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Dec 20, 2018 25 min

Quantum Hegemony

from CNAS Podcasts Hosted by Center for a New American Security

China is positioning itself as a powerhouse in quantum science, posing a challenge to U.S. national security and innovation leadership. Elsa B. Kania, an Adjunct Fellow at CNAS, and John Costello, former Co-Founder and Director Emeritus of the China Cyber and Intelligence Studies Institute, join Paul Scharre for a discussion on China's ambitions in quantum development and their recent report, "Quantum Hegemony."

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Quantum Hegemony

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Hello everyone, I'm Paul Shari, Director of the Technology and National Security Program here at the Center for New American Security, and back today with another edition of the Tech Program podcast series. Here today for a very special edition, we're going to hear from Elsa Kenia and John Costello about their new report, Quantum Hegemony, China's Ambitions and the Challenge to U.S. Innovation Leadership. You're going to hear from them, first Elsa and then John.

This will be, you'll listen to the recording of an event that we held at the Center for New American Security on December 18th called China's Quantum Quest, China's Pursuit of Quantum Technologies. I'll give a brief bio on each of them before I turn it over to Elsa. Elsa Kenia is an adjunct fellow here with the Technology and National Security Program at CNAS. She is a rock star member of our program doing some incredible work on China's emerging technologies.

You may have seen, if not, you should please check it out, her report from last year, Battlefield Singularity on China's work on artificial intelligence, and she's partnered with John this year on Quantum Hegemony with a full report which you can find online at cnas.org slash quantum. John Costello is currently at the Department of Homeland Security, but at the time of writing this report was co-founder and director emeritus for the China Cyber and Intelligence Studies Institute, as well as a cybersecurity fellow at our fellow Think Tank New America. So we are very grateful for Elsa and John's incredible work on this report, and I'll turn it over to Elsa now. All right, well thank you all so much for coming out this afternoon.

I will start by giving a quick overview of some of our research, and then John will speak to some of the policy considerations in play, and hopefully we can open it up for a more open-ended conversation, because I know that there's a lot of expertise on these issues in the room, and I think part of the inherent challenge and also what's fascinating about this research is it brings together questions that are deeply technical, but also issues that pertain to China's approach to innovation and future challenges of competitiveness, so hopefully we will manage to tie together a lot of these themes over the course of the roundtable today. So to start, I'll be quickly running through China's ambitions and advances so far, China's quantum quest, so to speak, and I think it's clear to start that I'm not a quantum physicist. I do not claim that I understand deeply the science in question. I definitely find it fascinating, and also quite quite challenging to make sense of as a research agenda, but those far smarter than I do also find that it is shocking and sometimes sounds magical when we start talking about the technologies in play, when we think about the second quantum revolution, so to speak, everything from quantum cryptography, which promises, at least in theory, uncraftable communications, to quantum computing, which has the potential for massive increases in computing capabilities, and the initial assessments that we granted our report in, we're looking at how Chinese leaders are starting to prioritize quantum computing and communications as a national megaproject, mobilizing to become a leader in innovation of these technologies.

So far and over the past couple of years, China has emerged as really the forefront of advances in the employment of quantum cryptography and communications in the race for perhaps more accurately marathon for quantum computing. China is starting to catch up and quite actively investing in a range of different pathways, and somewhat more opaque when we think about quantum radar sensing, imaging, metrology, navigation, technologies with clearer military ramifications. There's also quite active research and development underway, and in many respects, China's ambitions in quantum science and technology are closely tied to its national objective of becoming a superpower in science and technology, which is in a personal emphasis of Xi Jinping. China has demonstrated quite considerable and often headline-gravity events, including the launch of the world's first quantum satellite and exciting developments in quantum computing, but part of the question our report does raise is the extent to which China can be considered a quantum powerhouse when you think about the competitive global landscape and the tremendous challenges that remain.

China's agenda in innovation has been a clear priority under Xi Jinping's leadership, where he's launched a national strategy for innovation-driven development. I think if you look at the state of the technological landscape today, particularly across technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and biotechnology, it's clear that China is aiming to take advantage of what it sees as a historic opportunity not only to catch up, but also to potentially leapfrog ahead of the U.S. and really seize upon the full potential of these advances. Again, personally, at the level of Xi Jinping, there's been great emphasis on advances in quantum science as potentially leading to new industrial revolution, and prominent scientists, such as Guobong Sun, who's a key laboratory of quantum information, has highlighted that if China is to emerge as a leader in the struggle for quantum supremacy on the basis of advances in quantum computing, which would soon overtake classical computing, at least by some metrics, then China needs to mobilize and organize more of a group army, so to speak, in support of this research that's underway.

And indeed, if you look at Chinese S&T plans over the past couple of years, it's clear that this prioritization has been codified and really emphasized in China's S&T bureaucracy, including the National Science and Technology Innovation Plan, which first marked quantum communications and computing as a mega-project prioritized for advances by 2030. Recognizing the commercial potential of these technologies, China has also focused on the development of an industrialization of quantum cryptography and creating an overall ecosystem and layout, ranging from quantum chips to algorithms, software, and some of the underlying materials in play. And unsurprisingly, there is a clear recognition of the dual-use potential of these technologies, as highlighted in one of the many plans and initiatives aimed to advance military-civil fusion. And there's increasingly strong synergies between some of the directly academic research underway, with a focus on both military and commercial applications.

So as many of you may be aware at this point, China made history in summer 2016, launching the world's first quantum satellite, which so far has been primarily significant in terms of the experimentation that it's enabled, including a space-to-ground quantum distribution and quantum teleportation. This may be the first of many quantum satellites that China, as well as countries around the world, will launch in the years to come, and their plans, according to the Chinese Academy of Sciences, to launch a number of micro and nano satellites in the next five years, expanding towards a constellation that is integrated with an expanding quantum communications infrastructure that China is constructing at a national level, leveraging ground stations connected by fiber optic and the quantum satellite to scale up and enhance connectivity. Since the initial Beijing-Shanghai trunk opened last fall, there's been continued expansion of this network, even as recently as last month, with the opening of a new line that links Hosei and Wuhan, which is connected to this initial network in conjunction with an expanding number of global area networks. And increasingly, it's clear that not only the Chinese government and commercial enterprises, but also the Chinese military are looking to link up to this dual-use infrastructure in order to enhance information security, though, of course, the actual level of security that this new system guarantees remains to be seen.

Here is an unofficial estimate of the potential expansion of this infrastructure in the years to come, including its linkage to military bases, which are here in green, and banks, which are in blue. So clearly across many of China's main economic centers and major military installations, there will be the capacity to tap into this national quantum backbone, and at the very least, it will give China perhaps a parallel experience in the actual practical challenges of engineering and operationalizing quantum communications via quantum key distribution at scale. In quantum computing, there are quite a lot of recent developments and quite at an early stage in a competition that may play out over years, if not decades to come. But it is clear China is making progress among a number of pathways, including these photonic qubits and superconducting qubits, with new advances announced in China and around the world on a monthly, if not weekly, sometimes basis.

It's quite a dynamic and exciting field, and there have been recent indications of progress, including China's establishment of a new world record for entanglement among 18 qubits, the progress in a new system for quantum control that the University of Science and Technology of China has announced advances in optical quantum chips as well. And although much of this is academic for the time being, there's also some progress towards commercialization with a 11-qubit quantum computing cloud platform offered by Alibaba, and of course goals looking for longer term of advancing towards quantum's privacy around 2020 and eventually towards a prototype of fully functional quantum computer longer term. With more direct relevance for military applications, there are some potential advances in spooky capabilities, so to speak, with active research and development underway, everything from reports of advances in quantum radar to quantum imaging for remote sensing to quantum navigation, which could be used for guidance on future missiles or support of submarines to enable independence for space-based navigation systems. So this is more okay, but it's clear that there is fairly robust research underway in some reports of prototypes.

And turning to the overall ecosystem, it is quite expansive and rapidly expanding, with seemingly nearly unlimited funding in some cases, likely amounting to tens of billions of dollars between now and 2030, when you start to try to add up national sources of funding to that devoted to a new national laboratory, as well as private sector investments, such as those of Alibaba, and the investments of new funds and government guidance funding at the local level as well. There are quite an array of partnerships that bring together academic and defense research, including the new Beijing Academy of Quantum Information Sciences, and local provinces and cities, including Huawei and Shandong, looking to create their own dynamic ecosystems and centers of excellence in quantum science and industry. Of course, I think although China's advances and ambitions in quantum science have provoked a lot of concern and not without reason, it's also important to keep in mind some of the real challenges that remain, including, of course, the cultivation of talent, which is involved with education and recruitment of scientists from around the world. At the same time, the party's preference for control and some of the adverse bureaucratic characteristics of the Chinese research ecosystem may not be conducive to future innovation in this field, so there may be some lack of efficiency in the allocation of funding or some inflation of numbers and patents and publications given the sometimes financial incentives in play there, so there are reasons to look critically at and not take face value of the massive numbers in terms of funding and otherwise that are coming out of China, given the quality is harder to evaluate, and we did not explicitly undertake a big metric analysis for this report, including because of that difficulty of making sense of which lines of research are most innovative or truly unique, but I think clearly numbers of publications and patents do indicate that there has been a massive scaling up of this research, and increasingly there also are cutting-edge advances underway, though, of course, this will play out over years to come, and it remains to be seen whether support will be sustained by the long term.

Of course, I think if we're looking to the future of quantum science technology from the framework of US-China competition, it's clear that there are some quite serious implications when we think about potential new paradigms for information as well as cybersecurity and potential, of course, for new risks if a quantum computer develops the potential to overcome those forms of cryptography in the years to come, in a military context, of course, of potential new disruptive capabilities or, in some cases, incremental advances in things like timing, navigation, and situational awareness, and commercially China does seem poised to try to take advantage of the first move or advantage of these industries going forward. So in conclusion, the main takeaway of our report which hopefully has provided at least a first snapshot of the state of China's of quantum science and technology. Clearly, Chinese leaders recognize its strategic significance and are looking to leverage these technologies to enhance economic and military dimensions of national power, and China is catching up and looking to surpass US leadership in these technologies in ways that could have major implications for the balance in this relationship and could definitely pose a number of tricky policy questions as well, which I will now turn over to John to discuss before we launch into the broader conversation. Thanks, Elsa.

Having worked with us on a number of different projects over the last few years, I can tell you the difficulty which it is to follow us. She's a hard act to follow, but I'm trying my best. As Paul mentioned, currently I'm the director of strategy policy and plans, and we did have a name change for the cybersecurity and infrastructure security agency. Having said that, this report did come out before I took my current position, and I have to make sure everyone knows that my positions and what I talk about today represent my own personal positions, not those of CISA, the Department of Homeland Security, because we really focused on what we viewed as three major objectives for quantum information science in the United States.

Number one is defending against tech transfer. If you look at Chinese research, R&D activities, and S&T investments, you do see that China directly benefits from sending scholars overseas from academic collaboration and cooperation with foreign universities, from academics at the university, studied at universities, and then come back. The so-called father of quantum information science in China, Pan Genwe, studied in Vienna in his early years, came back and basically started a series of laboratories and series of programs from which China's quantum information science, particularly quantum encryption, has grown since the early 2000s. I'm not saying there's anything untoward there, but it is a model for how China goes out and trains its people and brings it back and actually funds R&D and investment, and we've seen that over and over and over again.

Second is spurring U.S. competitiveness. I mean, one part of this is defense, making sure the tech transfer does not occur, but also making sure that the U.S. government and is working with private industry to identify key priority areas for R&D investment in quantum information science, both in sensing, in computing, and encryption, and in material science as well.

And finally, reducing or mitigate the threat from a quantum surprise. Obviously, quantum sensing, through the sort of hazing potential quantum radar, is a clear and present threat to U.S. capabilities, and quantum encryption, I think, confounds some of our information collection capabilities. But really, the biggest threat, at least from our perspective, is the idea that China will be the first to attain quantum supremacy and will be able to harness quantum computer that can use Shores algorithms to break most modern standard forms of encryption.

Encryption is a given in a lot of cybersecurity systems and a lot of information security. So the ability to break that, the ability to undermine that fundamental pillar of information security creates a systemic risk across all of our critical infrastructure and all of our technological ecosystem. So we're down to go into the six sort of policy recommendations we made. Now, I will say this.

I think these are a little bit different from traditional policy recommendations. In some of these, it's really looking at specific fields of study that really, specific fields of questions that really warrant further study. Number one is spurring, excuse me, United States competitiveness in quantum information science. I think that sort of speaks for itself, because there has been some movement since the publishing of our report that is a positive step forward in this regard.

One is National Quantum Initiative Act passed and is looking to appropriate 1.2 billion for quantum information science funding. The Air Force Research Laboratory has also put 5 billion towards our study in quantum technologies. Second is evaluating the risk of quantum computing and critical infrastructure. And that's both in the federal government's side and I think some of the sort of less talked about is private industry as well.

When we're talking about Q-Day, which is a potential date, which is what we think is a very clever title, a very clever word for like the day that a quantum computer is created and an actual quantum computer that can break encryption is actually created. There's a number of dates that are given for that. Some it's five years out, 10 years out, 20 years out. Regardless of what the date is, what we really call for is at the time is a federal government study.

If we assume that a quantum computer was created today and we knew that someone across the world was able to break on most modern forms of encryption, how long would it take the federal government to completely migrate its systems to a quantum-resistant form of encryption to insulate themselves from potential impact, potential risks from a quantum computer? and sort of tease that out, and what would it cost? And then you take that even further, and what would it cost the private sector as well? The key critical industries that we need to make sure they're insulated and secure from intellectual property theft and cyber intrusion.

So that was our second one. The third is evaluate the impact and prepare for one surprise itself. So this is sort of largely looked around the idea of what we call wait-and-see, wait-and-see collection. So the idea that a foreign adversary could collect encrypted communications, extensive communications over time, store them for decades, and then when a quantum computer is created in the future, could crack that encryption and get the plan to have so that intelligence can have decades' worth of intelligence to fall back on.

Now granted, a lot of that would be outdated, but I'd be willing to bet that a number of that would be particularly actionable and would be relevant to the national security interests and economic security interests. So what we sort of call for is the IC looking at the potential of effectively running a large counterintelligence operation and seeing if you could bait in bellwethers that if that encryption or sensitive communications are cracked, that there would be some sort of externality that could be observed that would at least provide a red flag or bellwether if someone had achieved a quantum surprise. The presumption of this is that the first nation on Earth that achieved that capability may not be particularly forthright in announcing that capability if they had the ability to very quickly uproot most modern forms of encryption. So that is the presumption for that.

I mean, it could be a faulty assumption. It may not, but it is something that we both think is still worthy of study. The fourth is engage in more thorough study and evaluation of the military application of quantum technologies. I think there's been a number of reports over the last few years of the applications of quantum information science to military technologies, but as China, I think the point on the back of this is as China continues to look at new and creative applications, including the potential use of a quantum satellite for over-the-air quantum critical communications, really spurring the military to look for new and creative applications even for advanced weapons systems that could be harnessed through quantum information science.

Like I said, the Air Force Research Laboratory putting $5 billion towards studying the application of quantum technologies is a noteworthy step in that regard. Five is tasking the National Counterintelligence Executive to look at counterintelligence risks to U.S.'s quantum information science efforts. I mean, I think, again, that speaks for itself, but, you know, there's a number of ongoing academic and commercial partnerships and collaborations that consistently provide avenues for transfer intellectual property theft or, you know, extra legal techniques where someone comes and learns and then takes it back to China. I mean, that in and of itself is not necessarily a pressing threat, but when it's state-directed and when there's a larger plan that over time affects a massive transfer of wealth of knowledge from one country to another, that does become, you know, it's death by a thousand cuts, that does become a competitive risk and over time security risk in the United States.

Six is restore science and technology capacity and expertise to U.S. Congress. Now, we probably should have worded this different. We're not saying that Congress does not have science and technology expertise.

At least having been a former staffer myself and knowing a number of staffers, I can tell you that a lot of them are smart on this and a lot of them are willing to work with industry, academia to make sure that their principles get the best information possible. But from 1972 to 1995, there was the Office of Technology Assessment that existed in U.S. Congress, which was exclusively charged providing science and technology advice to U.S. members of Congress.

It went away in the mid-90s. But a lot of what it did, produced over 700 reports during its lifetime, it acted as a bellwether. That's one of my favorite words, so it may come up again. It acted as a bellwether for looking at new and emerging technologies, what are their impacts commercially and security-wise, and what are the policy options and legislative options that Congress could pursue to answer any given policy issue?

It was a congressional think tank, in other words. So part of this is recognizing that the United States needs a more comprehensive approach that can't just be on the federal government, and by that I mean the executive government, but it needs to also come from Congress to take a comprehensive approach across all these issue areas and consistently have a canary in the coal mine looking at emerging technologies, the risks to that, and how it could be hires for national security purposes and economic competitiveness. So we really promote that, and we think that is a cornerstone thing to achieve those three objectives, defending tech transfer, securing U.S. competitiveness, and reducing or mitigating the threat from climate surprise.

That really rounds out our policy recommendations and in general the threats that we're looking to counter or the opportunities we're looking to pursue. I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you. Thank you everyone for joining us for this edition of our CNAS Tech Podcast series.

As a reminder, you can find the full report from Elsa and John online at cnas.org slash quantum. That's quantum hegemony, Chinese ambitions and a challenge to U.S. innovation leadership at cnas.org slash quantum. Thanks so much.

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