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For a long time in climate politics, the question has been, what path do we need to be on to avert absolute catastrophe? And are we on it? Or do we have any chance of being on it? And the big win here in the past couple of years in America was the Inflation Reduction Act, $370 billion of the largest renewable energy investment ever.
To build the infrastructure of decarbonization. To build solar panels, wind turbines, electric vehicles, and so much more. Was it as much as climate advocates hoped? No.
Was it more than we've ever done before? Yeah, by a lot. Was it working to pull investment forward? Yet absolutely was.
And now it's been gutted in the big, beautiful bill. President Trump won the election, and he has slashed into the wind credits, the solar credits, the EV credits, to the winner-go-this-boils. So what path are we on now? And what does climate politics need to learn from this loss?
Are we just sort of courting catastrophe? Or do we actually still have a shot? Try and help me answer these questions. I want to have on two people who were involved, not just in the Inflation Reduction Act, not just in the lobbying effort against the big, beautiful bill, but who are doing really important work on both the modeling and the politics side to try to figure out where the climate movement goes from here.
Jesse Jenkins is a professor at Princeton. He leads the ZERO Lab on campus. And with his teams, he's been one of the leading climate modelers trying to figure out how much these policies will actually do. Jane Flakel is the executive director of the Blue Horizons Foundation, and she's a member of the Biden Administration's Climate Policy Team.
As always, my email is reclencho at nmytimes.com. Jane Flakel, Jesse Jenkins, welcome to the show. Thanks, good to be back. Thanks for having us.
So Jane, you worked on the Inflation Reduction Act's Clean Energy Investments incentives as part of the Biden Administration. So I think the place to begin is more than most important parts of that bill from perspective. Yeah, so as far as climate is concerned, I think there are two broad buckets of interventions that the Inflation Reduction Act made. One was the tax policy of that bill.
There was a technology neutral, clean electricity tax credit, both for production and investment in clean energy technologies that was extended basically into perpetuity, like until a long time. But what was unique about that was historically we had had these sort of fits and starts of very short term tax credit incentives for solar and wind that kept expiring and then coming back up for a new one, we'd have a legislative fight if should they be extended or not, which is that kind of uncertainty is on an environment in which private capital can make smart positions about investing in energy technologies. So the IRA really rationalized the clean energy tax credit scheme by making it technology neutral so it's not just solar and wind, it's any zero emissions technology from solar to wind to geothermal to nuclear could qualify. There was also tax subsidies for purchase of electric vehicles, which accounted for a very significant chunk of emissions reductions for advanced manufacturing, so building factories in the United States to build the component parts that make up these clean energy technologies.
So a series of subsidies essentially for investment and production in clean energy technologies. That was thing one. Thing two was a series of grant programs, which are in some way sort of the charismatic megafauna of the bill because it's like, you know, discrete grants going to discrete projects all across the country, not sort of vague tax interventions that are unleashing capital. But you mean example, this charismatic megafauna.
There was a grant program called the greenhouse gas reduction fund at EPA that funded really incredible, you know, install solar panels on the roof of a school in disadvantaged community, which is like a great thing to do for lots of reasons. But if you compare the emissions impact of even the sum total of all of those grant projects to what we anticipate the emissions impact of subsidizing solar power for the private sector to deploy at scale, it's not even close. This is the tax subsidies to do way more to bend the curve on emissions reductions. So Jesse, you did a ton of modeling on the inflation reduction act.
So what were the targets we were trying to hit and where were we in terms of what we were on pace to hit them prior to the BBB? Yeah. I mean, the basic target we're trying to hit is to get our greenhouse gas emissions to the point where whatever we're emitting is being canceled out by some kind of removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, other greenhouse gases, that's the net zero target. President Biden set that target as 2050 to get to net zero and then set an interim target of cutting emissions to half of our peak levels by 2030.
Our estimates were that from the REP project, which I run where the inflation reduction act, the infrastructure law that passed under the Biden administration and then the set of regulatory policies that they also implemented collectively would have gotten us about half of the way. So it was kind of two steps forward. Now we're taking a big step back, but we should have been taking four steps forward. If we were on track for those kinds of targets.
So I want to sell this down. So the inflation reduction act on paper would have gotten us halfway to Joe Biden's goal. The inflation reduction act and the other set of bills. Yeah, it's kind of full total of policies.
Okay. Bidenism would have gotten us halfway to Biden's goal. So then we're actually implementing this. What matters is not the words on the page, but are you actually building solar panels?
Are you building wind turbines? How is deployment implementation going? Yeah, solar batteries have been smashing new records each year since the IRA passed. And so that's going as intended.
Wind power is continuing to struggle to get back even to record levels that it reached in circa 2020 when we built about 15 gigawatts a year of wind. That's enough for 10 million households per year. We are only building about six or seven gigawatts a year now. So like half of that level.
We haven't making pretty good progress on electric vehicle adoption. And there we have seen a pretty substantial degree of market transformation. When the IRA passed, it was basically just Tesla. That was it.
Now we have a pretty competitive broad set of entries, dozens of different vehicles on the market. Some of those have now reached a point where they're at least profitable on paper like GM. That's a key threshold to get to. And I think just the sort of societal penetration of EVs is at a much higher level.
Now we're probably everybody knows somebody that has an electric vehicle or has seen them driving around. So that's sort of a long-term and dellable impact of that degree of penetration. So those are going relatively close to on track, basically, of what we were modeling. I think that EVs are a little bit slower than intended, partly because Tesla has become a bit controversial and it's not so many as many as intended.
And then Wind has been falling behind while solar kind of picks up a bit of that slack. So that's where we were prior-ish to the election. Yeah. The Elum Shumpt wins the election.
In great news for climate, he becomes very close with Elon Musk who runs electric vehicle companies. So green shoots there. You get the big, beautiful bill. What does that do to that set of programs?
What is gone? What is left? Yeah. And what sort of new problems have emerged?
Yeah. So, and Josti should jump in here because he's in the weeds probably more than anyone I know. But the most significant damage in that bill for clean energy was to solar and wind specifically where the Republicans were quite punitive actually, which really shortened the timeline for solar and wind. Anyone who's tried to build a large scale piece of energy infrastructure will tell you the work and time to get even to commence construction takes years.
I mean, it's a very long process. So what it means is that that tax incentive is no longer sending a long-term signal to the market that there will be incentives for them to build. Instead, we have this like mad rush to try to get to commence construction. Okay.
So we've just decided to as best we can wreck the solar and wind industries going forward. I mean, they even tried to go beyond that with the initial Senate draft adding in a new tax, not just ending the tax cuts that basically lowered the cost of wind and solar by somewhere between 30 and 50%. So we just like raised taxes 50% on wind and solar are our biggest forms of new electricity generation. They're actually proposed in excise tax on top of that to further penalize wind and solar beyond 2027.
That bit was at least removed at the last minute. But you can see there was a very strong and concerted effort from a kind of ideological contingent of the Republican Party that ran into a bit of a more pragmatic contingent of the party that was like, hey, wait a minute, electricity demand is growing rapidly. These technologies are contributing to our supply. They're keeping energy across low.
They're driving investment districts. Like, we don't want to cut this off immediately. Over 20 House members, half a dozen senators standing up to defend tax credits implemented in a partisan Democrat-only budget bill vocally and repeatedly. You know, the president telling them not to do that.
And so there are factions at play here. And unfortunately, the ideological contingent went out there. What is gene ideological contingent? I know you were involved in mobilization around defeating the added tax on wind and solar.
What was even the argument for taxing wind and solar specifically, right? You will cut tax on corporations. But specifically, if you want to build wind turbines or lay down solar panels, you face a new tax. The people are arguing for that.
How did they try to justify it? Okay. Let me, I think one thing that I have learned throughout this process is that climate politics is inseparable from all of our other politics. So going back to the election, I think part of what happened here was we passed the IRA on a purely Democrat.
It was a Democrat-only bill. So we live in a world now that you're quite familiar with where when that happens, there is a tendency to turn off the polarization on whatever is in the demi-bill right on the other side of the aisle. So I do think like this bill was framed as Biden's signature climate achievement. It's not in some ways surprising that the Republicans wanted to tear it down.
And in fact, we haven't talked as much about what's survived, which we should get to. But before we get into what's survived, it's just, so what you're saying, and this is what I saw, but you can tell me if you think it's wrong, just when it started became political culture war issues. And it's under the degree of electric vehicles as well, which also have their tax credits, the tax cuts for EVs and September 30th of this year as well, which is even shorter than the initial proposal. So that has to be went on that got shorter and shorter.
So the tax credits for wind, solar, and EVs gone. Gone. Gone. What's left?
Lots of stuff actually. So President Trump, who has a lot of authority in that party, called for full repeal of the green news scam. That's not what happened. So I do think that's an important thing because I've devoted my entire life to climate.
That would have been an unthinkable outcome to me even four years ago. If you had told me Dem's passed a Demonly climate bill, Trump tells everyone to repeal the full thing. And a significant chunk survives. So we mentioned that they tried to rationalize a clean energy tax incentive program by allowing any zero emissions technology to qualify.
Basically, any technology that can claim that it is zero emissions still can get this production or investment tax credit for clean energy. And through the end of 20, it's commencing instruction to the end of 2033, they get the full credit and then it steps down a couple more years. So basically Republicans just endorsed a decade long tax credit for carbon free electricity. So not wind and solar.
Wind and solar cannot get everything but wind and solar. Any nuclear plant in the advanced geothermal plant diffusion works, that'll qualify. I generally found this to be a puzzling part of Republican energy policy, which is I can almost understand as a matter of culture war, we are for fossil fuel energy and against renewables and energy. But there seems to be a particular thing of wind and solar.
But at the same time, some of them embrace at least an openness to nuclear, which I kind of get because a lot of our mentors don't like it. So maybe Republicans do like it. But then more technology forward, less mature technologies, advanced geothermal, green hydrogen, et cetera, those have maintained a kind of neutrality in the political war here. Is that basically?
I think that's basically true. And I think the reasons for it. So the culture war stuff is one. I think it is worth noting that part of the reason there was a larger target on solar and wind is because they are mature technologies that are being widely deployed because it makes economic sense.
So those tax credits look expensive as a matter of fiscal scoring, right? Whereas tax credits for more innovative technologies tend to not look expensive because no one thinks they're going to get built in the next 10 years. Well also then, to steel man, the Republican position here, there's a version of it that goes something like this. Wind and solar are more mature technologies.
They are by virtually any measure now competitive with other forms of energy. EVs are fairly mature technology. If we wanted cheaper electric vehicles, we don't need a tax credit. We could just open our borders to Chinese electric vehicles.
Which Republicans are certainly keen on doing. Which they don't want to do. But the arguments basically do not need to subsidize these technologies. Why is that wrong?
Having abundant electrons that we can use to fuel economic growth and meet rising demand for energy in the United States, which is happening for the first time in decades, is a public good. We subsidize all kinds of energy development because we know that a robust and large and abundant energy system is good for economic growth. It underpins the entire economy. So in a good for our national security.
So there even if you didn't care about climate change, given that solar in particular, solar and batteries are the most rapid way and in many cases the most cost effective way to meet growing demand, there's absolutely a public argument for subsidizing the stuff. Even if it's relatively mature in the same way we subsidize all kinds of things that are relatively mature because they're good for society. Then of course, an argument is most Republicans will not deny that climate change is a problem. Some do, but many Republicans now will acknowledge climate change is a problem.
They'll just argue for a different kind of solutions that Democrats. If you believe climate change is a problem, then you're subsidizing not just the public good of abundant energy that's affordable, but also the climate benefit. What is the solution set? I try to be fair to Republicans on the show, but I have not heard many Republicans argue for something that I would qualify to be as a solution set for climate change.
So when you say that, what do you think? Yeah, I mean insufficiently ambitious for sure. But the IIJ, the bipartisan infrastructure law, actually contained a fair amount of investments in clean energy technologies that Republicans supported. So clean hydrogen hubs, direct air capture, spending, spending on storage, carbon capture, like a fair amount of technology investment on more kind of innovation-oriented view.
Where it gets much harder is on anything that is very seriously about deploying mature clean energy technologies at scale or regulatory mandates that would achieve that aim and or restrict fossil fuels. Yeah, I mean, I think there's a challenge here, which is that what we see from the Republican party is they tend to support the technologies that are less mature. And you can argue that that's sort of a rational technology policy strategy. There's a case to be supporting innovative technologies as they mature and come down in cost.
And I've supported that case for years. But there's also, I worry that the reason they're doing that is because they're not a direct threat to incumbent energy industries. So what is driving down consumption of gasoline is the adoption of electric and hybrid vehicles. What is driving down the consumption of natural gas in the United States is the growth of wind and solar in the power sector.
And so when they become large competitive threats, then you have different factions in the Republican party, you know, standing up to defend the oil and gas industry, channeling the advice from donors and politically connected folks in those industries to try to attack their competitors. You have an ideological culture war element of this that, you know, well, liberals like these technologies, we have to hate them. And in this case, unfortunately, I think Donald Trump is much more strongly aligned with the culture war piece of it and probably a lot more susceptible to input from the fossil fuel aligned donors and members. And that went out over the more pragmatic block.
One thing that was part of the whole political theory of the inflation reduction act was we were going to pull on all this investment in factories and clean energy. And that was both going to generate economic activity, but it was going to generate jobs. And it did seem something that investment was coming forward. So what did we achieve on that?
And then what do we think will happen to those factories before planning, to those people who are getting hired? Yeah, it's a great question. I mean, there has been more than $100 billion worth of investment in clean energy related supply chains and factories in the US as a result of the IRA. Much of that has already started to get built.
And the EV investment has been huge with the US out investing China and all other countries in 2024. Like this was working on the global competitiveness context. Like we were mounting a competitive defense. And now that's being undermined by these policies.
I mean, I do think that the 45X tax credit for manufacturing was the same, which tells you something about it's probably popular. But to Jesse's point, the demand pull for the widgets we are manufacturing got totally taken away. The demand pull being the subsidy for EVs. So like actually, Rodeum Group found that US demand for EVs by 2030 when most of the manufacturing is online will be less than half of what it was before this Republican bill because of the termination of the EV tax credits and the rollback of the clean vehicle regulations.
If demand totally craters for the products these factories are now being incentivized to produce. It's entirely plausible that we have now. And I do think part of the reason the 45X manufacturing tax credit stuck around was because people saw it as like very discreetly tied to a tax credit. And they wanted to save that tax credit.
But industrial strategy is not just about the supply side. You know, it's about the other side. This is a place where what happened last couple of months just feels so strange to me. So Elon Musk becomes so close to Trump that he seems to be co-president in the early weeks and months of the administration when liberal protesters want to target the right wing coalitions, great vulnerability, maybe even protesting outside Tesla distributors.
Donald Trump does like a Tesla infomercial on the lawn of the White House. They still keep all of the policy wrecking the EV credits. And now of course, whether it's because of that or not, I'm skeptical that's why I must go with Trump. But now obviously Musk is on the outs and saying he'll start an American party.
But they're almost in like this moment where if there could have been one good thing out of the Elon Musk Donald Trump Alliance, it would have been Trump softening a bit on electric vehicles, musk selling electric vehicles to Republicans. But instead it's like the Republican in tip of the electric vehicles was much stronger than the Trump Musk Alliance. And that's the thing that held. It also was true that Elon was not advocating for retaining the EV.
Yes, that's why I don't believe that's what they have their relationship. Musk seemed perfectly willing to like Tesla on fire. Whatever it was you want to say about Elon Musk's politics, Tesla was America's most capable national champion in electric vehicles. It was a world leading, world being company.
They only completely convinced this company. But now it has destroyed its reputation among the people who buy its cars here and in Europe. So when you think about what's going to happen to the most capable American manufactured electric vehicles versus the Chinese manufacturers, it doesn't support from Trump. It is lost support among liberals here and again in Europe.
And it's getting crushed by competition in China. And the Chinese cars are good. So good, we can't let them in here. Because we're terrified that it would just take over our market functionally instantly.
If we let them in here, they would be the cheapest electric cars on the market. That's right. And so we just ended this whole Elon Musk Donald Trump saga with like American a much weaker position in one of these central industries we were trying to keep with China. Exactly.
I mean, all the talk about how tough Trump is on China, Biden had left our EV system in a much stronger position and Trump and Musk collaborated to destroy it. Absolutely. I mean, beyond how depressing the big stack of actors is on the climate side, and this is the other I think the lasting legacy of this bill, there's all kinds of other anti-China provisions that they threw into all the other tax credits we haven't talked about. Like you now have to basically demonstrate that there's no Chinese content in your supply chain to get any of the remaining tax credits that persisted.
But you can't compete globally by just throwing up walls to Chinese influencer Chinese competition. You have to actually have a domestic competitor strategy. And there isn't one right now. AI was supposed to take work off your plate.
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See website for details. We've talked about the ways in which this bill gutted wind solar electric vehicles. What did the bill do and what have been other Trump administration moves to accelerate the construction of fossil fuel infrastructure to try to help coal? Right.
Is there anything on the other side of that ledger? There's a real wackadoodle coal thing in the GOP law, which is there is now a production tax credit for metallurgical coal, which is really nonsensical on just about every front. Not least because if you're concerned about China and or the domestic steel industry, metallurgical coal is by and large exported, much of which is exported to China. You want to say about metallurgical coal?
It's coal that's used mostly for industrial processes for power generation. Largely steel production. So we are now subsidizing American metallurgical coal to be shipped to China, so they can make cheap and dirty steel, which they dump on global markets that undercuts American steel producers. I mean, this is by no means the worst thing in this one big term bill, but it is just a glaring example of how backwards the policy is and how much we get to get away.
It's in the last 40. It's a tiny subsidy. It's two and a half percent and it's only in place for a few years. So it is absolutely not going to affect any investment decisions to like expand US metallurgical coal production.
It's just a straight giveaway to whoever owns those coal mines. And so we're subsidizing coal production while raising taxes on clean energy production. It's hard to swallow that for sure. You said earlier that the IRA and the other the associate legislation got us a 50 percent of the internets your target just beautiful life.
What is the model saying now? Yes, our estimates that are under the current, you know, by neuro policies, we're on track to get to about 40 to 43 percent below peak emissions levels. Now we're probably going to be on the order of 20 to 24 percent below by 20 to 30, maybe closing it on, you know, 28 percent by 25. So cut about half.
Yeah, so cut about half of the progress that we've made. Okay, that's actually helpful. Can I actually say one thing here without repeating talking points that sometimes climate deniers and delayers use, it is absolutely important that the US reduces its emissions. Very rapidly.
It's a moral imperative. It's important for demonstrating to the world that a developed economy can decarbonize without major sacrifice. That is important that leadership is important. And the US is going to be like 13 percent of emissions.
All of the emissions are going to come from non-OECD economies that are developing. So one way to think about the US's role in addressing climate is to actually take a step back and think like it's not just about us decreasing our internal emissions as rapidly as possible. That is an important piece of it. But the investments in the innovative technologies that are going to represent 40 percent of the global emissions reductions, we now have a policy framework in the US for those more innovative technologies where we have an opportunity to actually lead in innovating, building, and deploying those things and importantly, diffusing them internationally.
So I get a little about the modeling anyway. I love just saying it's important, but I get a little bit. It's also a model over here. Yeah, like, okay, enough.
But I do think in debates about democratic politics and strategy, there's been a lot of conversation about impulses of the coalition toward maximalism. And climate has this thing where it has been framed as a physical scientific problem where there are hard limits. If we do not fully solve the problem and get to net zero emissions or get there by some deadline, or in the next 10 years, if we don't keep one and a half degrees, the plan is going to fall off a cliff. That is a scientifically incorrect.
It is true that there are uncertainties in the climate system, but every degree of warming, every fraction of a degree of warming that we don't cause matters, it matters a lot for the risk of climate change. And I kind of think that there's a way in which we framed this such that it encourages that kind of impulse among the Democratic Party to sort of say it's all or nothing. Like, progress is not worth considering because we have to solve this problem completely in the next five years or the planet is doomed. That is just not true.
And that also contributes I think to a mindset that well, we just suffered this big political loss. It's a truly substantive step backwards. Some people are not like, well, now we're done. Like we've lost it's over.
Like there's nothing we can do. We're going to run out of time. And that's not how it works. Let me try to get at how I understood the targets because you're of course right that every degree matters.
There is no on off switch for climate risk. But the way that this has been talked about almost universally within the climate movement, what I understood by an incident zero targets to mean, what I understood all of your modeling to mean is that the scientific community, everyone to define that, has looked at all its models, looked at all its research and described zones that are of really frightening levels of climate risk. No, that's actually not what the science says. And it's a huge communication failure.
That's communication failure. It's just to me a little bit like I can't tell the difference here between every degree matters. And we have been scaring you all unscientifically for decades in order to get you move faster. But now that moving slower, don't worry too much.
I wasn't scaring people with that kind of rhetoric. I mean, so the science is very clear. Get there as fast as possible. We're already seeing dangerous climate change around us today.
So the idea that there's sort of some safe zone and some dangerous zone and there's a threshold between the two is just not scientifically true. And the IPCC has never said that. There's no consensus in the scientific documents that frame it that way. What they've said is that every degree involves increasing risk.
And that's true. And so we have a sense of urgency. We want to make as much progress as possible as rapidly as possible. But that's what the science says.
And the as possible part, that's what politics and technology and society has to determine. And there's no science that says what that is. That's all us trying to hash this out and model through as best we can. There's social science.
Well, sorry. Sorry. Sorry. Well, give me the social science perspective, Jane.
The way that I've been thinking about this lately because all of what Jesse said is right. And one of the reasons that I remain very anxious about climate risk is because there is a lot of uncertainty in the climate system. There are things we don't yet understand. While it is true that our emissions trajectories seem to be improving relative to what they thought we would be.
And I can say more about that in a minute. How the climate will respond to those emissions and importantly what the potential for positive, which are actually negative feedback loops in the climate system might be or tipping points, which is another set of concerns. There's a lot of uncertainty about those things. And it's scary.
So like, and we don't know. But the point is that we don't know where they are. So like, I've been thinking about it as like a race between feedback loops, kind of it's like a race of like the positive but bad feedback loops in the climate system and the feedback loops that we've been trying to cultivate politically, where you're driving down the cost of technology is building political will. And that's the problem.
When you said a minute ago, I want to make sure we don't forget this that we are seeing somewhat better outcomes than we might have feared at the levels of warming that we're currently experiencing just expanding. I think most people have heard that. Yeah. What I actually mean is not that the impacts are better than we thought.
It's that our emissions themselves are not as high as we predicted them to be. That's largely because we've seen such rapid cost declines in these technologies and wide scale deployment of these technologies. The world is decarbonizing faster than we thought that it would. But the climate is not responding in the ways that we predicted that it would.
When you say the climate is not responding, you're referring to the fact that things have been extraordinarily hot. Yeah. Things are warming much more rapidly. And this is where you got to get Zeke on the show.
But there's lots of- Zeke's father who's an excellent climate modeler. Yeah. So like, we're trying to figure out what's causing that more rapid warming climate response. But the thing that we can definitely control is bending the emissions trajectory down, which we've been more successful at than we thought we would be.
All right. So it's another dimension of how the world is changing. It seems important here. So Jesse and I used to talk a lot about the basic theory of decarbonization, was we're going to electrify everything we can possibly electrify.
That's going to mean we need a lot more electricity. We're going to hopefully generate that electricity using clean sources. And then we're going to lay down a bunch of transmission lines to get that electricity where it's going to need to go. When people modeled how much electricity we would need, they were thinking about the trends as they existed in 2015 and 2018 and 2020.
But now AI has become this absolutely massive consumer of electricity. So how has that changed the amount of electricity we are projecting that we will need in the next five, 10 years? Our latest estimate is when we account for the reduced electrification due to the end of these tax cuts for heat pumps and for EVs and other things due to the Republican tax bill and the addition of data centers and AI to our forecasts. We're expecting electricity demand to grow at a sustained rate of about 2% per year over the next decade.
That's an increase of about 25% through 25% from current levels. That's a lot of additional electricity. So that's like more than our entire nuclear fleet, additional generation. No, that's all demand growth, of which AI is probably about a quarter of that.
And so it's big. It's an added trend and it's increasing the challenge that we face in the power sector when it comes to decarbonization, which is twofold. It's to both meet all of that demand growth with clean electricity sources so we don't dig a deeper hole while simultaneously reducing our reliance on fossil fuels for power generation. We're still going to do that but not as much as we thought.
In fact, our estimates are that we're going to lose about a nuclear fleet's worth of clean generation that would have been added if we'd sustained tax cuts for wind and solar through 2035. That goes away. However, we're still going to see wind and solar meet most of that demand growth. Probably all of it on net.
It's just that we're not going to eat as deeply into our existing coal fleet. So we're going to be more expensive than it would have been if we had retained the credits in the IR. We're basically taxing our most widely deployed energy supply. The one other thing about the demand though, that's worth noting, that's different about the broader economy-wide electrification demand is the AI demand is going to happen fast.
It's also big localized consumption of a city scale in one spot, which has opposed EVs, which are diffused over a while. There's a particular challenge for the grid, particularly the transmission grid. I know people who are big nerds on energy, not as big as you, but big. Who tell me that they are worried now about the grid being able to hold up, that they're worried in the next 5, 10 years about outages, about blackouts, about different kinds of grid failures because we're adding so much of such a different kind of electricity demand.
How do you think about that interaction between the grid we have and the energy we're about to need? I think that's certainly a risk. We're going to see demand growing rapidly. If we can't grow supply rapidly enough, then the risk is twofold.
One energy prices are going to go up because supply is not keeping pace with demand. And the risk of outages goes up because we might have this sort of normal demands met, but if things go out of sample, we get an extreme heatwave or an extreme cold event or something like that happens. We have far less slack in the system to absorb that if we haven't added enough new supply. What the Republicans have basically done is ensure that we're going to deploy less new electricity, that the new electricity we deploy is more expensive, and that because of that, we rely more on existing coal and gas plants that we're otherwise used.
So we're going to be paying more for nuclear electricity and paying more to use dirty old power plants and raising the risk that we're not able to keep up with demand growth, all because we've raised taxes on the most important sources of new electricity. You just heard it this a minute ago, but we've been talking a lot about the effect of all this on decarbonization. What about the effect on the energy bills people pay? Yeah, I mean, this is really quite brutal.
I don't know if I have the numbers on the top of my head, but there have been a bunch of analyses that large electricity buyers and others have done, independent analysts, of the impact on electricity rates associated with repeal of the IRA, and they are significant and they vary across the country. But in some cases, I think it's like, it's on the order of like 15% on average, 15% increase in retail bills. But of course, that can be 2% in some states and 30% in other states. It's quite substantial.
I mean, it's really quite bad. And we're in a moment, as you know, where affordability and cost of living is quite top of mind for the president, but also for everybody. The other thing that's going to happen though is we're deploying less electric vehicles, we're going to consume more gasoline nationally and diesel, and that's going to drive up prices at the pump too. The estimates are that could be on the order of 5% increase in gasoline prices.
So another way to think about it is Republicans just voted for a 5% gas tax by slowing the deployment of EVs. And so none of this stuff makes good economic sense, even if you don't care about climate, especially if you care about the affordability challenge. And so I do think it's going to exacerbate something Jane and I've talked about a lot. The next wave of energy politics, I think, is going to be centered around affordability and the rising stress of meeting energy bills.
Our estimates are from REFI project that energy bills will go up by about $280 per household per year in 2035, again, with a lot of variation across households. That's like a 13% increase in how much we pay for energy, both utility bills and gasoline and heating. Anything Jane about the politics of affordability here on the Democratic or climate concern side, because it's always been attention. On the one hand, you want to care about affordability, right?
You want energy to be affordable for people who need it. And on the other, if you are trying to face out a bunch of fossil fuel infrastructure, that's not just a relentless race for the cheapest energy possible, you are making energy on the margin more expensive by trying to face all this out and move us on to renewables. Yeah. Yeah.
I mean, the politics of those things are bad and brutal. And we should be very honest with ourselves about this. I mean, one of the lessons going into the IRA, and I think coming out of it is that there is a mythology that there are a silent walk of climate voters that represent the majority of the American public who are willing to sacrifice in the name of climate. And while I may wish that to be true, it is obviously not true.
We have run the experiment many times now. I think for solar wind and batteries, the most important thing we can do going forward if we take affordability seriously, and we take climate seriously, is remove all of the non-market barriers to deploying this stuff as rapidly as possible everywhere. And that's going to be tough for the environmental movement. Those are not market barriers.
There are very significant challenges around planning and transmission planning and citing we just don't really do it. Well, there are huge issues with permitting that you will be not unfamiliar with both at the federal level and frankly, a ton of state and local. I mean, you have renewable energy projects fighting at county commissions everywhere across the US and often losing and you have localities and counties just banning the building of clean energy projects. So here's a frustration I had with the Biden administration.
I would talk to people in it. You were in it. We didn't have this conversation that much, but I had it with your colleagues. And they knew all these problems.
The only permitting reform they ever backed was this sort of half-hearted backing of Joe Manchin's side cardiels that was not their ideal permitting reform. And of course, I'm poisoned in the eyes of the progressives because it was what Joe Manchin wanted and it would clear out way for this pipeline and so on. But they never, in fact, the Democrats in Congress really didn't propose this is what we think the ideal permitting system to accelerate clean energy climate would look like. If you were writing that bill, Jane, what would you write in it?
Well, I think one thing to say is that Texas is quite a good example of where this has gone reasonably well. So just looking at Texas, we're to take a couple of lessons here. One thing is that Texas, unlike many other markets in the United States, has done very proactive transmission planning. So they had these, it was a chrez, clean, renewable energy zones.
And they did, by the way, under George W. Bush and Perry. So that's that. We should be doing that across the country.
Which is basically saying we know where the renewable potential is. We don't need to wait for a developer to come and say, hey, I'd like to connect to the grid. Just build the big highway out there and let people connect the on-ramps. And that's what they did and it worked very well.
So they created the transmission infrastructure before they built the energy. Exactly. Yeah. There is also, I think, easier interconnection processes, which is getting more attention now.
There are more than 1000 gigawatts of clean energy projects. I mean, maybe they're not all real, but they're waiting to be connected and cannot get connected. And we haven't even really done the work to fully diagnose the problem, but a part of it is just automating the application process. Let's have this done.
Every energy one talks about this endlessly. I don't think it makes any sense when a normal person is it. When we are talking about the problems in these interconnection queues, what are we talking about? Basically, if you want to connect to the power grid, because the physics of the power grid is complicated and it's all connected and we don't want the grid to ever fail, they have to basically run a study to make sure that under any conditions that you're connected to the grid, you're not going to cause a problem.
You're not going to cause something to blow out and some cascading failure. And right now, those studies are meticulously done by individual highly skilled power engineers. We were in short supply and they can take years more than the hour times more than three years, which is just insane. Could chat GPT do you could not, but a chat agent could run all the simulations and then a smart power engineer could assess them at the end of the day, right?
Like we can make these limited skilled positions super powered with AI. And in fact, that's exactly what's happening now, because this has become such an issue just recently. I do think there's a lot of like politics of why this hasn't been solved because basically the incumbents in the industry like having high barriers to entry to new competitors. But as demand has started to grow rapidly, as capacity prices prices to bring on new electricity spiked in one of the biggest power markets in the country.
And that's driving now 20% rate hikes in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, Maryland. It's become very politically salient. You've got Governor Shapiro in Pennsylvania, like suing the grid operator, be like, hey, do a better job. And you've got large data centers being like, hey, we'd like to connect in three months, not in three years.
All of a sudden, now that they've got this pressure, the grid operator is like, oh, actually, we could do this in three months. So we could be doing this much faster. We should be. And I don't frankly think we should stand for anything longer than a few months to complete that process.
So that's one thing. Also, just like straight up permitting issues. I mean, one advantage Texas does have on this run is they have basically no federal land. So that is helpful in permitting.
But in general, they just have much lax or kind of friendly to industry regulations on permitting new energy projects in Texas. And that certainly helps. They also have, and this is like well beyond the bounds of my expertise, but the structure of their particular electricity market tends to be much friendlier to new entrants and building a new generation. It's highly competitive and easy to get into the market, basically.
But I think what's frustrating to me, Candidly, is like, we have ample evidence now. Many of these are mature technologies that we both say as a climate movement, these are the cheapest and easiest things to build. And then when it comes to getting serious about why it's not happening at the rate it needs to happen, it does raise some difficult questions for our own coalition around balancing conservation objectives and community engagement processes with our decarbonization rules. And for that reason, I think there's just been a lot of hesitancy around leaning in on this stuff.
And if we're being honest, like any deal that happens federally on this stuff is probably going to have to apply, not just preferentially to clean energy technologies, right? It will probably be like a truly all of the above permitting regime. But the thing is, if you look at currently all energy projects in the US that have competed environmental impact statements underneath, for instance, over the last decade, clean energy dominates fossil projects. Like it would almost undoubtedly advantage clean energy over fossil.
Yeah, just in the power sector, 95% of the new capacity we're adding to the grid right now and over the next couple of years is wind solar and batteries, 95%. And so just making it easier to build period will structurally advantage building clean energy. But it's a good thing to think, the climate change is an emergency and we have to solve it in seven years. And you think the primary way to do that is to block all fossil infrastructure?
Why would you take that deal? This is why I think the misunderstanding of the climate problem and the science of the problem has been really problematic for this kind of agenda. So I want to say that we just said that you're saying that the climate movement sort of trained itself on the idea that the thing we have to do is keep the dirty energy on the ground and stop all new fossil infrastructure from being built because that would dig us a deeper hole and lock in these assets and proposals that would make it much, much easier to build energy of all kinds, even though it would disproportionately lead to clean energy being built, sort of runs a foul of that intuition that there was, I always saw this in the fight over the mansion, the various mansion bills. There was much more activation around like this one big pipeline than there was excitement over the much bigger and total emissions impact, changes to transmission line permitting and citing and authorities.
But I want to hold here on the bottom of the session for a minute. What you just said a minute ago is probably right that any big deal that I've had to have been in all the above, because you would have meted Republican votes, given that the structure of commerce. But that's often true at the end of a process. There could have been a proposal on this is what we would like it to look like.
This is what we think progressive or liberal or democratic permitting reform would look like. And yes, now we need to get into negotiations and there's going to be course trading and concessions. How come I never saw that? I think there were very smart people working very much behind the scenes, but I think there was a real fear.
I think frankly, probably a misguided fear, although I understand why people had it, that sticking your neck out on this publicly in any way as a self-proclaimed climate champion, you would be tormented, basically, if you did this. And you might lose funding and if you're an environmental organization, you might be viewed as an enemy of environmental justice. And that's brutal. That's a deeply unfunposition to be in.
And we haven't yet. I think it's a reflection of the fact that we have not yet successfully built an environmental or a climate movement that creates the permission structure or incentive to really lean in on this stuff. I mean, like you've written about this as the environmental movement that provided most of the horsepower to date for climate politics and climate policy was built to stop bad stuff, not to build good stuff. And there's been a recognition of that for years.
I mean, Bill McKibben, who is a big proponent of the sort of maximalist approach in many ways to climate politics, also recognizes that the only way we solve the problems to build lots of stuff. He's trying to figure out how to activate people around, coming to county commissions and fighting for wind farms or solar farms now, right? But this is a big shift for that kind of political coalition. And it's going to require, basically, cleaning the slate and starting from scratch in many ways to build institutions and processes that are fit for purpose.
And that's going to remove some of the key tools that environmental groups have been and are still using to stop the bad stuff. And that's just a really difficult coalition of politics to navigate. So I think you're right to finger this as the area where the Biden administration fell short in proposing something even to date, congressional Democrats have not proposed a comprehensive pro-abundance energy permitting reform proposal that could be used to anchor further discussion with Republicans going forward. I think they should.
Let me grab two other pieces of that. So one, which has come up a few times here is the planning capacity. I think oftentimes people hear the sort of arguments for pro-energy abundance permitting and all the hears and de-regulatory dimensions in all of my reporting on this. There need to be more bodies and capacity.
There's like the question of various kinds of environmental reviews, which both have, which both raise the question of do we need such intensive environmental reviews on things that we know to be an energy, but also raises question of do we have the people needed to create and then respond to all the environmental reviews ping pong back and forth from the states and the government and so on. How about that dimension of it? What would it look like to add state capacity to the planning functions and implementation functions? There's a lot of these things to get built.
To be fair, the IRA did include actually a billion dollars of enhanced funding for all of the agencies involved in the review. Well, it was spent under the last years. Ideally, that would be like an ongoing appropriation. But that's just one piece of this broader mess.
I mean, my view of this is that we should be thinking about creating a one-stop process for all federal approvals required for these pieces of key national infrastructure. And that process should have a finite length. And it should not necessarily be a thumbs up decision every time, right? But as long as it's a clear, short decision and it is appropriately staffed to do that job well, then industry can go in and make the best case for the project and get an answer pretty quickly.
And if the answer is no, they can pivot to the next project. And so it's not that we need to disregard all environmental impact. It's that we need to make these processes streamline, centralize, and fast. So you can get a thumbs up or thumbs down decision that can't be dragged out in court for 50 years or 30 years.
What like the Department of Commerce creates this strategic infrastructure agency? Sure. I mean, we didn't electrify the country to begin with by just tweaking existing regulatory institutions. We created whole new agencies, created publicly owned utilities, we created, you know, rural electrification loan programs.
Like we have to be that creative if we want to be building at scale a new set of infrastructure across the country. Like the Department of Defense today announced a quite muscular industrial policy intervention to basically like take equity, stem meaningful equity stakes in a domestic critical minerals company. Yeah, to produce rarest for electric motors and defense. There's a version of this agenda on permitting, on planning, and industrial policy that is actually not deregulatory, that is really about a much more muscular and centralized state.
I mean, look, I worked in the White House. I think like I used to be of the view, like, hire more people to like more state capacity to like do a better job on it. If you do not have the political permission structure, you could just have a lot of people do. Like it doesn't, it actually doesn't matter.
So that actually is the core of the problem. Yeah. I mean, look what they did for the chips, you know, act like trying to build these semiconductor fabs as they recognize that like they weren't going to get their permits done on time to actually build. They were just like, we're just going to reorient this stuff and try to do it very fast and wave a bunch of things.
Yeah, exactly. From the national, the policy. Exactly. If we think it's important as a national priority to build more energy infrastructure to have cheap, affordable, clean electricity to power economic growth to power the industries in the future, we're not going to get there with the status quo.
So it's 2025. It was going to be a midterm election next year. It is very likely or at least very plausible that Democrats won the House. It is less likely to be not totally implausible than they win the Senate, though.
That would be quite hard rough math. But in a world where Democrats have a lever of power. And so that they are now at the Trump administration wants appropriations, Speaker, I came Jeffery, he's got to sign off on it. Before we even talk about like next time Democrats wield unified power, what should be on their agenda for 2027?
Okay, I think as a general matter, kind of even leaving the electoral stuff aside, like if we just took a step back and said, what are the most important things to do in the next few years? Because there's ways to make progress on all of them in most political context, you're just not going to get exactly what you want. Thing one is removed on market barriers to why it's the old deployment of the commercial clean energy tech. I think the permitting bill needs to be a huge priority of the climate movement.
That's the thing we've always thought could be a bipartisan. There would be things liberals don't like in it, but you can imagine a divided government doing major money actually in a way. Like I think the inter-coallational politics within the Democratic Party on this are potentially going to be tough. And the climate movement needs to figure out where they want to land on this, because if you actually care about deploying clean energy rapidly on a scale, we have to do this.
There just is no question. So that's thing one. Thing two, in my view, is the sort of deployment led innovation agenda. So roughly half probably less of global emissions reductions that we're going to see are going to come from not renewables and electric vehicles, all the other stuff that's not yet at commercial scale.
The US is remarkably good at inventing new technologies and demonstrating them. And we're trying to get better at deploying them too. So that's things like technologies in the power sector that generate electricity that are not solar and wind, like advanced nuclear power or geothermal or carbon capture or whatever. I think there's an innovation agenda on that that could garner bipartisan support.
The third pillar, I think, is how do we get serious about diffusing all of these technologies from OECD to non-OECD economies? And even there, I mean, look, what's happening with development funding, a lot of that is clean energy for economic development. So what's happening to development funding as a matter of US politics is deeply disturbing for many reasons. But I do think there may be some opportunity on trade.
We'll see if we better integrate climate into our trade policy. And I think the US is going to be more muscular in its kind of approach to economic statecraft as it relates to energy and supply chains, whether that's countering the rise of China in other countries or whatever. But you'll see that third pillar is not what people typically think of when they think of international climate action. What I'm proposing is something that I think could happen even in a world where it's not run hardly but never runs.
I mean, I think a long-term tax credit, an investment tax credit on the order of 10% for all new carbon free electricity beyond the ones that are less mature and get the higher level currently would make sense from a public policy perspective. I mean, there is a public good value to having more energy per energy. There's a public good value for energy being cleaner. And if we're not going to subsidize it and we're not going to penalize the dirty stuff, it's not going to be provided at the scale that we want.
But that's a much smaller and much less expensive subsidy than the one that was implemented. I don't think we're going to get back to that regime where we're basically covering half of the cost of a winter solar farm for the next decade. One of the areas that I'm most concerned about beyond climate of the impacts of this bill is that it has basically upended the electric vehicle and battery competitiveness strategy that was implemented over the last several years in a pretty thoughtful way to try to counter the rise of China, which is just utterly dominating global markets right now for electric vehicles. We were just at the point where we were starting to see major investment in the US batteries supply chain and electric vehicle deployment.
We were seeing new models, a more competitive market, and our automakers are investing in a real strategy to be competitive in that space. And if you look globally at the future of the auto industry, it's all electric and autonomous. And if you want to do autonomous vehicles, you also need them to be electric for the most part. They have to have a large amount of batteries and onboard power infrastructure to run all the computers and sensors that you need to run in autonomous vehicle.
And China is all in on that stuff. Its entire market is devoted to that now. And the US, if it doesn't find a way to compete in that space, will find itself with an automotive industry that is basically shut off from all other global markets, and that is only supplying a shrinking share of even our own domestic market where internal combustion engine vehicles sales peaked long ago and are only declining. And we just blew that all up.
Our whole industrial strategy there was just basically destroyed by this bill. Something has to replace that. And I do think there is bipartisan interest in having a competitive auto industry and in having the ability to produce batteries. And just look at this executive order around reverse.
Just from a defense-only interest, the future of warfighting will involve batteries everywhere as well. The time is around this piece recently comparing energy and energy-related exports of China and US. And it is really striking. US exports $117 billion in crude oil China, 844 million.
We export $42 billion in natural gas China, 3 billion. It is like you look at the energy of the past and we are way ahead. But then China exports 40 billion in solar panels and modules. We export $69 million worth of it.
They export $65 billion worth of lithium ion batteries. We export $3 billion. They are EV exports are way ahead of ours right now. China has been absolutely going all out to try to win these industries.
Part of the IRA was trying to win some part of them back. And even if you don't care at all about the clean energy implications, it is pretty clear we are growing industries. I look at China and I look at the emergence of what is the first global electrostate. We are basically doubling down now as a petrostate with the Republican strategy.
We should be clear way behind. It is not that we are losing our edge. We are already way behind in these industries. And the IRA and the infrastructure law were pretty concerted efforts to try to get back to a point where we could compete.
And if those are gone, something else has to be there or we are basically giving up. We are unilaterally disarming. You know what, China, go for it. The entire world auto market is yours.
You had signaled that maybe less of innovative technologies we are still funding. There is something that could become a big deal. When you look at those, more nascent technologies, green hydrogen, people are very excited about advanced geothermal a couple years ago. I can't quite tell if that is sustained at the same level.
Hot rocks. Hot rocks. What looks most promising there? If you are really placing bets, what should we be really being thrown ourselves behind?
I do think that advanced geothermal is the most promising thing right now. And it is not surprising that the United States has a better state that is extremely good at drilling wells and has drilled millions of them. What makes advanced geothermal events? So there are two flavors of it.
But the one that is advancing most rapidly is using directional drilling and hydraulic fracturing techniques that were developed originally to extract shale gas and oil are now being applied in a different geology to create different reservoirs, totally engineering design. The same core techniques to create a bunch of fractures in the ground you can circulate water through and extract the heat from the earth. The other strategy is a closed loop geothermal technology and it is on a advisory board of a company that does this called Ever Technologies. They basically just drill lots of out and back loops.
Both of those technologies allow us to build geothermal anywhere we can drill into hot rock. As opposed to needing a kind of natural hot springs type formation of fissures that naturally circulate water, whereas these technologies could allow geothermal to be built at terawatts scale globally. So we could be building hundreds of gigawatts like nuclear fleets worth of advanced geothermal in long-term. And the US has by far the best competitive position in that area because of the strength of our oil and gas industry.
So this could be one where we do have a competitive edge. But it would be nice if we had a longer list than that. I mean advanced nuclear. I don't buy it.
I mean, this is one of the ones where like, yes, maybe talk about it because I think people are just to know is advanced nuclear something I should believe in. Give me the case for advanced. It is. But whether the US can be...
I see. Absolutely. I think Jesse and I are totally agree that advanced nuclear is worth investing in both fusion and fission. What makes it advanced?
Really much smaller, more sort of compartmentalized and contained, slightly different designs, mechanisms to self-cool so that you're not dealing with a large scale cooling infrastructure that you need at generation three plants. Some of them use different coolant loops and things like that. But just, you know, the new flavors of nuclear that we hope will be both inherently safe. And I think more importantly, since the nuclear fleet is already incredibly safe, are hopefully cheaper to build.
And that's the key one. Which is why the smaller is sort of like, can you get economy- serialized version? Serialized version. So you have skepticism with not that the technology is really a step.
No. That's why we would be good. Exactly. And so like the first designs will be approved in the next couple of years.
The first one which just was, but there'll be a few more coming. It just takes years to build these things. So the first demonstration reactors, the first of the kind will come online in 2029 or 30 or 31 or 32. Meanwhile, China is already building them.
Like they have small modular reactors that they're building. They have gas-cooled high-temperature reactors that they're already building. The Koreans are out there selling large-scale reactors and building them in the UAE on time and on budget. You know, the Chinese are offering that now to competitors around the world too.
And so while it is an area where we have a lot of engineering, know-how and a lot of technical capability in the United States and a good investment environment to support innovative firms, we are starting a decade behind. That's my problem. We're starting five to ten years behind our competitors in South Korea and China. And so I hope we can compete there, but it's by no means a slam dunk.
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Conditions apply. See website for details. Two things that I think are more relevant as we go up the risk ladder of climate change. One is that various forms of carbon capture and removal or direct air capture, which I've been involved in, become more salient.
So most of the technologies we're talking about are ways of generating energy without creating any emissions. But if we can begin to suck emissions out of the atmosphere and do something with them, maybe we can begin to reverse it as you're already done or about to do. And we've been engaged in efforts to market for that. Let me start with that one.
What do you think of direct air capture? How plausible is it at what scale? In a situation where we're in really bad shape, where the risk is turning out to be worse than we had hoped. How much could we actually pump into that or pump out through that?
Yeah. I mean, I think there are a lot of open questions here. We need to work to figure it out as quickly as possible. My view on this has always been the models are assuming that it exists at large scale to solve for the climate problems.
So we have an obligation to do the instrumental work to figure out if that's possible to begin with. And we're starting to do that, which I think is very good. The challenge with removing CO2 from the ambient air and putting it somewhere permanently is that, A, it's hard to do thermodynamically. It can be difficult to do.
And the bigger problem is what I've been spending time working on, which is the market development problem, which is who will pay for cleaning up this invisible trash that no one seems to actually care about. I think that is a bigger challenge than the technology or the economics. It's largely just like who paid it as a pure. What was going on?
The thing you worked on just to clear about it was Stripe, which is a digital payments processing company, basically a side project to create some market for people to try to demonstrate they can do this and start to pay them. When you talk about things the government should be doing. That really felt to me like one where the government should be putting money behind a very risky technology in order to try to go to market or to try to get the innovative loop that would make this viable. And it was.
The bipartisan infrastructure law had several billion dollars to demonstrate direct air capture facilities. There also, there was a tax credit that we got enhanced in the inflation reduction act, which remains in the new bill that would give you $180 per tonne of CO2 that you pull from the ambient air and store permanently. So there are some policy infrastructures that is nowhere near the scale of investment that you need to make these things real. So that's first of all, one of the things we're discovering is that there are permanent carbon removal pathways.
So there's direct air capture, but there are other pathways that had not really been top of mind for folks a few years ago, things like enhanced rock weathering, where you're grinding up a bunch of salt rocks and increasing their surface area and exposing them to moisture so that they more rapidly do what they would do anyway, which is draw CO2 down and store permanently. I love rocks. I love rocks. But the point with some of these technologies is that there are non climate co-benefits.
There are agricultural that you can have productivity and yield increases as a consequence of doing this on fields where you're better managing the pH of soil so the land is more productive. So I tend to be more optimistic because I really believe that for now we need to be very candid with ourselves, which is painful for those of us who are concerned about the climate crisis that society is willingness to pay for pure climate action is very low. It is certainly not high enough to do large-scale carbon removal at the cost today at scale. So our view I think that's somewhat shared here is that the role of technology in politics and economics here, this goes to my feedback versus feedback analogy or metaphor, is that our job is to get the cost of these technologies down as much as possible, such that the marginal unit of political will for the sake of pure climate benefit required to do this stuff is as low as humanly possible.
So the role of these technologies and our impact now should be to sort of keep them alive or get birth to them in many cases and get them to a level where we understand the risks, understand the benefits and ideally we've reduced the cost by some degree so that if we get to a point where we decide okay we really need these then there are real option and not an option in a model or a makeup, you know, option on a piece of paper. Then how does that affect the set of technologies we call geoengineering? For all sorts of very good reasons people I think worry about trying to manipulate the climate with our slightly better than monkey brains but if we have screwed it up we might try to unscrew it up if things get particularly bad. How do you think about the funding and exploration of geoengineering as a kind of hedge?
Yeah, my view on this and I did a dissertation on solar geoengineering which is the set of ideas we're talking about here. I think like for me the right way to think about the potential value of solar geoengineering for managing climate risk is that we don't have that many tools to manage increase temperatures that are fast acting and solar geoengineering masking some of the incoming warming in the way that you could is one of very few tools that could work really fast if we were in a dire situation. So is this worthy of scientific inquiry? For me the answer is yes.
Now technologies aren't just inherently good or bad they need to be governed and steered in ways and my concern about solar geoengineering research and deployment is that we have such low trusted institutions right now that the ability to kind of do science in these domains in a way that's like truly aligned with global societal benefit is just difficult to imagine. On the other hand we're spending a lot of money in time and a lot of other technologies that I'm quite concerned about the global impact of them and that we don't subject them to the same level of scrutiny. So let's create a godlike artificial intelligence that we explicitly intend to use to replace human beings in the work that gives them both wages and dignity but yeah no plan and no plan and just like you know whatever like people seem like they can make a lot of money to go forth but but they're working on geoengineering for a long time it is very frustrating because I've been in countless social scientific academic meetings where we all opine and opine should we or shouldn't we should even do the research we should do the research and at the same time that we were doing that there's this is happening and no one it actually is and then what happens it's like almost unquestable we're just going to build all the data centers and hope for the battle. Totally because I see that there is potential promise in solar geoengineering for reducing suffering I'm very worried about research on this topic and agenda setting on this topic and the cultural politics of this topic being overtaken by Silicon Valley essentially like I don't think that is good for the long term politics or substance of solar geoengineering and so I am concerned about cultivating even less trust in the set of potential technologies based on who seems to be excited about them and who isn't.