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It's not just numbers and values, you're dealing with lives at that point. Welcome, I'm Maria Vermozas, and you're listening to T-minus Space Cyber Briefing. In this show, we examine the evolution of cyber security in the global and orbital infrastructure that powers, protects, and connects our lives. Hi there, thanks for joining me.
In today's episode, we're going to take a look at space cybersecurity within the bigger picture framing of risk management in space missions. And to guide us through that, I'm speaking with Dr. Mac McGuire. She's a researcher with a background in industrial energy processes, chemistry, and astronomical engineering. She recently successfully defended her dissertation.
Congratulations. Part of which covers extending spacesuit longevity by quantifying failure points. Physical failure points in those suits rely on mostly unchanged decades old technology, for example. And now, no big surprise, those spacesuits are increasingly wired for connectivity. So yes, cyber security concerns are also possible physical risks to humans in space exploration.
So how are we assessing those kinds of risks in what you might call an extraordinary edge case of a spacesuit? How do you build in safety measures? And what kinds of regulations are or aren't in place? What's still needed? How much is or isn't cyber security even a part of this entire conversation?
Well, Dr. McGuire will walk us through it. My background spans and other things, including industrial energy processes, alongside chemistry, astronomical engineering, and that's the spaceuit work that was a focus on my dissertation that you're referencing. And currently doing some work with the Space Generation Advisory Council and their space law and policy groups. Turns out those critical infrastructure risks look very similar, whether you're talking about refineries, spacesuits, or satellites.
So my dissertation focused on spacesuits and essentially just increasing their longevity. A lot of those suits have been in use to some degree for, they're about 40 years. So that technology has, there have been some updates, but that technology has remained largely the same across that entire time. So it was timely, let's say, with the recent Artemis missions and things like that, focusing on space suit longevity, kind of extending those capabilities that we have. Whether that was cooling line leaks, glove abrasions, clogged ventilation ducts, things like that, especially on the lunar surface with that lunar regolith that everyone loves.
Oh, yes. Yes. But my own research on those long duration lunar infrastructure and kind of expanding that, it runs into that question of we don't have a settled answer for things that, who is responsible for things that happen when it's so far away. Like, whenever a space asset gets hacked, for example, one of the cyber focus, we don't have a clear answer as to what entity is responsible for that at this point. The policy still catching up, let's say.
Yeah. And that really is kind of what I was hoping we can dig into a little bit today on the policy side. If you can maybe give me a sense of the lay of the land of what does that look like right now when we're talking about cyber risk, especially for space assets, like you mentioned that there are gaps, what's there right now and where maybe we can get to the gaps after? Sure. Well, there's a couple of different policies and frameworks, treaties, there's outer space treaty, which I think everyone that lists this podcast is probably familiar with in some way, shape or form.
But it doesn't have any provisions for cyber, like Article 6 states that make states internationally responsible for space activities of their own companies. And then Article 7 says, it makes states liable for damage of their space objects caused. But neither of those anticipated an attack that arrives over networks rather than a physical object. Right? But that wasn't what that was written in mind.
Yeah, it became official in 1967 if I remember the year correctly. Yes. Yes. Yeah. Very foundational, let's say, I think that's the conduit, it affords it.
Yeah. Very foundational documents. Yeah. And then we have space policy, Directive 5, that was established in 2020. And that was the first US cyber security policy, specifically for space systems.
But it's principal level guidance. Does it have any binding regulation, right? And how many teeth to actually enforce things? It's just guidelines. One of those other guidelines and the actual rules that kind of where that fits in.
And then we have a couple of other things that kind of govern the space. The NIST IR8270 document, which was established in 2023, you know, that translates the NIST cyber security framework into space specific terms. But again, it's voluntary, right? A quote from the answer act. It is meant to present basic concepts, generate discussions, and provide sample references.
In a quote. So not read, not read, nor read. Yeah, I'm noticing a trend there with the idea of guidelines, suggestions. Yes. Yeah.
That feels like quite a gap. You know, I know there's understandable pushback from people who go listen, the job is hard enough as it is. I don't want to read, you know, making it harder at the flip side. If there's no sense of consequences, I suppose, no teeth, as you say. I mean, what are we doing here?
Sure. Yeah. Absolutely. I mean, especially with something like spacesuit, you know, where I attack, call it in cyber or in via network. It doesn't, it's not simply just hand waving data packets that, you know, to some people won't mean anything, but it's someone's oxygen supply, right?
Like it's someone's telemetry. It's someone's thermal regulation. It's not, you know, it's not just numbers and values. You're dealing with lives at that point. Yeah.
Yeah, that's exactly it. I mean, I know a lot of times when shorthand we talk about, you know, hacking in space, a lot of the default assumption is we're talking about satellites. Cool. Yes. Understandable.
But I mean, that's not it. Sure. exclusively. There are other assets and certainly there are humans in space and their well-being is paramount. And yeah, yeah, and truly their lives are very much at risk.
And the cyber vector, so to speak, is I feel like under, I'm appreciated not with this audience, but in general. So, and this is sort of a general frustration I've had and I'm sure I'm not alone in this is everything has been like suggested guidelines and that's just not enough. We've seen that it's not enough. People are sort of being left hanging out, hanging a dry a little bit here. I mean, how do we move past this and get to a place where I can use your face?
We have things with teeth. Absolutely. I mean, I want to preface that there are some things that exist or trying to exist so that you space act that was posted 25. That is the most significant regulatory move that we've seen yet. Yeah, that would require cybersecurity risk assessments across full life cycles of satellites mandating, you know, onboard cybersecurity for those new satellites and create, you know, like a resilience network across the union space for those member states.
The kicker with that is it's still being negotiated to death in part of this. We have, you know, those lofty ideals, but I think we're kind of getting in our own way when it comes to a lot of that. And I think in my mind, again, coming up as somebody who's not necessarily a cyber expert, you know, make that caveat. But one thing kind of off the top of my head that you, you know, you could implement almost immediately, I won't say immediately because we know how fast government moves. But that would start to put things on the right track.
You know, making cyber-stream mandatory at the point of a contract or a license, right? It's not a candy optional at that point. Right now, like you said, almost everything is voluntary or a guideline. You know, we've already, we know how to fix this. We've seen this happen in other circumstances with energy grid, pipelines, et cetera, you know, drawing from other experiences that I've had.
But the actual fixes physically is writing cyber-streamed required into a procurement process rather than kind of after an incident forces that to happen. Time for a quick break now. When we return more with Dr. McGuire on risk management for space applications. Cyber risks continue to evolve and Traveler's Cyber Threat Report helps organizations stay informed on what's changing across today's risk landscape.
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We're back now. Let's dive back into my conversation with Dr. Map McGuire. This is maybe a bit of a woo-woo question, but what do you attribute to sort of the resistance that there has been to getting more serious about cyber security in space? Sure.
I think there's a couple of things. One, I think it's exactly like you said earlier. The more perceived hurdles there are in the way, the more difficult it makes a process. The less likely people in the sciences are to want to push and do that, especially if it's not directly related to the cool flashing parts of science. I'm calling out myself there as well.
That's fair. I think it's more, I would say, mundane, but you have to get that done, right? It's not maybe fun for everyone. I'm sure there are people that find it fascinating and engaging, but I think that is a big part of it. It's not super flashy.
I think because the mechanical infrastructure is growing so rapidly, the commercial space in this area is growing exponentially. I think you have a lot of just simply lagging policies. You simply have a lot of, oh, we didn't foresee this happening in, like you said, 1960, 1967. We had no point of conceptualizing this or things getting to this point. I think a lot of it is we are simply playing catch up.
I don't want to say that it's almost too late to play catch up at this point, but it feels like we need to really develop those frameworks and we really need to invest in communication. That's a very big part of it. Communication between agencies, communication between government and the public and private and all of the different sectors that are now playing in this space. We all want essentially the same things, maybe getting to it in different ways, but if we want that to happen, we all need to play nice, right? Absolutely.
I'm wondering if almost I'm asking the wrong question about does the regulatory hammer need to come down or is it something where maybe the industry can lead first? I don't know if it's relevant, but I'm remembering that recently there was the CMMC requirement. I'm hoping I'm not misremembering this, but there was a CMMC requirement for cybersecurity that kind of dropped at the last minute rather recently. I'm just thinking, okay, that was a regulatory thing. A lot of people were hoping it was a needle and I guess it was considered to burdensome.
Maybe this becomes a thing. Should it or maybe it will become a thing that industry can try and lead first before regulation becomes a more burdensome thing? I don't know where I am. Sure. Here's my question.
I definitely think that if we want things to actually be implemented, we want industry, we want to make it easy for industries to say yes, right? We want it to be easy for them to actually feasibly implement these things. The policy can hand wave, declare all of these things that they want, but in reality, somebody has to go out and actually make those things happen. It's engineers, technicians. It's not just a and so it is done.
Yeah, sure. That happens, right? That has to be put in place for those things to actually happen. I do think industry can make more clear maybe to policy creators. Here are things that are actually feasible for industry to implement.
Maybe that's a five-year or a ten-year plan. Here are things that are a little more feasible for us to physically implement now. There are things in the future that we can build towards. I think that there also needs to be overlapped between policy and industry, if a policy offering incentives, or at least saying, hey, if we encourage you to go in this direction and you do, and it makes everything safer and more secure, here are some benefits that can be had by all parties involved. Again, I don't know exactly what those would be.
I don't want to speak beyond my area of expertise there, but I do think there are ways that industry can lead and it can be effective, right? Then it is up to the policy people to listen and pay attention. It's just saying, yeah, that sounds good. But actually listen for comprehension, I guess, is the part of that. Yes, listening and understanding, yes, exactly, instead of just simply hearing.
Yes, I understand. Yeah, I want to make sure that I give you the last word. I always like to make sure I give guests an opportunity to address anything before we wrap up anything we missed or any concluding thoughts that you have since I recognize we're coming to the end of our time. So yeah, anything at all that you want to mention to the audience, by all means? I think essentially, in this off, I want to make a mention of who these things actually affect and who is missing from the table in these decisions are being made.
Every framework that we discussed up to this point, the EU Space Act, the NIST framework, it's built by and for incumbent space-aring states and large operators as those increase in the industry. Global South nations are disproportionately exposed. They're more reliant on those aging ground station infrastructures, and they typically have the least capacity to absorb a cyber incident. But they have the least voices in bodies like the United Nations Committee on Peace, Peace, and Matter Space, for example, where those rules are currently being negotiated. I think they are doing that.
A system hundreds of thousands of miles away is autonomous by necessity, and who owns the risk? Is it necessarily just a liability question? It's a design question. There's only a sense to be engineered in from the start. There's no fallback of a human fixing it in your thousands of miles away.
That's a great question. Well, I think it's a wonderful place to leave the conversation as well. I give everyone something to really think about. Dr. McGuire, thank you so much for joining me today and for sharing your expertise with the audience.
Absolutely. Thank you for coming. And that is Team Mind is Space Cyber Briefing brought to you by N2K Cyber Wire. If you like what you heard today, you will also enjoy our newsletter, Signals in Space. You'll get research and notes, pulled together by our producer Ethan Cook and me, along with this week's top space cyber news stories.
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