Welcome to Cato Audio for October 2024. I'm Caleb Brown. In this edition, Federal Appeals Court Judge Naomi Rao caps our Constitution Day event with a deep dive into legal interpretation. Nick Anthony details the very big problem with Donald Trump's proposed price control on credit card interest. House Financial Services Committee Chairman Patrick McHenry sits down with Cato's Jennifer Schultz to talk financial privacy. And Cato's Tommy Berry details some of the big administrative law cases tackled by the Supreme Court this term. First up, this month's Cato Roundtable.
At the Cato Institute, we talk a lot about what Congress should do, about what judges should do. And there is often a lot of discussion about what presidents shouldn't do. But here we're in sort of an interesting spot where we're talking about unilateral action that presidents are able to take. That is executive orders and other edicts that presidents can make. But it is executive orders to enhance freedom.
and to talk about what this project aims to do and some of the specific suggestions we make in our document. I'm speaking with Eric Gomez, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, and Alex Narasta, vice president for economic and social policy studies at the Cato Institute. So, Alex, you and I have talked about this offline a number of times about, you know, we have a massive federal executive bureaucracy that is empowered to do all manner of things, and a lot of which we don't like. And the president is the head of the executive branch and is the CEO, if you will, of that branch of government. And so there are a lot of things that a president can do either through the powers of the presidency itself or through powers that have been delegated to the executive branch. And those those powers can be used for good and ill. So explain to me why this project, why is it important now to point out things that a president can do unilaterally with the stroke of a pen to enhance freedom? The power of the presidency has been growing.
for over a century in the United States by leaps and bounds, oftentimes power taken by the president, but more often power given to the president by Congress. At the same time, the power and size of the federal government has mushroomed, and the president's role in running all of this has increased along with size and power given to him. And I think this trend is accelerating and continuing. Congress is not a dead institution. I don't want anyone to think that.
I think it's dead, but it is an ailing institution, is an ill institution, is an institution that has voluntarily given much of its power to the executive and I think will continue to do so. So a large portion of policymaking is done through executive orders and other presidential directives. My thinking was because of this increasing power, what Cato should do is have a document that identifies a large number of executive orders and other directives like proclamations that presidents have issued in the past and argue for ones that should be revoked or amended. So we're not... supporting additional EO's executive orders on top of this. We are merely arguing for revoking existing executive orders and amending some on there to delete some of the worst anti-freedom portions of presidential directives.
The areas here, the big ones seem to be health care, trade, immigration and foreign policy. And Eric, on the foreign policy front, what's most important to know about presidential authority and the history of presidential edicts with respect to foreign policy? So we primarily looked at those that came out in the last, say, 20 years or so. And it was interesting to see how many of these executive orders and proclamations deal with emergency issues that. aren't really exist anymore. So for example, Iraq, the second invasion of Iraq that overthrew the Saddam Hussein government.
there's still a lot of executive orders that are considered active that deal with a declaration of emergency to give the president power to do things like issue sanctions or identify particular individuals or institutions to cut off from the U.S. financial system that were initially issued in 2003, 2004. And a lot has changed in the last 20 years in Iraq. But those are still considered active. They've never been revoked. They've never been taken off. And so now that the U.S. is out of Afghanistan...
Now that the United States is still militarily present in Iraq, but the democratically elected government has been in Iraq now for well over a decade and a half. The one thing that stood out when I was reviewing these orders to see which ones we should revoke is there's just a lot of stuff on the books here that is just kind of like a zombie thing. It exists and the circumstances around which it came to be have been radically altered. But they're still around. And I feel like just even just the effort of sort of brush clearing, right? Like getting rid of these things that still exist, the president could still use them to justify certain policy actions. But when the circumstances have changed so much, it's similar to some of the arguments made around the 2001.
authorization for the use of military force after 9-11, where Congress gave the president authority to just go after Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. And we've been using the 2001 AUMF to justify U.S. military action in dozens and dozens of countries throughout the world because there may be some tiny sliver of someone who says they're in Al-Qaeda. And it's just kind of, the president has kind of swallowed up that authority and is just very reluctant to let it go. And to Alex's point about the ailing Congress, Congress is very unwilling to sort of vote to repeal that thing, even though it's been in effect for so long and the circumstances are so different.
And to put some more meat on this, an executive order is a written directive with the force of law. And some of them are very consequential. They tell an agency to regulate in this way, how to handle a foreign power under certain circumstances. But a lot of them are pretty innocuous and don't matter that much, right? One of them, for instance, the first one ever issued by George Washington was an order to all the department heads to send him a memo to say, hey, well, this is my job. This is what I'm doing. And how's it going? And that's fine. That's the normal operation, right? But there are over 14,000 executive orders.
that have been issued, over 10,000 proclamations. And a lot of them are very consequential for policy. And very clearly in my mind, many of them are effectively legislation and have the force of law. And this is a massive increase in the power of the president, the shape rules, the shape laws that channel them in his direction. And as Eric says, Some of them are really outdated, and we don't know what they can be used for in the future, but it's much better to sort of clear the brush, get rid of a lot of the deadwood, and in many of the cases here in these other issue areas that are covered by our paper, actually increase the measure of freedom, of economic and personal freedom in the United States, and pull government back from some very contentious social issues.
Eric, to your point about executive orders that where circumstances have changed, one of the items listed in the foreign policy section is revoking executive order 13823, which itself repealed an executive order which would have closed Guantanamo Bay. So what we're calling for here is, you know, and of the hundreds of people that have gone through Guantanamo Bay, it is effectively an offshore prison for 60 people at this point. Yes, the Guantanamo inmate numbers have been. dropping. And I think broadly that's good, although in some cases, you know, these prisoners are being transferred to pretty illiberal places, so who knows what kind of treatment they're getting once they get there. But yeah, the Obama administration, one of their very early executive orders when they came in was, we're going to shut down Guantanamo Bay. And they've made some progress in significantly reducing the number of prisoners there, but there's still quite a few. And, you know, when the Trump administration came in, he revoked
the initial executive order via an executive order. So yeah, there are at least that example of just saying, hey, this decision to close Guantanamo Bay prison facility in the global war on terror was a good thing that the Obama administration was trying to do. And the Trump administration has sort of stopped that process was a bad idea. And we should get back to closing it. Alex, in your primary issue area, that is immigration, Joe Biden just a few months ago signed a proclamation that made it much harder for effectively anyone to request asylum in the United States. Now, this is a very cynical order as far as I can tell. It is. And we do write a short piece in here calling for that to be repealed, as well as some other areas of executive orders be repealed having to do with interior immigration enforcement, government contracting. One of the.
The way this entire project is structured is it's very much written for policymakers. We have an introduction that lays out the history, what executive orders are, why we think there are a lot of problems. But the pieces themselves about the executive orders are very brief. It's a description of the order, why it's bad and what to do about it. And most of them are fewer than 400 words. So it's really designed for bureaucrats, people in the next administration, policy wonks around D.C., people like Eric and I.
or like me and Eric, to read and to get some ideas about how to put this into effect. And we identify things on immigration, on trade. Just to give you an example, George W. Bush promulgated an executive order in the last year of his administration to mandate the use of E-Verify for all federal contractors. Now, almost all major federal contractors are other large firms that have very large private markets and large numbers of private customers. But if a portion of your business mandates that you usually verify for hires there, you're probably going to mandate it for all of your hires so that you can move workers around on these different contracts. Otherwise, it's very confusing. You may be in violation of law. You're just going to do that. And that has raised the hiring costs for large numbers of American companies for really no benefit in terms of immigration enforcement. So that's just one example of an order that imposes costs. The costs are often hidden from people, but they're very real. And we call for just revoking it, replacing it with nothing.
notable executive orders that either need to go or need to be amended. Eric? Well, I only worked on the foreign policy ones. I know there's one, you know, you mentioned the example of an EO that repealed part of another one. The Trump administration repealed part of a Biden or sorry, an Obama EO that had to do with reporting of civilian casualties from U.S. airstrikes in the global war on terror. And the result of this was, you know, there was less transparency around U.S. use of force and its unintended consequences of killing civilians.
And there was a lot of reporting from the time that said, you know, this lack of oversight likely led to an increase in US operations that killed civilians. And so we call for that one being... revoking the bit that Trump said, don't worry about this anymore, and sort of returning it to its original form. For other examples, and Alex, you probably have the best, a better sense of any other big ones beyond the ones I just said. One of my favorite ones is written by Jennifer Huddleston, Jack Soloway, and it argues for amending Executive Order 14-110 issued by President Biden, which is about safe, secure, and trustworthy development and use of artificial intelligence. And it creates a regulatory structure.
invoking the Defense Production Act to place reporting vulnerabilities, requirements, trying to test risky scenarios, a very regulation-heavy approach to artificial intelligence. And this is something that I very much worry about. I think artificial intelligence could be one of these very beneficial technologies. I mean, I use it every day in my work now, but it could be much, much better. And I don't want the government to be involved in the slowdown development of that. So we argue for amending EO, or Jennifer and Jack do to amend EO 14.1.10. The only thing that they want to keep, and which I agree with, is the Biden EO does
slightly liberalized certain visas for high skilled. foreign workers to come here and work in artificial intelligence. Otherwise, we just want to get rid of this entire structure, especially where you take a look at the growth of the regulatory state over the last 50 or 60 years. Economists have tried to take a look at the cost of that, and it's very difficult to figure that out. And most of the cost estimates are around zero. But the way that it shows up, in my opinion, which is why we can't measure it too well, is what are the technologies, the processes that just didn't get created as a result of these high regulatory barriers? And the thing that would keep me up at night is if something like this goes through, maybe it's strengthened by additional executive orders that increase the burden of regulations on this new industry.
We could miss out on a potentially very beneficial technology. And so trying to go through and just at least limit these as much as possible and try to repeal them is an important thing to do. Right. As Jennifer Huddleston pounds the table to say repeatedly, we really don't want to be like Europe when it comes to regulating technology. And Europe definitely has a permission based approach to regulating tech. I want to draw your attention to another one. This is something that Clark Packard wrote up for us. And correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems like a lot of these edicts, proclamations, executive orders.
What have you? A lot of them came from the Trump administration. That's right. I mean, we do have more focus on relatively recent administrations, largely because, as I said, you know, there's over 14,000 EOs, almost 11,000 proclamations. And the people who work in this building, the policy experts.
They're more aware of the last 10 to 20 years of executive actions, executive orders that have been issued and that definitely affect policy in a big way. We do have some recommendations in here to repeal some older executive orders. So there's a lot of them from the Trump administration. And trade is one area where Congress has basically ceded all. power to the executive to increase or decrease tariffs, basically however they want, to put on new regulations and new requirements. The president has an enormous amount of power in that category. So you actually see a lot of proclamations in every administration on trade. It's just that a lot of them during the Trump and Biden administrations have been far more protectionist to a far greater extent on more products from more countries than earlier administrations. All of them had them, Barack Obama, George W. Bush, Clinton, others. But these ones go much further than the older ones. So we focus on those. And then if those get repealed or revoked,
There are definitely some other ones that would come up. But part of the issue is, you know, a lot of these EOs that are currently being issued, they amend older EOs. They add on to older EOs. They supersede other EOs. So it's not necessarily, you know, if we were to take just like randomly repeal a large number of EOs, randomly select them, it wouldn't necessarily do anything to increase freedom. What we want to do is repeal a lot of the most recent ones and then work our way down.
Yeah, one in particular here on trade proclamations from the Trump administration that imposed tariffs of 10 and 25 percent, respectively, on imported aluminum and steel products from every country other than Canada and Mexico. And that is pursuant to a power granted to the White House in 1962. And if you want to talk about impacting people's lives, the price of steel and aluminum certainly have that potential. One of the other ones that's pretty near and dear to my heart is to end affirmative action and federal hiring and contracting. So it may come as a surprise to a lot of people, but affirmative action exists in the federal government because of an executive order. It's not in statute. So this is something that any Republican president since the 1960s could have gotten rid of, and they haven't. So we recommend amending those EOs because large portions of those EOs...
that are involved in that. And this is executive orders 11246 and 11478. Large numbers of them basically implement a statute, which has to do with... equal employment, opportunity in federal law and federal government, basically implementing the civil rights after 1964, just putting the statute into effect. But the affirmative action portion is way in addition to whatever the statute calls for. So we call for amending these two executive VOs to delete the affirmative action portions for federal hiring and contracting, and to basically say that you can't use disparate impact analysis when judging whether there's been discrimination in federal employment and hiring, to basically pull back from that and to say when you apply federal civil rights law to hiring for the federal government and contracting, you have to see if there was discrimination in the individual.
case, but you can't use sort of demographic data from the entire federal bureaucracy to have evidence in like one particular instance when there may have been racial or religious discrimination. One of the interesting portions of this, of course, is the federal contracting portion of affirmative action. The courts are, they seem like they're on the verge of killing that on their own, but this would just be a much easier way. We can save a bunch of judges time. And one thing I like about this project is that it highlights the degree to which Congress has really dropped the ball.
and the degree to which they have ceded so much power to the executive branch for some short-term benefit that may ultimately have been illusory. So, you know, what do you hope to get out of this? I mean, other than, of course, the next president says, okay, do everything in this book. What do you hope to get out of it? So I hope to get a few things out of this. One, I want people to understand and realize how much power the president really has. I think the public sort of intuitively understands this, but it's entirely different to see the vast policy areas where the president has enormous control. I think the second portion of this is to give...
some kind of push or impetus for other policy wonks, for bureaucrats, for members of Congress to read this and say, we need to pull a lot of this power back from the president. We need to redistribute it as the founders intended away from the executive branch, pull it back to Congress and to get rid of a lot of these powers that have been given to one individual. And then the third is, even if we can't do any of that, one or two, at least if some of these get revoked, we can have a little bit more freedom. So I would sign an agreement, you know, a mutual disarmament pact or something like that. Like, we don't want the president to have any of this power anymore. All of these things have to go up for a vote. We can't issue executive orders that I think would be beneficial to American liberty. We can't issue any that I think would be bad. We just have sort of a mutual disarmament, put all this power back into Congress. Policy is still not going to be fixed. There's still going to be a ton of problems. We'd still have our jobs here at Cato arguing in favor of liberty, free markets, peace and limited government. However, there will at least be...
some measure of democratic deliberation instead of it just being the opinion of one man, the president of the United States. Or a woman if Kamala Harris gets elected. I think it was very illuminating as a policy wonk when, you know, you sent out the spreadsheet that contained information about all of these. And I was like, all right, let's start going through this. And this might be outing myself as maybe not so good of a policy wonk. But I knew there were a lot of executive orders. I didn't realize just how many. And I think seeing it, you know, like the EOs, they're just numbered sequentially, right? So like, you know, we're talking in just our conversation here, talking like into the 13,000s, 14,000s, right? It's really hard to sort of wrap your head around.
until you have to see the little scroll bar on the spreadsheet and see how tiny it is and how long you scroll without moving it. And that was really, you know, it was kind of shocking to me to see. And again, like I said before about the brush clean, just so many executive orders on foreign policy and defense that deal with circumstances and situations that just don't exist anymore, that have been overtaken by events, but yet remain. And yeah, like Alex says, it really shows how much authority and how much power the president has. And, you know, getting it back into the hands of Congress would be an excellent development.
All right, we're going to leave it there. Eric Gomez, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, and Alex Narasta, Vice President for Economic and Social Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. And the document here is the Cato Handbook on Executive Orders and Presidential Directives, which is available at our website, cato.org. The Supreme Court this term addressed some pretty core issues. What branch of government should hear cases? What branch should interpret the law? At the Cato Institute's Constitution Day event, the annual B. Kenneth Simon Lecture was delivered by Naomi Rao, the judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
And to close out the day, my lecture is going to focus on what I consider to be the Supreme Court's return to a best-meaning approach to the law. One of the clearest examples from this past term is, of course, Loper Bright. Not only did the Supreme Court end Chevron deference, but the majority pronounced, in the business of statutory interpretation, if it is not the best, it is not permissible. When said out loud, this hardly seems controversial. Why would courts consider anything other than the best meaning of the law?
Yet in fact, there are many other approaches to constitutional and statutory interpretation that do not seek the best meaning of the law. Rather, they emphasize the best policy outcomes, strict adherence to precedent, judicial modesty, or deference to the political branches. We also live under the brooding omnipresence of legal realism, which casts doubt on whether law even has a meaning that judges can ascertain. Best meaning interpretation rejects these competing understandings of the judicial power. And so in my lecture, I'll take a closer look at the court's embrace of best meaning interpretation.
First, I'll explain why best meaning interpretation marks a return to the traditional understanding of the Article III judicial power. Second, I'll consider how alternative theories have competed with and at times eclipsed a best meaning approach to judicial decision making. And finally, I'll elaborate on how best meaning interpretation works in practice. Best meaning interpretation recognizes that law has an objectively best meaning. Judges must find that meaning by exercising independent judgment. And importantly, best meaning interpretation is not easily reconciled with judicial minimalism and strong forms of stare decisis.
Okay, so I'll begin with a brief overview of how best-meaning approaches are consistent with the Anglo-American legal tradition and the original meaning of the judicial power. Best-meaning interpretation is one way of capturing the traditional understanding of what the Article III courts should do. The courts were established to uphold the law and to protect individuals' rights and liberties, including from the arbitrary and unlawful actions of the government. The Article III judicial power is accompanied by a judicial duty to decide cases in accordance with law. Or as Chief Justice Marshall famously said, it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.
This duty to expound and interpret the law requires ascertaining its best meaning, not creating a new meaning. As Blackstone said, the judge is sworn to determine not according to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of the land. Not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one. Emphasizing that judges must find the best meaning of the law draws a sharp line between the law and the judge's will. The discretion of a judge is the law of tyrants, one English judge explained, in the best it is oftentimes caprice, in the worst it is every vice, folly, and passion to which human nature is liable. Deciding a case in accordance with the best meaning of law reinforces the essential separation between judgment and will.
Furthermore, judicial independence is linked to the duty to find the best meaning. The Constitution confers independence on Article III judges by giving them life tenure and irreducible salaries. It is unsurprising that the Chief Justice's opinion in Loper Bright has more than a dozen references to judicial independence. Judicial independence and judgment go hand in hand. The constitutional bedrock of judicial independence shows why Chevron was wrong, but more fundamentally, it highlights why exercising independent judgment requires judges to find the best meaning of the law.
I hope this traditional understanding of the Article III power is familiar, and perhaps to this audience, a best-meaning approach to interpretation is intuitive and obvious. I agree. Best-meaning interpretation is consistent with formalism and with theories of textualism and originalism that have restored a focus on the meaning of the written law. But we shouldn't take this way of thinking for granted. The best-meaning approach was eclipsed for many years by a variety of innovative alternatives. Let me offer a few examples.
The original progressives at the turn of the 20th century candidly advocated for courts to step aside. Thinkers like Roscoe Pound championed what he called executive justice, which would allow the unfettered flourishing of expert administration. The progressives openly lamented that courts relied on an archaic constitution to protect individual rights and private property. To these progressives, the best meaning of the law came at the expense of efficiency and modernity. Although at least the progressives were very frank in acknowledging that their views were at odds with the original constitution. They pushed against the traditional understanding of the judicial power as a safeguard for maintaining individual rights and liberties.
And then we have the legal realists, who deny the possibility of an objectively best meeting of law. They believed in the radical indeterminacy of law, and they considered judging a matter of personal discretion. By shrinking the realm of law, they sowed doubt about the objectivity of judges and the possibility of law as an objective and independent study. Legal realism and its modern variants remain the prevailing undercurrent in the legal academy. Many law students are taught that formalism is overly simplistic and that those who think there is a best meeting of a legal text are kidding themselves.
During the Warren Court, the Supreme Court also offered interpretations of the Constitution that perhaps are most charitably characterized as aspirational rather than faithful to the Constitution and to the limits of the Article III judicial power. Justices Brennan and Marshall, for instance, defended their decisions by reference to social justice and human dignity. They looked to broader moral and political values rather than to the best meaning of the original Constitution. Or consider prominent legal theorists such as Ronald Dworkin, who depicted his Judge Hercules as one who would interpret the law consistent with particular moral and philosophical ideals. Meanwhile, Bill Eskridge, a very thoughtful scholar, advanced a theory of dynamic statutory interpretation, according to which the meaning of the text can evolve alongside a changing social and political context. And of course, the popular media is suffused with a policy-forward view of the courts. For instance, a recent New York Times essay grumbled that originalism prevents the courts from doing good things. Importantly, such good things are favored wholly apart from the best meaning of the law. Some law professors have recently called for simply abandoning the Constitution altogether. I could go on, but the ideas are no doubt familiar.
But against these currents, a best-meaning approach has gradually been restored. It's implicit in theories of textualism and originalism. And as Justice Thomas explained in his speech, Be Not Afraid, more than 20 years ago now, there may be reasonable disagreement about the meaning of the law. But, he says, that does not mean that there is no correct answer, that there are no clear, eternal principles recognized and put into motion by our founding documents. These principles do exist. The law is not a matter of purely personal opinion.
The law is a distinct, independent discipline with certain principles and modes of analysis that yield what we can discern to be correct and incorrect answers. When Justice Thomas came on the Supreme Court in 1992, his commitment to finding the right answer in each case was sometimes criticized as quixotic, dismissed as the voice of a lone dissent or concurrence. But now, in 2024, six justices joined the Loper-Brite majority, which fully embraces this traditional understanding that judges must ascertain the best meaning of the law when deciding cases. So let me next turn to a practical question. How should courts go about finding the best meaning of the law? Volumes have been written on questions of statutory and constitutional interpretation, but here I'll just provide an overview of best meaning interpretation at what I think of as the retail level, namely judicial decision making. Best meaning interpretation begins with positive law, the law enacted by the people and their representatives. I won't shy away from saying that best meaning interpretation is formalist. Justice Scalia once said that the most mindless critique of textualism is that it was formalistic. Of course it is formalistic, he said. The rule of law is about form.
So when interpreting a statute, a judge must first look to its text. This may require consulting dictionaries and determining whether Congress used words in a technical sense or incorporated common law principles. The meaning of a particular provision must also be understood in light of the entire act. What I often see in cases is that parties present bits and pieces of statutes as they have been divided up in the U.S. Code. But as a judge, when faced with a question of statutory interpretation, I consider it essential to read the entire public law that Congress enacted. The meaning of each part of the statute becomes clearer on reviewing the whole scheme of the law, not to mention other similar laws.
But the inquiry doesn't stop there. The best meaning also requires a judge to consider legal background principles. These principles often include the constitutional limits on the federal government and the structure of separated powers. Judges must consider constitutional and other legal backdrops, such as the common law or established legal principles. Meaning also derives from the context in which that law was passed. Every law exists within the broader province of our legal frameworks and traditions. Naomi Rao is a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump talks the talk on opposing price controls proposed by his opponent. But when he's got his own price control to unveil, it's a doozy. In a recent speech after lambasting Vice President Kamala Harris for her support of price controls, he proposed his own. A 10% cap on allowable rates of credit card interest. Cato's Nick Anthony for the Cato Daily Podcast argues that such a plan would be disastrous. Donald Trump likes to call his opponent far left.
I don't know if he's actually called her a communist or not, but he has, I think, alluded to her father, an economist who has some affinity there. And so much of his platform, and I'm not trying to leave out Kamala Harris, but because her platform is very similar along some dimensions, he wants to do a lot of something for nothing in a lot of policy areas. And the something in this case is you pay less interest on your debt. And everybody else just has to deal with it, I guess. So we've talked about this before. We talked about this in May about these proposals floating around from Democrats, for the most part, trying to limit credit card interest. What are the nuts and bolts, to the extent that we've heard them, what are the nuts and bolts of Donald Trump's plan here?
Well, that's a pretty good question because he left all of those out. At a rally in New York, Trump said, while working Americans catch up, we're going to put a temporary cap on credit card interest rates. We're going to cap it at around 10%. This is a pretty radical plan compared to what Democrats have called for in the past. So not only is it shocking to hear him say that he wants to restrict interest rates on credit cards and taking a pretty left position, but also that he wants to do it in such a radical sense. It's frankly one of the more bizarre policies that he's taken on because...
Over at least the past summer, he's tried to craft himself as this voice for financial freedom, speaking to crowds about cryptocurrency, especially Bitcoin, and speaking to them about financial privacy and reining in things like lawfare. So to have him turn around and then take this stance of, well, in this area, we do need to control them. We do need to restrict the companies that are at work. It's a little shocking. Yeah, on the one side, you have a greatly enhanced freedom, which, by the way, doesn't necessarily cost the government anything.
making it easier for people to affiliate with each other and associate with each other, both commercially and personally. It's just a matter of having regulations that respect individual rights. But in this case, what you're talking about is someone absorbing The cost associated with spending that you have already done. Yes. And this is an idea that is not new or novel. It has come up time and time again to have price controls in some form or fashion. And we know where they lead. It's either shortages of quantity or quality. They're going to reduce how much is available in the market because it's now being offered at a mandated lower price. And so they're also going to likely reduce the quality of it to try to meet their costs. And part of the reason why it's so shocking that.
this would come out is in the very same speech that former President Trump had made this announcement of what he was going to do, he also criticized Vice President Harris, saying specifically that Vice President Harris's only idea for solving inflation is to impose communist-inspired price controls, which have never worked. He said that about 30 minutes or so before saying he was going to then control the prices of credit. This is a tough one to square. Let's think about that. When we think about price controls in the context of groceries, as Vice President Harris has presented sort of a wisp of a plan, in this case, we're talking about in some ways controlling the actual price that you and I pay of everything.
To the extent that we, and a lot of people use credit cards extensively, some carry a balance, some don't. To the extent that you need something now and are willing to pay a little bit more in order to get it, sometimes the interest rate is the deciding factor between you having something now and having it later. And so in many ways, it's controlling a price of all manner of goods or services that you might consume. I could not have said it better. It's really the tough part about monetary and financial policy because...
All of us use money in some form or fashion. And it affects all of our lives, but it's not quite as immediate when you see the milk going up or down in price or the bread going up and down our price. We latch onto that a little bit more than with things that are... kind of obscure, like thinking about interest rates and thinking about our access to finances. But you're absolutely right that this is talking about affecting everything that we do, whether it's milk, bread, tobacco, alcohol, firearms, or donations to a charity. Whatever it is that you want to purchase is affected by these policies. With so much of the policy agenda, and I put that in scare quotes, of both of the major party candidates for president, there's so much we don't know. But to the extent that...
We take Donald Trump at his word here on caring about this or viewing this as something that's important. What have we seen from the more substantial proposals that have been offered in Congress on interest rate caps? Well, one good example is to turn over to the states, actually, and look at where similar caps have been put in place. So this is not for credit card interest rates, but rather payday loans or small-dollar loans. And one study found that in Illinois, there's a 36% cap, and they looked at what happened afterwards and found that both the availability of small-dollar loans, so how many businesses are actually offering the service, and also the financial status of consumers had gone down.
So few people are coming to market to offer these now that the prices have been restricted and consumers have thus less access to what they need. And I think the most notable part about that study was the number of loans that were issued to people who classified as financially vulnerable fell by 44% in six months. That is a big change. And what that really means in practice is for some people, maybe they're lucky and they can instead turn to family or friends to get something to help them bridge maybe between paychecks or over a rough patch. For other people, it means going late on a bill or skipping it entirely or not being able to buy food for themselves. It really gets into such an unfortunate place so quickly. And it's so sad because many people who are pushing these proposals do it because they want to help others. Look at what Trump had said. He wanted to help working families catch up.
The problem is when you look at both economic theory and history, it does nothing of the sort. For many people, especially those who don't carry a balance, and I believe the credit card industry refers to those people as deadbeats, people who don't pay any interest directly on their purchases. for leaving those people aside, for people who carry a balance, the choice for many of them is not between paying their relatively higher interest rate now and paying a lower interest rate if you support this or that candidate for president and they win and implement this policy. The choice for many people is, will I continue to have access to credit or will I not continue to have access to credit? Exactly. And that's where we have to think outside of the box a little bit because a lot of people are in that first camp you described where they don't have to worry quite as much. And I do imagine...
A lot of policymakers are at least hopefully in that camp. Hopefully everyone gets towards that. But it can be hard to think what happens to other folks. But that really is the art of economics, as Henry Hazlitt has famously said. It's about tracing the extended consequences, not just for the immediately affected people, but also to those afterwards. It's thinking about these cascading effects and how it might go awry. Nick Anthony is a policy analyst at the Cato Institute Center for Monetary and Financial Alternatives.
At the Gato Institute's Financial Privacy Conference, Jennifer Shulp sat down with Republican Patrick McHenry, chairman of the House Financial Services Committee. They spoke about the vast federal apparatus standing ready to spy on every American's financial transactions, the mission creep and civil liberties implications of financial surveillance powers, and the future of cryptocurrency regulation. What is financial privacy and why is it important? It's the ability to transact without undue government interference or unwarranted surveillance. It's what I think people assume that they have, which is some level of protection around what they do on a daily basis in their lives, free from the government watching or other parties being able to view it.
Yeah, and I think you're right that people assume that they have financial privacy. And that assumption tends to be pretty far from the truth at this point in kind of American history. There's been a lot of erosions of financial privacy over the years, including the Bank Secrecy Act, which was enacted in 1970, and a number of other steps that have happened over the years. And the justification for a lot of these laws has been in order for people to enjoy security and safety, they have to give up some level of that privacy. Can you talk a little bit about how you view the tradeoff between privacy and security?
Well, it's an obvious trade-off. First of all, you have to admit that there is a trade-off here and that there is a loss and a gain or a potential loss and a potential gain on both sides of the equation. We're in an era where everything is political, from your choice of where you shop for your kids' clothes or back-to-school stuff to the type of credit card you have to the type of car you have. And what should be separate from that layer of this politicized environment is your ability to make choices with your own money. And then there's a whole basket of laws around what those things are that are legal and not legal. And so we have both the left and the right identifying transactions that they don't like.
And rather than focusing on the end thing that they don't like, whether it's a healthcare debate or the type of chemicals people can access, they then go to how did you purchase those things, the mechanism by which you purchased those things. And instead of getting at the actual end of the chain, they want to politicize the chain from my wallet to your wallet. And so I think since then, we had this huge debate about the Bank Secrecy Act and anti-moneying laws. that were wise to try to find significant transactions with national security implications. And now we're at the phase where it's all transactions are a potential massive systemic risk, either in the financial sense or to geopolitics, which is not in keeping with what the data suggests, nor in keeping with our capacity to use that data, analyze that data, and to see.
And so right now we are dealing with a whole new set of reforms that FinCEN is, we'll get to FinCEN, I know, or I'm certain we're going to get to FinCEN. But we have a government agency that's been furnished new data. And it's unclear with my oversight, my committee's oversight, that they know how to use that data to see what is in that data. Yet what we're doing is putting more hay up for them to find that needle. And rather than actually honing in on the capacity to find the needle with better technology, we're keeping more hay on that is obscuring the fact that we're not getting better results with giving more information to government agencies and bureaus to review, which is a civil liberties concern. And I have tried to find allies to look more deeply into the type of data we're providing these agencies who can then look at that data at the account level, at the granular account level, just to peruse.
which we currently allow under the existing laws that we have that deal with our data. We had a massive debate since 9-11 around foreign ownership of cell phones and their ability to connect with other people's cell phones and whether or not we can allow our intelligence bureaus to look at two foreign nationals and whether or not they communicate with each other. And so we've set up a whole FISA court on this, and we spent hundreds of millions of dollars on a regime to have a third party, the courts, say whether our intelligence peers can look at information between two foreign nationals. Yet we have with FinCEN the ability for hundreds of law enforcement agencies to look at my transaction with you.
hundreds of law enforcement agencies without having to go to a court, without probable cause, without any of the standards that we see and require for two foreign nationals and whether or not they communicate with each other. Not even getting the contents of the communication, but to see if they even communicate with each other. And yet, I can't get the ACLU to care about it like Cato cares about it. And I cannot get our traditional allies on this to actually care that we're rendering all this information without the American people knowing it. And I think it's important that we have law enforcement, yes, but to what end, right? And in the United States, the checks and balances between our branches of government are the important civil liberties protections so that average Americans can still live their life free from government intervention on a daily, hourly, moment-to-moment basis. We need to make sure they can do that.
Sorry, I just took a long walk there. But we have to understand that civil liberties protections are important no matter what facet of life we're talking about. And there should be no a la carte picking about this. This is the reason why we've divided our government into these three branches in order to protect the American people's civil liberties. And we have a Bill of Rights out of demand that we be specific about the rights that are protected from federal intervention or federal government intervention.
And that's exactly where I was going to go next. We had a panel this morning talking about financial privacy in the Constitution, which not surprisingly talked about the Fourth Amendment and the balance that the Bill of Rights has already put into place in order to access Americans' financial records and other records. Yet the Bank Secrecy Act, as you correctly point out, goes without any of these processes. We've covered a lot of ground at this conference today, talking about central bank digital currencies, the Bank Secrecy Act. We're going to talk about decentralization and crypto. And we've touched on things like the SEC's consolidated audit trail.
Since you've already started talking about the Bank Secrecy Act and FinCEN, I wanted to kind of do a quick walkthrough some of the highlights of things that you've been working on in the committee. One of those things is a number of issues relating to FinCEN and the administration of the Bank Secrecy Act, including the 2020 AMLA amendments and the Corporate Transparency Act, which I think you alluded to in your remarks already. Can you talk a little bit more about what you would and what you've been working on, but what you'd like to see out of FinCEN in this space to... better balance the civil liberties intrusions with FinCEN's obligations here? Well, first, where we should have ended up with the Corporate Transparency Act, where we should have ended up with our changes in 2020, is this regime being driven out of the IRS. Where it provides this data to one government bureau, in essence, we could have repurposed that to ensure that we have a better understanding. It should be protected in the same way the data is protected to the IRS. And we've taken the same language that protects
tax filings, our individual tax filings. And we've taken that same language and applied it to FinCEN on the beneficial ownership regime. And so they have to care for this data in the same way the IRS is supposed to care. And over the long run, they've mostly been OK on the IRS, far better than many facets of government. But we've applied that as one level of protection. That's not sufficient, though.
Where we should be on this is using existing data rather than creating something new out of whole cloth. Where we should also be is the access to this data be severely constrained. And in order to look at it, you have to have a probable cause and a warrant. And that is specific to the law. And it is supposed to be a very high bar to go access this information. North Carolina Republican Patrick McHenry is chairman of the House Financial Services Committee. Jennifer Schultz directs financial regulation studies at the Cato Institute.
The Supreme Court handed down some big administrative law cases this term. That portends a potentially very different future for judges engaging with regulation and laws that hand vague powers to federal agencies. Cato's Tommy Berry, the editor of the Cato Institute Supreme Court Review, offers a brief recap of these cases and Cato's Constitution Day event in this Cato Audio exclusive. Tommy, I'm a little surprised to be talking to you right now because in years past, it is custom for the editor of the Cato Supreme Court Review, upon the completion of his Constitution Day duties, that is to unveil the Cato Supreme Court Review, preside over Constitution Day, which is a very important day for law, especially in Washington, D.C., but it is customary for the editor to simply vanish into thin air for a week or two.
right after this mad dash from the end of the Supreme Court term to Constitution Day. But thank you for speaking with me. I want to focus a little bit right now on the big blockbuster cases or many of the big blockbuster cases in this most recent Supreme Court term all dealt with administrative law. Could you recap some of those and what our new understanding is of the relationships among the branches and the relative power of the executive branch to do lawmaking? Absolutely. So among many blockbusters, the blockbuster of the blockbusters has to be Loper Bright versus Raimondo and its companion case called Relentless, the case that overturned the Chevron deference doctrine, which was instated in 1984 by the Supreme Court. And under the Chevron regime, the Supreme Court said that whenever a statute was ambiguous as to the scope of power that the executive branch had, federal courts had to defer to a reasonable interpretation proffered by the executive branch. This doctrine had essentially allowed the executive branch to win all the close cases for the past 40 years, even when they flip-flopped from one administration.
to another for pretty obviously partisan political policy-based reasons as opposed to legal reasons. But in this Loperbright case, the Supreme Court said that was never a proper interpretation of the judicial role. It was always inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act, a longstanding statute that describes how courts must review agency cases, questions of executive power, of executive authority. And it explicitly says that the courts shall decide all questions of law. And it does not.
mandate any deferential standard of review like it does for other types of questions, such as factual questions. So the courts simply on the basis of the APA said that going forward, courts simply have to rule for what they think is the best legal answer without a thumb on the scale in favor of the government. Now, one of our speakers at Constitution Day on a panel that you presided over, I think it was our first panel of the day, and I'll refer listeners to that if you want to get a more in-depth discussion of what happened at the Supreme Court term, this most recent term, and of course, I look forward to the next term, a Constitution Day event at the Cato Institute. You can't do any better than that. But one of the guests said that the ultimate conclusion that he drew from Loper Bright, the end of the Chevron Doctrine, is that ultimately this isn't going to change that much. What do you think of that view?
It's to be determined. I think it's going to be some fascinating fodder for scholars of administrative law, especially empirical scholars, to look at, okay, what's the government's win rate going forward versus their win rate previously? Of course... Courts ultimately have the freedom to decide what they're going to decide. And a judge who's more inclined to be sympathetic to government arguments, who might have before couched the opinion in terms of Chevron, might now simply write the opinion in a different way and say that the government has the better of the arguments. But I still think, ultimately, it's very important for clarifying the role of courts and for forcing judges to write their opinions in a more fully fleshed out way. And that in itself is not just a formalistic difference, but a meaningful difference because it allows us to evaluate their work. And it might change, for example, even if a district court rules for the government, it might change how an appellate court rules on that.
legal question because it might see, okay, now that you've had to spell out the best case for the government rather than simply deferring and saying it's close, we just don't think it's convincing. So this wasn't the only case. And in conversations that you and I have had, and I've had with Willie Yateman and Jennifer Schulte on issues of administrative law, particularly in finance and other areas, a lot of these cases are going to interact with one another, right? Absolutely. We had one panelist who's a tax lawyer, Sean McElroy, and he basically said that Loper Bright was the most important tax case this year as well, even though there was an explicitly tax case because Chevron affects everything that runs the gamut. And since you mentioned monetary regulations, obviously, probably the second biggest case was SEC versus Jarcusy on the power of an administrative agency to put someone through an adjudicative process without an Article III judge and without a jury. That is to essentially the federal government laying fines without you accessing a court.
Exactly. And the tension here was with the Seventh Amendment, which guarantees the right to a jury trial in all, quote, suits at common law. So there had been some mixed precedents by the Supreme Court during the 60s and 70s. They had been awfully deferential again to the executive branch and said, well, if there's no close enough analog to the common law era, and if we're really dealing with a scheme that was newly created by the federal government, then it's permissible for the federal government to adjudicate it within its own executive branch. But in the starkacy case, the Supreme Court really pulled back from those more extreme interpretations and said, no, these penalties are pretty analogous to what the government did at the common law. It needed a jury then. It needs a jury now.
rounding out these cases, some cases that might be underappreciated that nonetheless have implications for administrative law. What were they? Yeah, the biggest under the radar case is a case called Corner Post. It sounds like a wonky, unimportant issue, statute of limitations for the Administrative Procedure Act, but it has huge implications for when and whether people can bring challenges to unlawful rules. The APA sets a six-year time limit, so a rule is issued. The general assumption was after six years, if no one has won a case against the government, if no one's brought a case, time's up. The rule's just locked in, even if it's unlawful, even if a good plaintiff could have challenged and won. But what the Supreme Court said,
is no, that's not quite right. Because suppose someone opens a business seven years after the rule is issued. They didn't have an opportunity to challenge that rule right when it was issued. So for that new business, their clock starts the day they're first affected by the rule. So they get a new six-year clock. And anyone who opens a business down the line gets a new six-year clock. So this now means that rules that are much older than six years can now potentially be newly challenged by fresh plaintiffs, people who have standing for the first time. And that's going to give administrative lawyers a lot of opportunities to look back on the books and think maybe it's time to bring a fresh challenge to an old rule. It's sort of like a reverse grandfathering.
clause. Let's understand the reasoning there. What was it? Yeah. Essentially, the court looked again to traditional usages of terms like statute of limitations. The APA uses...
Pretty generic language. It just says six years from the time that the claim accrues, I believe. And looking at the history of that term, the court found that it's essentially a legal term of art for injury. So it's not really just about when the rule is issued. Now, when a rule is issued, it, of course, injures everyone who currently has a business or who currently is regulated. But that's not the time of injury for everyone. And so once the court made that step and said, you know, it accrues, a claim accrues when you're injured, then it was pretty much inevitable that it would say, well, if you're injured later on after the rule is issued, that's when your clock starts. So everyone has their own clock rather than just being one for the rules issuance.
I want to highlight and especially highlight your work here, which is we had an especially late Supreme Court term relative to a typical year. A lot of these cases came down last minute. And it's your job to oversee this fairly large process of getting a bunch of bright legal scholars to prioritize writing a compelling article for the first and, of course, always best review of the most recent Supreme Court term, the Cato Supreme Court Review. How did that process go this year?
Well, thank you. I appreciate that. It was a grueling process. The Supreme Court, you know, it's a good problem to have. The Supreme Court gave us so many monumental decisions, and in my view, many, many good and important decisions, that there were more than enough cases to fill the review. We typically aim for 8 to 12. We had 13 this year. That was also, I think, a product of the unexpected Trump cases, of which we had two, presidential immunity and Section 3 disqualification. We have articles by Keith Whittington and Ilya Soman on those two issues, respectively. So many important issues. The court has been moving at a slower pace the last few years. I think that may be related to the leak of its Dobbs opinion and new security measures in place.
They seem to take longer to finalize drafts now. And in fact, they went into the beginning of July for the first time since the COVID term, which is unusual for their practice. But I give a ton of credit to our authors. They really didn't need much prodding. They got it all in in an insanely short timeline of a month. And then really, I didn't have to do any edit on the merits, shall we say. I just put them in a consistent tone. And what we aim for is for the educated layperson to be able to pick up any article without a law degree and understand why the case matters and what happened. And for those who are, well, let's just cut to the chase. For people who are dummies like me.
Maybe a more, even more accessible version of the Cato Supreme Court review is necessary. And that's why, and I feel like this product was designed for me, that you all put out for the first time a comic book version of select cases for this Supreme Court term. And again, for dummies like me, that's really a fantastic product. We prefer the term graphic novel to comic book. Fair enough.
Yes, we call it the Illustrated Supreme Court Review. Five to six page articles on most of the big terms, a lot of overlap of the cases that are in the Cato Supreme Court Review. A ton of credit to my colleague, James Craven. He oversaw all of the articles in that. Really, the whole process was his brainchild. And Mark Pate, our illustrator, did fantastic and very quick work on a ton of illustrations for all of them. I love how they came out. I wrote two of them on Loperbright and the net choice cases. And it really gave a lot of freedom to kind of play around with these terms and have some fun with them. So, for example, under the old rules, you had the two-step. The judge first asks if it's clear and if it's not, they defer.
I thought, well, how do you turn that into a graphic novel version? You have a waltz between the president and a Supreme Court justice doing the two-step. And so we show them elegantly dancing through a ballroom to demonstrate the Chevron deference process. And I will say, to give credit to Mr. Craven, there are some funny bits in this graphic novel, as you say.
Yes. And we were helped out by the Supreme Court many times. So we wrote most of it before the opinions came out and then would write a page or two to sum it up once we knew what actually the outcome was. And I was delighted when Chief Justice Roberts made his own dance joke in the opinion in Loper Bright. He said that the two-step had turned into a dizzying breakdance. So obviously we had to have a breakdance image in our final page of our Loper Bright article showing the disastrous entanglement of the two branches.
Is this an exercise that will be repeated? Yes. We were so pleased with the outcome that we're going to make this a permanent feature of Constitution Day. We're going to be issuing not just the Cato Supreme Court review, but also the Illustrated Supreme Court review going forward every year. So in the next term, I know that there's a whole discussion from Constitution Day, and I'll refer listeners to our event again. You can get it as an event podcast or you can watch it at Cato.org. What do you see and what did some of our panelists see as the cases that are going to be most important in the next term?
Probably the most attention from a culture war basis is a case called Scrimetti. This is, for the first time, transgender issues are coming up to the Supreme Court, a Tennessee law essentially forbidding gender transition surgery for minors. That's going to obviously get a lot of attention. More under the radar, but really important for our friends who are public interest lawyers is a case called Lackey v. Skinny. When can you get attorney's fees when you sue the government and win? The statute says if you're the prevailing party, you can get money from the government, and that's really crucial for nonprofit attorneys. But what the government often does is after you win a preliminary injunction, they repeal the law, and then they say, sorry, you never won a final case on the merits. You're not a prevailing party. So the Supreme Court's going to decide whether the Supreme Court...
whether the government can get away with that maneuver or whether they owe attorney's fees. Bostock v. Clayton County was a case that dealt with transgender issues. maybe this isn't the very first time this issue has come up. That's true. That's a good correction. I guess I would say that this is the first time potentially the issue of actual regulation of the surgeries themselves and also obviously its implication for minors, which makes it particularly fraught. So overall, how did it go, this Constitution Day, which for an organization that likes to hand out the Constitution and has a very popular edition of the Constitution and Declaration of Independence, be sure to get your copy at the Cato Institute store. How did it go?
I was thrilled with how it went. We had fantastic attendance in the building. We had 150-some people come in person, as many as 120 simultaneously in the auditorium. The energy was great. The panelists were engaged. And we had an excellent keynote address by D.C. Circuit Judge Naomi Rao, who talked about a lot of the themes we're discussing, plain meaning interpretation. Now that Chevron is gone, what canons of interpretation are proper for judges to use and what are improper? How do you push the limits of text for these hardest cases? What context is important and relevant to look at? And what falls into that category of legislative history that we should really be skeptical about looking at?
manipulated. Tommy Berry directly Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies at the Cato Institute. Financial markets have fueled American prosperity for more than two centuries. So why are they often distrusted and criticized? While it's become popular to blame financial markets for a host of problems, many market deficiencies have been caused, in fact, by harmful government policies. In the new Cato book, Financing Opportunity, scholars Norbert Michelle and Jennifer Schulte not only bust many popular myths about markets, they also propose ways to improve how our financial markets function. Print and e-book copies of Financing Opportunity are available now at online retailers nationwide. That will do it for this edition of Cato Audio. I'm Caleb Brown. Talk to you again next month.