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Each office independently owned and operated. I'm Mr. Klein. This is the Ezra Kuncho.
Before we begin today's job creation, we're looking for a researcher on the show. If this is something you think you'd be great at, that you have some experience that you can show us the way you've done it before, take a look at the job listing. We have a link in the show description today. But for today's episode, go back a decade.
And socialist is a dirty word in American politics. Today is a pretty good brand, at least if you're in a pretty blue district. The bulk of the credit there, of course, goes to Bernie Sanders and his two presidential runs. But some of it goes to Jacobin, the socialist journal launched in 2010 by Vasquez and Kara, that updated both socialist thinking, and I would say the socialist aesthetic for a new generation of young leftists looking for ideas, for community, and for identity.
But for all the progress, Sunkara, who is now both the founding editor of Jacobin and the president of the Nation Magazine, who got a lot of power over the Lefty Journal in America, is nervous. The Left has gotten enough power to drive narrative, but not enough to win many elections. Biden, not Sanders, won in 2020. Eric Adams, not Diane Morales, won the 2021 primary for mayor among Democrats in New York City.
In San Francisco, Chase Aboudin, one of the most visible of the progressive Lefty DAs, he just got overwhelmingly recalled in the primary. So in a recent edition of Jacobin, titled The Left in Purgatory, Sunkara warns against the path to political self-satisfaction, a marginality that is just large enough to sustain itself, but that will never be strong enough to move beyond permanent resistance. And then he turns his attention and that of his journal to understanding why the Left isn't winning, and whether the kind of highly ideological appeals to the highly educated that formed a core of Jacobin's brand may be part of the problem, may actually be preventing them from developing the working-class base that a successful Left needs. So I want to have him on the show to talk about where the Left is now and where he thinks it needs to go next.
As always, my email is rconshow at nytimes.com. Bosco, I'm the Karla, welcome to the show. Thanks for having me, Ezra. So you recently published an issue of Jacobin titled The Left in Purgatory.
Tell me about that. How would you describe the state of the Lefty today? Well, the state of the Left is far better than I could have imagined where it would be 10 years ago, in that we're actually having a conversation about the state of the Left. I feel like for a good chunk of modern American history, at least since the 70s, it's been taken for granted that we were a country without a Left where the furthest Left you could go in American politics was not even as reclined, and Chris Hayes, but probably John Stewart maybe, Al Gore, and I think we're in a much better position than we used to be.
So even with some of the recent setbacks for the Lefty left, or like Tworely in the US, even with two Bernie Sanders defeats, we're at a point where we can say that the Left is a presence in American life. But the purgatory part comes in because we are simultaneously too large to be wiped completely off the map by a few setbacks. But we're also too small and too, I say this as a member of the Lefty of course, too incompetent in our ability to actually carry out our program. So we're stuck in the space in between.
You have an interesting way in the editorial you write in that issue of describing that space in between. And I want to quote it here, right? There's something dangerous about being large enough to be a political presence in parts of the country and a subculture for thousands of activists, but far too disorganized and powerless to carry out your political program. Why did you sort dangerous?
What is dangerous about that in between state? I think the part that's dangerous for those of us on the Left is the risk of self satisfaction or the risk of being able to basically spend the entirety of our lives in the Left and around the Left. I am a member of the Democratic Socialists of America. I've been less active in the past year, but there's been whole stretches where I could wake up on a Saturday and meet up with a friend from the Democratic Socialists of America, go to a canvas for a candidate we cared about, hang out afterwards, maybe in the evening write something for a DSA affiliated publication or for a pamphlet or some piece of literature or whatever else I could spend a huge chunk of my life in and around the Left and actually doing useful things.
But at the same time, we get so obsessed about small little victories and silver linings and the feeling that things are pushing our direction. We ignore the fact that the right in America is organized and actually achieving huge amounts of victories and rollbacks. There have been rights that many of us took for granted, like Roe v. Wade, for instance, and doing that through their own mechanisms.
And also you have just in general the center of the country, the political spectrum, feeling more threatened by criticisms from the right rather than from the Left. And at the same time, it's dangerous because I think a lot of voters associate the Left with power and blame us for things that we have no control of and blame us for not being able to carry out our program and feel in general more and more disenchanted from politics as usual. So we are kind of gone from this outsider insurgent force that in 2016 in Sanders campaign was actually able to win over some people who were disengaged from the political process and might have not even described themselves as liberals to being, I guess, just a part of the political scene that is not getting much done for ordinary people. Give me some examples of things that you feel the Left might get blamed for wrongly.
Well, I think that there's certainly a host of policy ideas that the Left has pushed for that are sometimes runheaded. But I think one example, you can look at the discourse and debate around defund the police. You can look at the discourse around critical race theory. You would think that the Left had control over policing policies in major cities in America.
You would think that the Left had control of our nation's curriculums. You would think that the Left had this overarching control of a lot of the things you could put into the bucket of the, you know, quote unquote, culture war in the United States when I think that the Left is largely a weak outsider opposition force that has a few well known figures. We have our AOCs. We have our burnies.
But in general, we've been locked out of power and locked out not just by the establishment in some kind of secret way, but locked out in part because we just don't have a social base attached to our project. That's the reason why I'm saying the word the Left instead of saying something like the workers movement, like you would in certain other countries of the world where the political Left and the broad organization of working class people were one in the same for decades and decades in the 20th century. You just don't have that association in the United States today. I want to put a pin in that question of the social base and who composes it.
But I want to ask you one more question about that quote because I was thinking about what it might mean and came to a thought similar to what you just gestured at, which is that there's maybe an asymmetry in the power of the Left wields, which is to say that the Left is a risen around Bernie Sanders around Jacobin has a lot of narrative setting power, a lot of media power, a lot of power to push ideas out into the ether. But then as you say, not a lot of power to actually accomplish, execute, improve, modify the lived realities people are in. Is that right? And is that part of the dangerous or something dangerous about having a lot of power over what people are talking about, but not a lot of power over what they're actually experiencing?
I think that's exactly right Ezra. And I would say that there's also a lot of danger in conceding yourself just a rhetorical force because what do you do when you're not responsible to a constituency, but you have this influence in the cultural sphere? Well, you end up just maximizing your rhetoric. If Joe Biden wants $4 trillion of spending, you'll say you want $10 trillion.
There's a kind of rhetorical maximism that comes from having a political worldview that I think for many people in the Left is too focused on expanding the over-chin window, the window of what's possible through our rhetoric and through our demands, instead of figuring out how to connect with and build a base and move them along to more progressive policies and rhetoric and eventually a very different, more humane world. You're at something else that relates to that in this editorial that I thought was interesting. You wrote quote, the question we may have to ask ourselves in the years to come is whether some of our actions could be hastening rather than reversing the process of class B alignment. So beginning with the question of what is class B alignment?
Can you unpack that for me? Yeah, I think class D alignment is just simply the fact that we used to associate being poor, being working class, having less than society with the politics of redistribution of these people get the franchise in many countries in the late 19th century and the US, obviously, throughout the 19th century and into the 20th century until people get the true franchise. And the thinking was, okay, the people with less than a capitalist society are going to use this power to demand that the state redistribute wealth from the rich to the not so rich, and that redistribution could be in their direct forms, more often than not to be through the creation of a welfare state. So the Left of Center parties around the world that were advocating for the creation of welfare states and redistribution tended to have the support of people with less, not just less education, but less education, less wealth, less power more generally.
They use their collective power to overcome what they didn't have as individuals. And there's kind of a common sense of that. But all around the world, what you're seeing now is that a lot of working class people are either dropping out of the political process entirely. They feel like they can't get anything from politics, so they're not bothering.
And some of them are actually voting for the political right, voting for parties that might be trying to reach them through cultural appeals through enticing, sometimes even populist rhetoric, which fundamentally don't alter the distribution of resources in a society. And that's the danger of the alignment. In the United States, we have had this problem for many years on the Left. Education has won simple proxy for it.
Obviously, it's a little bit more complex than that, but we can see that voters without college degrees used to be a very, very strong part of the New Deal coalition of the Democratic Party. Now, voters without college degrees, especially white voters are drifting towards the Republican Party. And as a result, the Democrats are not modulating their appeals to those people. So I want to key on something important you said there, which is that this is happening all around the world.
And certainly in pure countries, you'll get Europe, you'll get Canada, Thomas Piketty, who's just on the show along with co-authors has done work, looking at what they call the rise of a Brahmin Left, where this highly educated Left. Why do you think that is happening? What is behind the shift from a coalition of those who have less cultural and economic capital making up the foundation of the Left to become a coalition of people who have more little capital, but particularly more educational and cultural capital? Well, in the 20th century, the types of parties that captivated the attention of working-class people were deeply rooted in parties.
They were rooted in civil society. They were rooted in trade unions. They were tied so closely with working-class life that in some countries, every single tenment building might have had a representative from the Labour Party, a local resident who would knock on doors and whip the vote and who would take problems their neighbors would have to their local MP or their local city counselor. So there was this deep connection between working-class people and their politicians.
At some degree, we have this in the United States in certain areas with political machines. When we hear political machines, we think that it's an entirely negative thing. We hear the word patronage, and we think it's just a synonym for corruption. But there was a sense of rudeness in a lot of areas where people felt like the Democratic Party, for instance, was close to their needs, close to them, and an avenue that they could use to even up the odds and navigate bureaucracy and to figure things out.
There was a deep sense of association. A union endorsement actually meant something back then. If your union told you this is the list of candidates we're supporting in this election, you'd be more apt to help it. But also, once in power, those politicians were offering a model of growth tied to redistribution.
So in the post-war period, up through the 70s, not just in the United States, but across Europe. You have social Democratic parties, and you have the New Deal Democratic Party overseeing high growth rates and overseeing expansions of the welfare state, going along with those growth rates. It wasn't just an ideological quest of convincing people one by one that their interest was voting for the left, so they had more things, or they had representatives who, quote-unquote, looked like them, or spoke like them, or whatever else, was tied to a real concrete program. Since the 70s, you've had a decline in that kind of growth, liberalism in the United States or social democracy in Europe, and as a result, politics has lost some of its material force.
So I'm always a little skeptical of explanations that track an international trend, but that seem like they have a lot of counter examples. And so the story that left parties across the Western world became, to some extent, more neoliberal. They moved away from that post-New Deal mid-1950s consensus common good politics, and towards this more market oriented, somewhat redistributive politics. It's true in a bunch of individual cases, but politics, it seems to me, is competitive enough across a multi-country sample that you'd expect to see if that was a really bad way of doing politics.
There'd be a bunch of countries where left parties didn't do that, and really thrived. But what's so striking to me about the turn of the left in many countries to being a much more highly educated coalition is it really happens in virtually every country in the samples that I know of. And that applies to me that this reacting to something or building on something that is more common. If it was just strategic mistakes by this party or that party, it seems very unlikely that they would all be making the same strategic mistake at once unless there's something that they're commonly responding to.
So what do you see as the common force? If they stopped offering the agenda they should have offered, why did they all do that at the same time? Well, it wasn't rooted primarily in politics. I think it was rooted in an economic problem.
It was rooted in the fact that the growth rates of the post-war period slowed down. There's a variety of reasons why it slowed down in the 70s is up for debate. Part of it was just contingent factors like the OPEC oil shock and the growth in globalization, which made some of these models. These models less feasible to continue.
Some of it was the fact that labor was demanding really high wages and demanding lots of benefits. And that was great when things were growing, but when things slowed down, it became harder for capitalists to keep up with. And they would look for a way to restore growth and restore profitability. And I think a lot of center left leaders made a calculation.
And they said, we're going to give capital the flexibility to restructure. We're going to allow them to attack unions. We're going to allow them to deregulate certain things to restore growth rates. But then we're going to continue to tax this unleashed capital to maintain the bedrock of our social program.
So to some extent, this kind of political shift of center-left parties worked. And of course, as they undermined their social base, their traditional base in the working class, they had to find more and more voters from elsewhere to reach out to. So more of their voting bloc became professionals. It shifted to certain other segments of capital that might be willing to support them.
So they brought in their social base at a time when the old model wasn't working. And when it seemed like you really couldn't get far enough in politics with just a working class base. And that obviously became a self-fulfilling prophecy because you've now weakened trade unions. You now weaken some of the most powerful vehicles we're actually getting a party into office to begin with.
So let's go back then to the more recent history of the American left. So Bernie 2016 is a genuine watershed moment. It does as a campaign. I think change American politics profoundly.
When you look back from now, you know, post-Bernie 2020, post-all that we've seen, what were the lessons you think the left learned from that campaign? And for that matter, what lessons do you think Bernie learned from that campaign? And were they the right ones? Well, I think the initial lesson that left learned from Bernie 2016 was the fact that there are people out there that are hungry for a message, that more or less tells them it's not their fault, that the day-to-day miseries and the problems that they're encountering are things that are not the product of not working hard enough, not getting the right certificate or training, but the result of social problems and the social problems demand a collective solution.
And Bernie was able to reach these people through the mass media, through the bully pulpit of a presidential campaign, and just through very simple, common-sense rhetoric. You might say it was oversimplified how he was describing the world, but I think it was a simplification that tapped into and resonated with people because it was rooted in something real. They felt that they were working hard and they felt that millionaires and billionaires were not allowing them their fair share. And that was basically the core of left-wing politics, of egalitarian politics for decades and decades.
And Bernie, I think, just helped us remember some of it. And even though our trade unions were hollowed out, even though our civic association, in working class areas were hollowed out, even though the American left was minuscule at the time, Bernie, I think, through this kind of left-wing populist rhetoric, topped into something really special. And he became associated with just Medicare for all and with the same set of slogans, it became just the parody, right? Everyone knew what Bernie was going to say every single line of the speech because he just never deviated from his message.
I think some of the wrong lessons were learned from 2016 was that Bernie was too repetitive, that Bernie didn't incorporate gender and race into his worldview and anti-warism. And I think that ignored the fact that the simplicity and clarity is what attracted people to Bernie Sanders and that people basically want the same things. Black voters, white voters, Latino voters, Asian voters, our concerns are really not all that different. How we phrase our concerns, how we order our priorities might be different, but there was a simplicity to Bernie's universalism.
That I think to some extent, he moved away from to try to be more competitive in a Democratic Party primary, where identity really does matter more and how you frame things and how you reach voters. Something I notice around people who like Joe Biden who think there was a genius to the way he ran the 2020 campaign, but are now frustrated by him, I often notice a view that Biden's best instincts are older, that he had an advantage for being rooted in an older period of politics. And I gave him some standing, some intuitions that let him resist some of the trends, the Democratic politicians today, particularly very online ones. But I also detected in this edition of Jacobin a kind of similar view of Bernie and the left, a view that Bernie was rooted in an older left.
Bernie was rooted in other periods of American politics. And that particularly in 2016 gave him a kind of difference, gave him an aesthetic that was different, gave him a set of concerns that were different, that he lost a bit of that in 2020, and that the people coming after him, there are some pieces in there, critical of AOC and others have really lost it. And I think it's interesting that they both the moderates and the lefties, or at least some lefties at Jacobin, have a kind of nostalgia for what the more veteran politicians know that they worry that the younger politicians don't. Do you think I'm reading this right or does that bring falsely to you?
I think you're reading this right. But I would say that Bernie's politics were a learned politics. Yes, when you hear Bernie, it sounds like he's harkening not to the old left, necessarily the 1930s in the US, but to the rhetoric of the civil rights movement, which always aimed at majoritarian support. Martin Luther King's last campaign was, of course, a campaign for economic justice.
He's famous for having lines saying, yes, it's important that we desegregated the lunch counter, but we also need to make sure that everyone can afford to buy hamburger, too. You know, these are kind of the common sense rhetoric of people trying to build majorities. But Sanders came out of a new left that was at times more fringe and more radical in its rhetoric. He spent a lot of the 1970s kind of going back to the land and pursuing kind of minor third party politics in Vermont up until the his election as mayor of Burlington.
So I think Bernie found the rhetoric that worked through trial and error. He found the way to reach ordinary people. And it wasn't just that he was reading from the same book as older left is. I think he and a lot of his generation around the new left figured out how to reach people.
So I don't think that AOC is locked into sounding less like a Bernie Sanders style democratic socialist at time and more like a hyper liberal or a more hyperbolic version of the same liberalism offered by other wings of the party. But I think that this is something can be learned at her best AOC offers this kind of soaring, really inspiring rhetoric. It's just about getting to that core and avoiding language that I think the left is borrowed too much from academia in part because that's where we exist in the 80s, 90s and epidemians 2000s. We were really much just cloistered to the universities.
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Find out more at nytimes.com.com.com. Imagine Biden didn't get his Super Tuesday surge or that he bobbled it somehow and Bernie had won the primary and then had won the presidency. And I think we should expect it kind of would have been a similar size to Joe Biden given how he performed. What do you think looks differently today if Bernie Sanders was president but also had a 50-50 Democratic Senate majority and a relatively slim House majority?
How does it kind of actual play out? Well, governing the United States is extremely hard. Now it is. Obviously you covered a lot of this in your book where there's so many joke points.
There's so many veto points in American politics that it is very hard to govern. I think the difference is Sanders had a sense of what mass politics was. He had a sense that in order to break the gridlock, sometimes you had to just tell people, speak to them earnestly, tell them why things are stalled, tell them to go rally and organize and call their neighbors. In other words, try to inject this new force into American politics so that when Washington was stuck, we were calling upon the outsiders to unstick Washington.
And I think that's something that Bernie cautious saying this, but Bernie had in common with Donald Trump and that Trump was not a very successful politician as far as instituting new policies for his cause and for that I'm grateful. But he did try to mobilize his supporters to do things. He did try to have mass rallies. He was constantly in the media talking to the American people.
Thankfully, in my mind, he did not convince too many of them to support his causes, but I do think Bernie would have tried similar tactics to reach ordinary people, try to talk to them, try to tell them you're an agent in policies. You know, there's a joke about Biden, but I think it's really true that sometimes when you hear him complaining about things wrong in the country, you kind of just feel like he's the leader of Canada or something. He's just looking at the United States and being like, who's in charge of this thing? You know, so many things are not working.
It's a disaster. And I feel like with Bernie, at least there would have been this attempt to repoliticize American politics. Oh, it's really funny that that last point, because I almost see it exactly differently. And it gets to the peace and that issue by Natalie Sher on the end of the AOC, honeymoon.
So it always seems to me that because the US is so difficult to govern. And because even when you win, you win so little power compared to what it would mean if you won in Canada or you won in the UK. A very central problem for politicians is how do you explain what you can't do? How do you lead a government that you don't actually control, particularly if say Republicans have the House or the Senate or, you know, I guess if you're Donald Trump, if Democrats have the House or the Senate.
And I think a problem for many liberals, for Joe Biden, for Barack Obama, is that they often kind of own the failures of government, right? It's their government, their party, and they try to convince you that what's happening is still pretty good, even though it's not what they promised and maybe not what you wanted. I think something Donald Trump was always very good at was, you know, they got much done. He never really acted to his own side like the guy in charge to the extent that running against a deep state had a kind of genius to it.
The genius was that it severed Trump for some responsibility for what wasn't happening. He was trying to fight the government. He ran. You can't really hold him fully responsible for what it did.
I think Bernie has always been actually quite good as somebody who has worked very coalitionally with the Democratic Party and has been involved in passing a lot of bills from the Bernie Sanders perspective, very compromised. I think Sanders has always been very good at saying, Hey, look, that was progress, but it is still unacceptable progress. Like it isn't something we should really be proud of. It's just a step on the path.
The reason is what we should talk about is that when we really rely on the move, we need to know how we can to navigate that nad about how government works, and that AOC piece is interesting to me because it talks about AOC having to navigate some of these exact same tensions, now being part of a house majority at the moment that cannot do everything she wants to do, that cannot do everything it wants to do and some of the the left becoming alienated from her as she tries to operate more pragmatically in that context rather than symbolically, to be the very problem and I think also would have been very difficult for Sanders if he'd become president. That what do you do when you're the person in charge, you're in power, but you can't wield nearly as much power as the people who put you there thought you would or hoped you could. The left has always been thinking about what we can do with the balance of forces on the ground, what we are going to be able to accomplish or not. I think when you're in Congress, a lot of your mentality is going to be more coalitional because you're in one piece of a much larger body and you're trying not to get locked out.
And I think AOC is made a strategic choice to be one, a registered Democrat, I'm like Bernie because that makes her more competitive than a deep blue district. And also she made a decision that she was going to try to get onto committees and to play ball with the Democratic Party leadership on certain key issues and pick response otherwise. I think that's a rational choice. But then the question is, what is distinct about what you're offering?
What's the difference between an AOC and a let's say Nancy Pelosi? Well, I certainly think that there's a difference and I support AOC and I'm very critical of Nancy Pelosi, but is it just that Nancy Pelosi wants to go 50% towards a goal and AOC wants to go 70% or 80% towards a goal? Or is there a qualitative difference between Democratic socialist politicians and liberal politicians? So I think there should be a qualitative difference in terms of our rhetoric, our worldview and the type of even welfare state we're trying to construct.
So I think that's really what the critique of AOC should be about. It shouldn't be, oh, she wasn't intense enough about pushing through this. She wasn't disruptive enough when she was in power. It's more just like, is there something actually different in the worldviews that separates the squad for the rest of the Democratic Party?
Or are they just a part of a Democratic Party continuum that always has existed? I think that brings us back to the question of the left social base because how different the politicians are is also going to reflect what constituencies they are responsive to, where the support comes from, who they're listening to, who they're around. And Jacobin commissioned and wrote up in this issue a pretty interesting survey of working-class voters and their political preferences both substantively and aesthetically in a bunch of key states. So can you tell me a bit about that survey's findings, what you learned from it?
I think what we learned from that survey was that working-class voters are attracted to a bread and butter economic messaging, but that doesn't mean we have to ignore issues of race and racism. We could even use words like structural racism, but it does make sense to foreground material economic concerns. And that also there's a certain type of Democratic Party rhetoric, I think that has written off whole squads of the country as being deep red states, Trump country, in which there's a lot of voters in these areas that I think can be won over to the party, if it seems like the party is actually offering them something. And I think part of the goal is to say that there's multiple roads to building a welfare state and the one that is probably the easiest one comes from actually building a base across all races and backgrounds of working-class people.
That doesn't mean that you don't want any votes in the suburbs or you're just going to ignore every single electoral calculus. It's just if you're going to say like Chuck Schumer did, infinously a few years ago, that for every vote you lose in Pittsburgh or in the Rust Belt, you're going to pick up a couple votes in the suburbs of Philadelphia from more middle-class voters. I think that's an extremely defeatist way to go about politics. I think a lot of what we're looking for is proof that working-class voters have a distinct profile and are very much open to redistribution of standards.
I thought the survey, at least as I read it, posed some real challenges to the way a lot of left politics has evolved. And so I saw three. So one, as you say, working-less voters are very responsive to better issues, the economic messaging. But they're not wildly more redistributive, certainly than the more highly educated voters.
And I think actually in a lot of respects, we see evidence that they're somewhat less so. And then the non-voters are somewhat less liberal even still. The view that non-voters are this unbelievably left mass, it simply needs to be mobilized by sufficiently socialist or radical message. That doesn't really come out.
And then third, and this is a really genuinely interesting thing you all did in a survey, as you began testing different ways of phrasing the same appeal, that there is very much a preference for what you might call a more working-class aesthetic, a preference for less academic language, a preference for candidates who talk and present in a certain way that I think is kind of not the way a lot of left candidates, particularly when they come out of the more educated segments of the movement, do. Do you want to talk through how you understood those pieces of the survey? Yeah, I think that the real challenge to the Bernie worldview is that there was a massive block of non-voters wheeling to just come out. And all you needed was an outsider candidate.
And you would re-engage these people. And I think that Bernie's strategy did not really bring a new voting block to four in the last election cycle. And I think the survey kind of confirms that it's really complicated to get people who are out of the political process into the political process. And having a candidate say the right things isn't a magic solution to it.
And the real way in which you get people into the political process is through a lot of organizing, a lot of really expensive time-consuming organizing. It's not a rhetorical trick. The working-class aesthetic thing is kind of common sense to me, at least, but it makes sense that people want their candidates to be teachers. They want their candidates to speak in a way that's familiar with them.
They want their candidates to be postal workers. They want their candidates to be people that seem far more relatable than someone with an academic background or someone with a perfectly credentialized background, like a lawyer. We've had many, many generations of lawyers as politicians in the United States. I think it really should remind us that there is an audience out there that just cares about more or less the same things.
They care about having good health care. They care about jobs. They care about security in their neighborhoods. They want to see candidates that are speaking to them in common sense rhetoric.
And there's kind of a populist baseline in the United States or voting bloc that it would be reverse-erit-a-ignor. So I think that when it comes to middle-class voters and suburbs, it's not that you don't want these people to vote for you. Are you going to tailor your rhetoric to their concerns? Or are you going to talk vaguely about democracy?
Are you going to foreground certain social issues? Or are you just going to have one rhetoric for all people, then hope that those people in the suburbs go with you because of how far right the Republican party has moved on social and cultural and economic issues too? It gets to a problem, I think both for the left and then more broadly for the Democratic party as both have become more educationally polarized and both have become more concentrated among high education voters, particularly among their activists and very influential classes, which is I do think it is a well understood fact among the whole left center in American politics that representational politics is important. But that's usually thought of in terms of race and gender, to some degree, in terms of sexuality.
It's not nearly as often thought of in terms of class. And there's a lot of evidence that political scientists in the current has done a lot of work on this about how white color elected officials have gotten over the however many decades. And you're going to source your candidates from the people who were in your party or the people who were in your movement. And to the extent you want to build a more working class movement, you actually do need working class representation.
I think that's one of the lessons of that survey. But I think you see it in a lot of places. I think it's one reason that if you look at polling in 2019, a lot of Bernie Sanders voters had Joe Biden as their second choice and a lot of Joe Biden voters had Bernie Sanders as their second choice because the two candidates read aesthetically sort of similarly. They were kind of cranky older white guys with a somewhat more working class aesthetic than I think where the Democratic Party is gone if you compare them to say, you know, Elizabeth Warren saying.
And that just gets harder to find those candidates as your party polarizes around education. And there's not nearly as much of a push like a frustration in the party when working class candidates are less represented than there would be if other kinds of experiences or groups were less represented. And I think that's probably a mistake. Beyond that too, when you have weak parties, like a weak party structure, you need candidates that can self finance their own campaigns and have easy access to money.
So it becomes a lot easier in a primary if you're a corporate lawyer and you have access to a bunch of other friends with money and former clients with money and you're from that world to think about running a campaign, then if you're a insurgent who's well liked in your local community but don't have access to those networks. So a lot of this is how are you giving these candidates money to support them? What networks are they drawing on? Are they able to get not just endorsements but funds from unions?
Are groups like the Democratic Social South America able to assemble the funds to help some of these these up starts in a certain areas like New York City? They have them, but that's not the case in most places. But it's interesting because that doesn't seem to me to be at any level, an insoluble problem if somebody really wanted to solve it. I mean, when you think about the money sloshing around politics, including the left of politics, because there are funders from celebrities to the guy who runs the Dr.
Broners soap company to lefty rich people who get into this. I mean, it's always not. It's very interesting that AOC's first chief of staff and one of the core people who helped recruiters was a very early employee of the tech finance firm, Stripe. So I don't think it's the case that there's no money.
You could really imagine 10, 20, $50 million being put into a group that is simply doing working class candidate recruitment and funding super PACs given the way our system actually works now that helps us candidates out in their elections. And there are a lot of house elections in this country that are not that expensive. Certainly a lot of state legislature and Senate and mayoral and so on, elections that aren't that expensive. You guys have a piece in this issue about a social candidate in Buffalo who ends up losing.
And the sort of take on that is that the establishment drops a bunch of money against her. But it also just wasn't that much money. You could have imagined certainly as much or more money coming from other areas. So I wonder why you think those organizations haven't really been built?
Well, I think some of them are being built. Like I said, in New York State, we have several social members of the assembly. We have state senators that have backgrounds as teachers and nurses and so on that have gotten funds through the Democratic Social America and a host of other forces like the Working Families Party. And beyond those funds, they're able to have access to huge amounts of volunteers to do canvassing.
They tend to get a lot of media buzz, such as Democratic socialism still kind of had this luster post-burny about it. They were able to get a merit media. I actually do think and I would agree it's possible. It's about at the national level actually making sure that there are unions and there are groups willing to put the money into candid recruitment and finding these people and running them when sometimes they're going against establishment candidates willing to play ball with the left.
Why does Chuck Schumer not have a credible challenge from the left coming? Well, that's probably because we have a lot of unions in New York State that are very powerful and Chuck Schumer is willing to go along with them. It's pretty risky to spend money on these long-shot campaigns. Obviously, once in a while, you find a candidate like Federman in Pennsylvania.
You find someone who has both a working class aesthetic and has progressive policies. But beyond Federman, it's hard to say who at the national level there is after a Bernie that has that kind of mass appeal that you could imagine running in a presidential election and having that kind of platform like Bernie had in the last two cycles. Hi, I'm Solana Pine. I'm the director of video at the New York Times.
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You don't have to be a subscriber. Download the New York Times app to start watching. I want to move from this question of how left is composed to if it is able to win power, what it's able to deliver or even what the Democratic Party has currently composed is able to deliver. Because we've been talking about your issue on the left in political purgatory, but the issue that just came out is very relevant to my interests, which is you guys have you called the infrastructure issue.
I've been doing these pieces about the difficulties liberalism has building and supply cyberaggressivism. I see this issue as very much trying to think about how do you create a socialism that builds, how do you deal with the question that when the federal government spends money on the kinds of infrastructure projects, the left supports and wants to see a lot more of, it isn't getting as much for that money. It isn't getting things done as quickly as well on budget as other countries, other rich countries with more unions than we have and bigger percentage GDP governments than we have are. Tell me a bit about this.
What do you see as the problem to building infrastructure in America? I think part of the problem and just to give some numbers behind what you're saying, we had an article in that issue by Elizabeth Henderson and Jared Abbott that noted that the cost per mile of rail and recent projects in Madrid is around 140 million dollars per mile in LA. It's something like a half billion dollars per mile. The root of the problem, I think, is in part in American federalism.
We have a ton of competing stakeholders. We have agencies. We also have just different rules at federal, state, and local levels. We tend to institute things like in 1970, we instituted the National Environmental Policy Act, but instead of just having that environmental review whenever we do new construction being enforced through experts in civil society, we've let it be enforced through civilian lawsuits.
So you end up with this weird situation where you don't have just a transit agency empowered to make construction with review process, with a limited period of civilian discussion and with a limited period for potential litigation. You just have this very protracted for a long period with a lot of discussion and a lot of extra costs. And as a result, we just kind of don't have the expertise at quickly building transit because it's a muscle we haven't used in a while. And it's all a far cry from what we used to do.
The original Tennessee Valley Authority, the New Deal program, cost just $75 million at the time. And today that's around $1.6 billion today. That program still to this day, the TVA, employees around 10,000 people directly indirectly employs tens of thousands, more generates power for 10 million people. It's still the largest popular energy provider in the country.
And that was done by $1.6 billion. You can imagine the scale of what even the infrastructure bill we passed would be if we were able to actually push direct state planning and investment and cut through some of this bureaucracy. One thing I think is interesting here, at least as I've been trying to follow the threads of this among liberals and try to understand how we went from being able to build as much as we did in the mid 20th century, too as little as we're able to now, is confronting or realizing that there is a divided soul on the left inside liberalism, however you want to draw that circle. And so on the one hand, I think the stereotype is that this side of the political spectrum believes in big government, wants to give government a lot of power, wants government to build things, and it's the right that fears government doing things.
But there is a real strain inside liberalism, inside the left, that fears government, that fears government being captured, that remembers and thinks about Robert Moses building these highways through black communities, Rachel Carson, and thinking about how much construction in that era was done without any real thinking about the environmental consequences. And so build a lot of structures, laws that are in fact about hobbling government, about forcing it to hear the complaints of groups making it possible for people to throw themselves in front of the government with a lawsuit and actually get to stop until their concerns are heard out in a court of law. How do you think about those ideological tensions? Because I do think they're real.
How do you think about the question of the left that is afraid of government power, not the one that is confident in it? I think it's easy to focus on what government action gets wrong and mistakes made in the past through government action. But we often don't think about the cost of inaction. 45% of Americans don't have access to public transit at all.
These are people who are disproportionately poorer, they're in rural areas, they're really suffering, and there's no real political power that they're wielding about this issue. Built environments in those areas are built towards needing car ownership at the time the cars are really expensive and gas prices are really expensive. And it's just a hidden cost, a hidden burden on American workers we don't really think about. So I think that's one thing, foregrounding the cost of inaction, not just the cost of actions.
But I think all this is due to a mismatch we have in the United States between having not really mass membership democracy in the sense of in Spain when there is construction something in Madrid, yes, there's a very limited period compared to the US for public discussion of issues, but there is a period. There can be discussion. There can be review. There's just more trust the environmental reviews have been done by the state.
So they're trusting the material brought to them, which I think that as part of funding and healing our civil service in the US, we have very much the expertise to do the same sort of reviews through our experts, but also people are connected with political parties in a more intense ways that might be advocating for these these changes. They're connected with mass membership unions that have been consulted in the construction process. And all these parties at a mass level are stakeholders, but stakeholders without the same veto power as we have in the US where we have kind of small scale democracy, we have do-it-yourself democracy, we have civic groups, we have lawsuits, we have all sorts of community groups that wield power. And these are just a handful of people who are the most engaged and most active.
And often through a lawsuit, they're able to slow down a process. One way I've heard you frame this, which I thought was interesting, was that America, compared to pure countries, has a very thick civic democracy and a thin associational democracy. You want to talk about that for a minute? So yeah, this goes back to what I was saying before, which is that in the United States, people don't feel they don't get a party membership card.
They don't feel like they're it means something to be a Democrat. They don't feel like they could knock on the door of their representative or city counselor or feel like they have some sort of say in the program of their party. They don't feel like they're really tied into their union, if they are members of a union at all. They, in other words, feel like the way in which they could exercise agency, when they are involved, is through lawsuits.
It's through being members of a small scale civil association or environmental association that is going to just stop a project freeze everything until they can fully understand what's going on. So there is democracy. There are avenues for them to stop things, but it's at a fragmented local scale instead of a mass scale. And part of this is rooted in just at times historically, I rooted distrust in the state distrust and state actors.
Distress that these experts conducting environmental reviews might be bought and captured by some corporation or some special interest that they aren't truly giving dispassionate information. I think in other countries, there is a lot more trust there. Now what we can't really fix in the short term is the fact that we're going to have different regulations at the federal level, at the state level. Sometimes at the local level and companies bidding on these projects are going to have a more complicated time navigating that.
So it becomes harder sometimes to take a scheme that's used to build one set of rail in one state and apply it to another process and system in another. And that's kind of a problem of American federalism that plays us as a country. I'll ground this in an example that I've just been poking around over the past couple of days. So in 2019, New York passed congestion pricing in New York City.
So that money will go to mass this has been a long multi-multimulti-life fight. It's been defeated a bunch of times. But in 2019, Cuomo agrees on it. The Blasio agrees on it.
The New York legislature agrees on it. Then it turns out that because some of the roads in New York City were financed by the federal government and you can't just build a toll on a road finance by the federal government without their agreement, exemptions, etc. So now you need the federal government to sign off. So Trump hates Cuomo.
They drag their feet. Nothing happens for a year or two. Then Biden is elected. People who judge becomes Secretary of Transportation, they say, of course, we'll work with you on this.
New York is a blue state. It's full of their allies. congestion pricing is good for the climate. It's good for mass transit.
It's worked in Stockholm and London. So they start going forward. And they give New York an exemption from the normal environmental impact review. And they can just do the lighter environmental assessment, which the deal they strike includes 20 meetings and extensive consultation with Jersey and Connecticut.
And so the timeline on that is 16 months. And then the Federal Highway Administration, looking over the assessment, sends back 430 technical questions and comments, slowing everything down. And I'm sure a lot of these comments and questions are reasonable, right? The Federal Highway Administration is full of capable, smart people.
And at the same time, this thing is going to open up. Maybe the end of 2023, maybe later, maybe never, the government promised to do something and it's still not doing it. The mass transit improvements that would have been able to build are going to be that much later if they ever happen. So how do you understand that story from the left perspective?
What do you think should go differently if anything? Well, I think in my mind, democracy elections should have consequences and policies should have consequences too. So it's a problem and part of too many different stakeholders and too much mediation getting away from elected governments being able to pursue policies that are going to, of course, have some consequences. And if they turn out to be mistakes, people can get together and vote for a new set of electives that can pursue a new policies to reverse course.
But instead, we just have stagnation. And you have not just agencies, I think different levels of agencies having different concerns and having to mediate it happens in a lot of different democracies. But in the US on top of it, you also have very powerful NGOs, you have civil society groups. So mixed together, you have competing stakeholders in a way that I don't think you have elsewhere.
Now, what I would want to build in the United States isn't just more, more liberalism, more money spent on more things. What we want to do, I think, is push the type of state led planning that shifts investment decisions that thinks about the economy as a whole. So in other words, take the example of Nordic democracy. You had a system that tried to shape investment priorities largely through the mechanism of centralized wage bargaining.
So if you want to build a high productivity society, they said, well, we're going to make sure that in certain sectors, we are pushing up the level of wages to encourage capitalists to invest in more labor-saving technology. And you do that through the mechanisms not necessarily of the state, but of unions. But then when certain firms go out of business, the less efficient firms, well, then you have the states scoop in through active labor market policies and retrain those people, some of them, and other of them will join expanding firms at the top of the market, the most efficient firms. In other words, in that case, what they were able to build was not just a system that said, well, we want to spend a whole lot more money and deliver more of the same somewhat uneven social services where we currently have.
They said, well, we want to create a new system that will create a higher wage, more productive society, other than we want to tax the hell out of everyone to build a welfare state on that basis. You could agree with it or you could not agree with the model, but they had a kind of vision and a plan. And right now, I wonder whether even my favorite politician in the world, Bernie Sanders, even people I greatly respect, like I was seeing in El Hanomar, whether they have a real vision of the type of welfare state they want to construct and how to construct it, or whether their vision is simply taking existing programs and spending more money on it. Well, I do think this gets to this very core tension.
You had drawn this distinction between civic and associational democracy. One way I've been thinking about this issue is between centralized and decentralized ways of wielding and checking power. And on the left particularly, I think there's a very deep tension between preference for centralized ways of wielding power and decentralized ways, particularly of checking power. And towards the end of that key infrastructure piece and in the issue of Jacobin, you guys quote Ethan Elkind, who's a climate expert at U.S.
Berkeley saying, I think it's about making sure transit agencies have more sovereignty over the decision-making authority and process. So I've heard this from a lot of transit experts that this is an argument for more centralization, more autonomy, and check the results, as you said earlier through elections. And on the other hand, the left is very committed to small democracy, believes very deeply in this kind of organizing and hearing from people in a lot of meetings and a lot of opportunities to participate and a lot of opportunities for groups to come in to a city council meeting or board of supervisors meeting and register that you don't understand how this project is going to affect us. And I think you see that in all these campaigns you talked about and inside the souls of all these politicians you talked about.
I think if you listen to the rhetoric of a Sanders or an AOC or an Omar, it'll kind of shift between this need for a bigger government and this need for much more representation, consultation, community involvement. And so I'm curious how you think about managing that collision of values, because I think people often don't want to think that there is attention there, right? We should be able to have, like, wouldn't making government more participatory make it better. But if you believe, as I think sometimes this issue applies, you do, that you need more centralization, more decision-making that just can happen, then I think you're suggesting it may not be that easy.
Yeah, I think there's long been a tension between reconciling at least expertise and democracy. And I think the way you square the circle is by saying there should be democracy in the form of people feeling like they can influence elections. So that's one form of democracy. And obviously these bureaucrats aren't accountable.
They're accountable to elected officials. And these officials have a party affiliation. They are connected to their base if they pursue one popular policies, you know, that can exist. And also I think it's a matter of trusting the experts in the sense of, this is actually where, you know, I'm well known as a anti-identitarian leftist, but I think this is where a representation actually does matter.
You know, having experts who might come from working class backgrounds might be black or brown might have some sort of connection with the communities in which they're making decisions might lead them to thinking not just in terms of the macro-rationality of the US economy as a whole, but being able to weigh the particular interests of areas affected by construction projects. So if the major deacon is going to make it a lot easier to commute from Westchester to Manhattan, but it's also going to destroy some really important working class neighborhoods in the Bronx and leave a huge legacy, you know, I think that that decision doesn't mean that the model of having an empowered bureaucracy is wrong. It means that the bureaucracy was not conducting the right sort of reviews and the politicians that empowered them were not held to account. So I think that there is a delicate balancing act, but right now we have a system that is actively hurting people through inaction.
So again, I think that there's a little bit too much focus on the after effects of construction and new projects. And I think that that that's less benefiting for and working class people so much as benefiting NGOs and other groups and individuals in society that, you know, make livings off lawsuits and off blocking things from being constructed. I don't actually see this as a core working class demand, nor do I think that the type of democracy that you get at a community meeting about environmental impact is particularly the most rich type of democracy. I think a lot of this could be solved by having better trained, more empowered, and experts accountable in other ways.
And of course, in places like Spain, as Jared and Elizabeth Henderson, you know, point out in that article, they do have review processes and community involvement. They're just more tightly time delineated. Let me end by asking you a question too about about your work and your role. So you found it, Jacque Bin, which I think has been central in creating some of the resurgence on the left, you know, Bernie Sanders, but in terms of the intellectual effort, I think it's been a pretty important piece of it.
You've recently also taken over as president of the nation, which is one of the more venerable left journals in the country or magazines in the country. And at the same time, I hearing you a frustration. The left has become a little bit too much a space of educated folks who like talking about lefty ideas as opposed to more of a working class movement with a more diverse social base. So how do you think about that tension in your own work, or how do you think about the vehicles you have a hand in being part of that work?
Like, how how is a member of the educated scribbler class? Do you work on making the left less beholden to the educated scribbler class? Well, I guess I'm pleased with the role I have, because I think that I view the existing basis left as a conduit or a route to a mass space for this politics. You know, I think the ideas of democratic socialism belong, not just the people who hold them today, but belong in the future to millions of people who I hope will hold them.
You know, I think the idea of building a world without forms of exploitation and oppression of world where people can live in and at least some material comfort and feel like they're real stakeholders in a society and in a real way. This is something that I think that should be mainstream politics. And as long as there's inequality in society, I think a politics that calls for more equality and calls for more even distribution of power and resources should be mainstream. So I think publications like Jack of End publications like the nation have a role popularizing left-wing ideas.
And I think that they have a role calling for a type of politics and a rhetoric that can in the future captivate millions of people like Bernie Sanders was able to captivate in his campaign. So I would not be very satisfied if this was it, not just because of an aesthetic preference, because I, you know, feel like we shouldn't be just talking to ourselves and little salons. But because I think that the modern left arose in conjunction with the mass working class in the 19th century for a reason, because there's actually a group of people out there who have not only the material interests but actually have the power to change the world. I don't think that a handful of people writing or speaking truth to power have that power.
So I would love to see a left that continues to follow the lessons of the Sanders campaigns and continues to evolve from them and actually wins. But it's a very complicated question in part because we have such a hollowed out civil society. We don't really have the avenues of popular politics that we used to. And we're stuck basically just with election campaigns.
And it's a tricky thing to try to regenerate civil society when it doesn't really exist anywhere. It's not just a problem of the left. It's a problem of the entire political spectrum. It's particularly bad for the left because we actually need to mobilize a lot of people to get things done.
Whereas if you're on the right, you could find a way to elect a few of the right people, get the few of the right court appointments. And you could probably carry out a lot of your program without having millions of people actively behind you. I think it's a good place to end. So always a fun question.
What a free book to you would recommend to the audience. I think that everyone in the audience, this is very on brand too. But I think everyone should read Michael Harrington. Harrington, for most of the mid-century, was the most prominent American socialist.
His adversary, William E. Buckley, actually once introduced him that way, then he very quickly added that that's like being the tallest building in Topeka, Kansas. But I recommend you read his last book that he wrote when he had cancer, socialism, past and future. I also think that at least what drew me to the left was reading history and having a sense of the long arc of history, which I'm not so certain nowadays bends towards justice.
But I think it always helps Eric Hobson's The Age of Extremes, but his whole set of four books on modern history, I would highly recommend. I think that'd be a great starting place. Then for the third book, I really think everyone should read my book, the Social Manifesto, because I haven't plugged that in a long time. I think your book is one of the three, not allowed.
I'm just kidding. I think for the third book, I would really recommend that people read Adolf Reed's recent political memoir. I'm not sure if you would like it described as a memoir, but it's called The South. It just came out from Verso books, and I just finished reading, and it's a really excellent discussion about contemporary politics, about also his past growing up in the Jim Crow South and how it informs his current political worldview.
So it's by the political sciences Adolf Reed. It's called The South. That's Kirsten Carr. Thank you very much.
Thanks for having me, guys.