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Sep 19, 2012 53 min

Multiple Realization and the Computational Mind

from MCMP – Mathematical Philosophy (Archive 2011/12)

Paul Schweizer (Edinburgh) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (11 July, 2012) titled "Multiple Realization and the Computational Mind". Abstract: The paper addresses a standard line of criticism of the Computational Theory of Mind, based on the claim that realizing a computational formalism is overly liberal to the point of vacuity. In agreement with the underlying view of computation used to support this criticism, I argue that computation is not an intrinsic property of physical systems, but rather requires an observer dependent act of interpretation. The extent to which a given configuration of matter and energy can be said to realize an abstract formalism is always a matter of approximation and degree, and interpreting a physical device as performing a computation is relative to our purposes and potential epistemic gains. And while this may fatally undermine a computational explanation of consciousness, I argue that, contra Putnam and Searle, it does not rule out the possibility of a scientifically defensible account of propositional attitude states in computational terms.

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Multiple Realization and the Computational Mind

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