S2E20: Beyond markets and states: an intro to Elinor Ostrom—w/ Dr. Nick Cowen, University of Lincoln
Episode 20 of the Reversing Climate Change podcast, hosted by Carbon Removal Strategies LLC, titled "S2E20: Beyond markets and states: an intro to Elinor Ostrom—w/ Dr. Nick Cowen, University of Lincoln" was published on July 7, 2020 and runs 44 minutes.
July 7, 2020 ·44m · Reversing Climate Change
Summary
The tragedy of the commons suggests that, left to our own devices, we will overuse and overconsume our shared resources in the name of self-interest. And that either privatization or state control is required to keep us in check. But Elinor Ostrom advanced a third option, a polycentric governance approach in which the people involved solve the problem on their own through a commons solution. Dr. Nick Cowen is a lecturer in the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Lincoln and the author of the paper, ‘Cost and Choice in the Commons: Ostrom and the Case of British Flood Management’. Today, Nick joins Ross to discuss the differences among state, market, and commons solutions to the environmental problems we face. He explains how Ostrom’s work changed the way we think about the tragedy of the commons and walks us through several examples of communal solutions that preserve shared resources. Nick goes on to introduce the concepts of residual-claimancy and the transitional gains trap, describing how government intervention in flood management followed by a period of privatization led to the current dilemma in Great Britain. Listen in for insight around how Ostrom’s communal systems might appeal to both conservative and liberal politics and learn how we can apply her interdisciplinary ideas to protect our shared resources. Purchase Nori Carbon Removals Nori's website Nori on Facebook Nori on Twitter Carbon Removal Newsroom: our other podcast! Nori on Patreon Nori Newsletter Nori on Twitter Nick’s Website Nick on Academia Nick on SSRN Nick on Twitter ‘Cost and Choice in the Commons: Ostrom and the Case of British Flood Management’ by Nick Cowen Elinor Ostrom Ostrom’s Workshop Method Ostrom’s Google Scholar Page Ostrom’s Nobel Prize Lecture Books by James C. Scott Ludwig Von Mises’ Insights on Intervention ‘The Transitional Gains Trap’ by Gordon Tullock Dr. Bryan Caplan on RCC S2EP2 Karen Bradshaw Bryan Leonard Friedrich August Hayek Ilia Murtazashvili Kate Raworth
Episode Description
The tragedy of the commons suggests that, left to our own devices, we will overuse and overconsume our shared resources in the name of self-interest. And that either privatization or state control is required to keep us in check. But Elinor Ostrom advanced a third option, a polycentric governance approach in which the people involved solve the problem on their own through a commons solution.
Dr. Nick Cowen is a lecturer in the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Lincoln and the author of the paper, ‘Cost and Choice in the Commons: Ostrom and the Case of British Flood Management’. Today, Nick joins Ross to discuss the differences among state, market, and commons solutions to the environmental problems we face. He explains how Ostrom’s work changed the way we think about the tragedy of the commons and walks us through several examples of communal solutions that preserve shared resources.
Nick goes on to introduce the concepts of residual-claimancy and the transitional gains trap, describing how government intervention in flood management followed by a period of privatization led to the current dilemma in Great Britain. Listen in for insight around how Ostrom’s communal systems might appeal to both conservative and liberal politics and learn how we can apply her interdisciplinary ideas to protect our shared resources.
Nori's website
Carbon Removal Newsroom: our other podcast!
‘Cost and Choice in the Commons: Ostrom and the Case of British Flood Management’ by Nick Cowen
Ludwig Von Mises’ Insights on Intervention
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