Before we get on with episode two, some news. A few days ago, the army announced that it will take Bo-Burgdahl's charges to court-martial, to trial basically. He's charged with two crimes, desertion and something called misbehavior before the enemy. That second one, it's not used very often.
It carries the possibility of a life sentence, which doesn't seem likely that would happen. That'd be so extreme. But it does mean Bo could face some amount of prison time if he's convicted. The army's decision to go to court-martial, it's not that it's so surprising.
I mean, this was always a strong possibility. It's just that for a lot of people watching Bo's case, it's been hard to handicap. All outward signs have pointed to an army that has have two minds about how to deal with what Bo did, whether to throw the book at him, or whether to say, okay, yes, he screwed up in a huge way, but five years with the Taliban, enough is enough. On the one hand, the army level pretty severe charges against Bo.
But then, in a military hearing in September, the two-star general in charge of investigating Bo's case, a man named Kenneth Dahl, who took a 371-page statement from Bo, who assembled a 22-person team who coordinated with 24 government agencies, interviewed 56 people. He said he believed that Bo told him the truth about why he did what he did, that Bo was remorseful, that Bo recognizes, quote, that he was young and naive and inexperienced, unquote. When asked on the stand whether he thought Bo should go to jail, Major General Dahl said, quote, I think it would be inappropriate, unquote. Likewise, the officer in charge of that hearing, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Viscor, in his report on what to do about the charges, he apparently recommended a lesser proceeding, called a special court martial, more like a misdemeanor trial.
He also recommended no confinement. In response to which, Senator John McCain, arguably our country's most powerful former POW, he was held for five years during the Vietnam War, McCain told a reporter that if Bo got no punishment, he'd hold a congressional hearing to look into Bo's case. And then this week, the announcement that the army will pursue the charges in the most serious way possible, a general court martial. It's almost as if those military officials who have come into close contact with Bo are ready to forgive him, while the army as an institution continues to be furious.
A few months ago, filmmaker Mark Bo was talking about on the phone, and they were discussing the possibility of a plea deal, of whether Bo would take an offer for say one, two, three years in prison, in exchange for pleading guilty. Bo said he didn't think he would, even though the basic facts of the case aren't in dispute. Bo admits he walked away from his post of his own volition. But Bo told Mark he worried that if he took some plea offer, he'd never get to explain himself, and people would continue to hate him, and it's true a lot of people hate him, without ever fully understanding his reasons for doing what he did.
That was his fear, that after all of this, he'd end up misunderstood. Yeah, it's exhausted in the air. Yeah, well, I can respect that. I mean, I think that to give that up now would almost be like, I don't want to make the whole thing pointless.
From this American Life in WBE Chicago, it's serial, one story told week by week. I'm Sarah Kannick. Good evening, everyone. Early in the release of American servicemen after five years in a four-time captivity.
Pentagon sources tell NBC that Bergdahl vanished under mysterious circumstances. Can you call Bergdahl, hero, or deserted? The soldiers are engaged in a political smear campaign by raising questions. Parents of some fallen soldiers say their sons would be alive at Bergdahl, but Bergdahl had not gone missing from his post.
In the old days, the soldiers wish up. The very last thing is, just, I'm a prisoner. I want to go home. Bring me home.
Please. Give me home. I was talking on the phone recently to this Taliban fighter. I'm calling him Wuzha Hiedramann, not his real name.
He told me that when they got Bergdahl, that when they caught him, the Taliban knew they had scored. Vermont said, quote, a dead soldier is worth nothing, but he was captured alive and he was like a golden chicken, unquote. In the weeks and years really following Bose capture during the tactical push and pull between the insurgents and the US forces, each side would ask itself over and over, what is Bo worth to us? What is Bo worth to our enemy?
How much will we get? How much will we sacrifice? Wuzha Hiedramann described one raid by US forces not long after Bo disappeared. He said something like 15 Taliban were killed.
An American special operations commander I spoke to described a similar raid, 15 enemy killed. I asked Vermont, who was an interpreter who was next to me, was it worth it? 15 of your guys in one raid for Bergdahl? Barrio, in front of the country, I believe some people are worth more than a thousand men, and he was worth maybe more than 5,000 individuals.
So exactly how did the Taliban get Bo in the first place? And what did they do with him once they realized who he was? Mark Bol looked into this too, and it was his company, Page One, that got in touch with a guy named Sammy Yousafzai. Sammy is Afghan, he's a reporter, a very brave reporter.
He's based in Islamabad, but he travels around a lot for his work covering the war in Afghanistan. He writes for Newsweek and other publications. In about a year and a half ago, Page One hired Sammy to interview whomever he could and report back what he found. And he did, he didn't record these interviews on tape, but Sammy found about a half dozen people who said they'd either been part of the kidnapping or interacted with Bo while he was being held.
One of the first people Sammy found was this guy named Halal. Halal is a Taliban fighter, part of a group that was running missions in Pateka Province where both battalion was based. What Halal told Sammy is that the Taliban had gotten word from the local people in the area that sometimes a westerner was coming close to the village, taking photos, and also that they'd seen a soldier sitting on top of a hill near a US checkpoint. So Halal and a few of his guys had come to the village to see if it was true and if it was to work out a plan to grab him.
Kidnapping foreigners, journalists, aid workers, missionaries. This was big business for the Taliban at the time and it still is. I interviewed Sammy about what Halal told him. According to Halal, they've just gotten to this village to mess, in fact, where Bo's unit was manning an outpost and they're taking a rest at the mosque.
At that time, suddenly somebody shouted in and said, there is a foreigner in a kuchi tent. A foreigner in a kuchi tent. Kuchi is a word for nomads. They keep flocks of animals and live in these big tents.
In summer, they open up the sides of the tent for fresh air. And he's asking about Kabul or asking about police. And Halal said, we were unexpected. Let's find out what is this.
And then we said, OK, let's go and find out. So Halal and his guys go to this kuchi tent. They drive up on their motorbikes and see this foreigner. Sammy tells it from Halal's perspective.
And we told him that we are police. I mean, American normal working with the local militia, which is not necessarily to be where uniform. And we told him police. And he looked at us and then he jumped behind our bike.
So Halal is saying that we said, oh, we're local police, sort of come with us or whatever. And Bergdall seemed to believe that and think he was maybe in safe hands. That's why because the kuchi already told him that this guy, we don't understand his language, but he's asking about police in Kabul. That's why they understand maybe he was asking about something else.
He was asking for a bus or something or road. And that's why they came. And he said he was in white dress and sandals. And he heard something in his pocket.
He said there was a pistol or knife or something. But we don't know really exactly. OK. This kuchi tent thing comes up in various ways.
The Taliban say either bow walked into a kuchi tent or near a tent. The Americans got some intel at the time to the same effect. And that nomads tipped off the Taliban. For his part, bow says he was never in a kuchi tent.
He says he was out in the open when armed men rode up on motorcycles and grabbed him. This is one of those discrepancies. And there will be others where I feel like it's worth mentioning because if bow did walk into a kuchi tent as Halal is saying, well, then it makes his own explanation sound less solid. Maybe he wasn't really trying to cause a dust one by running from OP mess to Fob-Shirana.
Maybe he was simply deserting. But I also can't tell how much weight I should really give this kuchi tent story. Because the Taliban bring up all kinds of rumors, like that bow was in the village to meet up with a woman or that he was looking for drugs. Rumors pretty much anyone who's ever met bow can easily dismiss.
And maybe the truth is somewhere in between. It's possible bow was near a kuchi camp and just didn't know it. And that the nomads saw him out in the open and alerted the Taliban and bow was never the wiser. Probably we're not going to get to the bottom of it because we can't fact check the stories these guys told Sammy.
We can't be sure everything they told him is true. And the details of what happened do shift around depending on who Sammy's talking to, which isn't unusual in any kind of reporting. What I can say is that the overall chain of events, the major plot points that the Taliban describe are pretty consistent person to person. In Sammy's interviews with these guys, they don't seem that interested in pinning down exactly how bow ended up in or near a kuchi tent.
More what they want to talk about is how incredible it was that it happened at all. To Raman and halal to everyone involved, this was just miraculous. That kuchi's, nomads, people they consider un-sophisticated and un-educated, snag this westerner. And not just any westerner, but an American, an enemy of the Quran, of the Pashtun people, and not just any American, but a soldier.
Raman said the whole thing, the way they got him and just being up close with your adversary like that, it was one of those lifetime strange experiences. And they came to our custody so easily in Afghanistan, amongst all the provinces in the district. We were blessed. We were blessed.
We were blessed. In Sammy's interviews, they used this expression, they called a ready-made loaf, a gift from God. They felt so lucky that bow came to them, that of all the desert joints and all the provinces in all of Afghanistan, he walked into theirs. Halal told Sammy that bow fought at first, but they subdued him.
And then once they got him on one of their bikes, they took him back to the mosque. And one point in all of those, bow was again resisting, throwing punches, or maybe his captors were beating him up. It's not clear. He said that, like, Bregu Dal was kind of resisting.
I know he started like not giving up and he was a good punching gas and he was a boxer kind of guy. And then suddenly one Pakistani Taliban, he came close to him and he sat down on his knees and suddenly, you know, Bregu Dal kicked him with his feet because his feet was open. And we started joking with him. And this guy knew he was Pakistani.
So, yeah. I'm laughing here. That's if I got the joke. In some of Sammy's conversations, the Taliban described bow as strong and aggressive.
Other times he's meek and pathetic. The adjectives they applied to this mythic captive, changing to suit the scene. Halal told Sammy that for them, for these couches, who'd maybe never been up close with a westerner before or maybe not even with an infidel and non-muslim, bow was exotic. Halal said he was like an animal captured by kids.
His pale skin was weird. He spoke was weird. His eyes were blue, which Sammy says is somewhat suspicious in Afghanistan. There's a saying that you should keep away from blue-eyed people.
In the mosque, Halalal says people had gathered to discuss what to do with bow. I have Sammy's notes from these interviews. And this one part, Halal talks about how bow was sitting in a dark corner of the mosque. And another Taliban fighter said to him, quote, see, you look like a small cat baby with shining blue eyes, end quote.
I asked Sammy what that meant. I think this is something explaining somebody weaknesses. But I think he said he was very kind of weak. He was not like a big American.
You know, like a big heavy American state. He was like a weak American. Yeah, I'm just looking at a note that says, burgdoll was weak and I think brainless. Yeah.
What does he mean by that? Oh, brainless. But that's why he entered in their hands. Oh, like he, yeah.
Like he was a dummy. And they were like, okay, otherwise, you know, he would not. This was really something, you know, somebody coming and jumping in your bike. Was he scared?
Like did he say? Well, he was scared. Sometimes he was crying. Sometimes he was smiling and we thought what's happened with this guy.
But most of the club, he was silent. Anybody giving water, he was not drinking. And he said he was like a Buddha, Buddha, you know, the famous Buddha, I understand Bami and Buddha, you know, statues. So like a statue.
Okay. I'm really reacting to what was going on around him. We thought he's drunk. Oh, they did.
Yeah, apparently they, I mean, they drive in the water somewhere, you know, to release his drunkness, he was drunk, but he was not drunk. Hello, told Sammy that to be fair, he never actually seen a drunk person. But apparently they tend to think all Westerners are drunk. From that point forward, I was survival mode.
I knew I had to be extremely careful with my going to survive that. I knew I had to be extremely careful at what point in time I decided to push. Yeah. That's Bo talking to Mark on the phone.
Of course, yes, Bo was scared. It was only rational to be scared. When the Taliban guys explained to Sammy how they kidnapped Bo, they kind of wax romantic sometimes or crack jokes. There's a swashbuckling quality to Sammy's notes from these interviews.
But then you remember Bo himself. He's completely at their mercy. It's terrified for excellent reason. He's in the hands of people who conduct public executions, mass beheadings, and often film them for propaganda.
That's a comedy-comphoo movie. Bo says there was one guy in the convoy who spoke a little English and he asked Bo questions. Was Bo a big commander? Was he an intelligence officer?
You said no. No. You said no, I'm not. Did you tell it?
Did you explain to them why you were out there? Out there. Yeah. What did you say?
Yeah, totally. Bo says his memories from that time are sort of thin. In large part because he says he was blindfolded. He was focused on what was happening to him, minute to minute, trying to comprehend his circumstances and how he could possibly reverse them.
They rode me around from it. He got me to a small village, I guess. They pulled me off the motorcycle and got me down on the ground and one of the guys came up, I guess, I guess, like a younger brother or a younger buddy or something like that. He had his cell phone down and he was like, saying a video of me and his buddy was like, sitting off to the side and he was like, you know, then saying he was just like American.
Yeah, I just shook my head and then he'd slap me. And then that a few times all they wanted to put the video. And then after they were done, then they put the blindfold back on and they threw a blanket over my head. And then they, I don't know where they went, but then little kids started throwing rocks at me.
And so I kind of pretended to flinch on the rock, hitting him head, which kind of allowed me to shift my weight. I'd like trying to get my hands from behind my back and pull him around, you know, so I could get him in front of me. That didn't work. So then Beau tried to lean forward so he could use his knee to move the cloth off of his face.
I kind of got it to a point where he's like half off my left eye almost. I still had a blanket on my head. You know, nobody was really stopping me and I didn't hear any voices. So I was just like, yo, to the best way.
But it's probably going to get, I just stood up and pulled it. Beau says he didn't get more than maybe 20 or 30 feet before he was tackled by what felt like the entire village. That was day one of his captivity. By 2009 in Afghanistan, the US forces in the Taliban had been fighting for seven years.
And in all that time, there had never been a situation like this, an American soldier captured. It was a new kind of crisis. But each side also knew who they were dealing with. They could anticipate what each other's news would be.
In those first few days, the US knew that whoever had Beau would be moving him constantly, because along you stand one place, the more likely you already get caught. And they also knew that the Taliban's goal would be to get Beau to a hideout in the tribal region of Western Pakistan, because Pakistan is like home base. Or to put it in Tom and Jerry terms, Pakistan is the hole in the baseboard where Tom cannot go. Pakistan is a sovereign nation, our purported ally.
We are not at war with Pakistan. So once Beau's in Pakistan, we can't do much about it. In Afghanistan, US forces can go anywhere they want, can do almost anything they want. But in Pakistan, it's much, much harder for the US military to operate.
Here's the other thing that happens once Beau gets to Pakistan. He becomes much more valuable, because his captors don't have to get rid of him in a hurry. They can take their sweet time making the deal they want to make. But of course, the Taliban knew that the US knew they'd head for Pakistan.
So the Taliban did the opposite. Instead of heading straight east to the Pakistan border, the Taliban guy Sami talked to said they first took Beau West to Ghazni Province, where Mujahid Rahman lived. Yeah, I can hit him here when I should move. Sami Yousafzai put us in contact with Rahman.
He'd already interviewed him a year earlier for Page One. For this interview, Sami had a car pick Rahman up and they talked to me on a burner cell phone from inside the car, which was parked in a residential neighborhood known to be fairly safe. Is it? Do you just okay?
Yeah. The call dropped about a half-dozen times during our interview. Mujahid Rahman told me by the time burgdall came to him, the plan was already set. A Taliban commander named Kari Ismail Suleimanzai had taken charge of Beau and had arranged a delivery to a group known as the Hakani network in Pakistan.
In the meantime, Mujahid Rahman's orders were to keep Beau alive and out of sight for a couple of days and nights until the pressure on the border eased a little and they could sneak Beau across. By the time Rahman took charge of the motorcycle convoy, about eight people he said, it was obvious to the Taliban that US forces were pouring into eastern Afghanistan to search for Beau. Of course, we could see this massive search and the ground search and also the airplanes. And that was the reason we were moving around an hour by hour.
We were changing location and we were even changing Burgdall's dress and we were changing our dress. And at one point we came in a close contact with American ground forces by 500 meters while Burgdall was with us. Helal told Sami that at one point his convoy had come within a kilometer of Fob-Shirana where Beau's own battalion was based. But even if Beau had wanted to scream or make a commotion, he couldn't have.
His hands were tied and Rahman said he had a large claw wrapped around his head, partly to disguise him but partly just to keep the dust off his face. They all wore them against the dust. Rahman says these were probably the most stressful two days of any mission he'd ever done. Karias may all stayed in constant contact with his guy in Pakistan from the Hakhani network.
Rahman said they used fake names and locations over the Wauky-Takis to confuse the Americans but the US forces tracked him anyway. There were locations where we stayed in a location and then two or three hours later, American forces came to that place, to that house and search that house. By this time, of course, word had spread all over the region that a US soldier had gone missing. The military air drop leaflet saying quote, one of our American guests is missing and gave a phone number to call.
The other one handed out about two weeks after Bowdiss appeared was less gentle. It showed armed Western forces kicking in a door. The news report translated the text as quote, if you do not free the American soldier, you will be targeted. The army claimed the leaflet said hunted, not targeted, which actually sounds scarier to me.
They also distributed chocolate. Sammy Yousafzai interviewed some of the people who lived in or near Mestan Sharan at the time and they remembered the chocolate wrapped in shiny paper. They also remember helicopters all over the place and that the Americans were saying Bergdahl's name or at least a word that had a B7. The people Sammy talked to said they'd heard the missing soldier had been wandering around drunk when the Taliban grabbed him.
Just as Hall had suspected. That was a common rumor that Bowd was drunk or that he'd gone to a holy site or that he tried to fight off the Taliban with karate. In classified US military communications released to the public by WikiLeaks, there's all this chatter on the ground that first week after Bowdiss went missing. On July 1, 2009, the day after Bowdiss appears, an LLVI traffic report.
LLVI stands for low-level voice intercept. It's technology we use to eavesdrop on enemy voice or data communications. It picks up this conversation quote, is that true that they captured an American guy? Yes, they did.
He's alive. There's nowhere he can go. I asked a former soldier who regularly read such messages what LOL means in this context. And he said the only meaning that seemed plausible to him was laugh out loud.
Then a few hours later, there's this intercept. We were attacking the post. He was sitting taking ex-witive and had no gun with him. He was taking ex-witive.
He has not cleaned his butt yet. I think he's a big shot. That's why they're looking for him, unquote. Mushahed Rahman, of course, understood Bowd was a US soldier, but he didn't know precisely what kind.
He said the intensity of the search did suggest Bowd was a big shot. Since why would they put all that effort and money into looking for him if he wasn't important? Rahman said he'd heard foreign soldiers were sometimes trained in martial arts, so at first he and his men were very careful around their prisoner. But pretty soon Rahman says his main impression of Bowd was that he was just really scared.
He couldn't even eat, couldn't drink or sleep. And then because he was thinking that what type of people we might be and what are we going to do with him or we're going to kill him and we're going to be hit him or what are we going to do with him. So that was the situation. He was very scared and weak and confused.
Rahman said he didn't feel sorry for Bowd. He didn't think of him as innocent. At his point of view, Bowd was like all US soldiers. He traveled halfway around the world voluntarily to invade their country and kill Muslims.
But Rahman and most of the guys Sami interviewed, they also talked about how Bowd was their guest, how humane they were with him. It's a little jarring to hear. I mean, tying your guests to the back of a motorcycle against his will doesn't sound like great host behavior. But Sami explained to me that they're not being ironic, that in Pashtun culture a guest is always treated with generosity and respect.
And so the fact that Bowd was labeled a guest in this situation made it clear to the lower down guys under Kari's Myles Command that they're not allowed to kill him or even be the crap out of him, which Rahman said was a real concern that some al-Qaeda or Taliban fighters, especially if they'd had family members killed by Americans, might try to kill Bow or kidnap him for themselves. One of the L.L.V.I messages from July 1st, the day after Bowd left, reads, unidentified male says, quote, cut the head off, unquote. Rahman himself had been a prisoner of the Americans. He said he was held at Bagram for about two years.
And he said he made sure to treat Bowd better than he'd been treated. Quote, someone who was in your custody, he said, you treat him nicely, unquote. At one point, Rahman says they stopped the convoy in what he calls a wine field, like a grape orchard. They'd gone there to hide from US helicopters.
And Rahman said while they were there, they tried to help Bow out to make him feel better. He used to boost his morale and to cheer him up. We started this winery and we did this little dance, traditional dancing called a Tan for him so he can start eating. And a Tan is an Afghan dance where typically there's a drum and you move in a circle in unison.
So yeah, apparently they did one for this frightened American soldier and a grape orchard. Did it work? Did it boost his morale and get him to eat? No, it's not that far away.
I'm not sure. I'm not sure. I'm sure. I'm sure.
I'm sure. No, it did not help. It did not help at all. And it even had an adverse effect on him because he did not know why we were doing that.
What clear is that? Great portrait. That's Bow. You know.
Bow says he has no memory of this event that he's never seen in a Tan, except in a video that Taliban showed him much later. Kenneth Wolf was Command Sergeant Major of the 501st back when Bow disappeared, the battalion's highest ranking non-commissioned officer. He said at first he felt they'd find Bow. And I told the colonel, I said, you know what?
I'm going to stick around here for a few days because if we find him, I want to be on the helicopter that picks him up. And he was like, why don't I go? They're going to whip his ass. Meaning Bow's fellow soldiers are going to whip his ass.
Wolf wasn't wrong to worry about that. If we would have found him, I think a lot of us would have shot him. Did that tell you anything? That's Daryl Hansen, one of Bow's platoon mates.
I truly say that with sincerity that we had that much a towards him. We hated him. Oh. Absolutely hated him.
That's Mark McCrory, a specialist in the 501st, but a different company from Bow. I was like, well, if we see him, he's not going to last. Like seriously, or just kind of blustery, like I'm really pissed. Or do you really think it's possible he could get that and you do?
Yeah. Well, I mean, I don't know what kind of light that sheds on us, but it was one of those things where the conversation had come up. I found this shocking and disturbing that some of these guys were saying they might have killed Bow if they'd found him. But now after interviewing more than a dozen soldiers, I still don't sympathize with wanting to kill him.
But I do understand why their anger was so extreme. I get it. The dust one's search and recovery operations lasted officially for 45 days. And some people contend it went on even longer.
But the most frantic time the soldier said was those first few weeks. They told me the search for Bow started in the immediate vicinity of where he went missing, from O.P. Mess in Eastern Afghanistan. Right away, a nine-man foot patrol headed out from the O.P.
toward a boy's school in Malauk, who'd done a JP Billings, Bow's platoon leader, said they came across a boy who told Billings, yes, he had seen an American in a field that morning, and he gave a specific time, 6.02 a.m. He pulled up his sleeve to show his Cassie a watch. There are a bunch of reports like this of boys saying they'd seen an American low crawling on the ground or nearly fainting from dehydration. A couple of reports noted that they were also giving out candy to the kids.
In one instance, the kid got some pop tarts. Which is notable. An army report on Bow's disappearance suggests maybe it was our initial search, maybe even this first patrol, that led to Bow's capture. That the soldiers handing out candy and asking these questions tipped the kids off.
And ultimately the adults, and then the Taliban, that an American was missing. And so they went out looking for him and grabbed him. Which supports what Bow says that the Taliban rode right up to him on motorbikes. Bow says he hadn't told anyone what he planned to do.
So no one in his unit or his battalion has any idea why he left. How could they? All they have to go on is whatever early intel is coming in. I remember where I heard it from, but I remember hearing that he was in the town asking if people spoke English.
And then that's where he was nabbed. That's Austin Landford, another of Bow's platoon mates. A bunch of people I spoke to remember a report like this coming over the transom. Here's where I think they probably got it.
In the WikiLeaks release from the day Bow went missing, there's an entry saying they picked up LLVI traffic indicating quote, that an American soldier is talking and is looking for someone who speaks English. American soldier has camera, unquote. Which conjures an image of Bow's seeking contact or maybe help. But several people who know how military intel works told me these LLVI reports can be tricky.
They're quick translations of overheard chatter, nuances lost, mistranslations are not uncommon. So for what it's worth. The search for Bow was enormous. By the late afternoon of June 30th, 2009, it had ballooned.
Word goes out that quote, all operations will cease until missing soldier is found. All assets will be focused on the dust one situation and sustainment operations, unquote. They would search all of Pateka Province and neighboring Pateka Province too and into Gosney Province and coast, thousands of square miles. Anything they needed to make it happen, they got.
Planes, helicopters, drones, interpreters, elite units, special forces. Hundreds of people stopped what they were doing. Even if your job was to look for Osama bin Laden, now you're going to look for the dust one. They were snapping into action because of a basic ground floor principle of the army.
You do not leave anyone out there in a war zone. The military knew that the first 24 to 48 hours would be the most critical period if they were going to find him. Based on some fancy intel, they understood pretty quickly that Bow had been captured. And they knew whoever had him would be on the move and therefore talking on radios or phones the whole time, trying to figure out their own next steps.
So if you can intercept that chatter, you can maybe geolocate where Bow might be. So battalion command requests as much signal intelligence as it can get. And then of course, it needs more soldiers to check out all that intel. Five more platoons joined the search and eight more platoons.
The entire brigade gets pulled in. One commander told me it was like a mini surge. Our operational tempo went from sort of casual presence patrols driving around, handing out stuff, cordoning IEDs till EOD came out. This is John Thurman.
He was in Blackfoot Company, Bow's Company, different platoon. Two, I mean nonstop. It was round the clock. We'd be kicking indoors one minute, setting up a blocking position and searching every single car on our later.
A blocking position was basically a roadblock. The official mission in Afghanistan in 2009 was counterinsurgency, coin for short. American forces were supposed to be containing the insurgents, but also training Afghan security forces. They were supposed to be engaging the locals, gaining their trust, improving infrastructure.
All that pretty much stopped now. Here's Mark McCrory. Sure, there had been fights that had been going on, but you know, it weren't fights that we were picking. The bad guys would come to us and we'd fight them off, you know, whereas this was us going out every night looking for a guy smashing down the door.
We were just looking and looking and looking. John Thurman again. I mean, towns, I don't even know if these towns had seen Americans ever. Okay, now we're going to fly you into this bedwind village and you're going to go check every single building or room and check all the women's faces to make sure that they're not hiding him in women's clothing.
That's Ben Evans, a specialist from Charlie Company. He said there'd been intel that they'd dress bow as a woman, which at times, bow says they did. And so we, you know, went into this house and whenever you would go into a house to do a search, all the women would typically huddle into one corner together and normally we wouldn't pay them any mind just to leave them a bee, you know. But at that point, we kind of had to walk over and I had to, I mimics, you know, removing your veil, remove your veil so we can see.
This kind of stuff, making women lift their veils or kicking indoors doesn't exactly endear you to the local populace. But they didn't have time to worry about that right now. Any little fragment of actionable intelligence that are moving him in a white truck, they're handing him over to someone at this location, they didn't have a luxury to ignore any of it. You can see on paper in those Wikileaks releases all the scrambling that was going on those first few days.
From June 30th, 2009, the day will left. Update, 140 Cav has intel that Taliban is planning to move the US packs, packs means person or passenger to Gardez. Next day, July 1st, Update, Delaware 3-6 reports that have received intel that the body of the missing US soldier is due east of their current position. July 4th, Update, Spot Report.
The missing US soldier was last seen in a village at Grid Location VB-6118, a bag was covering his head and he was wearing dark khaki apparel and so on, day after day. Here's Mark McCrory. Apparently at one point these guys said they intercepted a phone call where it was one member of the Taliban speaking to another and he said, hey, the Americans are right outside and we've got this guy with us. And so that goes all the trickles all the way up and all the way back down.
Everybody frees. Well, what you got, stay where you are, set out and out of court on and search where everybody is. But by the time the information had traveled all the way up the chain and all the way back down, it was already too late. Despite the massive resources at their disposal, the Americans were at a certain disadvantage in that landscape because any movement of US forces and giant armor trucks or helicopters or whatever makes a lot of noise, kicks up a lot of dust.
The Taliban could be more nimble, skirting around on small roads or paths, often on motorcycles, as soon as they saw or heard that the enemy was coming their way. Like literally we were charging into these towns, just running out of our trucks like he's in here, we were running to this kalat. That's Daryl Hansen again. A kalat is a kind of compound.
Just going in with guns, like in fact I'll never forget, we ran in and as we're running in this freaking cow has a baby like right next to me just, we're scared to hell out of the cow, I just had his baby right there. So yeah, it was very intense, yeah. Just, you know, we were always seemed like one day behind where he's at. The Americans were certainly on the right track.
The battalion leadership met with a local Afghan leader who reported that Bo had been turned over to the local Taliban leader, Kari Ismail, just like a little old Sami. And the US was pretty sure those Taliban guys would turn Bo over to the Hakane's in Pakistan and North was Eurostand, to be precise. They'd also got an intel that Bo might be in Ghazni, just like Mujahid Raman said. In fact, Raman told me that a few days after he returned from delivering Bo to Pakistan, he got rolled up by the Americans, detained and questioned about Bo.
Raman said everyone was getting questioned about Bo, people from down South in Kandahar and from out West in Harat. But here the US had in front of them the very man who had shepherded Bo to the Hakane's. Here's what Raman told them. I have not seen this person and I don't know this person and I haven't heard of him.
So that was my reply all the time to the Americans. Pulling into towns you're unfamiliar with, based on single source intelligence or conflicting intelligence with almost no time to prepare your team for what's awaiting them. It's risky. In a more typical operation, you mitigate the danger, maximize the chance for success, and by doing everything you can in advance to do what's called shape the battlefield.
And you might take a few days to plan and prepare. Now commanders were lucky if they got a few hours. Sometimes they felt like they were winging it. A special operations commander told me his team went on more than 50 missions looking for Bo, and many of those were during the day rather than at night when his guys have the advantage.
Quote, we don't work in the day, he said. Major Mike Waltz was commander of a special forces company. He was in charge of Seven Greenberry and one Navy SEAL team. He took over the command on June 30th, the same day Bo left.
While infantry soldiers were out searching cars or going house to house in villages, Waltz says his teams were conducting raids, usually at night, targeting specific compounds or houses where they had intelbo either was or had been. Any shred of evidence that Bergdahl had been there, we thought he was there, a sighting, it wasn't really vetted, it wasn't buttressed by other types of reporting, there was just no time to check on it, we just went. And I can't emphasize, I can't overemphasize how dangerous that is. Waltz says there's one mission that still freaks him out.
His men went to Gosney, he says most of his missions were ordered in Gosney. And they'd had information that a young white male surrounded by fighters had been seen in a particular compound that day. So as fast as they could, they got the helicopters together, they didn't have time to substantiate anything. But they had to go to the top of the ground and walk into the compound to find the whole thing is booby trapped.
The team went in and looked up and saw the ceiling lined with C4. And then there was also a car bomb with the trunk packed with explosives sitting in the middle of the compound. Now by the grace of God, they evacuated before the thing could go off and it never did. But I would have easily lost 20 to 30 American green berry's that night had that thing go off and it quickly became very apparent to us that the Taliban knew and our sources began telling us that the Taliban and the Hakhani network knew that we were pulling out all the stops to find him and we're feeding false information into our informant networks.
All right, you've got the most advanced military in the world throwing all this effort, all this expertise and technology, trying to find one person. They do pull out all the stops just to get one soldier back. That's really something. But then they can't find him.
And not only that, in some instances, they're being played by the enemy, lured into traps. What is going on? I don't quite understand if we should be impressed by this operation or dismayed. I asked a guy named Jason Dempsey to answer this question for me.
At the time, Bo disappeared, Jason was a major in the 10th Mountain Division, an operations officer, meaning he planned military operations for battalion based in Loga Province, just north of Pektika and Pektia. I've interviewed Jason a couple of times now. And what I've learned is that he's very smart and that he can't stop fidgeting. Can't sit still.
I worry. Are you washing dishes? Yeah. Jason's got a PhD and he's taught at West Point.
He's done tours in both Iraq and Afghanistan. And he's thought a lot about what we did and didn't accomplish in Afghanistan. He is not surprised. We didn't find Bo.
When I think about what was happening, I just have this image of this big machine that's like moving around in this region in Afghanistan. And there's just a mouse running through the legs of the machine. Or like, I don't know, like an ad ad on Star Wars, you know. And Luke comes with his little thing and he just like ties up the legs and it falls over.
I mean, I know that's not fair, but. That's absolutely true. And it's a great analogy, right? You've got this big lumbering machine moving through like a destroying thing face on, but it can't get it has no idea on a granular level.
What's below it? Jason says, what's down there on the ground are towns we don't understand where regular people and government officials and the Taliban are impossibly enmeshed, where civilians might hate the Taliban, but they might hate the cars I got from it even more. So it's not clear at all that the US is the team to root for to help. It's not as simple as these people are loyal to our side and those people are loyal to their side.
It's fluid. And at that time in that part of Afghanistan, we just didn't understand the incredibly complicated politics of these towns. You know, we could target or track individual networks, but we never really able to tie in. Okay, which towns and villages and people who, you know, their relatives were happy to give them safe passage or, you know, they can walk through easily.
Even after even after seven years of war at this point, we don't know, we don't know the networks well enough. No. And remember, when you say seven years of war, it means we rotated. A few thousand dudes through there every seven to 12 months, right?
There is no institutional knowledge with the US North American Afghanistan, right? Nearly none. We never were there long enough to actually get engaged with. And this applies unfortunately after 2010 as well.
We've never had anybody fully engaged else with the Afghan part. But Jason said, that's the whole thing right there. The spider web of connections we never could untangle. We had come into Afghanistan in 2001 and ousted the Taliban and we did a pretty good job of that through 2003.
Then afterwards, Jason said our mission languished and the Taliban used the intervening years to refresh and regroup to learn how we operate, how we track them. And now they were pushing back into the country in a big way, in exactly this region. Bactika, Patiya, coast. Right where Boga's missing.
But that's what the soldiers of the 501st were up against. They were total outsiders looking for their guy and knowing their chances of finding him were diminishing every day that passed. Clint Baker, commander of the first battalion of the 501st said it was as high risk an operation as he's ever had, in part because there was no clear end point. In a military hearing he testified, quote, and I mean, frankly, I felt a bit of a loss on, you know, what to do.
In my entire time in the army, I can't think of a time where I felt that kind of adversity. Period. And really did not, you know, wasn't able to overcome it, end quote. The relentlessness was what was so crushing.
Here's John Thurman and then Daryl Hansen. It got to the point where sleep, I mean, sort of became a distant reality. Just 24 hours a day, seven days a week, no sleep, no nothing. Just ran out of juice.
All the guys were just miserable and it's just like hell on earth, you know. Of course, Afghanistan was dangerous and conditions were rough before Bo left also. But now because Operation Tempo was roughly doubled or even tripled in some cases, there's just more contact with the danger. Backfoot, third platoon, for instance, hit three IEDs in one day.
Major Slovenia testified that the battalions' M-Raps, those huge armored trucks that are built to sustain IED explosions, that about 80% of them were damaged during the search period and about half the damage was caused by IEDs. They're four mine rollers, all destroyed. Those numbers are one way to quantify the danger and the damage, but a full reckoning of the consequences, including the enormous question of whether people were wounded or died looking for Bo, would come publicly much later after Bo came home. I saw some pictures Daryl Hansen took from that time.
One shows him and another guy standing next to a carcass on a spit. Is that a goat? Yes, that's a goat. What's going on in that picture?
What's going on is they were tired of MREs, so they'd buy a goat off a local farmer, have some meat that wasn't vacuum packed. Some of these units couldn't go back to their fobs for what's called refit, where you clean and resupply your equipment, you shower, you get a hot meal, for weeks on end. Second platoon, Bo's platoon, they got sent out for 19 days straight, so that's outside the wire, living in trucks or just on the ground for nearly three weeks, doing non-stop missions. Another platoon from Charlie Company was sent out for 37 days straight.
You've got all your gear on, full battle rattle, and it weighs between 60 and 100 pounds, depending on what kind of weapon you're carrying or whether you're a radio operator who has extra batteries. It might be 90 degrees during the day, or 100 degrees, a night the temperature might drop by as much as 30 degrees. Major Slovenia said in a military hearing that the men would huddle together at night to keep warm. They would literally, I'll call it spoon, unquote.
JP Billings was one of the people who was out for 19 days straight. He testified that he'd gotten diarrhea early and quote, you know, I shit my pants unquote. He did have an extra pair, but it had ripped up the inside leg on some concertina wire. Quote, so knowing that I was going out and talking to locals, potentially females in whatever in villages, I couldn't necessarily have an exposed region like that on my pants unquote.
Billy's worth of shit pants for 19 days. People's t-shirts got shredded. Their socks rotted. People got sewers on their skin.
They could only wash with baby wipes and maybe bottled water. Undergarments falling off of them. Oh, really? Yeah.
Clothes, you know, like something you would think of in Malaysia or Burma, you know, clothes just falling apart. That's Ken Wolf, the command sergeant major. The hard part was they hadn't planned for this. No one knew how long the search was going to go on.
Yeah, I mean, eventually, because we had to start figuring it out. How are we going to rotate guys back in? How do we resupply them? Because they're everywhere.
You know, our guys are everywhere. They're spread out everywhere. I mean, it was just a logistics nightmare. And then also, it wasn't just our battalion.
The other battalions within the organization were looking for them too. And so what, you know, how does it make you feel when you walk for 15 days straight, looking for a guy who walked off and he's not even in your unit? And so you see somebody and they're like, hey, man, fuck you. We're out here looking for this guy.
Maybe you're thinking all this complaining about how hard that time was, crime your river, their soldiers and its war. And this is what they signed up for. Well, yes and no. Their job was to go find and rescue one of their own.
They knew that and they accepted it. It was the right thing to do to go look for him. And they genuinely wanted to find him. But they also knew, or at least pretty confident, that Bo had left Mesto P voluntarily.
And now they felt like they were going through how on his behalf. And it wasn't just Bo's own platoon doing it, but other battalions from other battalions. Most of the people I talked to you about this time, they said the search inflicted such major damage on morale, which could be a delicate thing to maintain in the best of times. At the end of July, about a month in, Major Larry Glasgow, the battalion's executive officer, went on leave back to Fort Richardson in Alaska where the battalion was based.
His boss had asked him to meet with a group of soldiers' family members who knew that their soldiers were out looking for Bergdahl. The families knew that we were conducting significant operations and that we were stepping up our kinetic activities against insurgents to try and find them. So they knew that their risk in Afghanistan for our battalion had increased. And it was a tough, tough meeting.
There was a lot of concern. There were a lot of scared wives. Like Mesto, they wanted answers and they wanted comfort. They wanted to know that their husband was going to be okay.
And you know, I'm not in a position to make his kinds of promises. Shane Cross was in Bo's platoon. He was friendly with Bo. Yeah, I still, I think I'm still angry about it.
Shane was out on that 19-day stint with the platoon. When they finally made it back to the fob on July 20th, it would be for only a few hours it turned out rather than the day or two they'd hoped for. Shane shot himself in the foot with his 9-millimeter pistol, always in the bathroom, and got sent home. Shane said it was an accident and he said the army agreed.
But the other guys saw it as a statement about how beaten down they all were, how they'd had enough. Commander said they could see in their faces how emotionally busted their soldiers were, how angry. They were starting to bicker with each other. Major Solvino testified that he'd given them pep talks but, quote, I could hear, well, mumbling, mumbling, rumbling, rumbling, ex-platives, blah, blah, blah, unquote.
As the weeks went on, they started to hit more and more dry holes. They'd air salt into some village or target and they'd find nothing. I asked Ken Wolf how he tried to keep morale up. Ken, to me, seems like the kind of guy who can scare the crap out of you and also hug you in the same encounter.
Ken told me he tried whatever he could to get his soldiers through, including asking his wife to send over Copenhagen's snuff from the States, which she did. She bought rules and rolls of it and Ken passed it around. I remember talking to a group of guys and I go, hey, we don't know everything at this point. We don't know.
And, you know, this is our mission. He's one of our guys. We got to find him. We're going to do it.
So that was one way. The other way, you know, giving out cans of Copenhagen, telling dirty jokes, putting people in the headlock. That's how you do it. Just being affectionate with them, basically.
Yeah. And saying, hey, what you're doing is good and honorable and we just got to keep looking. Yeah. And knowing in the back of my mind, this is fucking bullshit.
In what way was it bullshit? Because he's in Pakistan. It's true but wasn't Pakistan. What's it actually?
It's July 14th, 2009. This is the first hostage video the Taliban released of Bo. What's the name? My name is Bo Burko.
Bo. Bo would spend the next year figuring out how to escape. Next time on Serial. Serial is produced by Julius Nutter Dana Chivasanee in partnership with Mark Bolmagan Ellison-Hugel Lindgren-Grenzeska Weisberg-Pagelen in Annapurna Pictures.
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