You're listening to the Cyber Wire Network, powered by N2K. Hello, everyone, and welcome to the Cyber Wire's Research Saturday. I'm Dave Bittner, and this is our weekly conversation with researchers and analysts tracking down the threats and vulnerabilities, solving some of the hard problems, and protecting ourselves in a rapidly evolving cyberspace. Thanks for joining us. We've been focusing on various threat actors in the Middle East, and this came across our desk, I would say, just because it was allegedly focusing on Israel based on the metadata that we were able to see in the malware. And so we decided to look into it a little bit more in depth and see any conclusions that we could draw. That's Daniel Schwabe, Chief Information Security Officer and Head of Investigations at Domain Tools. The research we're discussing today is titled Zion Siphon OT Malware. First attempts? PsyOps? Both?
When you first encountered this malware sample, what was it that made you think that maybe it needed a closer look than, say, ordinary Windows malware? Yeah, so I would say the fact that the naming itself was kind of a little bit too on the nose. And then the other results that our colleagues had already published on some of the functionality got my attention. And I was thinking, what's the actual purpose of this thing? Because as we're going to, I'm sure, talk about, it's not very effective the way it was designed. So my question was, is this a...
a junior attempt and didn't get seen through? How did it actually get out in the public? Was it leaked? Was it an accident? Was somebody trying to test whether malware scanners would pick it up and not realizing that Sandbox provided share to stuff and it goes wide? Or is it actually more of a psyop attempt to portray capability without an actual intent to actually push that stuff out there? That was kind of my hypothesis. And I said, we should look at this because there might be some interesting conclusions we could draw.
Well, you mentioned the name, the file name was named SCADA Security Patch version 8.4.exe. As you say, that is a bit on the nose. Unusual for something to be so overt? Yeah, and at one point in my career, I was responsible for securing SCADA industrial control systems on a very large network. And while I personally would not handle the patching, we would certainly work with the engineers that did. And I've never come across any executable named something like that. It's typically more, you know...
towards the manufacturer, like Siemens is a big one, and they have a naming convention. This is not something I've ever come across, and that kind of caught my attention because having no product name in it and calling it just a security patch and then some arbitrary version after, that stood out to me. Well, let's go down the pathway here of following some of these clues. As you all began reverse engineering this malware, there was evidence suggesting it was focused on water infrastructure? Correct. There are some hints in the malware that...
seem to target specific facilities, water treatment facilities within Israel. They're named by name. So it felt like that was the intended target. Now, of course, it's impossible to say what the real intent here was, but based on circumstances and hints in the malware itself, et cetera, that seems like a likely target. So for folks in our audience who don't work in industrial control systems, can you explain why things like chlorine dosing, reverse osmosis systems, why are these significant components of water operations?
Yeah, so in general, water treatment, of course, takes dirty or polluted water or wastewater and tries to turn that back into potable drinking water. And there's various different ways of doing that. US-based water treatment has slightly different techniques of doing that. But basically, you remove the solids from it. You try to filter out as much of the other matter. But then the water that's left might still have bacteria or other bad things in it. And chlorine is one commonly accepted way to kill the bad things in the water. And the chlorine will eventually evaporate and not stick around. And so it becomes safe again for humans to consume.
So you started to dig into the malware's activation logic, and that's where things kind of take a turn here. What exactly did you find? Yeah, so the biggest one, without bearing the lead here, is that basically it has a faulty location identification logic. Basically, the malware was intended to say, checking its environment, checking its IP address, whatever, am I in Israel? Am I being run on a system that's connected to Israeli IP space, which is knowable? And if that's the case, execute.
it detects that it's anywhere else, like in the surrounding area in the Middle East or really anywhere around the world. If it's not connected to Israeli IP space, then it just kills itself. There's a flaw in that logic where the MI in Israel part will never be true. It's an XOR bug. And basically, it never has a chance to run in the version in the form that was uploaded to the sandboxes that we were able to analyze.
So to be clear here, does this mean that this may have never successfully executed in its intended geographic region? This is what we believe. That particular version, that's not to say that other versions couldn't have been developed afterwards that maybe didn't get caught publicly, but this particular version that we looked at had no chance to ever working. How unusual is it to find a fundamental flaw like this in a malware sample? It's not unusual, but this feels like maybe an early version that was in testing and somehow this didn't get caught yet, or it was intentionally set so you couldn't accidentally detonate it during the testing phase. But it's kind of a big miss to release something like that or let it get out into the public sphere with such a critical error. Looking at the structure and stuff of the malware itself,
has indications that maybe Vibe Coding and LLM Assist was being used, which that kind of tells me that maybe whoever did it was either in a real big hurry or was more junior and wasn't fully thinking through what all of the functionality would need to hit. One of the really interesting themes in your report is what you all describe as a gap between intent and capability. Can you describe that gap for us? This particular malware seems to have been designed to target these specific water treatment facilities in Israel. Like in the code, they are named. Like Mekorot, Sorek, there's a whole bunch of them that are named by name in there. That's also kind of interesting, and it almost seems like that was meant to be discovered. So that's interesting. That's not to say that other malware that was successful wouldn't do something similar, but to be so explicit here is an interesting tell. And then the fact that it...
had the rudimentary capability of installing itself on a system and running, but A, the validation error of the location basically made it so it could never execute. But additionally, it doesn't really have components in there to actually, let's say, location validation test, let's say it passed. Oh, I'm on an Israeli IP, I'm going to execute myself. It actually has no functionality built in to, for example, touch a PCL, so a programmable logic controller, a little piece of firmware that can affect things on an industrial control system. Stuxnet, which this is often compared to, is...
not even in the same universe. It's way more sophisticated and it's targeting the industrial controllers directly, where this particular malware basically relies on a Windows host to execute and then would try to write some configuration files to a controller like a PCL that might be connected to this Windows host, but there is no mechanism to actually push it there. So it would still rely on human interaction to then take the malicious files and copy them to a system that might want to be compromised. That is so unlikely to get that far that the execution really falls short of what its likely potential intent was. We'll be right back. Quick question. Who or what has access to your critical systems right now? I'll give you a hint. It's not just employees anymore. It's vendors, machines, applications, workloads, and so many AI agents. Zage Security helps organizations control every identity with zero trust policies that govern what they can access, what they can do, and when. Because when critical systems are at stake, compromised access can mean downtime, disrupted production, and real-world consequences. Protect what matters most with the Zage Identity Fabric platform. Learn more at Zage.com.
That's X-A-G-E dot com. Well, the report raises the possibility that this malware could be a prototype. Yes, it does feel like that. So there's just several different, you know, it's all speculation. I mean, of course, we use our expertise and other things that we have seen to kind of speculate here. But I want to be very clear. There is no, you know, very clear smoking gun here. It feels like it possibly was an early development version that got accidentally released, wasn't meant to get out yet, and additional functionality was supposed to be baked in.
There's also a slight possibility that this may have been some kind of PSYOP, false flag operation, trying to frame certain entities that might want to harm Israel, but make it so that it couldn't actually actively harm something and just put the allegation out there that maybe an Iranian actor or somebody sympathetic to their cause may have been behind that, but it might really have been counter PSYOP operation where entities that are friendly to Israel put this out to frame their adversaries. We don't know that, but it's a possibility. Right. Can you give us a little view behind the scenes? I mean, how do you and your colleagues avoid jumping to conclusions? In this case, you know, the malware seems to be pointing directly at a particular country or particular threat actor. How do you resist that temptation? Experience, I would say, because attribution is really, really hard, even for the best of us. And there are, let's be fair, there are people out there in our industry who run circles around us. Like, we're pretty good at this, but we are by no means, you know, the top experts on this. And so as the lead of our research team, you know, I read all articles before they go out and I do a risk review and I make very sure that we do not make.
strong attribution claims because ultimately, unless you were there in the room where it happened, it is all speculation to the best of it. So one of our internal doctrines is like, we will lay out the evidence that we can find and we might put some hypotheses out there, but we will never specifically attribute something to a particular threat actor just because it's impossible to know. Well, given that Zion Siphon is not indeed fully operational, it doesn't work as a cyber-physical weapon, why should defenders be paying attention to this? What makes this important? The targeting, at least the conceptual way, could be successful.
And it's not a big secret that industrial control systems, SCADA, has some issues and can be vulnerable. And there was a time in, I would say, the early 2000s where basically worldwide, any SCADA, which by the way, that stands for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition. That's a common acronym used in that industrial control circles. And back in the day, those things like a valve to turn on a water or a sewer pump, et cetera, how fast or how slow it goes, et cetera, those would all be controlled over serial bus or some proprietary protocols. They were never really in the early days intended to be connected to the internet.
Then with the advent of, you know, let's put everything online of the early to mid 2000s, vendors and third parties started crafting systems that allowed these existing control systems that only spoke serial to be connected to a box that then was connected to the internet. But security at the time was not really top of mind. It was meant to be, oh, this will make it so much easier. We can control everything from one single point rather than having to aggregate all of the serial connections somewhere. A few people would still have to go on site, et cetera. It was meant to make things easier and more efficient. But in the early days, security was not top of mind. And so threat actors pretty quickly figured out that they were easily compromisable and they could.
What do you suppose this malware tells us about where these OT threats might be headed? Are there any forward-facing lessons to be learned here? I do think industrial control systems and their operational technology remain a very interesting and big target for adversaries because they're typically tied to things like municipal water systems. You know, there's industrial controls, obviously, and like nuclear power plants and industrial manufacturing, et cetera. But where it affects the general public the most is water, sewer, energy, natural gas, et cetera. They're all hooked to these control systems. If as an adversary, I can target those and either cause them to go down, fail catastrophically, or cause some other issue, that will be felt by the population, which will then come to their government.
and be like, hey, what the heck is going on? And it creates a very big public impact. If you manage to stop the sewer pumps in Seattle, we have a bunch of big hills and stuff needs to get pumped from one elevation to the other. If you manage to shut those off or worse, break them by like trying to run them in reverse back and forth real quick, that will take a long time to fix. And in the meantime, people still need to use the bathroom. Where is that stuff going to go? It can create distrust in government by the population real fast, which is why it's a very interesting targeting tool to create up to civil unrest in the worst case. Yeah.
Well, based on the information you've gathered here, what are your recommendations for the defenders out there? What should they be doing based on your research? It kind of comes down to stuff that we've been talking about forever. You ideally don't have admin privileges on the workstation you run. Now, this particular malware, initially, if somebody had got it under the system and double-clicked the .exe file...
it would have installed itself with persistence with user level permissions. So that's hard to prevent. But a bunch of other stuff copying itself into certain locations that are protected by the system by default would require a privileged escalation where basically in Windows, a little box pops up and tells the user, hey, do you really want to do this? Yes, no. Most people are so trained to just click yes and not pay attention. So that likely would have been successful. But if it's a situation where a particular user does not have local admin rights, it would prompt for a username and password of a account that has these admin rights. In some situations, the users are giving that.
given that so they can still log in with a separate account to authorize that. Or in other situations, they have to talk to their IT support team and like, hey, I need admin privileges to install this. And then it's an opportunity for the IT or the support team or the security to be like, hey, wait a second, what are you doing here? So that's one thing. The other thing is getting more specific with user education that, you know, something like the particular file name that was used here, again, is too under nose. Is this really what you're expecting? If you've done this before, is this the type of file name that you would reasonably expect from a vendor? So that's kind of a user education problem. So it really...
comes down as overcoming the social engineering aspect, which gets quite good. And so training is really the best thing you can do there. But also locking down the local system used to those things, have endpoint protection on there, whether it's EDR or even just antivirus programs that might look at the executable you're about to detonate on the system and says, wait, that's going to do some bad things. We're going to stop it. So basically, have antivirus, NML around the system operate with the least amount of privileges as possible and user education so they don't just blindly try to execute any exe file that comes across their desk.
You know, Daniel, I routinely ask folks to rate the sophistication of the malware actor, but in this case, it's possible that they were unsophisticated, but it's also possible that they were trying to signal being unsophisticated as misdirection. How do you unpack that? Yeah, that's an excellent question. So independent of who might have been behind it, the executable that reached the sandbox, which we looked at, I would consider flawed and not very well thought out. Now, that may be the point in time that this particular executable was compiled, and there may have been plans to make it more effective in later versions. But we only...
came across this particular version, so that's all we have to go on. It does feel like it was LLM-assisted coding, which even for legit purposes, we run into where maybe some more junior developers who receive pressure to write code faster will rely on LLM code assist, which can be very powerful, but you still have to understand what the output of that is. Internally, we have a rule that says, yes, you may use certain LLM code assist things, but the code that it produces will be judged as if you wrote it. So you can't say, oh, well, I used Copilot and it just made the mistake. It's not my fault. No, if you use that, you're expected to fully understand the code and know what it does. So it can make you faster, but you can't absolve yourself from the responsibility of understanding what actually happens. In this particular case, it does seem like it was a rush job that might not have been very well thought out. And then an early version got out. And this is what we're looking at. Now, if it was the other potential where it was meant as a false flag operation, then...
In my opinion, it would have been more effective if it, you know, at least attempted to do some damage and then would have been stopped by normal means rather than, you know, not even able to execute ever because of the fault in the location identification. Our thanks to Daniel Schwabe, Chief Information Security Officer at Domain Tools for joining us. The research is titled Zion Siphon OT Malware First Attempts, PSYOPs? Both. We'll have a link in the show notes.
And that's Research Saturday brought to you by N2K Cyberwire. We'd love to know what you think of this podcast. Your feedback ensures we deliver the insights that keep you a step ahead in the rapidly changing world of cybersecurity. If you like our show, please share a rating and review in your favorite podcast app. Please also fill out the survey in the show notes or send an email to cyberwire at n2k.com. This episode was produced by Liz Stokes. We're mixed by Elliot Peltzman and Trey Hester. Our executive producer is Jennifer Ivan. Peter Kilby is our publisher, and I'm Dave Fittner. Thanks for listening. We'll see you back here next time.
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