Ontological Blindness in Modern Moral Science

This segment outlines an upcoming book project by language philosopher Bry Wills that critiques modern moral psychology for its failure to recognise deep ontological differences between cultural value systems. The author argues that prominent frameworks, such as Moral Foundations Theory, commit a category error by treating fundamentally different moral concepts as if they were identical, measurable units. This approach mistakenly labels cultural density as mere variety, often viewing groups that reject certain frameworks as having moral deficiencies rather than different worldviews. By treating liberal-naturalist assumptions as a neutral scientific baseline, researchers inadvertently practice a form of ontological imperialism that masks true incommensurability. The project aims to demonstrate that many moral disagreements cannot be resolved through data because they represent collisions between incompatible spaces rather than disputes within a shared one. Ultimately, the work seeks to provide a diagnostic analysis of these structural mistakes to foster intellectual honesty regarding the limits of social science.👉 https://philosophics.blog/2026/01/30/ontological-blindness-in-modern-moral-science/