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Feb 25, 2025 13 min

RANE's Forecast Trends for 2025

from The Decision Advantage Hosted by RANE Network

In this special episode of Essential Geopolitics, RANE’s Executive Director of the Stratfor Center for Applied Geopolitics Rodger Baker and Senior Middle East and North Africa Analyst Ryan Bohl provide an overview of trends expected to shape the global risk landscape in 2025. Access the overview of RANE's 2025 forecast here: https://go.ranenetwork.com/forecast-trends-2025-summary RANE is a global risk intelligence company that delivers risk and security professionals access to critical insights, analysis and support to ensure business continuity and resilience for our clients. For more information about RANE's risk management solutions, visit www.ranenetwork.com.

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RANE's Forecast Trends for 2025

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I'm Roger Baker, Executive Director of the Stratfor Center for Applied Geopolitics at RAIN, a global center of excellence for geopolitical intelligence and analysis. Learn how you can put geopolitics to work for your organization at rainnetwork.com. Well, good morning, good afternoon. My name is Ryan Boll. I'm a senior Middle East and North Africa analyst here at the RAINN Network. And I'm joined today with Roger Baker, one of our vice presidents of analysis and director of the Stratfor Center for Applied Geopolitics. And we're talking today about the broader trends that are unfolding geopolitically through the year 2025. And Roger, I want to kick it over to you to talk about some of the higher level trends that we're tracking, particularly regarding the transition in the United States with a new president and in some ways a new strategy and in other ways an old one.

Right. And I think that this is one of the defining characteristics of the year. And at this stage, particularly as we're having this conversation, it's still a very uncertain moment. As we look at the incoming administration, obviously, on the international front, one of the biggest dynamics that it is planning to act on and has advertised about is the idea of tariffs. We've already seen moves to increase tariffs on Canada and Mexico that have been...

paused, but not necessarily removed from the table. We've seen an expansion of tariffs already placed on China and a Chinese response. We've seen discussion of increased tariffs on the European Union, potentially on other key US trading partners, including key US allies in other parts of the world. And so this tariff pattern, I think, is the one that's certainly drawing attention internationally. And the question that's being asked is, is this...

in some ways a repeat of the first term of the administration of President Donald Trump, where tariffs were primarily utilized as negotiating or bargaining chips, and for the most part had minimal implementation, except very selectively? Or is this a new dynamic where tariffs in many ways are the end goal? as a way to fundamentally alter, not immediately, but down the road, the shape and structure of the U.S. economy and to reframe U.S. relationships with the world and with the ideas of globalization. And I think that this question is one that's going to be driving a lot of countries' behaviors. We'll see countries trying to find ways to preemptively appease the administration, but also perhaps start looking for ways to buffer themselves against likely short or long-term disruptions in economic dynamics with the United States, and that can have much longer-term consequences. So that seems to be the...

the core of what we're going to be seeing this year. But of course, the United States also has roles internationally. There is this discussion of whether the U.S. should pull back from some of these roles internationally. And I think the first one I'm going to throw back at you, Ryan, is talking a little bit about the Middle East. Things do seem to be changing in that region. What are you seeing in the Middle East during this coming year?

Yeah, and particularly, Roger, you're talking about how things restructure slowly, and that the same is taking place in the Middle East, where the balance of power, it's been in flux for a while, but we have some dramatic events over the past, you know, two years. The Gaza War, the collapse of the Assad government, the Israeli airstrikes on Iran, the interventions in Yemen. There are many incidents and trends that we're monitoring over the year to see how this balance of power somewhat naturally resets it. And I think what's different in our current historical phase is Washington's reticence. to get involved directly, to put its thumbs on the scales of power in the region. We've seen them act very aggressively in terms of defense, of keeping the status quo going, particularly protecting the Israelis. But are they willing to reframe Israeli-Palestinian relations in a way that moves that conflict to a new stage? Are they willing to be assertive and aggressive in the way that Syria reshapes itself in the post-Assad phase? And of course, as Iran has had serious strategic setbacks over the past year and a half, is the U.S. going to become a more hawkish power and align with the hawks, with the Israelis?

to really push that Iranian power back inside of its borders? Or is it going to outsource that conflict to local allies like the Israelis, perhaps the Gulf Arabs and the Saudis and the Emiratis, and let them decide the tempo of this unfolding dynamic? So it's a region that is in flux, that is discovering its own agency again after a very long time of extra-regional interference. And that extra-regional interference hasn't completely gone away. There is still very much an extended American presence throughout the region. And yes, the Russians had a major setback in Syria, but they're certainly not gone either. So outsiders can still tilt the balance in some of these indigenous conflicts.

but they're no longer driving them. They're no longer the central actor in them. They're more bystanders or peripheral. And when they intervene, it can be decisive, but they're not going to intervene in every little scuffle in the region. And so we're looking for that. How do power vacuums adapt and get filled? And how do balances get reestablished by their own independent actors? And I think another area where...

we've been thinking a lot about for the next year, of course, is further to the north of the Middle East, within Eastern Europe, where another balance of power is trying to establish itself, both in the terms of local actors, but certainly not outside of the interference of the great power. So we have in Russia and Ukraine, a slow moving, almost World War I style conflict in which territory has changed very slowly. But unlike World War I, it is staying in a very limited geography and there's still intervention by the United States, but not direct boots on the ground or anything along those lines. There's widespread expectations that perhaps something will change this year. So Roger, what are we looking for in this conflict, in this most direct and perhaps most geopolitical of trends over the next year?

Well, I think in the near term, you know, as we've identified in our annual forecast, and I know we'll be updating as our quarterly forecast come out, we've been looking at the likelihood of some form of negotiated pause to the current conflict in Ukraine. We see a strong interest from the United States. There appears to be interest from Russia, despite the fact that they, on the battlefield, they're trying to continue to push themselves forward and make sure they have maximum negotiating position. The Europeans, I think, would be happy to see this conflict stop right along the border as well, the border of Europe. And so we do think that...

that is moving forward, that there will be some form of negotiation. It doesn't fundamentally end the issues of security in the region, of Russia's perceived insecurity, of Europe's concerns. But as we watch that deal evolve, that's where we're going to really get a measure again of how this incoming U.S. administration is going to manage its foreign interests, and in particular, how the European and American relationship is going to develop. And we do think that...

the expectation that the United States again might try to hand European security and the frontier security to Europe is perhaps going to drive the Europeans towards a little further integration despite the fact that over the last couple of years the pattern we've largely seen is nationalism, national self-interest reasserting itself and a lack of centralized leadership in Europe. So I think we do see this conflict having some pause and that pause perhaps creating some incentives and opportunities for Europe to be able to pull together, particularly on defense, security and economic dynamics.

And I think there's one more region that we would be remiss if we didn't touch on. And of course, the tariffs are part of the story. But as we look over to the Asia Pacific region, we look at China with its underperforming economy and its own internal challenges at the same time as it's to try to respond to the new American administration and a new and old strategy that's being applied to it. Roger, what are we looking for out of the other great power on the map that, too, is trying to find its own natural balance of power in its own backyard? Right. I think, as you noted, Ryan, China has not.

come roaring out of the post-COVID lockdown in the way that perhaps the Chinese leadership expected, and quite frankly, much of the world expected. The Chinese economy is certainly not small. It's not what I would call sluggish. But for example, domestic consumption just isn't cutting it. And thus trade remains a very important part of China's economic recovery and economic growth. And trade is in question with the whole concept of tariffs, trade wars, things of that sort. So as we look at the Chinese, what we're going to be looking for this year is one.

How do the Chinese manage their relationship with the United States? Already we're seeing some hints of them trying to come back to the trade deals from the first Trump administration. That trade deal didn't work out exactly well. It was never fully achieved. So it may just be a starting point of negotiations for the Chinese. We do see the Chinese willing to put a little additional pressure on the United States through counter sanctions and counter tariffs. I mean, and they're willing to try to exploit certain key.

areas where they're stronger, whether that's going to be in critical minerals and mineral resources, or perhaps in challenging the US's plans or expectations under this administration to rapidly expand energy exports. And the Chinese are hinting that they'll just not necessarily take them or they'll just throw more tariffs on those as well. And I think the Chinese have space for that because their economy is not moving as fast. And we've seen them, for example, not draw on the full amount of resources that they could potentially be taking in from Russia. So they seem to have a little buffer space. Around their periphery, we would expect them to try to heal

at least a little bit, some of their tensions or stresses with some of their major neighbors. So we're going to be watching very closely the Chinese-India relationship, perhaps some Chinese outreach to Korea, particularly with the potential change in the government in Korea, maybe a few feelers out to Japan, definitely down into Vietnam, Indonesia, and places like that. So we do expect to see the Chinese trying to calm things in their neighborhood. And then finally, if we do see large-scale trade disruptions, we may see the Chinese and the Europeans try to find some ways to come together to ease some of the strain that's caused by the United States. And in some ways then, on a strategic basis, level, that would ultimately be counterproductive for the United States and what it's looking at from its grand strategy and balance of power and containment of China.

Well, we are obviously covering other AORs or areas of responsibility, places like Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Latin America, which we haven't gotten to in this video. But these are some of our top-line forecasts and top-line trends that we'll be keeping an eye on. Our team is tracking many things, both in the minutiae as well as the grand strategy elements. But Roger and I thought we would give a quick conversation here about some of the grand strategy that we're monitoring through the year and in which the story can't be so cleanly contained in a single 12-month period. Can it, Roger? These are things that we'll be watching unfold for a long time to come. Yeah, you got that right, Ryan. I'm Ryan Boll, Roger Baker. Thanks so much.

Thanks for watching. Visit the link in the description to download our 2025 annual geopolitical forecast summary. To access our full 2025 annual geopolitical forecast, contact a member of our team at rainnetwork.com.

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