Welcome to Cato Audio for October 2009. I'm Caleb Brown. In this month's offering, Cato's Ted Carpenter weighs the potential for China to engage more directly with North Korea. Johan Norberg offers his take on what delivered America into a financial fiasco. Economist Tyler Cowen discusses autism from a different perspective. Cato's Roger Pilon explores the foundations of rights. And author Stephen Hayward tries to give Ronald Reagan his due. First up, this month's Cato Roundtable.
As we record this, we are approaching the one-year anniversary of the Federal Reserve doubling the monetary base, which began September 18, 2008, and now a lot of people are referring to Ben Bernanke's second act as perhaps his second chance. I'm talking here with Mark Calabria, Director of Financial Regulation Studies at the Cato Institute, and Bert Ely, a banking consultant and adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute. Gentlemen, welcome. Now, where do we start here? This is certainly a long time in coming, and how far do you really have to go back to begin to assess the Federal Reserve's role in the current financial crisis we've had over the past year, Bert?
The role of the Fed really changed significantly a little over a year ago when it started providing a lot of direct support to the financial markets by, in effect, becoming an intermediary between borrowers and lenders. And the reason that happened is because borrowers and lenders ceased trusting each other. The financial markets froze up for that reason. And so the Federal Reserve and to some extent the United States Treasury Department stepped in as a middleman between borrowers and lenders. And now that seems to have peaked. And the Fed is moving into the next chapter, which is the unwinding over the next couple of years of these transactions where the Fed put
itself in the middle in the financial markets. Mark? I would say I think we do need to take the analysis back a little further. I mean, part of me would like to go all the way back to the founding of the Fed, but that's probably a little getting carried away. I would focus on, I think you need to look at the entire tenure of Chairman Greenspan. From the beginning of coming into the marketplace and the stock market crash in the late 80s, throughout his tenure, there really became a perception that should things go wrong in the financial markets, the Fed will be there to pump in liquidity into the system. And on one hand, you did have...
more moderate economic growth and more stability because of that at the time. But you also ended up, you know, with the reduction in sort of the risk management on the part of the banks and the financial market, because there really ended up being a narrowing of sort of what expectations of what could happen. So I do think in some sense... By making the system more resistant to smaller disruptions, we actually made the system more fragile to larger disruptions. Bert? I think it is important to differentiate the role of the Fed in the financial system over the last year to 18 months compared to two previous crises. One was back in 1987 after the stock market crash, when there was a very momentary, just a few days intervention by the Fed in any significant way to maintain liquidity in the financial system to keep the markets functioning. The other was in the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, when as much as anything else, because of the amount of destruction in lower Manhattan, physically,
important clearing and settlement systems froze up and the Fed, if you will, stepped into that role. But again, very short term, very transitory, no permanent effects. Whereas in this situation, we're looking at a multi-year intervention by the Fed. In examining that, what is most troubling about this intervention as long as it has been as compared with those others? What's the most troubling aspect of this one? Well, to me, the most troubling aspect is that we got into this mess in the first place.
cannot fault the Fed and the Treasury Department for what they did. They played a role in keeping the system functioning. If they hadn't been there, who knows what would have happened. What I find troubling is the fact that we did get into that situation. And the public policy challenge now is how can we avoid a circumstance like that again? And that is a debate that is just beginning in this country. And I'm not sure it's a very well-formed debate at this time. Mark? I think you need to distinguish between the role of the Fed in reacting.
to the bursting of the bubble in the crisis and the role of the Fed in helping to create the bubble itself. I know those are two things. A lot of people have looked at Bernanke's tenure and said, well, you know, maybe he made some wrong decisions as a governor. Maybe he made some wrong decisions. Maybe Greenspan made wrong decisions. But, you know, we shouldn't look at that. We can overlook that because of his reaction to the crisis and bringing stability. I think looking at the role of the Fed, particularly from the years 2002 to 2005, because by that point, we were beyond 9-11, the immediate aftermath and the disruption to the actual physical infrastructure of the payment systems.
was resolved. So one could not make an argument that we needed three years of real negative interest rates because of 9-11. And what concerns me most going forward now is you see a very similar situation today. For instance, the most politically important economic number in my mind is the unemployment number. That's what, because unemployed people vote. If a factory is idle, it doesn't necessarily vote and it doesn't necessarily cause political disruption immediately. So my concern with that is we know that the labor market tends to be a lagging indicator. We may be six months a year behind the curve on that. And so if you don't see Federal Reserve react to that,
For starters, if they don't react to the economy until the labor market turns around, they're already behind the curve. And then we know, as Milton Friedman reminded us, monetary policy worked with long and variable lags. So in my mind, we're at minimum six months behind the curve because of the labor market, and we'll be another six months, if not a year, behind the curve because of the effect of monetary policy. So I think the Fed, unless they start to act when it's unpopular, they will easily be a year plus behind the curve. Bert? Well, and I think Mark raises a very important point and an important distinction we have to draw. Prior to the current round of intervention where the Fed balance sheet really bloomed up because the Fed was engaged directly in the financial markets, its primary monetary policy tool had been its interest rate.
the federal funds rate target that it establishes. And again, to reinforce what Mark said, it was the excessively low rates that the Fed signaled earlier in the decade that did a lot to basically inflate the housing bubble. And the reason for that is because the Fed's rate signal tends to influence, number one, the interest rate on adjustable rate mortgages and also on home equity loans. And those two sources of borrowing became very cheap and consequently became very significant in housing finance and basically provided people with the wherewithal to bid up the prices on homes and leading to the bubble. The other area where the Fed arguably could be criticized and that is as a regulator of the mortgage marketplace, specifically with regard to mortgage terms and conditions. The Fed has been roundly criticized for its inaction as a regulator of the marketplace, and that inaction may lead to some statutory changes that would further increase the government's role in managing the mortgage marketplace, which I don't think is a very good idea, but to one of the drivers...
for that increased government intervention is the widespread allocation, which I think there is some truth, that the Fed did not do enough as a product regulator, so to speak, earlier in this decade. Mark? I want to take the other side of that a little bit, because I mean, Burt is right in that the Fed has been widely criticized in that regard. And I think to some extent unfairly, if you look at the statutory law behind what is called the Homeowners Equity Protection Act, which is part of the Truth in Lending Act, what it says is the Fed is supposed to go out there and deal with unfair and deceptive practices. And even with the regulations that were put into recently effect, the Fed was dealing with things like prepayment penalties and payments from lenders to brokers. The Fed had no ability, for instance,
to force borrowers to put more down payments up, for instance. Congress has made a decision via whether it's the Federal Housing Administration or whether it's other mortgage programs that we don't think is a public policy that people should have to put equity into their home. And I would say that was far more determinative. For instance, if someone's going to walk away from a mortgage and they're not going to be able to afford to pay their mortgage, it has almost nothing to do with whether they have a prepayment penalty on their mortgage. So the things the Fed could actually do and stop were product attitudes that had very little, if any, effect on the actual default rates. Well, I want to ask one other question. You were talking about getting into this mess, Bert, but the fact that the Fed took the actions that it did when it did, does that speak to credibility of the institution when it comes time for the next crisis to roll around? Well, I'm not sure it really enhanced the Fed's credibility. I think the Fed and the Treasury Department did what they had to do to keep the system functioning in the short term without being concerned about the longer term.
consequences. And, you know, quite likely if we had another crisis like this in five or 10 years, which we probably will, I would expect again to see the same kind of interventions. But the real question, in my opinion, is what changes are needed in public policy across the board, not just as they affect the Federal Reserve, but the whole entire financial structure so we don't get into this mess again. I have written an article for the Cato Journal in which I discussed 11 underlying public policy causes of the crisis, starting with the Internal Revenue Code. And what I find especially troubling right now as we look at the public debate and the congressional debate over how to reform the system, and that is that those underlying causes are not being addressed.
If anything, some of the actions that Congress takes may really magnify some of these causes and just make the next crisis that much more inevitable. Mark? First, I want to go back and elaborate on something we talked about earlier, which is the importance of the Fed reserve policy in the middle of the decade in causing this crisis. It's not simply that the Fed lowered rates. One of the impacts of the Fed lowering rates is the Fed traditionally, up until very recently, manipulated short-term rates. And the reason that this is important is, yes, we had a global savings glut. Yes, we had savings coming across the world at lowered rates across the world. But didn't that sort of short-circuit the Fed's ability to take certain actions? Yes and no, because this is the point I was just about to get to, which is that...
The global savings glut ended up lowering rates across the board and across the yield curve, which is basically the relationship between short-term and long-term rates. Because the Federal Reserve's monetary policy has traditionally focused on the short-term rates, the additional monetary stimulus we saw in the earlier part of this decade gave you historically very large spreads between short-term and long-term rates. In terms of consumers, that made it much more attractive, for instance, to get an adjustable rate mortgage rather than a fixed. In the term of financial institutions, while it's not the sole reason, it's certainly one of the reasons that institutions like Bayer would, say, fund 30-year mortgages with overnight paper. I'm certainly of the opinion that anybody who funds...
30-year mortgage with overnight paper will implode at some point. And so the Fed presented those opportunities where they greatly encouraged financial corporations to... try to profit off of that historically large spread between short-term and long-term rates. And we call this maturity mismatch. That was one of the biggest drivers of the fragility of the system. And what's ironic about this is that the first of the two S&L crises in the 1980s, in the very early 80s, grew out of exactly the same thing of maturity mismatching. Savings and loans would take in short-term deposits, lend amount for 20 and 30-year fixed-rate mortgages. Interest rates went up in the early 80s. We had hundreds of S&Ls were insolvent overnight. And the thing that I find amazing, having worked all the way through the S&L crisis, is the same mistakes were made again. And it's not just a matter of the market.
markets making it, but the fact that we have a financial system and a regulatory system in this country that, if anything, actually fosters maturity mismatching. And I don't see anything on the table right now in terms of public policy proposals that's going to reduce the likelihood of that in the future. And so, again, at some time, 5, 10, 15 years from now, another generation of financial engineers and bankers will come along. They'll see this tremendous opportunity to make a lot of money by borrowing short to lend long, and they'll set us up for the next crisis. Mark, you had talked about a narrowing of expectations, and Bert was just talking about the next generation of would-be financial innovators, perhaps, who see a grand opportunity.
What can the Fed do to prevent expectations to narrow when times are good? Well, you meant expectations to widen so that you sort of expect those black swans that might come out of the blue so that you're actually preparing for the worst. Now, some of this is certainly inherent in the mathematics of risk management. We're very lazy in that we rely on the normal distribution bell curve because it has all sorts of nice properties, but it doesn't necessarily represent the world. So it's a framework that works fine 95% of the time. The other 5% of the time causes us a whole lot of trouble. But the question in terms of what can the Fed do? Well, I think what the Fed needs to do...
is it needs to not worry about every single little blip. We have a history of the Fed where it's, okay, this could be the next Great Depression, so we need to just open up the fire hoses and call all out. And so I think what we need to accept, and the Fed needs to accept, is a little more short-term moderate volatility. And so that people need to be reminded every couple of years, not every 10 years, but every two or three years, that yes, indeed, they can lose money and that they should not take risks in a way that they cannot. Some people were arguing, and I think this is...
what ideally you would like to have, and I just don't think it would have, is the argument that the Fed needs to sort of preemptively tighten during bubbles. You know, the Fed's history and the politics of it have really led, in my opinion, to the Fed contributing to bubbles rather than tightening. And I think very basically, you know, I spent a number of years working on one of the congressional oversight committees of the Fed. And my experience has been the Federal Reserve and other bank regulators respond very closely to the wishes of the oversight committees in the Congress. And then Congress responds pretty much to the wishes of the public. And at the end of the day, the sad truth is the public loves a bubble when it's going on. And we think of all sorts of reasons at the time, why it won't end and why it's great are that, wow, we'll get out before everybody else.
So to me, the really tough question in terms of monetary policy, in terms of regulatory policy is, how do you create political institutions that are willing to lean against the wind when it's very unpopular to do so? The other question might well be, how do you measure bubbles? Exactly. There's always an element of fundamental to it. I mean, I would say, I even think up to 2002, 2003, you had fundamentals largely driving the housing market. Beyond that point, you really did get in the bubble territory. And I will note, because I think Bert made a great point earlier about the savings and loan crisis and so many other things. There's so many reinforcing, repeating things we see. And one of the things we see all the time is a lot of the financial crisis we've had in the past.
have occurred with a property bubble of some sort. So, you know, we need to have a really strong re-evaluation in bank regulatory policy about the role of real estate. Whether it's housing, whether it's commercial real estate, you repeatedly see the same sort of elements come up in terms of what sets the bubbles off. I think that, first of all, the notion that the Fed or any central bank will pull away the punch bowl before the party really gets going, while something that people, economists and others have talked about for many years, politically is just not realistic. Because when the bubble is going up, as Mark said, there's a lot of political support for it. People don't want a punch bowl pulled away. And I don't see anything in the public policy proposals that's going to change that, which then raises a much more basic question. And that is, to what extent should we look upon a central bank as doing as much interest rate signaling as it is, and instead look more to market forces?
to determine what the level of short-term interest rates are contributor to the bubble, as we saw the last time. In other words, it was part of the problem, the fact that we don't have enough reliance on market forces, specifically with regard to setting short-term interest rates. It's important to remember, there's probably no more important price in an economy than the price of time, than the price of interest, and the price of money. Yet, that is the most managed price in our economy. So I think we do need to be cognizant of, we do not live in an unfettered market of where the most important price is just, you know.
left to the market to determine, we have constant manipulation of those prices. But I also think that we have to keep in mind that there are multiple causes of the crisis and that reducing the likelihood of a future crisis involves issues that extend far beyond the Federal Reserve, as I've said on many occasions. Probably the number one cause is the Internal Revenue Code and specifically the premium that it effectively places on high leverage. Leverage is what really gets you into trouble because that's when people go broke. And we have a tax code that for both individuals and businesses essentially allows for the tax deductibility of interest paid on debt. That is a subsidy of debt. It effectively is a subsidy of leverage. And so when we look at
How do we reduce the likelihood of future crises? We're not going to eliminate them, but how do we reduce the likelihood of crises and the magnitude of those crises? We have to look at a broad range of issues and not feel that we can solve it just by dealing with the Federal Reserve. Somewhat related to that, Bert, you were talking about reducing the likelihood and the magnitude of crises. Is there potentially any kind of trade-off between different monetary regimes that would give us more crises on a regular basis, but might give us not so many that are of high magnitude? One thing to keep in mind is you can look at other frameworks across the world, but because the dollar is essentially the reserve currency of the world, we export a great deal of our monetary policy as well. So we are limited in the ability to look at and say, well, here's what they do in the EU, here's what they do in New Zealand, whatever, and take that as a guide. But I do think there are things we can look at. And the things that I would suggest looking at, for instance, the Fed is one of the very few, if not the only central bank in the world that has the dual mandate of not simply price stability, but also maximum.
sustainable employment. Quite often, the employment thing has been used as a cover to not move to tighten monetary policy until you've actually seen growth in the labor market, which, as I mentioned earlier, is a lagging indicator. So I think the first thing we need to do is to give... the Fed one job, and that's price stability. I also think we need to move from, we kind of have an implicit inflation targeting, price targeting in the US. It needs to be made much more explicit so that we can actually measure. You have very little way to actually say at any one time whether the Fed is doing its job correctly. And there are certainly limits to inflation targeting. There are certainly limits to imposing things that are called like Taylor rules of how much you're supposed to raise. I would also say one thing I think we need to keep in mind, an economy where productivity is growing.
prices should fall. So the assumption that deflation is everywhere and always a bad thing that needs to be fought, you know, there is good deflation, there's bad deflation. And I think the Fed, because of the experience of the Great Depression, where you had bad deflation, really obsesses about any sort of deflation. I don't think the deflation we were seeing earlier this decade after the dot-com bubble and during the 90s... was necessarily a bad deflation. It was really a deflation that was driven by China entering the world labor market and driven by great productivity gains. Last words, Bert Ely. Well, again, I just want to reinforce that while it is important to talk about the Fed's role in this crisis, we have to understand that there are a multiplicity of public policy causes. I write about 11 of them. I think I've thought of another three or four beyond that. And in terms of reducing the likelihood of future crises, and more importantly, the magnitude of those crises, we have to deal with these issues across the board and not just focus on some causes, but not others. All right, gentlemen, Bert Ely, banking consultant and adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute. And Mark,
Labria, Director of Financial Regulation Studies, also at the Cato Institute. If you need any more information about monetary policy, Cato has written extensively in its 30-plus years in operation on monetary policy, so please check it out at Cato.org. Stephen Hayward's first volume of The Age of Reagan ended with the president's election. The second volume provides a complete narrative history of the Reagan presidency and its aftermath, covering both domestic and foreign policy. Hayward pays special attention to Reagan's battles within his own party, as well as opposition from Democrats, and assesses how Reagan changed both parties. Hayward spoke about the new volume of The Age of Reagan at the Cato Institute in August.
Above all, I think we need to see if we can explain or understand Reagan's seeming contradictions. On foreign policy, he talked tough about the Soviets, but then reached arms control agreements that dismayed conservatives, and that might have dismayed the pre-presidential Reagan himself. And indeed, many conservatives were apoplectic over this turn in Reagan's statecraft. On the domestic scene, as Bill Niskanen pointed out in his fine early assessment called Reaganomics, Reagan acquiesced to tax increases every year after the initial tax cut package of 1981. And in other areas, just to pick one example, Reagan agreed to impose quote-unquote voluntary auto import restraints on Japanese automakers, which cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be calculated as a defensible policy by any friend of open markets and free trade. Indeed, Bill Niskanen is among those flinty realists who rejects the idea that the Reagan years should be understood as revolutionary. At the end of his book, he wrote, in the end, there was no Reagan revolution.
I think we miss some important aspects of Reagan's statecraft and maybe misjudge the results if we weigh things on a purely abstract scale. Back in the 1930s, Winston Churchill wrote an essay called Consistency in Politics, partly to explain his own party switching. Remember, Reagan was a party switcher, too. And Churchill wrote this. A statesman in contact with the moving current of events and anxious to keep the ship of state on an even keel and steer a steady course may lean all his weight now on one side and now on the other.
His arguments in each case, when contrasted, can be shown to be not only very different in character, but contradictory in spirit and opposite in direction. Yet his object will throughout have remained the same. His results, his wishes, his outlook may have been unchanged, but his methods may be verbally irreconcilable. We cannot call this inconsistency. In fact, it may be claimed to be the truest consistency. The only way a man can remain consistent amid the changing circumstances is to change with them while preserving the same dominating purpose. Close quote.
Well, Reagan's dominating purpose at home was to shrink, as he put it in his first inaugural address, to shrink the size and influence of the federal government. And abroad, his dominating purpose was, to paraphrase Lincoln, to place communism on the course of ultimate extinction. And I think most of Reagan's course corrections, both at home and abroad, can be explained within the compass of Churchill's understanding of consistency in politics. On the domestic side, to pick one example, consider Reagan's agreement in 1982 to raise taxes by $98 billion over the next three years, a deal that caused a lot of conservatives to cry that they had been betrayed. Now, I have a long analysis of this in my book that I'll just summarize very briefly and inadequately here. I make a speculative argument, and it's the only speculative argument in the book for which I don't have convincing evidence that I'm going more on intuition about the matter, is that Reagan knew early on in the fall of 1981 that the overall tax cut package of 1981 had been too large and that the deficit as it was unfolding would be too large and that he'd have to give back or backtrack on some of the tax cut. But he had an uncanny sense of timing in negotiations. His opening bid was, I might go for $3 billion in increased taxes. The Democrats, of course, wanted to cancel the rest of the income tax cuts or cancel the third year or roll back the whole thing.
And that, above all, is what Reagan wanted to preserve was the income tax rate cuts. And then remember, too, that if you know the story, that the deal as it was laid out on paper was that for every dollar of tax increases, Congress would come forward with $3 in spending cuts. Well, you can argue about whether that's a good deal or not, but from Reagan's point of view, he was shrinking the government while helping to balance the budget. He later said that this was his biggest mistake in domestic policy because, in fact, Congress didn't deliver the spending cuts, and by several estimates, every dollar of new taxes out of that deal led to about $1.15 of additional spending. So he didn't make that mistake again of that kind of deal. He did go on with other tax increases while, again, preserving the central point of keeping marginal income tax rates lower.
The foreign policy story is more straightforward, but here, too, I think Reagan is misunderstood. And what's interesting now is the way the two sides have changed. 20 years ago, it was conservatives who said, and then starting 10 years ago, it was liberals who said that Reagan did an about-faced and went soft on the Soviet Union in his second term. Now, on the surface, this reading of an old and new Reagan appears quite plausible. But I think contrary to the Reagan reversal school, I think it's possible to make out a fundamental consistency in his Cold War statecraft from the beginning to the end.
but changing as he perceived his own position of strength, changing, and also changing as he understood different circumstances in the Soviet Union. On the one hand, we recall Reagan's tough talk, the evil empire, the lie, cheat, and steal remark from his first press conference in January of 1981. We remember those quite clearly. There was also, I think, a very interesting private letter Reagan wrote in 1983 to a friend. He said, quote, I have never believed in any negotiation with the Soviets that we could appeal to them as we would to people like us. Negotiations with the Soviets is really a case of presenting a choice in which they face alternatives they must consider on the basis of cost.
For example, in our arms reduction talks, they must recognize that failure to meet us on some mutually agreeable level will result in an arms race in which they know they cannot maintain superiority. They must choose between reduced equal levels or inferiority. Close quote. Comes pretty close to Reagan saying, I'm going to make them a deal they can't refuse. So that's the tough side of Reagan. On the other hand, we know of Reagan's personal letter to Brezhnev in April of 1981, a handwritten letter he sent him.
in which he said, among other things, quote, is it possible that we have permitted ideology, political and economic philosophies, and governmental policies to keep us from considering the very real everyday problems of our peoples? Mr. President, should we not be concerned with eliminating the obstacles which prevent our people from achieving their most cherished goals? And isn't it possible that some of these obstacles are born of government objectives which have little to do with the real need and desires of our people? And I'm guessing that the Soviets found that letter deeply confusing when they received it.
Then too, in December 1981, in an interview with a newspaper reporter that tended to go over, look, Reagan said this, I've always recognized about dealing with the Soviet Union, I've always recognized that ultimately there's got to be a settlement, a solution. The other way, if you don't believe that, well then you're trapped in the back of your mind with the inevitability of conflict someday. That kind of conflict is going to end the world. Now, by the way, he is here saying almost exactly the same thing Churchill said in his Iron Curtain speech about the necessity of reaching a genuine settlement with the Soviet Union over the Cold War division of the world. Churchill used to say in the middle months of 1945 when he saw trouble coming, if I could just sit down with Stalin once a week and have dinner with him, there would be no trouble at all after the war. Surely an errant judgment, but also entirely typical of the overconfidence and personal diplomacy that certain kind of political leaders have. Reagan would drive his advisors, especially his hardline advisors, crazy when he'd say, if I could just sit down with the Soviet leaders, I'm sure I could make them see reason.
explain what's crazy about the system and what's better about ours and why it's nuts to go on with this arms race. I thought this man's really naive. And to a certain extent that may be correct. And I think, by the way, this explains the same kind of overconfidence and personal diplomacy you see today in Obama saying he will talk to the Iranians, initially without preconditions until clear heads got to him about that. But in Gorbachev, Reagan found someone he could talk to for real. I have a lot to say about Gorbachev in the book. He did have some genuine reformist instincts, although they were deeply confused. In a sentence, he thought the problems of socialism required more socialism as the solution. Or, as I put it in the book, he was much less Machiavelli than he was Inspector Clouseau.
But nonetheless, he was something, and Reagan perceived that here was someone with whom you could genuinely make a deal with. What justifies law? The systems of order built around us to arrange legitimate human behavior. The American tradition is that rights exist without respect to government, and those pre-existing rights must define the relationship between the individual and the state. Cato Institute Vice President for Legal Affairs, Roger Pilon, explored rights and the state at Cato University on Capitol Hill in August.
How did we start out with the Constitution for limited government, whose powers, James Madison told us in Federalist 45, were few and defined, and end up with a Leviathan that we have here in Washington today, which all of you serve in one respect or another? That is something that cries out for explanation, which is what I'm going to do in a sort of summary way this afternoon. The place to begin with that explanation, however, isn't with the Constitution, but with the Declaration of Independence, because it's there that the framers, when they met in Philadelphia in 1787, set forth the... philosophy of government that when they met previously in Philadelphia in 1776, they incorporated into the Declaration of Independence. So let's start with that because we will then see how that philosophy of government is captured by the Constitution. When Jefferson began those famous words, we hold these truths to be self-evident, he was, of course, saying that the propositions that follow are truths and they're self-evident truths or truths of reason. In other words, he was placing us plainly in the natural law tradition, the tradition that holds that there's a higher law of right and wrong from which to
criticize the positive law at any time and from which to derive that positive law. And that's a very old theory going back to antiquity. We find it in the Greeks, especially in Plato and Aristotle. Plato's discussion in the Euthyphro with respect to the meaning of piety, is piety pious because the gods love it or the gods love it because it's pious, is a question that poses two theories of law. Namely, the law is justified because it reflects the will of the sovereign, whether it be the king, the tyrant, the aristocracy, the democratic majority, whatever the case may be, versus the idea that law is justified because it conforms to certain higher law principles of right or wrong. And that's why the gods love it. With this discussion between natural law theory and legal positivism has taken place over the ensuing 2000 years.
We find it in the Romans. We find it in the Middle Ages, in the disputes between the crown and the church. And we find it especially in the English legal history and the development of the common law, whereby judges in the king's court were empowered to decide cases or controversies brought before them between ordinary individuals and later between individuals and the king. And the effort to do so involved them in finding rights that people may or may not have with reference to this notion of a higher law. And the accumulation of these common law decisions made common by an appellate court is what we think of as the common law and is what...
John Locke drew upon when he wrote the Second Treatise of Government in which he drew this all together, setting forth the theory of rights, the theory of property, and the social contract theory, all of which Jefferson drew upon when he sat down to draft the Declaration. And so he began after that first phrase with the premise of the Declaration, namely that all men are created equal, and he defined that equality with reference to rights, not values or other moral notions, but rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. And so you've got your starting point. for the conception of the relationship between government and the individual. But you don't have government yet because Jefferson, like Locke before him and Hobbes before that, was working within the tradition of state of nature theory. The idea is that if you want to try to justify government and governmental powers, you don't start with a state of affairs with government because that involves you in begging the question. You start in a state of affairs without government and you try to determine what our rights and obligations are vis-a-vis each other so that you can then determine what rights we may exercise by way of creating government and empowering it. And so you start, thus far as I've gone in the Declaration, with the moral order. And that moral order is defined by equality.
between individuals which itself is defined by rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. All of which rights are reducible, as Locke put it, to property, by which he meant lives, liberties, and estates. The property in your life, your property in your liberty, and the property you acquire in the world. And thus, the correlative obligation to those rights are essentially the obligation to leave individuals alone. Each of us has a right to be free, and each of us has an obligation to leave his neighbor free. And all of this can, as I said, be reduced to property. But of course, you don't spend your life living in splendid isolation on Black Acre or White Acre. You associate with other people as you work your way through life. And so we come to the second great foundation of rights, namely contract. So that you have now...
the foundations of the theory of rights. Property between common law strangers and contract, the way people come together voluntarily to create all sorts of new institutions to extinguish rights that they had before and create new rights to extinguish obligations and create new obligations through promises or contracts. And through these two fundamental rights, promise and contract on one hand, and before that property, you can create the whole of what we call civilization or civil society. It's not easily or well understood, but autistics often have some significant advantages over the rest of us. And as our lives become increasingly driven by arranging resources, skills often associated with autism may grow in value. Economist Tyler Cowen argues that it might help us all to become a little more autistic. That's part of his new book, Create Your Own Economy, The Path to Prosperity in a Disordered World. He discussed these ideas at a Cato Book Forum in August.
It's a cognitive strength of autism that many or perhaps all autistics are very good at ordering, classifying, arranging information in preferred areas of interest, and then pursuing knowledge in these areas with a kind of extreme or intense focus. A lot of what the book does is tie together these two areas, information technology and human neurodiversity, by showing, in essence, what we're trying to do with the web is to mimic some of the cognitive strengths of autistic people. But if we're not autistics ourselves, what we have to do is use technology to help us in this endeavor. A big picture summary of the book might be something like, yes, in some ways we are becoming more autistic, but this is actually a good thing, not a bad thing. We're not becoming more autistic in the genetic sense, but we're achieving capabilities that are, as individuals, more like those which autistic people have. Part of the book presents what I would consider to be a revisionist portrait of autism. In the 1960s, it was commonly the view that autistic people, or most of them, were mentally retarded.
Over the last 20 years, there's been more and more research showing the cognitive advantages of autistics, recognizing they often have very difficult life problems. But when autistics are given tests for pattern recognition, information collecting, noticing small details, detecting changes in musical pitch, certain kinds of memory, if you give them up some problems in experimental economics and all these areas on average, actually it seems that autistics do better. So there's this general sense of humanity having this great diversity of cognitive profiles, which we call neurodiversity. And the vision of the book, the moral vision of the book, is about the power of the individual human being. to take modernity and become more like himself or herself, to become more authentic, to become more individual, to become more diverse. And it's really a message from Adam Smith that's driving a lot of themes in the book. Smith wrote that division of labor is limited by the extent of the market. I think you can also argue that the power of human neurodiversity is limited by the extent of the market. And as we move into contemporary society, people who are in some ways different, whether neurologically or otherwise, they can achieve greater power, greater opportunities, and that we all ought to take this revisionist view.
which I would, for instance, also apply to what's called ADD or ADHD, so-called attention deficit disorder. I'm arguing ADD, we shouldn't call it disorder. Autism, we shouldn't call it disorder. We should recognize them as cognitive profiles, which have advantages and disadvantages. And in some individuals, the social advantages may outweigh the disadvantages or vice versa. So it's very much a revisionist view of creativity and cognition and how it relates with economic growth and modernity, which is overall a very optimistic picture, not only of information technology, but of this notion of the future of human neurodiversity.
That's my overview of the book in big picture terms. What I'd like to talk about in my remaining time are just some of the arguments in the book about politics. There's a chapter called Autistic Politics, which is a deliberately jarring title, but I chose it to be jarring on purpose. And one of the points I make is that when it comes to politics, there are aspects of the autistic cognitive profile that I feel would greatly improve politics and that we could learn a lot from this cognitive profile. Just to summarize what I think those aspects are, autistics, in my view, and there's some evidence behind this, they're less likely to think in terms of us versus them. They're less likely to encode false memories.
They're less likely to think in terms of simple, stereotypical narratives. They're more likely to remember particular individual facts when shown a narrative, less likely to use narratives to oversimplify. And when it comes to economic experiments, they're less likely to be fooled by framing our endowment effects, which means, I think more broadly, the notion that simply because something is theirs, or maybe that a point of view of theirs, it doesn't, for that reason alone, make it more valuable. I also view autistics and neurodiverse people more generally as kind of natural cosmopolitans, that if an autistic person grows up being very different, feeling very different in the schoolyard, And then that same autistic person is, say, 27 years old and being asked to believe that the real differences across human beings are defined by what nation you belong to. I believe this is a very unnatural thought for most autistic people, that the idea that there's a common humanity, which autistics sometimes are accused or defined of not belonging to, is a very powerful notion in what I would call autistic thought. And this notion of the common humanity is a very cosmopolitan one. So my vision of an autistic politics, it's not any particular political point of view, but I think it would embody these features of being extremely cosmopolitan, of more interested in being objective.
not seeing everything in us versus them terms, not being so preoccupied with the notion of revenge, and really thinking in some pretty fundamentally different ways about what politics is. I think the way the battle lines are drawn in the world we live in, the battle lines typically fall in terms of what are your conclusions. Like, are you a Republican? Are you a Democrat? Are you a Libertarian? Are you a Socialist? And the more I think about it, this strikes me as extremely odd. Why should the battle lines be drawn in terms of conclusions? Another way of drawing the battle lines would be, say, in terms of how people think. So if I take someone like Matt, who's one of the commenters, I read Matt's blog all the time, Matt, I think, would agree that he and I disagree on a lot of issues. Not on everything, but...
We disagree a lot. We disagree every day. We sort of write back and forth to each other and to others, and even if we don't call each other by name, we're like disagreeing in public every day. But at the same time, when I read Matt, I have this feeling, like if I were a progressive, this is the argument I would make. I feel that way when I read Matt. There's other writers, like when I read Paul Krugman, I don't feel that way. I don't think if I were a progressive, I would argue like Paul Krugman. So there's this method of thinking in common.
So there's the question, like, should I be emotionally, intellectually, whatever, more allied to people with whom I share conclusions or with whom I share a certain method of thinking? And when I disagree with Matt, which is frequent, I feel I can always figure out very quickly where we disagree. There's something like about the framework that we have in common. And that to me seems like a powerful commonality. So in general, I'm interested in getting people to explore or re-explore what are our true commonalities with other people. We should rethink these commonalities in terms other than us versus them.
I feel myself actually not very attached to a lot of libertarians. I think they think very differently than I do. So when Brink said maybe I'm a small L libertarian, maybe I'm a very small L, like you're wondering what font, you know, what typeface, can we get that L down to the quantum level? I don't know. But I guess I would say the people I feel like allied with are people who think in particular ways. And that to me, as I get older, is becoming a more important distinction. So like how big L libertarian I am isn't what I think about so much these days. It's like how can we develop better methods for thinking? And when I write Marginal Revolution, for me, it's not fundamentally about conclusions.
Obviously, I'll tell people what I think, but it's about trying to develop or illustrate or myself learn some dialogic form of thinking, which is in some way fundamentally open, which I think is what the blogosphere is, and trying to learn from that myself. And that, to me, over time, has become a powerful vision. And emotionally, in a lot of ways, it's more important to me than any particular set of policy conclusions. North Korea's isolation poses a risk to various parts of the world. China may well be the key to easing global tensions with that failed state, but it's reluctant to do so. Ted Galen Carpenter, Cato's vice president for defense and foreign policy studies, evaluated the costs and benefits of a more engaged China at a Cato policy forum in July. Ever since the latest North Korea nuclear crisis began in the fall of 2002,
There's been a dominant assumption in the policy community in the United States and throughout much of East Asia, and that is that whatever hard bargaining the North Koreans might engage in, ultimately they would agree to give up their nuclear program in exchange for concessions from the United States and other relevant parties. The vehicle to achieve this kind of peaceful diplomatic solution eventually became the six-party talks involving not only North Korea and the United States, but also Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia. However, recent North Korean actions have increased doubts about whether it is possible to achieve an effective diplomatic solution.
engaged in a number of troubling actions, including long-range test of a ballistic missile, not entirely successful, but still rather worrisome. When the United Nations Security Council issued a largely toothless statement of condemnation, the North used that as a pretext to announce its withdrawal yet again from the six-party talks. That was followed by a nuclear test, the second that North Korea had conducted, the expulsion of international inspectors from the Yongbyon reactor complex. And then the announcement that the North was no longer going to abide by the armistice ending the Korean War. And finally, an indication that it was going to test even more missiles, which it did just a matter of a couple weeks ago, this time largely short-range missiles. That series of developments has caused at least some in the U.S. policy community to become much more pessimistic about the prospects for a diplomatic solution. That those of us who had been arguing for years that North Korea might very well be using the Six-Party Talks to stall for time, and that Pyongyang was in fact...
determined to become a nuclear weapon state, that view has become stronger, certainly in recent months. The U.S. policy community is not the only one that is becoming a bit more pessimistic. Chinese officials and scholars are also becoming more pessimistic. That point became graphically clear in my visit and set of meetings in China last month. I'd been in China in April of 2008 for a series of meetings, and at that time, the dominant view in China was exactly the same as it was in the United States. Yeah, the North Koreans posture, they engage in very tough bargaining, but ultimately, the diplomatic process will work. This time, the change in attitude was palpable.
Most scholars the overwhelming majority in fact now said this looks bad It looks as though the north may in fact not be serious about giving up its nuclear program Those who remained optimistic were very much in the minority this time around. Observers had noted that China is the key to this issue, that China has considerable potential leverage. After all, provides a large portion of North Korea's food supplies, a large portion of North Korea's energy supplies. This has led some observers to assume that China can dictate an outcome. In fact, New York Times colonist Tom Friedman a few years ago made the rather flippant comment that Beijing could solve the North Korea nuclear crisis with a telephone call.
Well, far be it from me to accuse Tom Friedman of oversimplifying highly complex foreign policy issues, but it's not quite that simple. China indeed has a lot of leverage. And it's also true that without China's active cooperation, any kind of sanctions regime against North Korea likely have minimal effect. It may inconvenience the regime. It may even cause some pain to the regime, as the financial sanctions that the U.S. pushed with the last round of sanctions did. That kind of pain is not likely to be severe enough to cause a significant change in regime behavior.
China has the leverage that could cause real pain to Kim Jong-il's government, but China is reluctant to use that leverage. Now, there are multiple reasons for this. Some of the Chinese cite moral reasons that it would be wrong to betray a friend and longtime ally. You get the sense, though, that most Chinese officials and scholars are not terribly serious about that. There are other fears, though, and they are far more serious and far more genuine.
China fears that if it really puts the screws to Pyongyang, there could be a number of very bad consequences to China. One is that, faced with truly onerous sanctions, Kim Jong-il might conclude that his regime is on its way out, and he has nothing to lose. He might then do something terribly rash, including the possibility of triggering another war on the Korean Peninsula. Another possibility, even if Kim doesn't do anything crazy, is that sanctions of that sort could cause the North Korean state to suddenly implode. That would result in chaos and a surge of refugees, perhaps even several million refugees, over the Yalu River into northeastern China, something clearly Chinese officials do not want to face. Moreover, even if an implosion did not occur, even if there was a more gradual unraveling of the North Korean regime, that could still lead to unpleasant results from China's standpoint.
including the likelihood of a united, non-communist Korea allied with the United States and with a probable U.S. military presence on the peninsula. Some of the Chinese that I talked to, both on the 2008 visit and this one, said, look, we need a geostrategic buffer between our homeland and the U.S. sphere of influence in Northeast Asia. Interestingly enough, though, there was a split in opinion, particularly this time. Some younger Chinese scholars in particular said, the whole concept of buffer states is obsolete. The United States wants to attack us. It can attack us with weapons from a great distance. It doesn't need forward deployed bases on the Korean Peninsula. So who cares if the U.S.?
has an alliance with South Korea, but that view is still very much a minority view. In any case, China remains profoundly reluctant to use the leverage that it has. How is it possible that in a world where thousands of people regulated financial markets, the whole system crashed down? And why do the solutions offered appear to double down on failure? Johan Norberg offers his take on the crisis in finance over the past two years in his new book, Financial Fiasco, how America's infatuation with home ownership and easy money created the economic crisis. He spoke at a Cato forum for the book last month.
This whole process, this old show, could also be called How to Ruin the Economy in Seven Easy Steps. And I'm going to talk about those steps. Not by design, not consciously, but because of unintended consequences of human action, something that often happens when we do things. And to start it off, it started where it often starts, with monetary policy and with easy money in the economy. Let's go back to an era that's very...
much resembles our own. There's an economic crisis, rise in unemployment. People are afraid of a Japanese-style deflation. They're afraid of possibly a 30s-style depression. So we have to look at Fed and hope that they're going to save us with more liquidity, with lower interest rates, and that is what happened in 2001 after the dot-com bubble and after the 9-11 terrorist attacks. Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke and his other colleagues, what they did in...
The few years following that was that they lowered interest rates dramatically, more than they've ever done before, from 6.75% to 1.75% at the end of the year. And they kept reducing the interest rate to 1% in mids of 2003. And this wasn't just a temporary response to this crisis. This was a really discretionary policy to make sure that the economy had a better shape for the long term and avoided possible deflation, possible depression. As Alan Greenspan has defended the rate cut in 2003, this was not an attempt to...
save an economy from a crash because, and I quote, we agreed on the reduction despite our consensus that the economy probably did not need yet another rate cut. The stock market had finally begun to revive and our forecast called for much stronger GDP growth in the year's second half. Yet we went ahead on the basis of a balancing of risk. We wanted to shut down the possibility of corrosive deflation. We were willing to chance that by cutting rates we might foster a bubble, an inflationary boom of some sort, which we would subsequently have to address, end of quote.
Well, now we're in the subsequently and we're now addressing it. Because when you lower interest rate, that's dramatically and for such a long period. And when you tell people that this is something that's for the considerable future, then you change and distort all the incentives on the financial market. As one investor put it, I don't want to be in equities anymore with these low interest rates and I'm not getting any return in my bond positions. So two things happen. We take on more and more leverage and we reach for riskier asset classes. Give me yield. Give me leverage. Give me return. End of quote. Because it was suddenly expensive to have capital of your own. You don't get any returns, but it's lucrative to use other people's capital.
And this affects financial markets. You'll get more leverage. You'll get smaller margins, less capital. But it also affects households, of course. With those interest rates, we also see that easy money, easy money is step one. Step two is that easy money turns into more mortgages. And we can see that the...
Price rise in housing is quite dramatic over these few years. In 2002, a year of recession, we could still see an increase in housing prices. In 2003, it climbed further, and we could see an increase by 10% to 15% every year in the American cities. Because money always ends up somewhere. And if people, if they're afraid of the stock market after the dot-com bubble, if they're not interested in bonds and savings, well, then they might be interested in putting them in the house, where it seems very, very safe.
And if prices then begin to rise, you become even more interested in refinancing, in building bigger, in buying something even larger. It felt like getting a house for free with these interest rates, as one investor put it when he bought his second house. And you could then see your house as the new ATM machine. This is where you get new cash to fund your consumption. In 2002, a year of recession, American households borrowed $269 billion more to fund new consumptions on their old houses. And especially people did this in states, non-recourse states, where it's possible to get a loan and return the key to the bank if the mortgage goes sour and walk away without any debts left.
But this wasn't just a spontaneous process by the households. If easy money and money into mortgages were something that happened because of interest rates, we also saw a political push from Democrats and Republicans from the left to right, a very bipartisan consensus, that home ownership rates is one of the most important indicators of the health of society. And trying to increase this rate by just a few percentage points really makes it legitimate with quite dramatic policies. As President Bush put it in 2002, we use the mighty muscle of the federal government in combination with state and local governments to encourage owning your own home. And there was a battery of political activities and policies that aimed at this. We had the tax deductions on mortgage rates. We had government insurance policies. We had pressure on private lenders. And most of all, we had government-sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which had as their sole purpose of getting more mortgages out there on the market and make sure that people who couldn't get credit on the market could do that anyway. These weren't small corporations. They were some of the biggest in the world. And they had a political goal set by Congress and the administration to increase mortgages.
They weren't small, as I said. In 1994, Fannie Mae alone introduced their trillion-dollar commitment, $1,000 billion going to people who could not afford a mortgage on the private market. In the year 2000, that was done, so they started their American Dream commitment, $2 trillion with the same purpose. This grew more and more radical. And under the Bush administration, at the moment when we saw these reality shows explaining that you can flip a house because prices increased that dramatically, the Bush administration raised the goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, saying that it used to be 50% of the loans that should be going to people with a low income. Now it should be 56%. It used to be 20% going to people with a very low income. It should be 28%. So Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had to respond by buying more subprime mortgages, buying mortgages based on...
Credit that was hurt in some way or another. People who weren't considered credit worthy on the market. In the year of 2004 alone, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bought $175 million of subprime loans. This is when you get the stated income loans. You don't prove your income. You just tell it up front. Also called the liar's loans. You'll get the Nina loans. The no income, no asset loans. Which means that, yeah, you're probably self-employed and you probably have some sort of income somewhere. But then you also get the Nina loans. The no income, no job, no asset loan. No problem loan. Because you'll get it anyway. We'll fix this. And anyway, prices rise by 10-15%. So you can refinance if you don't have an income.
And you can see where this is heading. One of the employees at Fannie Mae said, it didn't take a lot of sophistication to notice what was happening to the quality of the loans. Anybody could have seen it, but nobody on the outside was even questioning us about it because there was so much political will in here. So we get more easy money. Easy money turns into more mortgages. And mortgages, they are not what they used to be. It used to be that a lender just, they sat on the loan.
So they really were interested in the long-term prospects, if you're able to repay the loan, if you're able to pay the interest rates. But because of innovation in the financial markets and on Wall Street in the last decade, we've seen more and more securitization of the loans, which means that you basically pass the loans on to someone else. Basically, a good idea to spread risk, to diversify, so that you as a lender, you're not totally exposed to one part of the country. Something that was pioneered by the government-sponsored enterprises who began to guarantee securitization. because of this. But the problem, of course, is that you also create worse incentive for the lenders to make bad loans and pass them on to someone else quickly so that they face the risk rather than you. What you get is that you have a lot of mortgages, you've got a lot of houses out there, housing loans, and then you as a lender, you take thousands of loans and you put them into a pool of mortgages, you slice them up, and then you sell them on as bonds, as securities to someone else according to different risk clauses so that if you own one of these mortgage-backed securities, you're exposed to all the loans, even the worst loans, even if you own a sort of safe security. But...
you will be the last one who loses out if there is a problem on the housing market. People with the less safe, the more risky mortgage-backed securities, they will lose out first. So you think you're pretty safe. And this was something that was incredibly interesting for a lot of people, partly for Wall Street banks, because they earned fees on every step. When they made the loans, when they packaged the loans, when they passed them on to someone else, and they earned a lot of bonuses when they did.
This was important for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac because this was their way of dramatically upscaling their buying of more mortgages. They could just buy securities rather than buying loans as they were. But they also became hugely popular for one important reason. The credit rating agencies, the agencies that are supposed to tell us what kind of risks are out there on the financial markets, they basically told us that this is a great idea. This is something that's not risky, and since it's not risky, it's tremendously interesting because it gives you much better yields than other ways of investing. They said that the safest mortgage-backed securities, they were...
Triple A. They were almost as safe as government bonds. But they also said that the riskiest mortgage-backed securities were investment-grade rather than speculative, which meant that all around the world, people said that, wow. Alchemy works. It's possible to turn the lead of risky loans into gold by just sort of putting them into a package and scrambling them around and selling them in different trenches to someone else. In that case, we want a piece of the cake. And this is what happened. Norwegian municipalities bought these bonds because they thought that this was a way of funding health care and education for the long term. German state banks bought them because they thought this was a safe and lucrative investment. And the Chinese government bought them because they thought that this was the way to place their reserves. But the problem was, of course, that...
The credit rating agencies, well, some people claim that they lied. I would just say in a more diplomatic fashion that they were systematically telling us things that weren't true. Because they were in the hands of people who went there. People who wanted to sell securities like that paid the rating agencies to get them rated. Which of course creates some sort of problematic interest for the rating agencies. So they could really give them...
bizarre ratings because they wanted the fees. We've seen a lot of internal memos and chats and discussions about this in the rating agencies that are truly bizarre. That shows us that they really knew that parts of this were really house of cards. That's one member of a committee that was supposed to value one of these to another in a chat. By the way, that deal is ridiculous. I know, I know, right. Model definitely does not capture half the risk. Well, we should not be rating it. Well, we rate every deal. It could be structured by cows and we would rate it. Well, but there's a lot of risk associated with it. I personally don't feel comfy signing off as a committee member. And then they went on and signed off as committee members because
of this interest, but you would also think that they would like to preserve their reputation on the market, not by telling us untruths. But the problem is that since the 1970s, the big credit rating agencies are not on the market. They don't have to defend their reputation because they have been given basically a government oligopoly, monopoly power. They have become a part of the regulatory structure by being given the power to set the official definition of risk, to tell the rest of the market what's risky and what's not. And others are forced to abide by their decision. Banks who invest in different assets, they're forced to hold more capital as a safety measure if they own
what the credit rating agencies consider speculative, and some investment funds, pension funds and others, they're not even allowed to invest in something the credit rating agencies don't find that safe. So in other words, the rating agencies didn't have an incentive to be trustworthy, to fight for their long-term reputation or anything like that. They only had the incentive to please the customer, and therefore we got these strange ratings. As one director of corporate development at one of these large credit rating agencies warned the SEC in 1995. Rating agencies are staffed by ordinary people with families to support and bills to meet and mortgages to pay. Government regulators, by giving us this oligopoly power, are inadvertently subjecting those people to improper pressure and share accountability for any scandals which might result because of this inflation in ratings. But few people listen to those warnings and...
Norwegian municipalities, German state banks, and the Chinese government definitely did not. So everybody entered the market for mortgage-backed securities. As Warren Buffett has put it, in every bubble there are three I's. The innovators, and then the imitators, and then the idiots who just think that they will be able to, well... dawns closer to the exit and leave before everything goes sour. So these are some of the steps on the way to the crisis. But another important step was the fact that banks who got interested in holding these securities, partly because they were so safe, so they could basically have some regulatory arbitrage. They could fund it by borrowing money from others at an incredibly low rate and don't hold much capital. Because traditionally, they would hold them on the balance sheet as normal assets in a very transparent way. But because of new international banking regulations set by the Basel Committee of Bank Regulators, it suddenly became expensive to hold assets in this transparent way.
In a normal way, if they hold mortgage-backed securities, they would have to have 8% of capital themselves as a safety device. But what happened was that these regulators said, if you do it in another way, if you create some sort of special companies that are formally independent, sieves and conduits, and put the mortgage-backed securities into them and fund them, not yourself, but via short-term loans on the market, well, in that case, you don't need 8% of capital. You only need 0.8% of capital because then you only give them a credit line and say, no one else is willing to fund these loans. So the regulators basically gave the banks a pricing list saying, Transparency is costly, but the shadow banking sector is very interesting and profitable for you. And then we got, at the same time, new accounting rules that said that mortgage-backed securities in 2007 had to be accounted for in the same way as other assets, according to market principles, which means that, well, it might be the way to account for these assets, but it also means that you introduce a stronger element of pro-cyclicality. It becomes pro-cyclical. If the price goes up, it means that you're able to reduce the capital that you have. You look more solvent. But if prices could begin to collapse, even if...
Nothing has happened to your situation. It looks like you're insolvent and then you might have to sell in panic. And if that happens, prices will collapse even further and people will be forced to write down the value even more. And then we get to the last step before we enter the crisis. Why do you do risky things like this? How come you fund governments, banks, municipalities in this way? How come you're interested in being dependent on these short-term loans or mortgage-backed securities like this? Partly because there's a safety net. For 100 years, we've tried to make banking safer by introducing lenders of lost resource, central banks, deposit insurances.
And different forms of bailouts, helping financial companies that are on the ropes by injecting capital or buying bad assets from them or whatever. But that is also a way of making them less responsible for the decisions that they make. It creates the idea that if things go in the right way, you're able to privatize the gains. But if things go sour, if there's problems, well, then you can pass on the losses to someone else, to the taxpayers. And the Fed, Federal Reserve, increased this moral hazard on the market in the last two decades by constantly, every time there was a bad movement on the market, lowering interest rates. By saying consciously that we will never do anything to threaten a bubble, but we will mop up afterwards. Which means that...
The bankers began to say that there's a Greenspan put. Greenspan will save us if things are problematic. The chief investment officer of Deutsche Bank Security said that lowering hard landing, I'm less concerned of that because I believe that Fed is our friend. And if you think that your friend is out there with limitless resources to bail you out, to lower interest rates, to supply liquidity, well, then you do more dramatic, risky things. You can have more leverage. So these are the seven steps that it takes to create...
huge problems to store them up for the future. A lot of easy money, easy money going into mortgages. Mortgages turns into mortgage-backed securities. Mortgage-backed securities get AAA ratings and everybody wants to buy them and they put them in the shadow banking sector rather than on the transparent balance sheet. And they are marked to market and there's a safety net to encourage risks and leverage like this. And the rest is history.
A new book is now available from the Cato Institute, Mad About Trade, Why Main Street America Should Embrace Globalization. It's authored by Dan Griswold, director of Cato's Center for Trade Policy Studies. The book tells the underreported story of how a more global U.S. economy has created better jobs and higher living standards for American workers. Mad About Trade is now available at catostore.org. That will do it for this edition of Cato Audio. I'm Caleb Brown. Talk to you again next month.