Skip to content
Lecture 12
 - Evolutionary Stability: Social Convention, Aggression, and Cycles episode artwork

Jun 6, 2018 1 hr 6 min

Lecture 12 - Evolutionary Stability: Social Convention, Aggression, and Cycles

from Yale Open Courses ECON 159: Game Theory Hosted by William Sheppard

We apply the idea of evolutionary stability to consider the evolution of social conventions. Then we consider games that involve aggressive (Hawk) and passive (Dove) strategies, finding that sometimes, evolutionary populations are mixed. We discuss how such games can help us to predict how behavior might vary across settings. Finally, we consider a game in which there is no evolutionary stable population and discuss an example from nature.

Episode details come from the podcast's RSS feed.

Embed this episode

Ready to play

Lecture 12 - Evolutionary Stability: Social Convention, Aggression, and Cycles

0:00 1:06:05

No transcript yet.

Requests help us decide what to transcribe next.

Frequently asked questions

How long is this episode of Yale Open Courses ECON 159: Game Theory?

This episode is 1 hour and 6 minutes long.

When was this Yale Open Courses ECON 159: Game Theory episode published?

This episode was published on June 6, 2018.

Can I download this Yale Open Courses ECON 159: Game Theory episode?

Yes. Use the download control on the episode player to save the publisher-provided media file.