Marcel Dubovec – The Inner Structure of Heidegger’s Concept of Freedom

Here is the latest of our recordings from The British Society for Phenomenology’s 2018 Annual Conference ‘The Theory and Practice of Phenomenology’. Marcel Dubovec’s paper is titled ‘The Inner Structure of Heidegger’s Concept of Freedom’.   Abstract: “The purpose of this paper is to present Heidegger's concept of freedom between 1927 and 1930. It puts emphasis on the difference between the fundamental-ontological and the transcendental concept of freedom. The elaboration of this difference is founded on the transformation of the ontological difference in its three forms: the difference of the being of beings (existential approach), the difference of the being and beings (transcendental/metontological) and the cosmological difference as a difference between the thing and the world (phenomenological metaphysics). The central manifestation of the difference is the possibility of a deeper understanding of freedom beyond its existential structures (Being and time) that focus on authenticity. The transcendental concept of freedom is the essence of the ground in the context of transcendence and the world and as such it is also the ground for existentially conceived freedom. In order to show this hierarchy in particular, Heidegger's debate on Kant's concept of freedom as spontaneity will be explained. Spontaneity is a specific form of causality and as such it is also grounded in transcendental freedom. The limits of a hierarchical way of thinking illustrate themselves in the significance of freedom for the essence of truth. This refers to the inner transformation of Heidegger's philosophy into the thinking of being from itself. In this context, the importance of a possibility to evolve the concept of freedom in its metontological turn is emphasised. On this metontological way of Heidegger's thinking, Hungarian philosopher László Tengelyi follows with his concept of phenomenological metaphysics that is placed beyond the onto-theological constitution of metaphysics. Tengelyi's concept of freedom as a partial causality is of particular significance to this subject.”   The British Society for Phenomenology’s Annual Conference took place at the University of Kent, in Canterbury, UK during July, 2018. It gathered together philosophers, literary scholars, phenomenologists, and practitioners exploring phenomenological theory and its practical application. It covered a broad range of areas and issues including the arts, ethics, medical humanities, mental health, education, technology, feminism, politics and political governance, with contributions throwing a new light on both traditional phenomenological thinkers and the themes associated with classical phenomenology. More information about the conference can be found at: https://www.britishphenomenology.org.uk/conference-2018/   The British Society for Phenomenology is a not-for-profit organisation set up with the intention of promoting research and awareness in the field of Phenomenology and other cognate arms of philosophical thought. Currently, the society accomplishes these aims through its journal, conferences and other events, and its podcast. You can support the society by becoming a member, for which you will receive a subscription to our journal: https://www.britishphenomenology.org.uk/about/