This podcast is brought to you by HealthcareInfoSecurity.com, the leading online publication for risk management and security professionals within the healthcare industry. This is Howard Anderson, executive editor at Information Security Media Group. Today, we're talking about medical device security issues with Dr. Dale Nordenberg, founder of the Medical Device Innovation Safety and Security Consortium.
Thanks so much for joining us today, Dr. Nordenberg. Thank you, Howard. My pleasure.
For starters, why is the security of medical devices an issue that's growing in importance? Howard, there are two key issues that are converging to cause this increased concern around the security of medical devices. The good news is that the innovation across the medical device industry is healthy, and we are seeing more and more medical devices, specifically digitally-enabled and network medical devices, that are good for patients and patient care, being designed, manufactured, and implemented in provider networks. So on one hand, we have an increased number of medical devices on our network.
At the same time, I think most people are aware of the fact that we are hearing more and more about malicious hacking and the generalized presence and prevalence of malware across networks in all industries. And the healthcare industry is not immune to this increased incidence of malware. And as a consequence, these two factors are converging to cause increased concern around the issue of security of medical devices on the part of security experts in these healthcare systems. The other factor that's also present is the fact that these devices are regulated by the FDA.
And unlike the computer that would sit on an administrative desk in a hospital, which can be accessed and manipulated by the appropriate networking staff in a healthcare system, these biomedical devices, these medical devices, which are regulated by the FDA, present a challenge vis-a-vis even simple patching and simple malware intrusion detection testing because of concerns over changing the functional specifications of these devices. And so while the risk is increasing, there's also, if you will, some barriers to healthcare systems in terms of their being able to aggressively work with these devices. Tell us why you decided to launch the consortium. Will your group eventually recommend some best practices for protecting medical devices, and what are your other goals?
The consortium was founded because one of the nation's largest providers was starting to express concerns around the risk of adverse health outcomes, which may be associated with medical devices that were infected. All the medical or provider networks that we have spoken with have experienced malware issues with one or more of their medical devices. As a consequence, this provider felt that it was only a matter of time before they started to identify an association between malware, security issues, and adverse health outcomes. And in talking with this particular provider, and then subsequently additional providers, what we realized is that we didn't speak to even one provider that wasn't very enthusiastic about working with their sister organizations around the country to better understand the scope of this problem and to, in fact, work together to establish a scoping of the problem and solutions to the problem.
And as a consequence, providers have come together in the context of this consortium, which is being co-led by the VA and Kaiser, and there are three core goals at this point. The first goal is to create a public-private partnership that will include a broad stakeholder community around medical devices. So this would include clearly the providers or the healthcare systems that are delivering healthcare to the people of this nation. It would include clearly the manufacturers of the medical devices.
It would also include other technology companies, the companies that are producing the chips and other pieces of the medical devices, security companies in the healthcare technology arena. It will include infrastructure companies. It will include academic institutions, research institutions, other not-for-profit organizations or associations and trade associations, and also importantly, patient advocacy organizations. So the first goal area is to bring the stakeholder community together.
The second goal area is to work together to actually define the scope of this problem. We feel at this point that there is not enough data that has been generated around how many devices are out there, how many are getting exposed to malware, how many security intrusions are getting. We even believe from an epidemiologic perspective that we need to come up with clear case definitions, just like we would do with any epidemic, and what a problem would be, what problems there are, so then we can rigorously count these from an epidemiologic perspective. Ideally, we'll do this in controlled environments where we understand the denominator.
We'll be able to count the incidents of events and we'll be able to come up with some good rates. So the second goal area is really focused on a series of activities and capability development that will allow us to contribute to the scoping of the problem. And finally, the third goal area is understanding and developing the capability to address the issues identified by our scoping exercises, our scoping activities. So to that end, the consortium will work together with other cross-stakeholders to build best practices to address the issues related to security and medical devices.
And what the community realizes already is that no one stakeholder can do this. The manufacturers will have a clear role. They are, you know, they design these devices. They manufacture them.
The providers have a clear role. They ultimately buy these. They implement them. They maintain them.
And at an organizational level in provider networks, what we're discovering is even at that level, there's best practices around the organization of the ownership of medical devices and who's responsible for these. Is it biomedical engineering? But now that they're computerized and connected to the network, what is the role of technology? What's the role of the security group?
And what we're finding is that there are a lot of silos in these organizations. And so essentially, when we talk about best practices, it's not just at the manufacturer, you know, point to the manufacturer, but best practices at the point of implementation and maintenance as well across the whole lifecycle. And additionally, we're very interested in the ability to take this particular issue and bring it to the attention of the chief quality officers and the chief safety officers of the healthcare provider institutions so they can understand that this is not purely a technical issue, but that this is also a healthcare quality issue. And in fact, what most people will recognize is that the expression security and privacy is something that we've heard now for well over 10 years.
It's obviously related to HIPAA. But the expression security and safety is not an expression that is heard very often. And part of our goal is to expand the dialogue from security and privacy to security and safety. So how can others go about getting involved in your consortium?
Well, we have a website. It's www.mdisf.org. And people can go to the website. There's a downloadable brochure that's available.
There's also other information available throughout the website. And there is the ability to go and go to the membership section and get information about how to become a member and fill out a form. And we would welcome participation by all stakeholders. At a recent conference, you said that because so many medical devices are linked to computer networks and because so many of those networks are linked to others, we have a national biomedical device network that remains largely unrecognized.
What are the risks posed by that connectivity and how can they be mitigated? The real issue here is that medical devices have been developed with their medical functions being the primary focus for stakeholders and manufacturers. They have become digitally enabled and network enabled and finally part of a network. However, they continue to be treated more like medical devices and less like a device on a network or a computer on a network.
While the IT departments and staff for healthcare systems or provider enterprises are adept at managing computers on the network, they are expressing significant concern that medical devices are a challenge to manage because the technology best practices that are standard for computers on a network cannot be applied to medical devices on a network for fear of adversely impacting the medical functions of these FDA regulated devices. Furthermore, medical devices are often or even usually purchased by a department or product line in the hospital, for example, cardiology. And it's not uncommon for the IT staff to be the last people to know about the purchase. Interestingly, this often occurs when the medical device shows up on a network and there's a huge spike in network traffic.
If you contrast this with the usual hardware that's purchased and implemented by hospitals, most of this is done by the technology department. And as a consequence, it's possible for them to factor in issues such as stability, security, safety, and the like. And the healthcare system must recognize that medical devices are increasingly a network commodity, often associated with quality of care impact. Significantly, the medical device stakeholders, including manufacturers, healthcare systems that purchase and implement medical devices, healthcare professionals that use the medical devices, are all just starting to recognize that medical devices on their networks must be treated differently than other network devices, for example, computers.
In fact, the VA has pioneered isolated medical device networks as a strategy to render their medical devices secure. Perhaps one of the key contributions of the consortium will be to help providers work together with other stakeholders, such as manufacturers and trade associations and academics and research institutes, to rapidly understand and address the challenges of managing networked medical devices that are impacting the quality of healthcare for patients around the nation and even among international markets so that they are secure while still supporting the nation's drive towards interoperable healthcare systems and the meaningful use of healthcare data. The balance between security and interoperability remains a significant challenge. While institutions are just starting to recognize that they have a large population of medical devices on their networks, it is perhaps even less appreciated that these devices are essentially all interconnected across the nation and, as has been pointed out by some, even beyond our national borders through the internet.
Failure to recognize the emergence of networked medical devices, the unique challenges of managing medical devices on the network, and the fact that networked medical devices have rapidly become so prevalent presents a risk beyond the single device or institution. In fact, a systemic, large-scale, malicious attack on medical devices has the potential to cripple affected healthcare systems and may impact care at a city or multi-city level and And Roger Baker, the Assistant Secretary for Veterans Affairs testifying in Congress, provided tremendous leadership around this—around transparency of this particular issue. So understanding or reaching out to colleagues that have been working on this for many years is also very helpful. I think some of the things that make our consortium unique is, one, as I mentioned before, we're provider-driven.
We are interested in bringing to bear the tools, the standards, the best practices that are already out there, leveraging those, building on those, and really being an organization that being driven by providers will have the ability to accelerate the understanding, accelerate the adoption, accelerate the development and adoption of the types of interventions that will ultimately render the medical device industry a safer industry. Well, thanks very much.