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Nov 28, 2018 31 min

Stories from the Backchannel

from CNAS Podcasts Hosted by Center for a New American Security

Stories from the Backchannel is a new CNAS podcast program that examines the stories behind some of America's most important national security moments. Hosted by CNAS Middle East Program Director, Ilan Goldenberg, the podcast invites listeners into the room as government officials, and world leaders put aside niceties in favor of candid discussions, and hard-nosed negotiations. In our first episode, Unavoidable Russia, CNAS CEO Victoria Nuland recounts her time as one of America's leading diplomats on Russia. Each story is told from the perspective of officials who were part of some of our nation's most captivating and historic moments.

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From the Center for New American Security, this is Stories from the Back Channel, the podcast about pivotal moments in national security as told from the inside. I'm Yolan Golimberg. Over the next four weeks, every Tuesday we'll be releasing a new episode of our first season. Today, a rebroadcast of our pilot episode, which we initially rolled out this summer.

We call it unavoidable Russia, because since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States and Russia have been on a collision course. As each superpower tried to widen its sphere of influence, the other would try to get in its way. And in 2016, Russia did something much, much bigger. The Russian hacking plot tried to influence the US presidential election in the United States as striking back at Russia for interfering in the 2016 presidential election, with the whole...

But the relationship between the US and Russia hasn't always been so adversarial. Today, we're going to look at three times in the past three decades, when we couldn't tell if Russia was a friend or an enemy. The first time was at the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The second was with the war in Kosovo.

Finally, the failed Obama reset in Russia's invasion into Ukraine. These events tell a story about how our relationship with Russia got to where it is today, why Russia does what it does and where things might go from here. And Victoria Newland had a front-row seat to all of these events. In terms of understanding who's on what side, predicting what's going to happen with Yeltsin and Gorbachev, it's just a moment of extreme excitement, you know?

Today, she's the president of the Center for New American Security. But before that, she rose up to become one of the country's top diplomats on Russia. No small feat, especially because when she graduated college after studying Russian literature, it was the Reagan era, and everyone wanted to be a Russia expert. So Toria used her skills the only place she could, on a Soviet fishing boat.

The Soviets had these big fish factory processing ships. They would bring them within 20 miles of our coast. The American fishermen would catch fish within our 20-mile zone. They would transfer the fish at sea, and the Soviets would trade back to the American company for Krab and Caviar.

But the American company had a representative on each of these Soviet ships to negotiate the catch and to help the boats make the alignment. And I thought, what a great adventure. Ended up spending six, seven months on this Soviet fishing trawler with 80 Russian men and four Russian women working the radio so that the fish bag could get transferred from the Americans to the Russian boat five times a day, and also negotiating with the grizzled old factory manager about how much was in the bag when it came up on the back of the boat. These guys were spectacular to me.

They taught me all my stars. They taught me all my Russian curse words. And it was an invaluable experience for later understanding where they all were coming from. And I landed on the dock after the seven months and collected a huge stack of old snail mail.

You know how you get your mail, the old days, and buried in the middle was a three month expired invitation to join the foreign service. So I literally stood on the dock, put a quarter in the payphone, called the number and said, I still be a diplomat and they said sure, show up in two weeks. So Toria, when I say you're sitting in the front row, I mean, literally, you're sitting in the front row, you're sitting inside the Russian parliament building, representing the US government while Boris Yeltsin is outside standing on a tank. Moscow, August 19th, 1991, the summerpiece is shattered by the roar of tank engines racing into the city center.

They are there on full military alert. How did you get there? I was at that time assigned to Emissi Moscow. I was the baby political officer in charge of covering the Russian Federation inside the Soviet Union and one morning, six weeks after I arrived, my husband and I wake up and there's nothing on the television but some guy playing the cello, always ominous.

And then the next thing I knew my boss called and he said, there's been a coup. Red Army armored personnel carriers on the streets of Moscow this morning. The first sign of the coup d'etat that removed Mikhail Gorbachev from power. The head of the KGB and the defense ministry and a lot of other hardliners are holding Gorbachev hostage at his summer dacha and they want to take over and overthrow him.

And meanwhile Yeltsin, who's head of the Russian Federation at that point, is having a parliament session to resist and he's called on people to come out to the street. Yeltsin supporters reacted with their bare hands, building makeshift barricades to prevent any army attempts to seize the Russian parliament building. So you need to go over the parliament, you need to tell us what's happening there and report to us. And so I go running over there and the parliament's in session.

Meanwhile my husband, who was having lunch at the cafeteria at the embassy and somebody said to him, where's your wife? And he said she's doing her job. She's over at the Russian parliament trying to figure out what's going on and what the Russian Federation's going to do. And this person said, well, you know that the parliament is now surrounded by tanks.

And he leapt up from his lunch and raced across the street because he had in his mind the Tiananmen massacre in China two years prior. And he thought, you know, when the tanks start firing, I'll pull my wife out of the rubble. And it was just at that moment as the parliament session was ending that Yeltsin came out of the building, stood on the tank and made the declaration that the Russian Federation would resist to this coup. And my husband was right there and so was I.

And then we spent the next three days interviewing 250,000 Russians who had come to stand on the street in the rain to defend their parliament building from these tankers. All of the demonstrators were sticking flowers in the barrels of their guns and in their hair and on their tanks. And they were very eager to tell us that they were on the side of Gorbachev and Yeltsin and change. Wow.

That sounds amazing. And from there you go, you go into working in the Soviet Union for the next two or three years. What are you feeling during the rest of that time there? How are things going?

Well, first of all, in that first six months, the Soviet Union itself dissolved. The chief state TV channel was halfway through its evening news when it got the first details of the agreement signed in means. The Soviet Union no longer exists. I think there was a little concern that if the Soviet Union broke up that there would be loose nukes and chaos and we wouldn't know how to deal with it.

So the US ambassador was going in on a daily basis to talk to Gorbachev about how he holds the situation together. But to their credit, Washington also wanted to hear from other voices. And so they were sending folks like me in to talk to the Russian Federation leaders and Yeltsin's people. And all of them were saying Soviet Union's over, it's over, it's over.

You all have to decide what side you're on. And of course, six months later, I was standing on Red Square on New Year's Eve when the Soviet flag was lowered for the last time and the Russian flag went up and this great cheer erupted from the New Year's Eve crowd. This is the end of the coming system in Europe. They were appropriately drunk but also very joyous and appreciative of the moment.

And then there was this whole question of how do we write a democratic constitution and they wanted US assistance with that. They wanted to open up their economy. They needed economic support, economic aid. It was a very difficult period because obviously the ruble plummeted at that period.

And they were having lots of political pluralism at the same time. So we were talking to everybody from the extreme hardline communists to those who wanted radical change immediately. It was exciting. Where did you think it was all going to go at that time?

Like if you looked and thought, well, where is this all going to go over the next? Were you even thinking that way or were you so absorbed in the moment that it was even hard to do that or even predict? I think we had had a false sense of how smooth change might be as a result of the transformations in Eastern Europe and Central Europe that had happened in the previous years now. Poland was a country that had had a democratic past.

Hungary had a great European culture. For Russia it ultimately ended up much harder. Our sense was that if we could help them to quickly transform the economy, quickly create a pluralistic political system that Russia would relatively smoothly knit into the European family of nations and if not completely liberalized would be a country that wouldn't be threatening to us at all. Kosovo.

Suddenly we have this confrontation that nobody expected. Where were you now by the late 90s when this challenge comes up? By then I'm working back in Washington. I was working for the Deputy Secretary of State Stobet, who was responsible for relations with the states of the former Soviet Union.

Then what happens is the Kosovo's Albanian ethnic majority population inside of what was then Serbia, want independence from Serbia. They start rising up militarily. Milosevic, who is still the leader of Serbia, sends his army to flatten them. It's a very, very vicious, genocidal effort to suppress their independence claim.

We are fighting for our homes, fighting for our family. This is the second time now that Milosevic has launched a war in the Balkans. And so NATO decides that it needs to protect the innocents and to stop this rampaging of the Serm army for a second time in the middle of Europe. The Russians side with the Serps and say that Kosovo is going to try to secede and that'll start unraveling throughout Europe and who are these up at the Kosovoars to think that they can detach themselves from Belgrade.

And we have for years and years and years now been passing UN Security Council resolutions telling Milosevic to stop, telling him to make peace, telling him to support greater political autonomy for Kosovo within Serbia. He has been, and Russia has been supporting those, but he's been ignoring them. And so when NATO starts falling Milosevic, again, the Russians this time don't cooperate with us. They side with Milosevic and we end up in a real confrontation.

And the Russians start saying it's extra legal and we say, well, you know, we can't allow a genocide in the middle of Europe. And Americans today, our armed forces joined our NATO allies and airstrikes against Serbian forces. Then it's the 50th anniversary of NATO and we are having a summit and Yeltsin is invited as a bilateral partner of NATO and he and Clinton have a bilateral meeting. We work closely with Russia for a peaceful solution for Kosovo at Ramu Gay.

We welcome Russia's efforts and hope they will continue. And in this meeting, they task strobe-tobed on the one hand and gorgi-ma-mietta, the Russian deputy foreman's run the other hand, to settle the Kosovo problem, to come to agreement on how we're going to deal with Milosevic, US and Russia. And we are dispatched immediately. We leave the Washington summit, go get on a small plane and begin an eight-week negotiation to try to reach common cause with the Russians.

And we're, you know, every week getting on a plane, going to Moscow, going to Brussels, going to Helsinki. We think we're making some progress. And then one night we're in the Russian defense ministry having a meeting with all of the generals trying to work out the terms under which Russia and NATO will deploy again to keep the peace in Kosovo. And the next thing we know strobe-self on his ringing.

And it's Sandy Burger from the National Security Advisor saying, I don't know what you're talking about, but they have just landed forces in Priscina and whatever they're telling you about cooperating, they're lying. You need to fix it. And we left the defense ministry at four o'clock in the morning feeling like, you know, our forces in Russian forces were about to go to war in Kosovo. Earlier today there were reports that Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the speaker of the Russian Duma had discussed the possibility of ordering missiles to target NATO countries.

You're sitting there in that room with these Russian negotiators finding out we're about to go potentially come to blows. I mean, how surprising is that to you, given where you were just a few years earlier, trying to bring the Soviet Union along and into the Western fold? You know, we, this was the second iteration of disagreement about the future of the Balkans because we had already been through it in Bosnia. And you know, just as they did in the Soviet period and just as they do now under Putin, Moscow believed in strong man rule in complicated places and they were very much allied with Malazovich.

So even as he was unleashing his army on civilians, they were going to protect him because he thought that they would protect their interests. So, frankly, it was cultural, it was relationship driven, it was on their side a concern that we would decide about the future of the Balkans and that they would get dealt out of that historic relationship. But also it was a reflection of their concern about ethnic uprising potentially first inside the Soviet Union and later within Russia itself. So, you know, even as you can see their point of view, we've got an overriding concern about genocide in the middle of Europe and we're trying to get them to want to be part of the solution rather than stoking the problem.

Ultimately, we were able to settle it and Russia again deployed with NATO to keep the peace and cause of hope, but that was quite a wild moment. President also spoke with President Yeltsin, the two presidents that have firmed documents that have been left with quite a lot of it should form the basis for peaceful settlement of conflict and the suspension of NATO's air campaign. They both agreed to instruct their foreign ministers for a bond. Okay, so let's move on and talk about what comes after Yeltsin.

Vladimir, Vladimir, Putin. You know, most Americans know him at this point as the guy who interfered in the 2016 election, seems to like to ride around on a horse without a shirt on, you know, work that for the KGB for a while, what should we know about Vladimir Putin? What do you make of him and what did you make of him when he first came to power? Remember that Putin starts his post-Soviet career as the deputy mayor of St.

Petersburg, one of the most liberal cities in Russia after the Soviet Union breaks up, and he works for this very liberal reformist mayor, Subchalk. So, you know, at the beginning, we saw him as team Yeltsin, and we assumed that he wanted a more open, more European Russia quickly became clear after he was fully empowered, and Yeltsin was out of the way that that wasn't what he had in mind at all. I've recently begun to point out that when Russia was having this enormous renaissance of openness in the 90s, until about 1996, 7, Putin is actually not in the country. He's still serving in the KGB in East Germany, and so he misses a lot of the euphoric period of completely free press, etc., and by the time he comes back, a lot of individual Russians and particularly middle and lower income Russians have suffered a lot by the economic insecurity by the second time the Ruble-Emma's crash in 1998, and for somebody like him, his education is in the KGB, and who was fed a steady diet of Soviet greatness, you begin to understand that his whole mindset is that we've lost our glory, we've lost our prestige, we've lost the respect that we have, and this disorder is crippling to individual Russians.

So, it's one thing at the beginning when he starts to reestablish economic stability, reestablish some rule of law, bring some order, but what's also beginning to happen is he's closing down the free press. And so, the repression begins very quickly, and essentially, it is clear by 2004-5 that he is not a Democrat, that he'd like the trappings of openness, that he'd like the prestige of being part of the liberal family, but he's not interested in leading in a liberal way. We have this, it seems a pattern with continuous US presidents first getting interested in finding a deal with him and then finding themselves disappointed. I feel like the first time you would have seen it would have been George Bush, who famously talked about his relationship with Putin.

How did you see that? So, I was, by then, deputy at our mission to NATO, when the famous I looked into his eyes, comment was made. I'll answer the question. I looked at the man in the eye.

I found it to be very straightforward and trustworthy. I was able to get a sense of his soul. I will say it bluntly, Putin does not have warm eyes. So, I'm not sure whether it was a KGB move, a faux warmth that was done on President Bush, or whether he so wanted relations to get better, that he willed a warmer relationship than existed.

I do think that after September 11th, when we were hit, and Putin was the first to offer condolences, the first to reach out to Bush, and see if Russia could offer intelligence support or anything else. There was a hope that we had a lot of common interest in defeating terrorism together, that this enemy was a threat to us both, that we could work well together. On our side, we didn't find that the quality of the intelligence that was shared was all that helpful. And on the Russian side, they don't believe that we grabbed the hand that they had out.

So then moving on from that to as we go through the history, we come to the second opportunity to make nice with Russia, the Obama reset. We want to reset our relationship. So we will do it together. I think the first years of the Obama administration, there was interest on both sides in fixing some of the problems.

But I don't think anybody should be under any illusion that the reset with Russia changed Putin's overall approach. It seems like Putin really does not like Hillary Clinton. There's a history there, like what is your assessment that or what did you see working for her that you think helped drive that in his mind? No, throughout her tenure, Hillary Clinton was true to the best of American values in terms of calling it straight when she saw an election that wasn't free and fair, when she saw protests put down with force, et cetera.

Now the Russian authorities say that this anti-corruption protest is illegal, but people have come onto the streets anyway. And as we have seen in many places and most recently in the Duma elections in Russia, elections that are neither free nor fair have the same effect. We have serious concerns about the conduct of those elections. Her willingness to use her pulpit of the State Department not to allow Putin to whitewash elections in 2011, 2012, galled him and, you know, he was also quite concerned, I think, by the number of Russians that hit the street.

A war of words has erupted between Moscow and Washington with the Russian Prime Minister accusing Washington of encouraging protests against his government. And it was far easier to blame us than to think that his own people were actually reacting to the lack of change and the lack of freedom. We're also concerned by reports that independent Russian election observers, including the nationwide Goloz network, were harassed and had cyber attacks on their websites, which is completely contrary to what should be the protected rights of people to observe elections, participate in them and disseminate information. And so I think she was a useful whipping girl, if that makes sense.

By 2013, your continued journey with the Russians, I think maybe peaks at this point. Where are you now? So in September of 2013, I am confirmed as Assistant Secretary for Europe in Eurasia, so working for Secretary Kerry and President Obama with responsibility for policy towards all the countries from the Atlantic Ocean and the UK through Russia. So I would come into this job at a time when Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova were at the end of a four year conversation negotiation with the European Union about associating with the EU, about getting free trade with the EU, about getting visa free travel and a closer relationship.

And we hadn't paid too much attention to this thing. And even more importantly, Moscow hadn't paid too much attention to this thing. But then, you know, they're down to the last couple of problems and we're trying to help the EU to help them over the line with this thing. And all of a sudden, Moscow starts paying attention.

Last minute about turning Ukraine has seen the government suspend a trade pact with the European Union just a week before it was set to be signed. It comes after months of negotiations between Kiev and Brussels. And Moscow decides that, particularly in the case of Ukraine, if this association agreement goes through that Moscow somehow a loser in this game, rather than seeing it as a win-win, you know, potentially if Ukraine has free trade with Europe, Russia, which has free trade with Ukraine might have been able to benefit, they see it as a zero sum, and then Moscow starts putting huge pressure on Ukraine on the leader of Ukraine, Yanukovych, not to sign, and offers him a huge loan. And Yanukovych, after promising his people, he was going to do this for three years.

Reverse, of course, says we're not going to do it now. The government is now issued an order calling off parliamentary votes on the deal, saying it will renew active dialogue with Russia. The streets of Kiev and 20 other cities in Ukraine explode with protesters. It's snowing.

They're setting up camp. They're occupying streets for weeks and weeks and weeks. And then it starts to get dangerous. And we're trying to negotiate some sort of a climb down.

And then it starts to get sporting with regard to me personally. We're doing a lot of work in Ukraine to try to discredit our efforts to negotiate. But the most exciting chapter comes in late January of 2014. Yanukovych finally decides that he's going to accept the international community's recommendation to deescalate this by forming a technical government and inviting some of the protesters to be part of it.

But the opposition is afraid to go into negotiations with him without some international observer in the room. And their first choice is the EU, and their second choice is the UN. And we have been trying to get the EU to come and be this negotiator for weeks and weeks and weeks. And the ambassador calls me at home on a Saturday and says, you know, we've got to move now.

We're going to lose this moment. And I am thinking I'm having a private phone conversation. I mean, I obviously knew the Russians were listening, but they hadn't put a phone call on the street in some 25 years. And I say to him, so that would be great, I think, to help blue the thing and how the UN helped blue it.

And, you know, f*** the EU. I use a bourniard epithet with regard to the EU because I'm frustrated that they haven't been helping us and say, let's go on and use the UN. And two weeks later, the Russians released this phone call. It's evidence that, A, the United States in their narrative is manipulating the whole situation, B, that I obviously have no respect for the major institution within my purview and C, that, you know, I don't have respect for the Ukrainians either.

And they're obviously looking to discredit me personally. And I have to apologize to everybody, all the Europeans, all the Ukrainians, my own president. But ultimately, I think the tactic backfired. Brussels wouldn't comment on a leaked alleged phone conversation.

The video clearly aims to embarrass the US, echoing Moscow's accusations that the West is meddling in Ukraine. It demonstrated to the world that we were trying to settle the situation, whereas they were just trying to stir the pot. You really are coming full circle. As I hear the story, I'll just think about you going from interviewing people out on the street in Moscow in 1991, all the way to talking to people on the streets in Kiev in 2014 and 2015.

But that's the great thing about real diplomacy. When you're empowered to do it, which is it's not just about walking into the presidential palace or the foreign ministry and talking to leaders. You need to talk to the people of the country to really understand where it's going and to make those connections. And that's been a great joy of my career.

So last question for you. You clearly have deep respect for the Russians. You clearly love the Russian people. You spend your career dealing and negotiating with them, sometimes butting heads with them.

Is there hope for a positive way forward between the US and Russia after all these years? I want to hope so. You know, the planet is safer. Both countries are at their best when we do well together, when we're solving problems together.

But you know, the Russian people for all their fantastic culture, beautiful literature, deep souls, all of which I have enjoyed throughout my life, have been badly governed for a lot of their history and have had leaders who want to keep them separated from the rest of the world and want to restrict their freedom and their opportunities. And when that happens, it's very hard for us to work together. So I want to hope for their sake that in my lifetime, in my kid's lifetime, they have more opportunities. They have less corruption and more freedom in their lives.

And I think that'll make it possible for us to do more together. That's Victoria Newland. She left her career in foreign service at the end of President Obama's time in office. Of course, there's a whole other chapter to the US-Russian relationship that's occurred under this new administration.

But that's still being written. I have great confidence in my intelligence people, but I will tell you that President Putin was extremely strong and powerful in his denial today. And what he did is it incredible. Next week on the podcast, in the early 1990s, Martin and Dick was an Australian-born Middle East swanke living in D.C.

You then got called to be a foreign policy advisor to then candidate Bill Clinton. And I told him, look, if you become president, you'll have the opportunity, with Robin, to get four-piece agreements in your first time between the Jordan, Palestinian, and Lebanon. And I just remember he stopped eating, he looked at me and he said, I want to do that. That story and others from index career in the pursuit of peace agreements between Israel and its neighbors on the next stories from the back channel, dropping next Tuesday.

Our podcast is a production of the Center for New American Security. Our producers are Rob Sacks and Ashoshi Shmulovitz. Music from Nolan Schneider. I'm Yolan Gollenberg.

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