Welcome to the Center for New American Securities National Security Startups Podcast Series, hosted by Senior Fellow and Director of the Technology and National Security Program, Ben Fitzgerald. Welcome everyone to another episode of our National Security Startups Podcast. We are joined today by Dr. Erin Simpson.
Erin, welcome. Oh, thank you Ben. For those of you who don't know, Erin buys her stellar reputation. Erin, until recently, was the CEO of Kerris.
Prior to her time at Kerris, she spent a lot of time in the field, particularly in Afghanistan, providing advice to the Marine Corps. She's also taught at the Marine Corps Commandant's Staff College, and has a PhD from Harvard. So, as an excellent background, substantively, and in terms of running a business, we're very glad to have you here, Erin. Let's just jump straight into some questions.
Sounds good. Cool. So, you just completed a successful exit via sale with Kerris. Most importantly, let's just stop and say congratulations.
Thank you. No, everyone gets to do that. For those not familiar with Kerris, could you just tell us a little bit about what the business does, how you got started, clients, that kind of thing? Sure.
So, Kerris was founded by Dave Kocollan, a friend of the show, if you will. In 2010, I joined when I got back from Afghanistan. And like a lot of firms, kind of get started in the consulting or in the analytics space, began with kind of one project. We built around that.
So, the core interests, I think that all of the folks who came through Kerris had, was a deep interest in modern conflict and understanding and analyzing modern conflicts and coming up with new approaches to understanding those better, how you used to call it, sensing and sense making. But there was a real interest in trying to figure out through open source data, through field research, through big data, different kinds of analytical techniques that would help the defense department, USAID, the World Bank, private companies better understand these kind of complex conflicts that we see around the world. That's great. And so, what was the particular gap that Kerris filled and how do you feel that sort of being a startup helped you address that gap?
Sure. So, we embarked on the very ambitious goal of trying to create a new market. We can come back to why that was either a brilliant or terrible idea, kind of a coin depended on the day. We're looking to marry up some very sophisticated data analytic techniques with good social science, what we thought we knew about, political violence or insurgencies, along with kind of money boots experience.
So, people who had spent time in the field, people who had spent time with development organizations or military services, actually out in the world doing things. So, not just your typical aid contractor, not just your typical data analytics firm, but really trying to be in the middle of all of those things and provide a new capability to folks. Big startup, you know, is great and you're trying to do something new, but it also means you are sailing ahead and wins pretty much the entire time. Totally.
And so, were there other sort of natural competitors in terms of large terms that were already out there doing something similar? How did the landscape look despite the fact that you were in your market? Sure. So, new data analytics firms, you know, in this time frame, this is 2010, 2012, and even more recently.
So, you saw a lot of folks coming into that space as the Defense Department and the intelligence community were gaining an interest in these techniques. Probably our biggest competition was honestly our primes and partners. We used to call them the compedivates, which I think is not uncommon in this landscape. And part of that's driven, you know, by the way the government sort of chooses to do business.
I mean, to be on these large IDIQs or IQCs, these kind of big omnibus contracts. And an IDIQ and an IQCI. Indefinite quantity contracts or indefinite something? A lot of everything is indefinite.
That's the important part. But they're kind of like, you know, large scale credit cards for a government office. And the big firms, you know, and everybody that you know you might have heard of in this space ranging from Lockheed Martin to Booz Allen Hamilton to the USAID contractors put together teams to try to win a spot on the big contract and then you bid on the task orders that come out. And so, your competitors might be your prime.
Your competitors might be your other partners on this. And that creates in some way some good incentives for some good behavior, you hope, but certainly some challenges in terms of just how much can you innovate, how much new stuff are you going to bring to the table when you're going to have to share it with a lot of folks that you don't have a lot of experience with. Yeah. So I definitely had the exact same experience when I was running things at Nahuick and I often found that I could never get any of those primes to be interested in my organization.
However, if I was speaking to someone who owned funding and they needed to find a vehicle to get access to me, all of a sudden I would receive phone calls from these companies who would never call me back saying, no one sounds like a fascinating organization would love to partner with you on this one thing and then we want to try to replicate it ourselves. Absolutely. Great. So I think we come to the table with a bit of either ego or paranoia or both.
It can be challenging to try to put together those partnerships in a way where you're bringing unique capability and you don't think it's going to get appropriated or bored by the larger company. It certainly makes a tricky piece of this sort of business landscape. So I think that that's one of the endemic challenges associated with running a startup in the current DOD ecosystem of acquisition. That would be interesting in your thoughts on other challenges associated with running a startup when you do have predominantly DOD or USG clients.
Yeah, there's certainly, I think the biggest challenge right now is the uncertainty and the funding landscape. So back in the day, you would certainly get a full year's contract for something and on these larger contracts, multi-year contracts and that's why people found it attractive to work with the government and they're willing to jump through these other accounting and security and other kinds of compliance hoops. I think almost every contract that we've had, certainly since the Budget Control Act went into effect, has been partially funded, it's incrementally funded, so you're getting three and four months funding at a time. And that sort of sounds reasonable.
You don't have to pay your rent before you have to pay your rent, so whatever. But for us, where that really manifested as a challenge was in retention. We had very high talent people, especially once we were really invested on the data analytics and data science space, folks who could be employed at dozens of firms across the city. And so to tell them that, well, we think that you're going to still be able to pay you in September, but it's June and I honestly can't 100% guarantee that.
Folks will vote with their feet eventually. Now, to be honest, the big firms struggle with the same problem. They just don't tell you that the contract might fall apart and they'll fire you with two weeks notice, as a smaller firm, we were trying to avoid that particular problem. But the uncertainty, it's not just so much the low dollar value.
You can deal with low dollars, it's the uncertainty around those dollars that really creates some put sand in the gears and creates some headaches. And the thing that I found as well is that it's the gaps between the funding. So from a deeper perspective, like, well, you're still getting the money. It's like, I'm not getting the money back from the three weeks in which my team had nothing to do and I didn't have any income to cover their costs.
And I also wasn't going to fire them or send them on unpaid leave for that period of time. And by the way, this contract is capped at 9% fee to begin with. So it's not like there was a ton of extra money floating through this enterprise. You just move out all of these bumps along the way.
I mean, that's certainly a challenge. I mean, some of the other typical administrative pieces I think are a headache, but they're part and parcel. I mean, the security stuff and the clearance stuff is always kind of a challenge. But if you want to be in the space, you either choose to participate in that regime or not.
So thinking about that, from your perspective, it's not a key challenge or something you have to live with the fact that you are going to have the Fence Contract Order Agency stuff. You're going to have security clearance. What do you call it? I'm glad I forgot the term for that.
Site licenses, those kind of things. That's just perfectly what you build into the business model. Yeah, and I guess I'm probably just inured to it at this point. If you were coming from outside the government contracting system, you would be quite startled.
Certainly there are some organizational culture pieces. If you're coming from a more freewheeling startup culture or academic research culture, the time sheet regime will certainly feel like a bit of a pinch. The other piece that certainly can be a challenge and it's less of administrative or compliance issue is just the need to be on these contract vehicles. I've tried to forget the number of times that we had not only interested clients, but clients with money and a capability that we were ready to deploy on short order, but they couldn't figure out how to move their money onto a contract that we could get onto.
I think that's something that the Defense Innovation Unit is trying to address with their new procurement model. But there definitely needs to be, from my perspective, some better simplified acquisition thresholds or charge card purchase order types arrangements, at least for pilot proposals or small heroes relative in the Defense Department. Single shot engagements to try to figure out if something works so that you can keep while you're figuring out these other service agreements for something that's longer term. But that, at least we call it vehicle ballousa.
It was never fun. It was really frustrating. It was definitely a challenge for a small company to find all the points of entry for particular or particular office. That was definitely a dark art.
Absolutely. So speaking of dark arts, with a particular management practices or techniques that you would implement to deal with the uncertainty of the funding, all those bureaucratic funds, as an example, when I was running things, when I was running a company, I would keep about four months cash on hand as operating cash, which is not how you would run a normal business. But I knew that I needed to do that. And I had periods where I went through virtually all of that, thanks to continuing resolutions.
So I had to take the risk of not deploying my capital towards growth, just as a risk mitigation strategy. Absolutely. Are there other things that you would do, or do you think they're important for folks who are running startups who might be listening to this? Yeah.
And we certainly went through similar to anybody who was here 2011, 2012, went through and forced some really serious, I think, rationing of expectations for that period as well. One of the things that I did, we certainly, we didn't keep quite that much cash, but we kept that plus, we kept our line of credit free. So we didn't use the line of credit for growth investment or R&D, we used it in case we weren't getting paid mysteriously for three or four months at a time. When I took over as CEO in 2014, one of the things that I did was to say, we're going to stop a lot of the experimentation that we've been doing with some of these agencies that were doing kind of three month pilots or new launching new capabilities, where having come out of that sequestration period, we're only going to do projects that have six months worth of funding minimum, and frankly, that's crazy.
Nobody does projects for six months, right? That's already quite risk accepted. But I didn't want to be high, I want to be able to hire people and tell them that I would keep you, you were funded for six months, and we'd work out the rest of the runway from there. But I became much more focused on long-term work and not these bits and bots, especially once you get your cash flow arranged, you can, you can work toward that long-term continuing work, but it was, I mean, it's always a lot more fun when we're doing all kinds of different stuff, you know, for all kinds of different organizations, but it's one, like an invoice thing and sort of administrative nightmare.
But too, just a lot of, you know, it's a spanner in the works kind of constantly to manage that. So my risk mitigation strategy was to accept less risk. Yeah. It's interesting the ways in which the nature of the client that you're trained to work with inherently limits your potential.
So the thing that has allowed you to start the business also makes it almost impossible to run that business successfully. It's a bit of a, there's a term that I would like to use for it that starts with mind that I won't use it as a family podcast. And it's also one of the things, you know, for folks that are looking to start, you know, when you're starting, you got to go where opportunity takes you, right? You got to be willing to see this kind of any brass ring.
But those things are like stem cells. Once you lock it down, you now are locked into a particular approach. And so, you know, one thing that I certainly wasn't cognizant of, you know, when I first joined this, you know, my vast training in political science and, you know, social science research gave me a lot of insight into business strategy, no, it did not. Was, you know, are we a product firm or services firm?
Yeah. You know, and there's a lot of incentive to do one or the other, but there's some point at which is a point of no return. Yeah. And it fundamentally affects the character of the firm, you know, going forward both in terms of valuation, but also in terms of who you're hiring and how you get paid and, you know, what your business model is.
And I think there's a lot of folks who end up doing that sort of haphazardly or in an ad hoc manner, even though it has probably the decision has the most long-term implications for, you know, growth and value. That's right. And this point about valuation is something that's come up a little bit in our conversations. And so for folks listening at home, as a services business, you're probably going to be valued at one X annual revenue.
That's the general way. Or exactly. That's the general way I'll have. As a product company, you're going to be at much out of much higher multiple.
Now, then as a product company with a commercial market opportunity, that's a much higher multiple than before I limited the Fence marketplace. So the challenge, so obviously the goal is be a product company in a commercial space, but you have to be true to yourself. If you can't execute on that, you're better to have a company that actually has annual revenue than it aspires to a market that you're never going to get. For sure.
I mean, that's, you know, I think one of the things that, you know, it's very easy, you know, and we can have this experience, you know, in the nonprofit world, in the government office, you know, or in sort of startup land, you can think about all the things you do differently. And, you know, hindsight is 2020 and as my CEO used to say useless. You know, so it's just what you can think about doing maybe the next round through, but there are in the current market in DOD. And, you know, it's been six years since we sort of started this experiment, but it's really about volume.
You know, if you're doing services, you've got to be doing having a lot of humans in a lot of seats and a lot of different agencies. And as it turned out, that just wasn't the company that I wanted to run. I don't think it was the company that Dave wanted to build. And, but I think we, you know, the full sort of digestion or realization of that reality, you know, comes later in the process and trying to figure out how to do the pure R&D clay, you know, I spent a fair amount of time trying to figure out how to take the work we done at Darbyl and other places, and then to productize that, we would almost, I think, to have done that successfully, you'd just spin off a company.
You really, you basically acted as your own incubator. But we did spin off a company, we spun off a company called First Mile Geo, that is a product company and working in a sort of geospatial data and geosocial data collection space. And part of the reason we spun that out was just the DNA of Keras, so services oriented, that it could never really be the home for, you know, a price product, you know, sales organization. Exactly.
So I think that there's been a certain amount of advice that's been embedded in the last couple of minutes about conversation, which I think certainly it speaks to me as someone who's already gone through it, although I'm not sure if it's advice if I already have the scuff or it. Is there any other advice that you would offer for folks who are either running social or looking to start a business in that national security space? I mean, I would definitely say, you know, find someone as your COO, your Chief Operating Officer, Chief Finance Officer, who knows business. Yeah.
And I would say even, you know, business ops. There is, for most of the folks, you know, certainly something with my background, you know, which not only was in research and was in sort of substantive analysis, you know, it turns out that I was really good at making decisions. I'm not an indecisive person. But I didn't know business, right?
So like having somebody who not only knows how to but enjoys management of, you know, key things like the accounts payable and the accounts receivable and having solid HR practices and keeping good employee files and keeping good vendor files, I mean, that's the only reason we were able to, you know, not the only reason, but one of the main reasons we were able to have successful sales, we had very clean books and very clean files and very good accounting of the last several years of the company. And you know, you can totally, you can have catastrophic success that will undo a company if you don't have good business practices. Absolutely. If you don't have good HR practices, you know, one threat in lawsuit and everything can be, you know, out the door.
So, you know, having somebody, you know, who trusts completely, and that's hard to do. Yep. But you absolutely have 100% trust in that person. Well, you know, in a good division of labor over these are the business operations, which I almost never mucked in, and then work with them to build the strategy into, you know, the growth path, you know, from that.
I think a lot of folks in DC, it's like, oh, you know, like, I'm super smart and I know the defense department and I'm really into X, Y, Z, and that's hot right now. So, I'm going to start a company, super great. Go right ahead, go with God. Yeah.
Get a business person or else, all of it, which is expensive, but you definitely need somebody, you know, who is, who is keeping your books and keeping you because on the, on the DOD side, on the government contracting side, it's illegal. Yeah. All those mistakes are actually illegal. They're a civil and criminal penalties.
It's a good one, you know, with the drag. Yeah. You know, and your lawyer can tell you that it's illegal, but they're not very good at designing the systems that keep you out of it. That's right.
Yeah. But they're not necessarily going to make you a business healthy and they will take every penny you have because that's their business. Yeah. It's a challenging environment.
You touched on your substantive background and some of the benefits there in terms of being able to make decisions, but they need to augment that in terms of a business office person, which I think is right. Are there any sort of generalizable lessons, though, about the relative value of that substantive education or experience compared to business school? I'm also conscious of your opening remark that many of these sort of smaller or very focused consulting startups do take on the character of their CEO. And it's important to be substantive and have that reputation.
So what benefits are there? Yeah. I mean, I think that there's, I mean, it depends on what you're selling. If you're selling a product, you know, my good friend Nate Fick, who I think you've had on, Nate is great, can sell cybersecurity software all day long.
Believe it, Nate has a super PhD level in depth understanding of the particular technology. It doesn't matter. It's a product firm. It's not selling him.
He's selling the product. Right. Through any consulting firm, you're selling you. Right.
You personally have a solution to their problem. So that's tough, right. And that's an interesting challenge for growth. You know, how do you get it to the point where the one person isn't the one running the company, managing the clients, doing the work and hiring all the new people?
That does not sound like a scalable solution. It is not a scalable solution. And I think there is some natural limit to consulting firms, right? Both in terms of profitability, but also in terms of quality and certainly in terms of fun, right?
There's some ideal number of people where you're going to max out on that little trilema. But I think the general advice, I would say, is to be excellent, right? Not to be the best. It's not that it's per se a competition.
But you're bringing excellence in some domain to your job, to this organization. My substantive expertise was valuable to particular clients, right? So even big data work at DARPA when it was focused on Afghanistan and critical contributions that we were able to make there. Because of that, they trusted me to hire other analysts to bring to that team.
And those analysts wanted to come work for me because they knew that I understood their skills, but I could employ them well. Always try to do that. Sometimes hard to do that. I think I successfully got all the best out of every single employee.
But when you're hiring talent, you need talent that gets talent, right? So ace hire, ace, beat, hire, seize, and I believe that sort of through and through, both as a manager and as a CEO in the organization. But I think the difference, and this is even true on the nonprofit side, you're running an organization. There's money coming in, there's money going out, there's a number of vendors.
But people's rent and mortgage payments and college tuition, it depends on that basically working. So you need a mix of the people who can make it work. And as CEO, what I tried to do the most was to keep all of that strategy and administrative and financial brush clearing out of the way so the teams could run their projects, right? And so if they were distracted by a contract issue or a personnel issue or some other headache, that was a failure on my part.
I had learned that by coming up in a small company. So I had a different time done, lots of different small kinds of things. But that, I think has to be the goal of the executive team. And then it's about, you see, it's in all kinds of different companies.
An executive with a strong technical background needs a president who has more of a strategy background, right? Or somebody who's come up as a chief marketing officer needs that, you know, emergency acquisition CFO, you know, focused on that. So again, the individual doesn't scale. So it's really about how you put the team together to solve these problems.
The challenge in a small business is that everyone's wearing four hats. You don't get a CEO, a CFO, a strategist, a BD person, you know, you can have all that. You don't have any money. Yeah, that's right.
You know, especially if you're bootstrapped. Exactly right. I saw Rooka when I was the only employee at the company I started. And I had a dilemma about like, what do I put on my business card?
Because it seems self-aggrandizing to put like CEO of managing director. I did that. I should also put like janitor accounts receivable, ops manager. So I don't know if nothing which confused people even more.
But that's a different story. So we talked through a number of the challenges of running these organizations based on your experience. So what recommendations do you have for the DOD in ways that they might make it easier for startups to operate, to succeed? You talked a little bit about sort of what charge card, easier to do low dollar transactions.
Are there other sort of things you could make a difference? Yeah, I mean that's certainly one place, especially for kind of data driven or software different pilot projects. I think that's some revisions that simplified acquisition threshold. You know, some, you know, we are not in the day of the sole source contract at this point.
They were used widely in kind of the 2000s. Pretty much stopped with sequestration. They were used in abuse. There's no doubt about it.
But I mean there's also a punishing effect for a lot of folks who do have a unique capability or do have unique capability to bring to the government. But sole source contract, you talk about dark art, right? You just got to get a willing contracting officer and somebody to sign off and nobody wants to sign it and all of that. I mean one thing I think that could be helpful, and I think there are some groups that are trying to, you know, on the private sector side, Eastern Foundry and some others who are trying to simplify this.
You know some senior officials, you put together a capability whether it's a service or a product. They would like to use it somewhere. There is really nowhere you can go to figure out, you know, because the senior officials have no idea what contracts vehicles their office uses. They don't want to know.
They've never met the contracting officer in their office. So some sort of decoder ring that would tell you, look you got to find somebody who's a seaport e vehicle or you need to figure out how to get on air all four. You know, like and I'm not explaining what these terms mean because nobody knows what they mean. I want to care about those.
Yes, but those are actual vehicles. You know, and so, you know, these are the people that you can reach out to and some, you know, and some folks were good about it. But it's, you know, you don't have to sell the government. You got to sell these, you know, the prime contract holders or to have some other sort of simplified acquisition.
I think that that would be one thing. I don't think that there's a lot they can do. I mean, maybe on kind of the accounting and the time sheets. I mean, I think a lot of that is good practice and good protection of taxpayer money on some of the things.
We were a small firm. There was a lot of other regulations that we were exempt from, you know, as a result of being small. But, you know, that was not the part that I found particularly onerous. Got it.
So, um, conscious of time and just sort of wrap things up here. In this podcast series, we're exploring four perspectives on startups, the entrepreneur, the investor, the defense industry and the DOD or USG. It's been interesting in your thoughts on the value that any of those actors provides to the other and that they receive from the other. We've touched on a little bit through the conversation, but just sort of your synthesis of what that value process looks like.
I mean, I think entrepreneurs obviously, you know, are great. That's where innovation happens. There's actually, there's a fair amount of innovation, especially in the research arms, you know, of the larger defense firms. But in terms of genuinely new capabilities, new approaches, something that I'm particularly interested in, new operating concepts, you know, that's coming out of small groups, small companies, really trying to bring that in.
The challenge is whether or not the government is a good customer, you know, for those folks. I think that that's really what DIUX and others are trying to grapple with. Others, you know, can provide obviously, you know, key upfront capital. We were bootstrapped from the beginning.
We were not debt financed. We were not VC-backed. There was a lot of control and power that came from that, but also a lot of constraint. I mean, there was things we weren't able to do because we literally didn't have the cash.
Investors that are savvy to the government enterprise and the defense enterprise in particular, I think can help guide, you know, companies in that direction, but also get them over those first-year humps. Right. Get them through the prototyping, the beta testing, while you're waiting for the contract vehicles to sort of get themselves worked out. The hellacious sales cycle, though.
You know, you really need 18 months, right? I mean, that's a long time in investor terms. You know, the defense industry obviously gets kind of a bum wrap in this discussion. And you know, what they do provide is continuity.
There's incredible depth of experience in those large firms, not just with the technologies, but also with the technologies, but with the contracting. And I mean, innovation is important and it's necessary, but we can't have a defense department that is reinventing itself or its procurement requirements, you know, every six or 18 months because it takes five years to build something, right? So there needs to be, you know, some smoothing, you know, in those, in those development curves. You know, I think that that's the real challenge I think here and, you know, and this is where like a lot of things in Washington right now, you know, they read as collusion or corruption, you know, when people do things to mutual benefit.
You know, and so it looks like the iron triangle or it looks like this revolving door and there's enough bad behavior that we should be suspicious. You know, a lot of, across a lot of these different venues, but it also, for people to want to work with the government, it needs to be profitable, right? And you might accept lower profit for continuity, right, for consistency, you know, for volume, right? If we're missing some of those things, the government and the defense department in particular stops being an attractive place to do business.
And people will, especially when we're talking kind of the cutting edge software and data and cyber related spaces, they're going to take that work someplace else. They don't need to try to spend 18 months getting on a C4D contract, you know, to do something. That's where, that's one of the biggest differences now that in 1995, 1985 that, you know, how does the government become an attractive customer? Because it's not a problem to fire a client, right?
And when they're too big of a pain, you will definitely do that. And I think that's, you know, one of the things that, you know, of all the acquisition reform pieces we could talk about, that's a place where, you know, why should people want to do business with us? And then that's where you can get people, I think, you know, long-term commitments. Okay, well, we're not going to, like, charge you with the arm and the leg, right?
We have, you know, government pricing. We have, you know, better deals that we can make. But that's got to be a two-way street. And that's a difficult conversation, I think, for a lot of folks to have in the current environment.
No, I think that's exactly right. And while it's challenging, I think that's a highly, a wholly appropriate point to end our conversation on, because it could still go either way. I think we're seeing lots of positive signs, but it's not clear to me that we're going to get out of this mess on our country trajectory. So with that, thanks again for joining us, Aaron.
And I hope you take at least a couple of months off before going on to your next thing, whatever that might be, and enjoy a successful exit. I'll surely try. Thanks, Ben. To hear more from the National Security Startup Series, go to startups.cnas.org or search for CNAS on iTunes or SoundCloud.