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Sep 21, 2016 36 min

Startups Series: Ben Riley

from CNAS Podcasts Hosted by Center for a New American Security

Ben Riley, former Principal Deputy Secretary of Defense for the Rapid Fielding Directorate, describes his experiences funding and working with startups from inside the Pentagon and offers advice for startups seeking to work with the Department of Defense.

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Startups Series: Ben Riley

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Welcome to the Center for New American Securities National Security Startups podcast series, hosted by Senior Fellow and Director of the Technology and National Security Program, Ben Fitzgerald. Welcome everyone to another National Security Startups podcast. We're joined today by Ben Riley. Ben, thanks for joining us.

Thank you. It's good to be here. So Ben is recently retired from the Pentagon. I need to stop and congratulate you on being able to be outside of that building for a little bit now.

And he's currently working at the Georgia Tech Research Institute. Prior to his time at Georgia Tech and prior to his time as a civilian in the Pentagon, Ben had a great career in the Navy. I spent a lot of time in P3s as a tactical NFL. I should also say in full disclosure, that Ben funded a number of projects for the company I used to run, Noetic.

So I like to think that I maintain some impartiality here, but I'm very grateful for Ben's support to my work over the years. So Ben, let's just jump straight in and I've got a few questions for you and we'll have a conversation here. So you've invested DoD funds in a range of interesting startups and other companies over many years. Could you give out listeners a brief summary of your background and some of the work that you did in the rationale for it?

Sure. As you point out, Ben, I spent almost 30 years in the Navy. I started out as a listed man, so in our technician and then the technician is an officer and took my ASW work from being enlisted into the P3 community. My last job in the Navy as a captain was an assignment to the officer's sector defense and acquisition and technology and what was called advanced technology at the time.

It was the program under Larry Lynn who then became the head of DARPA that went on to become what's called the advanced concept technology demonstration. And I was a military deputy to Larry and I learned a lot of what I later took on to subsequent parts of my career from that particular tour with Larry and working with him and getting insights and companies and where they thought he thought and others depending on the department, all of these other technologies and the life and so when I had a chance to do other things and I came back to civilian, I said okay, I saw all the things they did in that program and I said okay, they did well here, they could have done better here and took those lessons running. So from your perspective, what was some of the more interesting or impactful investments that you made in your time of head on? I highlight just two.

We did a lot but one of my favorite quotes when we would come up with the project in the idea was that we don't have a requirement for that and we don't need that and I would call hearings or Michael Howard talk one time at the area of workology in about 1995. You made a quote, the only thing harder than putting the new idea in writing was to take him over. He was actually citing little heart, exactly, who made that quote much earlier. When people would sit there and meeting and trying to convince somebody of somebody to say that, we don't have to eat for that or whatever the comment was.

One of the big ones when I got to OSD, as I was still in the Navy, was part of it. We had that as one of our first ACPDs and Larry and I spent a lot of time walking around, kind of gone talking to people about it and people say it's interesting. I think I could probably find five or six senior people who we talked about a many, many several hundred who thought it was a good idea. In about 1996, I don't have exactly, we were at military people in peacekeeping in Bosnia and we were directed by Secretary Perry to deploy the thing to Bosnia.

And we said that it's not ready. And we said that it's not ready. We said it's not ready. And we said yes sir.

And we deployed to Bosnia. It went up into the North, I call it the North, 40 where nothing was happening. And ultimately one of these vehicles crashed over there and I immediately got called and somebody got a chance to say that. It said, see, we totally will work.

Yeah. And the lesson there is you got to, to me, the lesson was even in the face of resistance, you somehow have to put your foot, which knows under the tender of your foot in the door, and to get the thing going, you know you're going to fail. You know it's not that way completely right. But if you look at where we are today, none of that would happen unless I think we're carrying it for the forceless.

We're at the fail of learning. So that was one I think to impact ultimately. The second one I'll say was biometrics. In this time I was a civilian in OSD and we were looking at the ID problem.

I used this as a late 2003, really we got working on biometrics as a potential solution. There was potential, not solution, not say the pay, tracking down, insurgents. And so we started putting this and somebody came up with a senior guy came up with. Yeah.

We had a fair degree of resistance to biometrics. I mean, there were pockets of people who were very interested in pushing it, but at more senior levels, there was also resistance. So it took a lot of time, hard work to build, that infrastructure to collect data, analyze it, share the data with others, normally within fingerprints, what you started out with, the range of other capabilities, the DNA, sorry, again, you can refer to the very resistance. What's the core first guy?

I don't think he's always that. Yeah, we haven't even done that. And so you have to be, the lesson to me is you have to be, you have to realize the lessons they've learned are hard, so it's not a one-hour stream. Yeah, absolutely.

So I recall many years ago, I asked you a question, but I haven't known you for very long, which is, how do you make your investment? How do you make decisions about that? And your reply to me at the time was that you read widely, which was actually a very good answer. I realized in hindsight.

But I would just be interested for our listeners. How did you go about making decisions about what to invest in or not? Well, a couple things. One is, you build a new capability in technology, often we have people coming with a problem that need an answer right now, okay, and start around.

But when you have an entirely new capability, whether you know it or not, it's going to take you a number of years. So by the time you get that, you reset to your complicated work, whatever the problem was, make it a way, particularly. So it causes me to try to think ahead about what's seen as now, National Intelligence Council, global trends, that get a little always online and look at something. And I'm trying to figure out where we're going.

Over time, we've had many, many companies land government on the same. That's a transformation with technology. That's a game show. Everything's a game show.

Everything's a game show. Everything's a game show. Everything's a game show. And I tell people I look at the technology.

So what I have to do is put it in, and so therefore I need to kind of have some understanding of it. Yes. Where do you think, whatever this you mentioned, when you were in the web, you know, you're bothering you. Correct.

Yep. But non-state groups. Yep. And what kind of capabilities do those kind of things that really help you think about?

Where should we be investing? What should we have? And it might be invested before I write a letter, write the investment, some piece of the plan to jump. Yeah.

At least start the conversation. That's kind of the, it's kind of guessing, retrospectively, I think. Yeah. So it's always going to be that good of a future.

Being bigger. So in that context, as you're making those investments, you work with a pretty interesting range of startups at very early stages. I still recall what you did with Palantio early on, those kind of things. So from your perspective, what value do you believe that DOD provides startups and why should startups be working with the Department of Defense?

What is it that makes startups feel interesting from your perspective? Well, we were a very early investor in Palantio. The defense analysis currently one of the instructs the great officers primarily from the special entity, the fine one. And we help them set up what we call the common hopes in that, which is some of the senior opportunities.

We'll understand and appreciate it. So Palantio, we'll just start at that time. We invested in Palantio if he wasn't to say the value, I think it's certainly the insight that we've centered on there with us. Do you want to be objective?

Yeah, I agree. I'm a bit of a simple way to find just one other thing you just talked about, technical problems. One of the other things that I recall you spending a lot of time supporting was field testing and providing opportunities, whether that was at the human proving grounds or other places where startups could come and test their capabilities and integrate it. From my perspective, that's something that's pretty valuable to a startup.

They wouldn't be able to do that in another context. What were your thoughts on the investments you made in that and what you got out of it or what you got out of it and what those startups got out of it? Well, to go back in time, in late 2003 when the ID challenge came to a head, Dr. Ron Seger was a prospective defense researcher on this.

He had been tasked by the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Wolfowitz, I should say, in coming up with some funding capabilities to address the problem, which challenge the value. So he did a lot of work on this. He went in with the deputy with a list of things that he funded and a lot of things on that list of calculations. Yeah.

And some money, of course, sort of one. Yeah, flexible money is I think that. And so as we looked at the problem and was in help of some people, one of the things we came up with, we could be able to test whatever kind of thing. So we, the first money we spent, I don't know that much, but we built the idea of the city, the road.

We died looking along, giant city sites, I think several test areas, unique companies, small big government laboratories. We thought they had an idea of the kind of deal was they would ride down an infrastructure, we also had a testing unit set up the test. JYTO responsibility, we were not advocates for a program. There was parts and dust, and then we go away and six months, nine months, we go back to now I can be quite a lot.

Some companies, we thought it was, we didn't charge up the test unit. We also, test was just tested, we bought that on the face, this other test that they accepted. Now I got it. I still remember being out in 29th homes, California, for one of the experiments that you were working on, and they had the biometrics, fingerprint scanner out there.

And it seemed it was running like I was being ruggedized. It can deal with the desert, and then we had, we were in the process of fake arresting a bunch of Marines. And one of the NCOs bent down, put his hand into some water, some mud, some sand, spat on his hands, rubbed it all over the place, and then put his hands on the scanner and shut it down for 24 hours. And I'm like, we haven't tested for that.

Like, exactly. So, I think that, by the way, I think that's still going on. I think a lot of it still going on. I never really kept the head down on how many companies were there.

Yeah, so there's a lot of people who went through that stuff, and it was always valuable, I think. So one of the challenges that I say is that, in my view, the department depends, actually does a reasonable job of scouting and investing in technologies. And it can often do interesting prototypes, but it really struggles to go from that early good work into production or getting integrated onto existing systems. The Stoke-old Valley of Death in the commercial world is like a grand canyon of death for the DoD.

You've lived through a lot of that, and I know that you used to get measured on transition or not. How did you work around that problem? And what do you think that a problem needs to do differently to improve that vision? Well, I think, my idea is maybe a different, but I think that the metric of transition does not include one to build a program.

Yep. I think of all these reports, but I do, at first experience, that I'm an ACCD program, later in things that you can always see in my subsequent tours, and you'll see people coming in somewhere in the Pentagon, or in the GEO, or in the field, and say, okay, don't give me a lot of facts. Just tell me how the program is your transition. What percentage?

And I said, I mean, what percentage? Seventy-seven percent, everybody's going to do that. Nobody took the time to say what was that? Yep.

I think, but when your program reformers, your program, your principal investigator program reformers become aware that your primary metric of success is transition. And in order to get a good grade, more funding, they don't take a lot of risks. And programs become incremental in their improvements and come to the technology. It becomes a small game over what might be happening.

They're not the breakthrough games that we both live. So I think, particularly now from what I mean by the focus, that idea of transition should not be at the forefront of your program. So I think rather my preference was always to be small programs, human and small, and like-duty parameters. Oh, yep.

Today, when Georgia Tech gets $25,000, right? But small programs, take a risk. Don't be afraid to take a risk if you fail. $25,000, you're not going to be penalized.

Inevitably, you learn something in the field. If you succeed, it's obviously very productive. The other thing I think is, so I like small programs, but I like risk. But the other thing is, when you go into somebody and you say, okay, that was great idea.

And you show it to them in slides. That's a slide where you go with it again. In my view, not many people translate whatever that idea is on a newspaper, it reminds me I could visualize it. So I would rather focus on small criteria, build a little bit to the point where I can do even in the primitive level, whatever it is you want to do.

And then you start to show it to people. Don't build the whole system. But start to show it to people. And if they start saying, oh, well, could it also do this, or could it do that?

Then you know, A, or understanding the program and B, or what you're trying to make the whole system in the end, as I always used to say, you paint it gray, or paint it green, and call it. What really would be better for that? That little 5% thing. So the only two point where they say they can see it clearly, they can take it down and see if a classic one immediately is on the CD with the investigation.

With the Ia and some more, obviously, one point. So we're doing it, and we had an all-sevent and maybe we can go on and program all the changes. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Exactly.

Exactly. Exactly. I believe that is there. I think that there's some good advice embedded in there for what the department's defense should do as it seeks to work with more startups and other non-traditional suppliers.

Is there any other more explicit advice you have for the DoD? We've seen that the DIO itself, and they've opened their Boston office. Are there other things that you think that the secretary or deputy secretary or the building in general should do to make it easy up the startups or other non-traditional providers of innovation? One of the biggest problems we've faced is that many of these guys have to say that there were some companies that we know.

So each of these companies are going to have that. Anything, or anything, there's something happening out there about it. You want a couple of numbers of things that challenge the PAs? Yeah, certainly.

Absolutely. I recall multiple times in what we did together where we had agreed on a project, you had funding available, and we weren't allowed to stop because it was a continuing resolution and a new start or all these sorts of things. It was incredibly frustrating for everyone. We couldn't do anything about it, and you couldn't do anything about it, even though we had common intent.

So the last question that I have before you then is, as someone who has funded a large number of projects from the department of business and worked with a wide range of startups and other interesting organizations, what advice do you have for people running startups, entrepreneurs, CEOs of small and growing businesses as they're looking to do work with the department? How would you help them think about success? Well, not really. Obviously, the IUX is expanding.

But in my view, we used to invest the into Dell. As part of that, we would get emails from into Dell pretty much every day sometimes. And each of these is a call meeting that would be a summary of the company that would be roughly even, that employees would lose the product that would invest in, think it's all customers, should be interested in, or, but it's 10 or 15 a day that we'll see. It's almost more than we've done.

So the lesson, the lesson that I could only do, I have to be more than just one way to think about it. You'll find these, the IUX, the great start, the greater, I think there's probably more companies out there that we are looking at. We continue to do that, depending on the idea of company today. So there's nothing in it for me except there's so many up there.

So I think a lot of it, in this case, many times the guy would call me, and say, well, I talked to Zonto in this office, he's talking to Zonto in this office, he's talking to Zonto in this office, he's talking to Zonto in this office. Yeah. And so the guy's obviously getting a run around. And that guy calls, he probably got a call.

So that's not magic, it's not. By the way, for me, I'm going to go to the competition. And I guess the advice for the startup is just keep making the calls until you find someone who's actually going to help you. Because if you're one of the things I've found when I was on the other side is that the formal advice that you get is go talk to contracting officers and read the BIA's.

And like, that's all good. But we didn't have any success until we found people who would listen, who would listen, who owned problems and were willing to do stuff. And once we did that, once we found that, then we could watch for all contracting stuff. But until then, it was not helpful.

So I have a call with this company today for a person, companies, I said, go online like me, I'm trying to learn about your product. So at least when the guy starts talking, I'm saying, well, yeah, yeah, I get it. I understand that. So I think, you know, it's a two way street.

Absolutely. Someone with obviously incredibly done. Yeah, absolutely. Absolutely.

Absolutely. Absolutely. Absolutely. I couldn't agree more.

So Ben, thank you for sharing insights from, I guess, decades working on this and for sharing that wealth of knowledge with others. We can wrap it up here. Just end by, initially, thank you for your time today. Thank you for everything you've done for the Navy, for the country in the Pentagon.

I do feel obliged to point out to you that you have done the thing off. You have retired, but you still have a job. So it's not complete success, but you're no longer in the Pentagon. So congratulations again for that.

I do a similar thing now with George Beck, we're getting some money around competition for junior research scientists and engineering with GTRI and I work probably about thousand dollar prices. But they're ideas competitive. You got to be looking five to 10 years in the future and risk is good. That sounds nice.

Exactly. Always, always take risk. I think that's the lesson. And I'm happy with it.

It's good talking to them or smarter than I am. So it's a good time. Thanks again. Thanks again.

To hear more from the National Security Startup Series, go to startups.cnas.org or search for CNAS on iTunes or SoundCloud.

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