What would you tell Jerome Powell to differently than he is currently doing what is your what is your sense of how the situation has changed since 70s imply for how he should treat the situation differently than the analogy to the 70s which is.
The interest rate pain will continue until morale declines. How would that exchange. I mean I like the power of the beginning of 2021 who came flat out and said you know we don't think basically that's the inflation of my youth will return these on record of saying we can bury the 1970s and he's right he was right that time around I think he's been bullied into the sort of orcishness that he's adopted more recently by the just relentless drum beat of the inflation hawks by the fact that inflation has remained relatively high by the fact that it's spread. To a wide range of sectors that it's now quite deeply entrenched above all in the cost of housing which is the big driver most recently it's read from energy and supply bottlenecks to a much wider circumference.
Broadly speaking I'm not a critic of the Fed in the way it's handled the situation I think that the argument that they should have height sooner is misplaced I think they heard on the right side in being slow I don't think we should regard this inflation shock as a disaster. It's a reasonable trade off that isn't to say that we should downplay the distribution of consequences it's been very tough for the real living standards of certain parts of the American population and there's a need for policy to adjust to that fiscal policy should be doing that work. I don't actually think that the Fed is wildly off beam here I think the questions are going forward how long did they tighten for and what are the costs and the solution for emerging market and low income countries is not necessarily for the Fed to stop its movement but for other agency notably the international financial institutions to step in to provide the support that they need. So the questions about the Fed are really how long are they going to continue this type of thing cycle for they've been slow enough to get their interest rate increases so far have been I mean large in historic terms because they're doing 75% you know 75 basis points at a time but nevertheless we're still quite a long way away from having positive losses.
So this is not a savage tightening cycle in those terms the question really is whether the current system with a huge levels of leverage we've got in it and the global ramifications can manage that and if the Fed needs to do interest rate increases it may not to do need to do very more because I think the American economy the steam is rapidly coming out of the system at that point they should be flexible enough and brave enough to take their foot off the break as soon as possible but if there are wider problems in the global economy you need other instruments to deal with that right you cannot target multiple problems with one instrument if you do you'll end up in horrible trade off situation so what we need to do is multiply the means with which we fight this crisis could be another issue and so SDRs or there could be a more generous policy in reality. More generous policy in reallocating the synthetic currency that was created within the balance sheets of the IMF that's what SDRs are to face the crisis we should ensure that the World Bank and the IMF can move rapidly to address country crises the United States and other Western states should be proactive in pushing for debt restructuring options at this point. So that would be the range of policies that I would advocate that they should be moving also towards cooperation with other central banks and should do so publicly it's not that they're going to make a major adjustment to American interest rate policy but they need to signal that the central banks of the world of cognizant of the blowback the interaction between the policies that they're adopting on a national basis. Because otherwise we really are going to be dealing with the first truly global inflationary shock of the new era of globalization since the 1990s on a nation-by-nation basis and that I think is behind the curve of what the current moment demands.
What is your explanation then for why the month on month and how you're in your inflation data has been so defiant to the projections of those including me I should say who felt this is different than 70s is localized the way the inflation has kept spreading spreading out of localized sectors into a general dynamic the way you're beginning to see wage adjustment the way it has been persistent in the face of the stimulus running out of the economy the way it is persistent in the face of the economy sort of coming out of the pandemic the way it just keeps going beyond what I think people who are a little bit more dervish said was caused and ending up kind of somewhere else or somewhere more broad. You know I think there is something where Powell would say hey look my rhetoric certainly has changed because the facts changed. You still seem a little bit more bullish on the view that this would ring out of the system that we're looking at an adjustment not a problem of expectations. But I think also expected to end earlier so what if anything has the sort of ongoing persistence of the inflation done to your model of the situation.
Well the situation is more complicated and dangerous than I thought in particular thinking about the European side of assistance of the energy plus shock linked to the war is a huge aggregation of the problem you can say the same about the food markets which also shocked earlier in the year. Then I think it's very interesting to see the recovery dynamics in the US notably the labor market recovery dynamics so the fact that there was such a wave of unemployment people made redundant lost their jobs during covid did shift labor market dynamics in a way which I don't think is going to be a problem. I think the market dynamics in a way which I don't think we quite anticipated why because as people got back into work individually they had a degree of bargaining power and were more choosier about the sort of jobs that they went back into for good reason and furthermore demanded adjustment in relation to prices and got it largely from employers who thought they could probably afford to pay those wages. And so that's why we've seen those adjustments.
I think the element of this which is probably most troubling is the housing sector and I don't think there's much reason to doubt that in quite a number of the major real estate markets of the United States there was some pretty serious structural issues which mean that they are sensitive to no price pushes like this. So there's a lot of difficulty of the discrepancy between the coast and the other parts of the United States where we don't see the same level of escalation in real estate and rental prices which is now one of the key elements driving this so as that real estate boom I think grinds to a halt and goes into reverse I still expect the transit tree hypothesis to be confirmed of course this point you can say well this is a semantic argument but in any case I expect a downturn in the real estate market to become quite a big driver of a slowdown over the course of the rest of this year and into next year by which point I think many people expect the US housing market to be going into a quite serious phase I mean it would be astonishing if that were not the case given how rapidly mortgage rates have moved up to 6% so this is a huge shock to the cost of buying houses that too may be something that ripples around the world so Canada Australia where there's very very overheated real estate markets. So I think that's the broad logic is there was the energy and quality price shop there was then a widening of that to labor and to the service sector and now the inflation is to a considerable extent in the real estate sector and I expect that to ever way in the next six to 12 months so that by next year most of the time we're going to be able to see inflation coming down dramatically which again is a reason why on the whole I don't think that we are going to see anything remotely like Volcker style interest rate shocks that we know what what power and his colleagues are doing aren't going to add up to that. But there's a way in which they need to you know summon the ghost the spirit of Volcker to re fight the 1970s apart from nothing else to demonstrate that they're serious I mean amongst central bankers and in finance want finance Twitter world invoking those kind of analogies are what you do when you want the signal purpose.
And I think that's the whole the gathering of central bankers and economists some this summer that the whole speech was an exercise in kind of retrosheak if you like a kind of invocation of the stylistic of the 1970s and 80s just to kind of reassure everyone. That they were now wide awake and smell the coffee and we're ready to do what was necessary in practice I don't think I'm going to have to do anything remotely as dramatic as what we did because the underlying dynamics are different right because you do not have that sociology of distribution or struggle working its way through the American system and expressing itself in prices and wages in the way that it did you know 40 years ago. I got a good place to end so I was a final question what if we books that have been on your mind of late that you'd recommend to the audience. So I've been reading the Elena Ferranti and the Apollo 10 quartet series which are stunning.
Another book that I recently brought my world was Edward Paces but youth quake why African demography should matter to the world. And I'm the right read it and reviewed it quite critically I think if you want to follow the conversation right now on global economic history you should check out Brad the long slouching towards utopia which came out recently and has been very widely reviewed and make up your own mind. Adam toose thank you very much. Great pleasure to be here.
The concert was produced by any Galvin Jeff Gelt and Richard Karma. Back checking my Michelle Harris Roland Hugh Mary March Lockerate Kate Sinclair. Original music by Isaac Jones mixing by Jeff Gelt. Auditing strategy by Shannon Buster.
Special thanks to Kristin Lind Christiany Samuuski Jason Furman Mike Consul and Reese Anselt.