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Jun 29, 2023 27 min

Prigozhin - Moscow or Bust

from Fourth Estate Hosted by 2SER

This week we speak with Leonid Ragozin about Prigozhin's failed mutiny and what this means for Putin. Your host this week was Monica Attard Produced by Anthony Dockrill

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Prigozhin - Moscow or Bust

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Hello and welcome to Fourth Estate, a show about journalism. We're coming to you from 2SCR in Sydney on the Gadigal lands of the Eora nation, right across Australia on the community radio network and directly to your device across the globe via podcast. I'm on the cat-eyed. There's been a dramatic escalation in tensions between Russia's military and the Wagner-Musan Group raising fears.

It could lead to a civil war in Russia, Wagner's founder Yavgeni Prigogen, who claims his troops have crossed the border back in Russia from Ukraine. The Wagner Group describes itself as a private military company and has been fighting alongside the Russian army in Ukraine for more than a year. Potentions between these private mercenaries and the Russian military have been simmering. We both saw the Wagner Group accusing Russia's Minister of incompetence.

Now that tension has risen considerably. It's not that we're going to be able to do this. We're going to be able to do this. We're going to be able to do this.

We're going to be able to do this. We're going to be able to do this. We're going to be able to do this. We're going to be able to do this.

Let's go ahead and take a look outside at Moscow. Russia, we do have this live look today. This is the site of a lot of action yesterday as the Wagner Group started making their way to Moscow, but they were at a deterrent at some point. Some kind of deal was made between Putin and the Wagner Group.

So we'll go to that story here that arm rebellion in Russia ended after that deal yesterday. We do have Fox's Alex Hogan, she has the latest details out of London. Well, it's been an astounding few days. If you follow Russia, the war in Ukraine and of course the Russian President Vladimir Putin on Saturday came news that you have any pregogen, the head of the infamous private military provider, the Wagner Group was depending on your sources, attempting a coup or a mutiny or was having a huge dummy speech after seizing the cities of Rostov on Don and Varanesh.

And with his forces just 200 kilometers from Moscow, pregogen called the whole show off, turned his soldiers around and headed back in the direction of Ukraine. A deal had been struck by the Belarusian President, which would see Wagner set up base on the territory of Russia's closest ally and more curiously, pregogen walking away having been accused of treason by one man you'd never want to be accused of treason by Putin. So why did pregogen do it? And what does this actually mean for the Russian President?

Also did our media let us down with simplistic analysis that suddenly turned pregogen into a good guy, which he certainly is not. To help us talk about all of this, we're lucky to be joined by Russian journalist Vienna Repusum. Repusum is based in Riga in Latvia. He's a freelance journalist who's previously worked for the BC.

He's also just written a book on the shadowy groups behind the Information Wars, which has dominated the war between Russia and Ukraine. And then a welcome to Fourth Estate. Thank you for being back on the show. The war in Ukraine is now well into its second year.

The death toll on both sides is enormous. When you heard that you have any pregogen and his troops were trying to take the Russian city of Rostov on Don, what was your first reaction to the news? Well, it was pretty shocking. It did sound like presidential style of a civil war in Russia.

And we of course know that the foreign group is one of the most formidable units in the Russian armed forces. So when it transpired that they are mutineering and that they have taken a major population center in the South of Russia, which itself is the most densely populated part of Russia, it felt very worrying because of course Russia is not just another country. It's a nuclear superpower. So any disturbances on that scale inside Russia is an issue not just for Russia itself but for entire humanity.

Did you think that he was actually attempting a coup? That's what he had in mind? Or did you think it was mutiny? Or did you think that, you know, as I did, I have to say that he hysterically misjudged the level of support that he had from the Russian president?

Well, look, when it all started, it wasn't clear at all what it is. And it did look like a coup attempt from what he was saying, from how he defied the president, Dr. Putin made his initial speech and called him plainly a mutineer and said that what is happening, what was happening because it was an act of treason. But Russian proceeded to with the march of Moscow towards Moscow at that point.

So yeah, initially it did look like coup d'etat. And hindsight, now it looks more like a show of force or as Sakhnigosz himself who did a protest, a kind of desperate gesture of a person who was about to lose his army. The defense ministry insisted that Wagner Group, that members of Wagner Group signed contracts with the Russian army by July the 1st was the deadline for Wagner to essentially to cease to exist. And what the Goshun I think was trying to do is to demonstrate that his command and formidable force that she could actually create a lot of trouble.

Again, from what he was saying, this was not an attempt to topple Putin. He never during the 24 hours of his mutiny said that the intention is to change the government. He insisted on removing the two main enemies, the defense ministry, Sakhnigosz, and the chief of the general staff, Valeric Grasimov. So this is where he's stated goals.

Yes. So of course, that dispute has been going on for so long between he and the defense minister. One of the things that I've wondered about is whether this was simply really at the end of the day, a case of the Russian president not really doing his job very well, because Putin isn't relies on on on feuding factions within the various verticals of power. And what Putin has been very good at doing for the past 20 years has been quilling any disputes in order to, you know, maintain his own power base.

Is this a simple case that he just he didn't intervene sooner in the dispute between Shui Gu and pregusion and it got to this point? Well, we don't know yet. The question really is whether she is acting as an independent autonomous figure as a party in this dispute, or is he presenting a faction within the Kremlin, which somehow precipitated his mutiny? So there is there are signs that she might be representing such affection.

And so that's essentially the younger generation of military leaders who want the war in Ukraine to be waged in a different way. In the more, I would say, brutal way, but also in the way that involves slaves of the Russian population, they want a more mobilization. They want the Russian army to be more proactive on the frontline and to be more brutal, more cruel in relation to Ukraine and to the civilian population in Ukraine. So these people are represented to a large extent by the many Instagram channels, which are where openly promoting and are still openly promoting certain political figures as potential candidates for the position of the Defense Minister and one of them is Alexei Jumin, the governor of Tula Course.

Putin's former bodyguard and who played a mysterious, probably very important role in the occupation of Crimean 2014, perhaps as the commander of the Special Forces under the Russian military intelligence, the GRU. But that remains as state secret. And so he has been denied his role, but all we know about him, that he is not a mayor governor, but a high-level fixer person who solves delicate problems for Putin. So, yeah.

You'd have to think though that if Putin was going to make a move on Shogu, it wouldn't be for quite some time. He won't want to be seen as being getting into the demands of the Afghan precaution. No, absolutely. If the removal of Shogu or Naseimaph is part of the deal, then perhaps a way for Putin to not lose face in the process is also part of the deal.

So the fact that Shogu is not divided from his post immediately after the mutiny doesn't mean that he will not lose his post in the near future. However, Putin made a point about saying that the Russian Defense Minister played the key role in repellent the mutiny in suppressing the mutiny. So it's not quite clear whether Shogu is going to go or not. There is a intrigue that is still unfolding within the Kremlin.

And also the negotiations between the Russian government and the Pragotian are probably still continuing. There is the question of the heavy weapons and military hardware that Pragotian was supposed to go into the Russian Defense Ministry to hand over to the Ministry. However, this kind of equipment has been transferred to Belarus, to Pragotian's new base and in another country. So it's not clear if that is happening.

But also, it's very likely that there is political negotiations between parties and figures we are not aware of. The impact of this mutiny on the shape of the Russian government is yet to transpire and it will probably take days or weeks or weeks or even months before we know what is going to happen. And presumably also it will take days, weeks and months before anybody can say whether it has significantly or even, you know, to any extent, weakened Putin, I imagine. No, exactly.

And the main question is whether it was the initiative of Pragotian and his immediate entourage. And in that case, it's a desperate gesture by a person who was about to lose his business and his friends and partners who were about to lose their autonomy and freedom inside this private army. So that's of course a possibility. The Port Vanger group is this deniable force very much modeled on Blackwater in the United States.

And it enjoyed some great autonomy at the same time as Putin had made yesterday. It was entirely on the Russian government payroll. But there were residents in the world history when the government had issues with mercenaries. And even in this war, after the start of the war in 2014, the Ukrainian side, the Ukrainian government had to rein in some of the volunteer forces.

The Ukrainian and Ukrainian Armed Forces had to blockade the basis of the right sector and of us off at some point in order to coerce these volunteer forces into being properly incorporated into the Ukrainian Armed Forces. And they kind of succeeded, but the success is also compromised because both of these forces continue to enjoy a great deal of autonomy, both operational autonomy and ideological autonomy. So then I don't want to get into the interesting milking area of information, because there's been so much misinformation, not only around the war and its conduct, but on Saturday, it seemed to be, you know, misinformation seemed to be on steroids, particularly on social media and Twitter in particular. There were so many analysts out there who were giving their opinions that Putin was being torn down by a military faction that this was tantamount to a coup that Putin would now have one to two months maximum left in power.

If that had pregusion actually reached Moscow, he would have succeeded. You would have been saying roughly the same Twitter feed that I was. What were you making of it all? Well, first of all, of course, I don't think that this is this event is signified the an imminent downfall of Putin's regime, which is, of course, a serious event.

But again, as I said before, as I said before, it is not clear whether it reflects a fight for power within the Kremlin. Does Russian say a battle of Kremlin's towers, or it was a mutiny of of this autonomous deniable force that was used by the Russian army? And it happened just because there were two autonomous and it's kind of inevitable conflict between between the regular army and those irregulars. But the way they managed to travel several hundred kilometers and they claimed that they came to the distance of about two hundred kilometers away from Moscow.

Reports confirmed that they managed to reach the town of Iliad, which is 400 kilometers away from Moscow. So it's not clear whether the claim is true. But yes, if it were not Wagner troops, Wagner group, but a foreign army, a Ukrainian army, then slaves of the Russian territory would have been occupied and the battle would have been waged on approaches to Moscow. That does make the Russian defense lines, the home defense look quite weak and vulnerable.

So it does matter. But on the other hand, I think what is most important in Putin's calculation is, and the reason why Putin remains in power is that he protects people or he projects an image of somebody who is protecting Russian people from exactly that, from civil war. And at the end of the day, the fact that he did not start military operation against Wagner troops somewhere in the stop region or somewhere close to Moscow, but instead he chose the path of negotiations. In the eyes of the Russian public, it doesn't necessarily show him as somebody who is weak, shows him as somebody who was clever enough and responsible enough not to start civil war in Russia.

And again, the fact that he needed foreign president Alexander Lukashenko to negotiate, it on the one hand, it kind of shows that Putin is not capable of dealing with the situation on his own. But from the viewpoint of the Russian public and indeed the Russian propaganda is going to present it in this way. What Putin was doing is again a very interesting civil war. Which is a really interesting aspect of it, because that is, as you say, that he's going to be the line of Russian propaganda.

And it's likely I imagine to be reasonably successful as well. It's not the way it's going to be viewed by the West, is it? And it's not the way it's not going to be reported like that by Western media, I don't imagine. No, of course, but I don't think Putin cares much how the West has seen it at this point.

What he cares about is the sustainability of his regime inside Russia. And the main pillar of this regime is that image of Putin protecting any kind of war coming to their porch. And that talks back to the events of the Chechen War, when the Chechen and Sergeants staged daring attacks inside Moscow, they threatened the siege in Moscow, and also the attack on the school in Beslan. They were also blamed for blowing up apartment logs inside Moscow in 1999.

So Putin is what he showed is again, an ability to protect people to prevent civil war, which Russians, especially in this situation of a major conflict with the West, consider as a realistic, realistic possibility. So even if he comes across as somewhat weak, the fact that civil war has been a very trumps all other considerations in the eyes of Russia or the Russian public. And there is another aspect which another pillar, another foundation of Putin's regime, which is the lack of alternative. There is this famous Russian political meme, who else but not Putin?

Who else if not Putin? It's pertains to the lack of alternative or rather to the fact to not to effect but to a perception that every alternative to Putin will be much more than Putin himself. And of course, the precaution with his image of another thug, he fits into this mindset quite neatly. The majority of Russians definitely don't want somebody like the precaution to replace Putin at the end of the day.

No, they don't. But one of the other interesting aspects of the media coverage and certainly of the commentary that we saw unfold on social media was that all of a sudden on Saturday, the precaution was he had an extraordinary makeover, he became a hero, he became somebody who could save the world from Putin and save and more to the point, stop the war in Ukraine, which is something that I found personally extraordinary to see on social media that there it was. Did you see it as well? Did you notice that strain of thought?

Well, I do notice that strain of thought and it lasted for some hours, I guess, but later government officials in the West expressed much more, much more caution and restraining in assessing this situation. But of course, the people who have been always active in promoting the idea of of defeating Russia, not merely in Ukraine completely and toppling the Putin and precipitating a breakup of Russia at the end of the day, yes, that they were failing and that they were very cheerful about the Prigoshan starting this mutiny. So there was a lot of wishful thinking and when supporters of the Prigoshan gathering in Restov, several dozen or several hundred young, traditional, men who were cheering Prigoshan, they interpreted this as several public supporters of Prigoshan in Russia, which of course it wasn't. So and it's where it was mostly, it's where Western hoax, but mostly it's near European politicians and commentators.

One peculiar personality who joined this, why was Milh Khodakovsky the exile to Russian on the guard hold essentially called on Russians to join the mutiny to support Prigoshan. But even from the point of view of the imagery, Russians, this is a political suicide, associating yourself with Prigoshan and also calling for civil war in Russia, that's a way to alienate yourself from the British audience. Yes, it was quite an extraordinary call to Russians to hold their nose and support Prigoshan. One of the other things I think that is has been noticeable out of all of this is the reaction of the Russian media.

Now from the limited amount that I've seen, it seems that there has been a degree of concern and criticism of the way this whole thing was handled in the Russian media itself, which is something that we haven't seen for a very long time at the, you know, a couple of years at least in the Russian media. Have you noticed any discernible change in the way the Russian media is is reporting Putin and his handling of this affair? Well, I'm not sure about this because soon after the start of the full integration, and especially after the first setback in Ukraine, Putin's administration itself created this situation of a relative pluralism in the media coverage of this war. But this pluralism was quite narrow.

It was a pluralism for the pro-war faction. So the dispute about how Russia should be waging the war went into the open quite some time ago. It went into the open maybe in the summer of 2022. And that's why now the many telegram channels appeared.

Telegram channels now account for 18% of the Russian audience, 18% of Russians according to the vital poll, the use telegram as the main source of information. So and this is the premium audience. This is the most politically active audience in Russia. It doesn't really matter what Russian, what mainstream Russian media is.

Well, it doesn't. It doesn't. The mainstream Russian media, and by that we mean television primarily, is catering to the conformance majority. The majority whose support of Putin is conditional, but also a majority that has been apathetic for the last 20 years.

So the purpose of television propaganda from Kremlin's point of view is to, as for this conformance majority to remain apathetic. However, it is just as important for Putin to control the pro-active minority, apolitically active minority, which is also a very large force. And in a situation of apolitical upheaval, the most important thing is who controls this political active minority, not the passive majority, which probably will continue to be passive, and will just watch this upheaval to unfold. So in that sense, it isn't just important that Putin tried to create the situation in which different factions in the pro-war party were fighting each other and fighting each other bitterly.

But of course, with this mutiny by the Putin who himself controlled many of his channels, and a medium pile of swords, it went into the open and it resulted in this major political earthquake. A final question. I mean, if I might, one of the other aspects of the story that I think I'm personally surprised has not gotten more play certainly in Western media was pre-goshans saying that the Kremlin stated reason for starting this war, that NATO was encroaching into its fear of its traditional sphere of influence was rubbish. That was not true.

That is the narrative that the Westers used to criticise the Kremlin for a year and a half. Well, here we have somebody who is quite senior in the overall military hierarchy saying exactly that. But the Western media doesn't appear to have picked up on it as strongly as you might have thought. And is that surprised you at all?

No, it doesn't surprise me. I mean, it's of course an endless dispute why things are happening in Russia, the way they are happening. In my personal opinion, this is to a large extent due to the fact that instead of serving as an arbiter between different countries in Eastern Europe, the West chose to be a party in the conflict. And basically, instead of trying to integrate Russia and international and European Union back in the 1990s, it's a choice, it's a slamming tactic itself, cutting away slices of former Russian sphere of influence.

And people like Lukaszkoff and the Guinea-Permagof were warning back in 1999 that as a result of this tactic, save Russian leadership, the Russian political regime will become more authoritarian and there'll be more conflict with the West. So much of what is happening in Russia and with Russia is being driven by this conflict. It's part of the logic of the conflict in which both sides are escalating at some point both sides, crossing those proverbial red lines and stepping up confrontation. It's the Kremlin is of course using the conflict with the West in order for Putin to retain power.

The conflict is the reason why Putin is still in power. So there is a bit of this of a symbiosis between Putin's regime and the corks of the West who on the surface of it are fighting Putin with all their might. But in actual fact, they are helping Putin to retain power. Bennett, we'll leave it there.

I thank you very much for your time and we look forward to speaking to you again in the future. Thank you very much for having me. And on that note, I'd like to thank Leid Ruggosen for being on For The State and thanks for listening to the program. This edition was recorded at the studios of 2SER and heard across the country on the community radio network.

For The State is produced with the assistance of the Community Broadcasting Foundation. Thanks to the Foundation for their continuing support. Make sure you subscribe to For The State on your favourite podcast app so that you can hear us talk about media politics and everything in between. We'll be back with more next week, but in the meantime, you can stay in touch with us on Twitter.

Our handle there is For The State AU. Thanks to my producer Anthony Dachral. I'm Monica Atard and thank you for listening.

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