My Philosophical Position [04/10] Selfhood and personal identity

Philosopher Bry Willis discusses metaphysics and his position of Philosophy of self and episodic inexicalism.The first-person “I” is an indexical compression. It marks the presently organised locus of perspective, salience, memory-access, and action. It is indispensable, but indispensability does not establish an inner owner to which the index refers.The diachronic self is a broader compression: a narrative, biological, documentary, interpersonal, and institutional device for tracking selected continuities across time. Memory contributes to this, but memory is lossy, reconstructive, and uneven. The person remembered is not transported intact into the act of remembering.Philosophy should expose inherited architecture before erecting replacement systems. This is part 2 of 10.Full essay on Substack:  ⁠https://brywillis634737.substack.com/p/a-provisional-map-of-my-philosophical⁠