Good afternoon everyone and welcome to the third episode of Pivot. Before we begin, I just want to say thank you all to those who have continued to tune in and support the growth of this podcast and really take consideration information as provider as we look in depth into the importance of political job during the 21st century. And those are the observations of the precedent that historical developments plays when observing our current political institutions, the decaying of political institutions and where exactly we're going for our future. Are we seeing the decline of Western civilization?
Are we seeing the decay of Western political and economic institutions? Are we seeing the return of multilateral, multipolar international system? Rather than going into what we've done in the previous episode and kind of discussing the preliminaries of what constitutes civilization, I'm going to do something a little different today and that's to discuss in detail a particular geographical region that is picking up a lot of coverage for many different reasons. But there's one particular reason, a reason that we have to put a spotlight on this area.
I'm not talking about Asia, I'm not talking about South China Sea, yet this one is much more important as being a breeding ground for the rise of of terrorism and trainings for prolonging insurgent warfare. The area that I'm talking about is directly south of Libya, which is right now in a complete abyss. We're going to be completely, completely honest here, rather than biased on the carnival affairs of Libya. After the ousting and the rather public assassinations of Abu Mar Gaddafi.
After his ousting, Libya became the epicenter for the growth of terrorist organizations across not just South Africa, in the Middle east, in Central Asia and Europe, but also the topic of this episode and I speak of the Sahel region, a lot of people may not understand where exactly is the Sahel region located? The Sahara region is located on continental Africa and it's known as the traditional period or the transitional geographic location that separates the Islamic Arabized North African construct or location of a continent from the sub Saharan primarily dominating Roman Catholic Christian animist tribal sub Saharan African countries. It's very important to understand the reason for this is simply because that in the Sahara region it was primarily the zone for caravan trading centuries ago, the expansion of Islam of North Africa outside of the conquest campaigns of caliphates and then subsequently the Ottoman Empire came afterwards. A lot of the times the religion of Islam spread across Africa through trade routes and then subsequently the armies of leaders that converted to Islam.
So now as you see, if you look on a map of kind of Africa. And you kind of get the Sahara region and you look at the breakdown of religious affiliations, cultural identities, politics, things, you see that there is a clear, clear distinction and a clear contrast between Northern Africa, as I said, is dominantly Muslim, more so affiliated with the Arab world. And then once you get below the sub, once you get below the Sahara region, you get into sub Saharan Africa. And that's when you get to more of the Catholic blocks, the Christian blocks.
You still have some pockets of orthodox Muslims, especially in countries like Nigeria, but for the most part, due to colonial policies and conversion policies, it's predominantly Roman Catholic, especially to the French and Christian. But you have examples of South Africa, for example, where it's very secular. You have Christians, Muslims, Hindus, blues, you have people that continue to practice animism, essentially present the way of the earth, giving human characteristics to the natural world. So with that being said, we're going to look much more in detail on the Savo region, its importance and modern day geopolitical security dilemmas for countries such as France and the United States.
And all this is going to be tied together on the overarching topic of insurgent warfare. This is the first episode where we're kind of discussing the practices of insurgent warfare by individuals for political grievances, for the means to have to change policies to overthrow the government which is primarily secede from an independent sovereign country to form its own country. So in order to really understand this, we are going to have to look at the geography of the Sahela region and what that teaches us primarily and how that plays very well into insurgent warfare, terrorism, things of that nature with the case study of Boko Haram. So the Sahela region, just to give you an idea of just the massive size of this geographical region, it's approximately 3,300 miles long from the Atlantic Ocean all the way to the Red Sea.
As stated, it is the geographical representation of the changes in civilization, culture, religion and identity between the Islamic Sahara Desert nations. So the Maghreb, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, as well as the other Arab countries such as Libya, Egypt. And then you have the more fertile tropics of Sahara, predominantly Catholic and Christian African nations themselves. The countries in particular in some way fashion that characterizes the Sahel to Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan.
And in some cases its incorporation sometimes is not onto the notions of Eritrean, the Ethiopian islands of Eastern Africa. On top of that, as we have, as we've kind of mentioned these countries, because of that, it is home of extensive Poverty, ethnoreligious tensions, political corruption and cultural tensions. It makes sense that you are literally, you're the middle ground between two distinct types of civilizations which were documented in Samuel Hunting clash civilizations. You have Islamic civilization to the north, you have the African civilization.
South. You also have components of Western civilization. That's demonstrated in African Arab Nigeria, the presence of foreign companies, primarily energy companies, Israelis and Aristotle d', Ivoire due to continual lingering influences from France, even past decolonization periods. And because of this reason why I bring all this up.
Another way to show the sizes, how large the Sahara region is. They can fit multiple Iraqs in Afghanistan. If you were to place them side by side from the Atlantic Ocean, the Red Sea and similar terrain as that of Iraq and Afghanistan. And to put much more pressing political geographic importance to the area, it's one of the fastest rising population centers in the world.
They reported that over the next 20 years. So by 2040, the population of what's called the G5 Dusahel, which is the Kinaphazal, Chad, Mali, Mauritanian, Niger, they will experience a major population boom of between 80 and 160 million people. Between 80 and 160 million people by 2040, it's astronomical. The growth of Africa population will remain by 2050, 1/5 of the global population due in fact of these major population center booms.
Moving on just with this, you know, the rise of populations, it doesn't really help that the primary geographic terrain is semi arid and relatively flatlands. The only real fertile area is out of the Niger river, which is one of Africa's longest rivers in fact. But because of aggressive agricultural practices to try to accommodate for this growth of population, there is continual rapid deforestation that has produced extensive historical droughts and famines. The previous one that we've gotten more mules.
These are becoming much more common because of the need to feed. So how does this all relate to insurgent warfare servicing terrorism in this particular geographical area? Keep in mind, we're talking about an area of 3,300 miles. To give you an idea, that's pretty much the distance between Boston, Massachusetts and Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.
It's about the size of the United States from coast to coast. That is what we're talking about right now. Okay. So in the aspect of terrorism, we are talking about primarily organizations such as Al Qaeda, the Islamic State of the West African provinces, which, which in this case is Boko Haram, this is what they started to call themselves post 2015.
And then as well there's actual Islamic State affiliate organizations. But because of the destabilization and the terrorist cesspool essential to be to keep it honest in Libya Acted 2011, it is a primary source of weapons modeling as well as illustrating tools terrorist organizations to garner money, soldiers, water, raised ammunition. Ever since the housing of Umar Gaddafi, this has not helped. This is not help in the science.
Actually, the implications of this unstable Saiya region. In addition to that, because of the African countries that were mentioned, the borders are relatively porous and not controlled about central governments. Because of this, terrorists are allowed to officially establish unchecked and continually growing and expansive supply lines as well as logistic coordinations across these massive countries. Unchecked, they're able to do terrorist attacks on Burkina fossil and then two days later appear in Niger giving up the same types of terrorist attacks unchecked because of a weak system of rule of law.
To give you some statistical impact to show the severity of this. Approximately just 2019 alone, approximately 4,000 civilians died at the hands of terrorism and the prolonging of insurgency to establish Islamic state and or an overall caliphate within West Africa. And because of the continual acts of violence and the clashes of government, approximately 600,000 people have become displaced just from the violence alone. And to get even more specific, in Burkina, Fanzo deaths from this insurgency since 2016 has jumped from 80 in 2016 to 1800 in 2019.
That is a 2150% increase in civilian deaths due to this continual regional uncertainty. 2150% increase. That's astounding. Just from this one country alone.
There's a highlight of this problem that has to be addressed. But what is causing this sheer increase in civilians targeting? Remember, to understand, we have to understand the purpose of insurgencies and the strategy of guerrilla warfare. Well, it comes down to the overall desire to systematically defeat the will and capacity of the government by undermining their support base across the populace.
It is to substantially increase in a way to the combat, the combat attrition, combat training and risks for continual escalations of violence between insurgents and the government. And granted, in some cases, the surgeons do not necessarily have to result in a complete regime change. They can adhere to, you know, to agreeing to political grievances and demands. But insurgencies are usually never ended.
At a peace conference or a peace through negotiations, that's always ending. It's very bloody and very prolonged. In order for the success of an insurgency to be guaranteed in a way, there's three major things that the four come. Think about it, there are four major factors that have to go into successful insurgency.
And that's what the insurgents to decide on a strategy they have to determine their type of structure. Is it going to be strictly hierarchical, organized or very loose. Different groups and cabals and cliques that they adhere to a particular ideology, but they're able to operate on their own accord. That's vastly different from the other cliques and organized groupings within this organization.
Can they secure aid from a foreign sovereign state or who are the non state actors? An example of this would be the Sonic Republic of Iran. Iran provides weapons, financial assistance, logistics, political support organizations like Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, popular mobilization forces, Taliban, potentially even Al Shabaab and list goes on. And the final is how they're going to utilize the tactics.
So according to give you a bunch more definition identitative kind of understanding of what exactly is an insurgency. Author Seth Jones of G. Jones stated, and I quote, uncertain is a political military campaign by non state group or groups to overthrow regime or secede from a country. The motives and the size of insurgent groups tend to be clandestine organizations, clandestine or covert.
That way the high level secrecy will allow for the organization to grow to expand its capabilities and increase potential chances of success. Some of the tactics that insurgent or insurgency groups would use in the range of assassinations and terrorism to subversion and sabotage ambushes, raids, suicide bombings and mass shootings. And through the course of an insurgency, the organizations will seek to represent themselves as an alternative, yet in their eyes legitimate. But really in reality, it's an illegitimate form of state building.
A good clear example available with Islamic State. Once they garner territory in both Iraq and scare, they tax their populations. They establish means of judiciary authority. They constructed miniature industries of service due to them owning the vast deposits of oil in Iraq.
They've implemented political authorities in their provinces, established a nascent economic system due to having energy sources and participating in illicit trades. They established housings for their for their soldiers. They had a political establishment through information, propaganda and advertising, social media. The reason this is to provide a psychological reasoning of an image of being effective in government, much more effective than actually legitimate government.
And because of this due to the ones of the propaganda and mass media demonstrating the the major successes onslaught of the Islamic State insurgency. Foreign fighters flocked to the Islamic State because they wanted to be part of something that was perceived as a modern, a true modern Islamic caliphate. Something that seemed that was closed where there was going to win in both Iraq and Syria. But as we saw that the dangers of insurgency rather than just a terrorist is that it tends to be protracted and continuous warfare.
Terrorism is just opposite. An episodic, politically motivated act of violence doesn't mean anybody want to seek a few political changes here and there. But an actual insurgency is the complete overhauling of a sovereign political regime. That is the main key difference in the terrorism.
There's a tactic of insurgents. In order for an insurgency to be effective, it must have a political vanguard or group of ambitious, rather radical individuals at the very head of this one situation. It's a violent movement, that's what it is. It's not non violent.
There's no protest. It may start as just simple protestings. But due to government responses to the protestings for the now Sam's insurgency, the only option to gain what is desired violence. But the other reason to establish a political apparatus is to acquire and direct information to provide the notions of being legitimate to political grievances as well as to undermine the sovereign governments in the struggle to acquire the support of the populace of a country as well as the international community.
By acquiring support from the international community, the statistics of an insurgency increases substantially, substantially. And that ties into the three main actors actually insurgency. There's insurgents themselves. Then there's a local allies, whether they or the militias, tribes or population tends to follow the insurgent or the government.
Then there's the outside actors, the external sovereign state that get involved as well as the non state organizations. Actually I have a few examples of these. So the first example we'll look at Syria starting in 2011. It's continuing to this day.
Some of the organizations that have for anti Syrian government, you had the Free Syrian Army, Suraisham. Then you had Jaish Al Islam, the Islamic Front, Tahri Al Sham which is Nahida affiliate. You have Fatah Islam and then you have Abdullah Azzam Brigades. On the other hand you had the pro Syrian government regimes which was Hezbollah, the Lebanese Resistance Brigades which worked under Hezbollah.
You have the Amal movement and you have Fatah Al Intifara. See as you can see that there were external states such as Iran, Turkey, the United States, the multinational coalition led by the United States of Russia that were involved in both sides of pro Syrian and anti Syrian insurgents disappeared. We move on to Iraq for pro Iraqi republic organizations. You had the popular mobilization forces that was prompted up by Islamic Republic of Iran.
You had the BAR organization which was to this day still as a political entity that's Shiite, therefore pro Iran, pro Khomeinius. We also have organizations there were pro Iraq at that time, the Shia as a Shia sect of Islam is the majority of religion. For the Kurds, you had the KDB Peshmerga, the PUK Peshmerga, the Sinjar lines and the Syrian forces. For the Sinis, as well as the Baathist loyalists, you have the Supreme Command for jihad and liberation, you have the General Military Council for Iraqi Revolutionaries, Ansar al Islam, the Free Iraqi army, the Council of Revolutionaries of the tribes of the Anbar Province.
This is a clear example of how deep that once the central government is seen as either failed, failing or already destroyed, you have these different types of insurgent groups that try to reap the opportunity to establish the influence and their domination in the presence. And we're gonna go a little bit more into that statistics, the statistics of the success rates of insurgency warfare. It's much more spiraling than a lot of people may think. Between 1939, 2015, so the beginnings of World War II, up until five years ago, we had approximately around 181 different insurances.
The average duration of insurance is 12 years. 12 years was the average length of an insurgency. And the median, which is the number in between or the middle number between the higher half and the lower half of data samples, the median was seven years. So at least these insurgencies lasted at least seven years.
The average duration of this prolonged protracted asymmetrical warfare within the country would last at least 12 years. By 1922, the number of insurgencies peaked at 60 per year, but had decreased to just 38. Of these 38, six countries continue to experience insurgency to this very day in some way, shape or fashion. That's India, Ethiopia, Burma, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Philippines and Yemen.
There's no mistake that a bulk of these Pakistan to extent Yemen, Burma, Pakistan, but India, Pakistan, Yemen, Burma, even the Philippines, they're all in tensions or the borders, the crosshairs, the flashpoints of civilization divides. The Philippines is a Roman Catholic country with a Muslim insurgency. The history of India and Pakistan between being two fault lines between the Hindu civilization and Islamic civilization. Burma, which was known as Myanmar.
Myanmar is on the crosshairs of the Islamic civilization of Bangladesh as well as their own Buddhist merging civilization. They want to be a pure Buddhist state, which is ironic because their brother was granted Nobel Peace price. It's fascinating. Another component of exurgency, especially the modern sense is is the easy accessibility and the continuation of the growth of sophistication of technology.
Insurgents as well as terrorists acquire higher levels of technological means of manufacturing rather sophisticated weaponry. Because IEDs, which is improvised explosive devices, VBIED vehicle bound improvised explosive devices. And that's VBIED suicide vehicular bound improvised explosive devices. You see that a lot with Al Qaeda and Taliban, especially in Afghanistan, also roadside bombings.
The truth with Taliban Al Qaeda is that they did get sophisticated how they handled their IEDs. It's not on purpose, not by accident, that for the most part they use for regular 4x4 pickup trucks that look like force. The reason for this is that a lot of their IDs are pressure activated. If I implement with high construction IED and I put it in a road or on the road and I hide it and I, I'm driving a vehicle that weighs less than the pressure needed to activate the IED, I'm perfectly fine.
I can take my 4x4 to drive along the road without booby traffic IEDs. Let's say if I'm being chased now by a massive American, a 4x4, 6x6 or an 8x8 armored personnel carrier armor, which you find vehicle. And they're following me and I smoothly run over the road and to them and their perception this is a safe road. There's no IEDs on this road.
So on the 4th they're going to continue to chase me. And so boom. Because their vehicle weighs more than the pressure that's needed to detonate the ied, it works. And then you have to deal with the psychological factor of the surprise roadside bombs.
Now you're looking at, we have to change the technology of what we utilize for our reconnaissance vehicles, our vehicles that we deploy to Afghanistan to make sure that we can minimize IED that nations and IED casualties amongst American coalition troops. Okay. Another part of technology we see, and we actually started to really see and examine the Islamic State was their mastery of the using of mass media, social media platforms for recruitment and propaganda. We saw this a lot.
Facebook, Instagram, Tumblr, Telegram. I'm not really sure whether this was Ask FM, Twitter and YouTube. For me, my experiences of watching this came from Twitter and YouTube going back to 2011. That is what exposed me to the grave realities of this world.
From a computer project. Mind you, with this technology, they didn't have the means to construct a global network and inspire individuals to commit acts, whether that's in groups or as a lone wolf. And we see that not just Islamic terrorism, we see that not a lot now in right wing terrorism. Not saying that left wing terrorism does not exist, but since the the growth and anti globalization ideologies and rhetoric has grown in the 21st century, especially after the election of Donald Trump.
We see that a lot of right wing white nationalists and populist organizations are utilizing the same tactics that these Islamic terrorists are utilizing in areas like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and now in Africa. We see that then they get more into the insurgency statistics that some policy analysts are rather reluctant to give that insurgencies do have a higher level of success, whether they wish to admit that or not. Since World War II until 1939 and 1945. Since that period and now to modern day, 35% of the services result in the overthrowing of the government and or gaining independence.
Another 36% of the searches resulted in governments defeating the surgeon seas in some way or fashion. 29 of insurgencies result in the draw. That means that there's a 71% chance of insurgencies resulting in some sort of victory, a 71 chance that some sort of change is going to happen. This is damn and it's interesting, but it also makes sense.
If you look at, look at the combating of Taliban in Afghanistan since we've invaded in 2001, the insurgencies that happened after the 2003 invasion, Iraq, you can see now the Houthi retaliations, the Saudi UAE coalition invasion of Yemen. A lot of people thought that these insurgents weren't going on last, but they aren't going to them know cause as much of a hindrance. It's much more conventionally superior military than the United States. But look at what happened.
They used geography to their advantage to combat technologically conventionally superior entities to the degree of now indicating and bringing to the table these greater powers to construct terms of negotiations as if they are an actual state, an actual sovereign force. And what are some of the main strategies of insurance? Well then there's the guerrilla warfare, which we've seen throughout history really. But when you talk about growth warfare, you think of the Viet Cong, you think of the revolutionary war, you think of the civil war of the United States.
Do you think of the communist revolution in China, the peasant revolution? You think of asymmetrical mobilizations of mutinous movements against a conventionally more powerful, more coordinated enemy. However, that can turn into what's known as conventional warfare, which is a standard means of engaging an enemy. And then there's the concept of punishment that we've observed Islamic State with the even to an extent you have countries like the Kingdom, Saudi Arabia that have those called the chop chop squares, which is essentially public executions.
But here in concept of insurgent warfare, punishment is essentially the targeting to an extent. It may include civilians as Public visual displays of psychological intimidation through death essentially. And some of these tactics would include ambushes, raids, sabotage, subversion instead of earlier assassinations, mutilations and bombings. Insurgents are very nuanced in the coordination and that has to be observed in order to resolve and address the situation.
They can be very centralized, maybe very loose information based. It's really come down to what is the geographical makeup of the country, what is the status of the power of the central government, what is the attitude of the local populace as external support available in the forms of another sovereign nation or non state actors. According to some statistical facts and explained by office of Writers that insertions tend to prolong 10 times longer than international wars. Based on three particular factors.
That specific grievances of insurgency, weak governance, where there's a failure, laws, corruption in greed, natural resources and list traits. All of that combined in some way or fashion does not always guarantee the establishment of an insurgency, but it does influence the establishment of the necessary environment to produce the initial presence of insurgency. With that in mind, we'll go more now into these three particular basis for the rises of various surgeons. So for specific grievances, for example, we're looking at low per capita income, people are poor, they should be poor.
And the more they become poor or perceived that they become poor, the more animosity towards the central authority that can be exploited by militants. Ethnic dominance received ethnic dominance. You saw that in the Republic of Iraq, Understood what I'm saying? Religious dominance.
We also call that Iraq. There's a higher risk of resurgency in countries with dominating, with a dominating religious group, but also a well organized minority group. We also see that insurgency with deep religious ethnic images tend to be more bark. And it's good to keep all this in mind because once we get to.
Well, how exactly does all this pertain to the Sahel region? Once you look at Boko Haram, various other organizations that are very active and the Sahara region, all this will start to make more sense. We're getting back to this. That there's a higher chance of conservancy in polarized countries when there is a perceived you versus them part of the in group or the out group.
If you're part of the out group, you're part of the minority. You may feel phenomenally determined against, but you're not even relevant when it comes to the daily notions of government. And that's not just in particular with the hell outreach. This is just an overall feeling.
We see some of that here in the United States a lot of times that's the reason why Donald Trump was elected. That's also some of the reasons why you had this populist growth across Europe. There's this notion amongst European Union countries, but you have the lower countries such as Portugal, Spain, Greece, Hungary and then you have the much more influential prominent such as France and Germany that are primarily dictating the policies of the European Union. Therefore, people in the low income per capita countries of the European Union, you see this growth of popular sentiments about what we're done.
We're tired of going with the supernational liberal doctrine of the European Union. We want to claim reclaim sovereignty in our countries. And because of this we have countries such a led of the Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin. They utilize disinformation campaigns to exploit the anger.
This is true now instead of the sovereign political entity, it's not state actors, that is terrorist organizations. Che Guevara stated we must come to the narrow conclusion that the guerrilla war, the guerrilla fighter is a social reformer and that he fights in order to change the social system that keeps all his unknown brothers in misery. He also stated that problems of all natures are supported before insurgency. Anything deemed as a political grievance can be utilized to initiate and insurgency.
In addition to the political grievous notions of governance, the excessive present usage of military police forces is a clear example of governance. The weak implementation of the rule of law. If there is no rule of law president acknowledged rule of law, nobody's going to follow it. Nor they really want to care what their rule of law has said.
If it is not affiliated associated as a capacity to my identity, I would deem it as illegitimate. And then the continual excessive use of forces was initiated the Syrian civil war to a plethora of other reasons. But it was the immediate fire of the wide rounds by Syrian security forces onto a group of non combatant protesters. That is what that was the spark and subsequently the invasion by the Islamic State insurance.
All of this produces a security dilemma. Security dilemma is essentially where both sides they continue to enhance their security measures which eventually sparks confrontation. It is a dilemma for the most part bringing us all this together to the Sahara region. The weak governments of state weakness is primarily in remote areas.
In areas in regions that allows the insurgents to establish rural strongholds. In these rural areas that are lacking modern infrastructure, they are lacking employment and education that has extensive illiteracy rates. Poverty, hunger, the lack of presence of official political and security representation. The more extreme and the declined absence of the party in these particular regions, the more the population can be targeted by insurgents.
Therefore, they provide opportunities for the establishment of these illegitimate states within the sovereign states. The population becomes essentially annexed by these insurgents. So now they are at the will of these extremists. And it only gets worse for areas that are mountainous empty jungles as well as deserting countries in fact that are half mountainous mountainous Approximately have a 13.2% chance of insurgency over the course of 10 years while a country that's less mountainous approximately 6.5% risk of enduring insurgency over the next 10 years.
Examples of this it's a long list but we have Syria, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Somalia, the Kashmir region, the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt, Afghanistan, Somalia state smiling button put more emphasis on Somalia due to its location with the Bab El Mandab Strait between Yemen and northern Somalia, which is the strategic location for the transportation of energy primarily from the Persian Gulf, which uses transports approximately 25% of the global energy Joffrey plays a huge significant foundation and influence on the development, continuation and success of asserts who loves theirs and the final notions of what makes a conservancy is Greek is the acquisition of natural resources primarily in the forms of oil and other forms of energy drugs, heart materials such as diamonds and gold mines. This is a way to acquire money to buy weapons and supplies and you know, fund their violence campaigns as well as pay their fighters and insure housing example once again Islam state where they actually recruit members of the Taliban Al Qaeda simply because they pay more. It comes down to the two most innate notions of human nature survival and self interest. If I have a family defeat but also terrorists and I have if I'm making let's say $8 to work for Haida and Islam state guns around like hey well you if you be a freedom fighter for us, we'll pay you $45.
There's there's no seven yes and that there's nothing. There's opportunity cost. I can now afford more and provide more with that $45 to that $8 now I've just expanded opportunity cost to be able to do more. Another good example of greed the tunnel Tigers of Sri Lanka in the early 2000s when they hated their insurgency because they wanted to essentially acquire annex and establish their own country out of Northeast Rica they spent between 200 and $350 million per year.
To compare that that is between 20 and 34% of the GDP of Northeast Chica. In 2005 they gave even more comparison 2005 the United Kingdom Conservative Party always spent $50 million per year for Their budget. This acquired a share of GDP that is 10,000 times greater than the UK Conservative Party. Another example of that would be the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone.
The RUF had acquired access to diamond mines in the colonial and Kenyan districts as it means to finance operations to oust the leader at that time, Joseph Homo. The money was used then to buy weapons and ammunition from Guinea Liberia. Socialism is armed and feel like fighting. Another example would be the park in Colombia.
For the most part, they financed their operations via the drudgery. They charged taxes for providing protection and services to drug producers, drug smugglers, plantation owners, laboratories to produce drugs, air strips. But also, at the same time, they also participate in legal practices in agriculture, transportation and security industries as a means to diversify their profit accumulation to ensure the continuation of their operations against the government that they sought to oust. In the regime that they sought to destroy.
They implemented taxes on the landlord owners of foreign companies. The GIA and Algeria implemented what they call a global revolutionary tax. This is the notion, this is a means to grant the notions of that we are a sovereign state, that we can establish effective and efficient political, economic, new security apparatus as a way to delegitimize the sovereign nation, to give credibility to their initiative. It's promoted, their way is better.
That is the utmost goal of insurgency. And part of the, as we said, for the success of insurgency starting government in determining that is it even feasible to do an insurgency? You need to determine is the geography suitable enough to have. And as we stated that the best secure places to do it are deep jungles, desert and mountains.
When we look at mountainous terrain, you think of the North Caucasus. So the Caucasus is east of the Black Sea, south, well, part of southern Russia and South Russia, the area between Russia, Turkey and then on. So we're talking about Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia country. South Ossetia in particular.
If we look at the country of Georgia is located between the Black Sea, which is to the west of the country, and it's in between the Caucasus Mountain range, the Great Caucasus, Caucasus Mountains to the north, lesser mountain ranges south. 65% of its territory is above 2,265ft, with a few peaks of the mountains going above 5,000. The importance of the mountain stirring allow for guerrilla tactics to be used in Akazia and South Ossetia. And this is around the time that Russia 2008, when Russia intervened in the Caucasus as a means to indicate that, oh well, we can do this in our sphere.
The same way that the United States interfered interfered in the Bosnian war as well as targeting Serbia and Serbia has always been a historical ally to Russia. As we're talking about Russia actually we look at the Russians struggled to secure the southern portions of Chechnya because of the populace's band range. The band range allowed for the Chechens to ambush Russian convoys, conceal their weapons storage areas and their logistical stations as well their supply lines which ranged from Georgia to Dagestan and Gushentia. Another prime example to be much more relevant in as far as the course of time.
Look at the Philippines the mortal Islamic Liberation Front who swore and religious Islamist state. They used the mountains amended out to Israel warfare the Philippine armed forces in the government to seek secession from the Philippines to establish an Islamic state. Is the well organized minority going against a majority Muslims against their own Catholics. If you look at Afghanistan, Taliban and non military uses the Hindu Kushan in Cuba.
Rebels such as fiduciary use the Seattle Mayasura mountains, El Salvador, Bunda Martin National Liberation Front, the fmln. They use the mountain ranges along the Honduran border. Watamal and Mar 13 used the mountain ranges that are located in Yugoslavia. You had the Bosnian rebels to be much more current in the border ranges between Syria and Turkey.
You had the BKK characterist fighters who quoted the goal was to learn the geography, figure out where the gorillas could hide I out the views of the people to the struggle and learn where the Turkish soldiers were based. In Nicaragua. You had Sandinistas. They relied on the mountains located near Margaux for training and planning their operations.
So what does all this have to do with political geography? Well, it's simple. It's important to really understand the political, the social culture and economic nuances of each individual country to better understand the standing not just in international relations, but also the better understanding the political station, the history of their political establishments as well as what are some of the respectives of national security. Why do people act the way that they are?
Based off of the geographical placement, their capabilities of development and their attitudes towards other people. That's neighbors other countries around the world. Insurgents can exploit these particular views as different nuances to mobilize local populations for their efforts. You can leverage the geographical areas where government is weak by building extensive, complex and interconnected by recruitment and operation bases.
And in some cases these areas insurgents will seize them if they have natural resources available to secure high profit. They can then be used for great recruitment strategies to purchase licenses, ammunition, better multimedia campaigns, increase the success rates of of their operations, acquire new alliances, more soldiers housing much more legitimacy, better Access to further technology to ensure the continuation of their goals. All of this now wraps into the Sahel region where Islamic militant leaders tend to meet. For example, in the forest, the Tri state border region of Mali, Niger, Burkina, Basel.
Where is the epicenter? It is the epicenter of the growth of Islamic radicalism in the south region. Directly in the area in which the Islamic north separates from the secular, multinational, ethnic, multi religious, yet tribal sub Saharan African states. With that, having all that said, we can now look forever into Boko Haram instability of the south.
And why is that executed along with the United States and Western countries such as France? Well, Boko Haram, they don't have to call themselves. Boko Haram is just a name in which the locals gave them. Because boko in the Hausa tongue and culture means Western education.
And then Haram Islamic for sin forbid. So bokaram means in Western education, People committed to the propagation of the prophets teaching. Now a lot of people depend. Oh well, was established in 2002.
No, it goes back actually to 1995 when the name was Sahapa and it was formed by Abu Bakr Lawan. And then eventually it was taken over by Madam Muhammad Yusuf When Lawan went to the University of Medina, which are here in Saudi Arabia. Yusuf changed the understandings of. What they stood for and became much more apocalyptic, enthusiastic and their radical jihad ideology starting in 2002 and then again around 2008 when Yusuf was assassinated.
But for them, what gives them and what brings them legitimacy is what exactly their political grievances are. And then they are against, just like their name. Because the notions of Russian education and secularization in Nigeria, we're talking about the predominantly Catholic South. They also can understand the corruption of the Nigerian government.
And they perceive Orthodox Muslims as well as Catholics. They have a dominant southern Nigerian threats. But it goes deeper than that because the vast majority of Nigeria's vast energy resources so oil and natural gas is liquid financial gas, LNG are all located primarily off coast offshore Jordan as well as in southern Nigeria. But there are much more problems that were ensuing and that provide much more legitimacy to Boko Haram within the northern and northeastern provinces where they currently continue their operations at that time.
And according to some statistics, there are some direct linkages towards Nigerian systemic problems of poverty, literacy, government corruption, inequality, unemployment that allow Boko Haram to capitalize on its notions of hatred disdain for the Nigerian government to the point where that as when Boko Haram were really starting their insurgent punishment campaigns and world warfare tactics. A lot of People in Northern Nigeria were blaming the government more for their responses and leaving Boko Haram as a terrorist organization than actual terrorists themselves. This all stems from also the relationship, the historical relationship between the Islamic north and Black Thai, the colonial south. It used to be an Islamic state to the degree of boredom.
And this is something that is believed that Boharam wanted to replicate. And so according to this statistics, it made perfect sense. The history is there. People don't like the government.
We have a well established perceived minority that's well organized and they only have opportunity to seek establishment of our own Islamic state. There are those statistics in the statistics they go back to about 2010 and 2012. But understanding statistics, you can really get an understanding of what can call it the, the operations, the missions and the successes for the recruitment. So courts of these statistics, Boko Haram really begins to develop their urgency.
2010, 112,047,000 million people out of Nigeria's 159.7 million people lived in abject poverty. Over 112 million people out of 159, almost 160 million people lived in poverty. That is asinine. That's insane.
In 2012, Northeast Nigeria recorded a poverty rate of between 76.3 and 77.7%. About 78 of those that lived in Northeast Nigeria in 2012 were impoverished. The Northeast Nigerian literacy rate in 2011 was 32.32percent of those that live in northeast Nigeria were alert in northwest Nigeria. 37% unemployment in northeast Nigeria from 2009 to2011.
I'll give you the trajectory went from 19.7 in 2009 to 21.10 in 2010 to 23.9 in 2011. And the youth unemployment in the northern region of Nigeria I'm talking about Northern Nigeria was 76.6% for males and 58% for females. And at that time Nigeria was ranked the 39th most corrupt country in the world. Because those astronomical percentages of impoverishment, illiteracy, low income per capita, so on, so forth.
Boko Haram in addition to the geographical placement of rural Nigeria, it was the perfect breeding ground for insurgency. Now over the years since the beginnings of the insurgency, Boko Haram has favored punishment certain tactics to their guerrilla strategy for seeking establishment of Islam state in Northern Nigeria. Boko Haram is directly responsible for the targeting and killing Christians of Muslims, the bombing and attacking of churches, mosques and government facilities, police stations and military positions, schools, markets and shopping centers, banks, public gatherings, tribal villages, kidnappings and killings of women Children, students and foreigners abducting, raping and enslaving women and young girls. The insurgency is primarily located in northeastern Nigeria in Nyobe, Borno, Aramawa, Kano, Kaduna and Palki regions of northeastern Nigeria.
But as stated earlier, in 2015 they really left the name of Bokoram and simply came Islam state and West African provinces once they declare their filthy allegiance to that state leader Khalifa Al Baghdadi, which ironically is when they started their insurgency in the neighboring countries of Cameroon, Niger and Chad. Some of the other organizations that they do collaborate with and coordinate with include Al Qaeda and Islamic aqim, formerly known as the Salafa's Group for Preaching in Combat or sgbc. The SGPC is mostly active in Algeria, so the Islamic part of the Islamic Sahara nations in Northern Africa. But they also conduct terrorism in Mali with intentions of establishing the very own along the state with the assistance of Saharan tribes.
In addition to their Boko Haram is assisted by Al Murabitun, which to give you a little history on Al Murtum, they're formed by the merging of Ahmed Al Amr's Ahmed Al mc's movement from Oneness in Jihad in North Africa, as well as eventually joined together peacefully with Haida and the Islamic Maghreb in 2015 and beginning in 2017, you started seeing the notes of the Jama Nushrat ul Islamin AKA Nusrat, which operates not coincidentally in Mali, Algeria, Niger, Libya, Mauritania, Tunisia, Chad, Burkina Faso. In 2012 there was a splinter from Boko Haram which established SARU, which is formerly known as Jamaatul Muslima Fi Abayad Sudan or Haida in the lands beyond the south. These individuals are allied again not coincidentally, but with Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda and Islamic group and they primarily operate in Nigeria and Mali. So now we're going to what exactly what are the problems is ensuing in the Sahel region and in the growth of Islamic group 30s.
It's very important to understand situational awareness of this extensive, as I said earlier, 3,300 miles, the importance of possessing situational awareness of this very geopolitically crucial region that is ripe and accessible for the growth of Islamic terrorism. How did this affect American national security? Well, as last year was really being reported, organizations that were affiliated with both Islamic State as well as Al Qaeda are continuously cooperating and coordinating their texts as well as agreeing to essentially cut up the Sahel region to acquire territory starting primarily West Africa, where the borders are much more porous. There's a weak Rule of law, there's government dysfunction, there's disregard for government.
There's much more suitable geographical locations. The terrain allows much more long term insurgency. There's extreme levels of inequality, there's lack of modern infrastructure to integrate the interior and there's lower capital income. What is interesting though is that these groups similar, well not like Islamic State, they have not declared themselves caliphates.
They proclaim this smaller Islamic states. But that's pretty much the understanding that it allowed them more time to recruit, to create attacks, to acquire funds and weapons, ammunition and then eventually come together to establish those notions of a natural caliphate. West Africa with the hopes that it would eventually link to other Islamic states in the Middle East, North Africa, Southeast Asia, South Asia, the caucus established once again an extensive Islamic Khalifa that has not been seen since the days of the Ottoman Empire. Even before that that is notion.
The other problem that we see is that the readily available source of soldiers Jamal Islam Wa Al Muslim approximately possesses as of February, as reported on February 2020 by the United States they have approximately 2,000 soldiers. 2,000. But also this proves that the expected capabilities of operations Islamic State and greatest directly responsible for an attack in Niger in 2017 that killed four American soldiers. They've expanded operations of southeast Somali the migrant.
Although these are Islamic State and Al Qaeda affiliate organizations and as I'm saying, Al Qaeda they didn't fight each other in actual Middle east and Afghanistan. These was different. What's interesting about their affiliated groups in West African region is that they are based not necessarily on Islamic ideological affiliations, but now but more so they're based off of ethnic tribal ties which state as stated earlier, ethno religious uncertainties tend to be much more barbaric. And we see that.
We see that with the recorded beheadings and the mass shootings of surprise attacks, the suicide bombings and stuff. An example of this is that 2009 and this was reported from by US intelligence that these set affiliated groups isolated Kina Fazel's capital Wadadogu, which is a city of 2.2 million people this year by seizing control their highways and conducting bombings through the bridges in the second military commerce. The overall point is that the lack of development in the countrysides produce ample opportunities for military recruitments by these extremists. Their game plan is to provoke ethnic rivalries intentions and then quote unquote provide protection, quote unquote protection via recruitment into their race.
Now how can this be stopped precisely? Well, in order to incapacitate insurgents in this particular region, the governments of these regions must work together much more closely. This can't be individualized, you know, counter insurgent plan. And more importantly, it can't be done solely by foreign militaries.
Yes, our foreign militaries can provide logistical and reinforce supports, but it has to be the governance of those impacting the Sahara region that are at the helm of counterinsurgency operations. But it can't just simply be military insecurity. It has to be through development. It has to be through infrastructure modernization.
It has to be towards the combating of actual systemic governance. These particular governments, they have to work with their people. They must bring together the public and the private sectors, disperse the wealth of natural resources, expand education, invest in health care, bring people together as much as possible despite ethnic rivalries. You know, it.
We have to target the insurgents where they are seeking. And that means you have to actively engage with the population. And granted, foreign governments like the United States can sanction these particular governments or individuals in the government that are doing the bare minimum to combat the growth of Islamic insurgencies across the region, such as Amarzania in Mali. But that plays a dangerous game as sanctions tend not to really impact the individuals that they are determined or dedicated towards.
And we see that with Iran. The role of this is to actively address the geographical, the social and the political grievances as well as issues and propel these central governments do not back down from these insurgents and to allow them them as these governments to further empower and embolden their people. The minute that these governments lose momentum to their own people is the very moment the insurgents win. There's over 14,000 UN peace keepers, at least Somali alone.
You have the fruits and about 5,000 soldiers and the United States has about 3,000 in this one particular region of the Sahel. And it's, well, fine, that's great. But it must be the African countries that take the initiative so that their people can see that it is their government that actually didn't really care for the future. It cannot be foreign governments, it cannot be foreign militaries.
It's all about public relations. Public relations allow for the government, for the government to outpace terrorists. And in an area that is a source, one of the fastest rising population centers in the world. This solely allows now for terrorists to expand the legitimacy and operations.
And if they are ambitious, if they can capitalize and seize the Sahara region, whether that's through Libya or the already established networks, they're getting closer and closer and closer and closer. But that is the United States or whatever other country that they seem to target that is a national security dilemma. Now although these organizations cannot directly attack United States with conventional means, but by locking down key geopolitical areas such as West Africa, they're able to deny the United States any capacity to effectively assist in counterterrorism counter surgeon operations. And that's something we can't afford.
But there's nothing this world can afford. If terrorists come down in a geographical area of 3300 miles, God knows what they'll be allowed to do. With that being said, this is going to be the first episode of many to come when we talk about the circumstances and so on. For Islamic terrorism or any just terrorism in general, it's important to really understand the cost of uncertainties, their tactics, their strategies, their morals, their grievances.
So then that better solutions such as pushing a non government organization to actually do their job and assist the people in their global developments, we were able to better understand and then prepare and address the notions of uncertainties. This is again and I look forward to our next discussions. Until next time.