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Hello, welcome to the fun show. Today with a somewhat less ethical and normal, probably a welcome for everybody. I'm on vacation this week, but we're giving you an episode of our sister podcast, Sway, led by Karis Swisher, a podcast about power. You can follow Sway wherever you get your podcast, but for now, please enjoy.
I'm Karis Swisher and you're listening to Sway. My guest today is Elliot Higgins. He created Bellingcat, the open source investigative team that's part online detective agency and part news outlet. Higgins Group has broken some of the biggest stories in recent years.
Bellingcat found evidence linking Russia to the downing of light MH17, identified alt-right protesters in Charlottesville, and unveiled the alleged poisoners who targeted Russian opposition leader, Alexei Navalny. Bellingcat has become a major thorn in the side of powerful and dangerous people like Vladimir Putin. I wanted to understand how Higgins decides what's worth investigating and what distinguishes his organization from online vigilantes. But first, I asked him how he came up with the name Bellingcat in the first place.
So Bellingcat is based off the fable of Belling the cat, where there's a group of mice who are very farisins of a large, ferocious cat, so they decide that they need a plan to deal with it and they come up with the idea of putting a bell around the cat's neck, but then they realize they don't actually know how to do that because there's a huge cat in their mice. So we're in a way teaching people how to bell the cat. So that they can hear the cat coming. So they can hear it coming and be kind of warned of it.
So you are the mice presumably in this scenario. Yeah, people always go like the Bellingcats and we know we're the mice. Anyway, but you are the mice in this idea is that you are facing some ferocious people that could eat you essentially and that you are going to make sure people can hear them coming or hear them when they're doing in a stealthy way, for example. Yeah, and that takes all kinds of different forms.
I mean, the work of Bellingcat comes as a pretty wide range of topics. I mean, a lot of it does end up focusing on Russia, but that's because Russia's up to quite a lot of free bath stuff at the moment, but we write on a whole range of different topics. And recently we've been writing a lot about the kind of origins of Q and, you know, clues that his identity might be. We've written about the kind of violence of January 6 and Washington DC.
We've looked into kind of Saudi airstrikes in Yemen, just like a whole range of different topics looking at how open source material can be used to investigate those topics. I want to explain what open source means. So open source information is anything that's basically publicly available information information that you can either kind of go out and find or you can buy, for example, satellite map imagery. What changed over the last 10 years or so is how much of that information is available and who is available to because of really the rise of smartphone technology from 2007 onwards.
And around that, the development of a social media sharing apps, people sharing information all the time alongside that you have the development of things like Google Earth, making satellite imagery accessible to everyone, Google Street View, so you had a view from the ground anywhere in the world virtually. And by combining those two kind of almost revolutions and technology, that allows us to do this kind of new form of online open source investigation where anyone with a laptop and internet connection can look at videos and images and information coming from a range of different incidents and countries. And so actually piecing together and verifying what this is actually showing. I want to know how you got started in doing this kind of digital forensics.
For me, actually really started off in 2010 with the events of the Arab Spring. Back then, I was just working in finance and admin jobs, nothing really kind of grand, but I had an interest in what was happening in the Arab Spring and I was also spent an awful lot of time on the internet. So I was part of these kind of online debates and discussions. So over a period of a year, I did that more and more and started to build a performing, particularly among people who are interested in conflict in Syria, be they journalists, people at think tanks, even people in the kind of political classes and various experts, because no one else was really bothering to look at these videos in a kind of any sort of analytical way.
And in 2013, I actually, using these videos discovered the Saudi secret smuggling operation to the Syrian rebels because they were getting all these new weapons from the former Yugoslavia. I figured out where they were coming from and actually working with the New York Times. We were able to establish that this was part of the secret smuggling operation. So what you were doing was basically Gumpshoe Journalism using online tools.
I mean, most of the journalists would go in and see them or take pictures of them and see them. In this case, you're being provided photos because everybody's taking and uploading photos all around the world, essentially. Yeah, I mean, it's basically just looking at the evidence and figuring out what it said. More than the advantage I had, funnily enough, was because I didn't speak a word of Arabic.
I could only see what was being shown. So someone was saying something in a video and they were telling the whole story. It didn't matter to me. But I could see that that object on the ground was like a cluster munitions or very particular kind of, you know, barrel bomb design.
And you're doing all of this online from England? Yeah, I mean, I was just sounding so for every night, kind of looking for you for the latest videos. So how much a Belling Cats open service for NSX are based on social media like this? Yeah, I mean, it is really any public information that we can find as people posting on the internet forums or YouTube or, you know, weird social media sites you never really hear about because they're for like some really minor obscure groups.
So, you know, for example, when we were doing our work on the Downing Information Analyze Flight 17, we were looking into the soldiers who were connected to the Russian military brigade that sent them to someone. And we looked into them using the V Contacti profile of the 53rd air defense brigade, which they belong to. So that's like Russia's equivalent of Facebook. Then we looked at all the people who were following them and a lot of them with soldiers serving in that brigade.
And then we looked at their user IDs as such, those user IDs on different social media platforms, which then revealed more and more information about them, what they were doing, who their friends were. And we used that basically to map out the entire network of the 53rd air defense brigade. Every member, photograph, rank. We also used an internet forum for the wives, girlfriends and mothers of these soldiers where they were discussing their concerns about their, you know, sons and, you know, husbands, boyfriends, boyfriends.
Giving details of them into operations because they all kind of felt like it was a secure place, which was a public forum. So it's anywhere where there's information being shared online and, you know, obviously that's a lot of different places. Right. The Russian government is cracked down on soldiers selfies and things like that, because essentially they were saying where they were, what they were doing, and so you could make links between them, which is, you know, a banquet for intelligence services and you yourself.
Yeah. So your investigations really build on platforms that do a terrible job with privacy, Facebook, for example, or YouTube. And are you troubled by the idea that your success depends on their surveillance and their terrible privacy? I was almost a paradox of the kind of work we do because a good example of this is Facebook Graph Search, which was a search tool they introduced.
Several years ago, that allows you to do very complicated searches on any individuals or groups of individuals. Like you could find out people working in Washington, DC, you could go to the new Starbucks to the White House who, you know, like really granular searches, which was fantastic if you're investigating people because you could find out all sorts of things and the kidding connections. It was also fantastic if you were Cambridge Analytica and you wanted to swing the boat, or if you were rushing, you wanted to swing the 2016 election. So that got shut down.
So we lost a really good investigation tool, but it also meant that society also lost something that was beginning to become quite toxic to it. And you have all these kind of paradoxes. You know, we want people to be safe and secure online, but we also want people to be sharing as much information as possible. Yeah, you kind of benefit from the shitty privacy settings that these companies have or and people's demented need to share at this point because people are carrying surveillance devices every day of their lives.
We see every single day of our work, how often people overexposed them. It's like when we're looking into cases of corruption, the easiest way to look into corrupt individuals is look at their children and their wife's social media accounts because they will have all their sports cars and their whole days all over that. The person might be quite humble in their kind of own social media posts. This is why I switched off all location and access to Facebook, for example.
This is the thing. And so people have got a way to share really useful information about incidents that we're interested in. And we want people to kind of pull out a phone and you know, feel an airstrike or the remains of a bomb or, you know, someone committing a crime. But we don't want them to come over exposing their lives.
It's like the my activity thing on Google where you can see you go, then they've got a map of every single place you've been to. So you also helped ID violent extremists at the 2017 Charlottesville rally on January 6. There was a riot at the Capitol. So walk me through it step by step how your investigators sprang into action on January 6.
When did you first learn about the attack? I mean, really, when it was, I was kind of on Twitter and then, you know, watching it kind of basically because you had Donald Trump speech. And so we were kind of just generally watching it as consumers of news. And then when we realized what was happening, that's kind of when we started glossing to actually collecting these videos.
Who did you call first? I want to, I want actual details. So what did you do first? You're like, you're like, I bet these people are going to record.
We're doing crimes. Look at us. Yeah. I mean, we were discussing it, you know, in the build up to it, you know, should we do what we do with Charlottesville and, you know, we're thinking surely they wouldn't be stupid enough to kind of record what they do again.
But we were wrong. So with Charlottesville, we collected as many videos as possible. So we did the same thing with January 6. We put a big kind of call from material.
And then all the difference there was the massive amount of material that was, you know, from January 6 compared to 2017 because everyone had a phone there, everyone was streaming. So then when that was happening, we already had like a Google sheet and a Google form set up for people to fill in and on Twitter, we just said, if you have a video, could you, you know, pull it into this sheet and then we go through it. So we had these 1000 videos or so. And then we can't deduicate them or feed out which ones had clips in.
And that was literally watching every video and just recognizing obviously that video, you know, 200 cells beforehand and then sorting them by kind of location. So we had like the inaugural entrance was one location. I spent several weeks looking at all the videos of that to put them into sequential order and also figure out their physical position. So we had kind of been 1000 videos from all over the area, but we knew when they were filmed and that was weeks of works to do that.
But what do you do that law enforcement is also working on trying to identify rioters continuing to do? Do you partner with them or intelligence services? No, we are actually approached by the FBI on this one saying if we could kind of give them any assistance, but we don't want to do the job for law enforcement for them, especially when they're so well resourced that mean we're a small organization with a budget of about 1.7 million a year, which, you know, so it's something we had to build up to. What we didn't want to do though is end up in a situation where we're saying, oh, we've got to figure out who that guy is because we know from experience, even if you get some people right, plenty of people get misidentified.
And that's exactly what happened to come into net community forms because to hunt down the people responsible and identify a bunch of people who ended up getting harassed online. And we've seen that going back years at the Boston Marathon for an investigation being a good example of that, where they identify two suspects because there's a group of people that occurred by having hundreds of people involved. And in my experience, it's a more complicated investigation of less people you want involved because that's when you start having group trink emerge. Right.
So one of the things that I think was important that you mentioned now was this idea of people misidentifying people. There are a lot of online vigilantes. So we saw after the Capitol attack many citizens and online forms combed socially trying to identify writers. There's been called due processors, there's been called presuming innocent before guilt.
How do you think about that? Well, in the specific case of January 6, we knew from past experience that we didn't want loads of people looking into the identities of these people because we knew that would just be a disaster. So we, you know, we said on our social media account that we aren't looking for people. You know, it's the FBI's job to do that.
We knew that we'd stop people from doing it, but we tried to discourage it wherever we could. But, you know, when we're doing our own work, when we do identify people, we're looking at details, I'm just, oh, that guy has a similar face. Like when we're looking at this Charlottesville individuals we're looking into. One guy had a big distinct pattern of morals on his neck and that's kind of the key thing that allowed us to be 100% sure we're looking at the right person.
So there's also quite distinct when we're looking for example for these Russian spies looking at their fake passports and their real identity documents. Not only do you have the shape of their face, but their real shape is actually quite distinct as well. So you can use that almost as like kind of a fingerprint if you look at their shapes, kind of a care for your past book photographs. We also now work with universities who have expertise in facial recognition.
Which can be wrong. One of the things that I think you probably are aware of most journalists, even though they sort of get a pillar reader in fear of getting things wrong and hurting people. I think it's sort of drilled into you at a very early age as a journalist. And you know, especially with online people make all these leaps.
I mean, in a sense, for me, it's kind of was always informed by kind of the origins of my own career path, which is basically arguing with people on the internet and knowing that people on the internet, A will argue over any point to a ridiculous land. They will. And if you get something wrong, they will never let you forget it. So those are kind of the two things that inform our work.
Plus now we also have Russia basically doing the same thing because if we get something wrong, Russia won't let us forget it either. So we're, that's kind of, you know, I think informs all our work. Plus the way we actually work is we're often, it's quite collaborative. For example, if the Russia stuff we're doing at the moment, there's like four or five of us in a group who are discussing this stuff quite regularly examining each other's works questioning kind of each other.
And then that goes to the editorial team who then go through it and then ask more more questions on top of that. All right. Last summer, Russian opposition leader, Alexei Navalny was hospitalized in Siberia after being poisoned with a nerve agent, Nova Choke. He was then treated in Germany.
You launched a major investigation into who was behind this. How did you start working with Navalny? Well, fully enough, it was really a part of an ongoing investigation we've been doing since 2018 with the. Around boyzings.
Yes, because in 2018, we started looking into the identities of the two people connected to the Sergei Sripel poisoning in the UK and using Russian bureaucratic sources, we able to find out, you know, their real identities and show they were to GI officers that then led us to the identity of a third year officer who was involved with that case and that they were part of this unit, two nine one five five. The GRU, that's Russia's military intelligence service. Go ahead. And then, yeah, and then that led then to an investigation of Bulgaria where those same, that same unit was involved with another poisoning that investigation led us to phone records which connected them to basic series of research laboratories in Russia, where there were chemists working there who were doing that.
Right. So this is a sort of a daisy chain of poisoners. And so one, if they did it in one place, it stands to reason they might try it in another or they might use the same people. And the same source for the poisoning.
So when the only was poisoned, we got the phone records of the scientists who work at these places and they were actually calling up FSB teams and being called by these FSB officers. So we had to identify who these numbers were. There are FSB officers. We got their travel records and it just happened.
How did you get those? By the way, FSB is federal security service for Russia. How did you get those records? You could literally like go to like some Russian internet for some guys sending them for like 1000 Rubels or anyone you want in there if you've got the passport number.
So these are things presumably our government keeps under wraps. Yeah, so your phone records, for example, now phone records aren't just the phone numbers they've called, but the cell phone tower they connected to, which means you can track their movements. We were also able then to get along with the flight records and we got their real identity documents and their fake identity documents because we realized there was a process they used when they created a fake identity, which allowed us to identify their real identity. They would use the same first name, a date of birth that was exactly one year different and usually made a name of their wife or girlfriend.
And their password was one, two, three, four. So we have done some investigations where we have found the passwords and it's always like really stupid passwords they use like GRU1 and stuff like that. We found some when we found their social media accounts where they literally call themselves something like the Terminator or like some assassination later and they're utterly ridiculous. But we piece this together and then we went to Novani's team and started talking to him and his team about what happened.
He was really surprised because he thought he would find out in like 40 years time that the FSB poisoned him, not literally the people were like at his hotel tonight he was poisoned. Now these chuckleheads. And then we basically worked with him. He wanted to make sure everything we were using was also not coming from like MI5 for the CIA.
So he wanted to know every single source we were using. So he went through about, I think about a long process of him and his team double checking all that findings. We got CNN involved as well who also double checked all that findings and sources as well. And then we kind of published another day of publication.
We decided it would be fun if we found out these poisonous because we had their phone numbers. So Novani calls them up. Like say hi, I'm Novani. Why did you voice me?
This is in a 33 minute YouTube video with over 20 million views. That was kind of a build up stack. So what we did is use of phone numbers spoofing app which allowed us to pretend to be calling from the FSB head office called on the FSB offices. So it's called where I did the FSB head office.
And then the Barnley tended to be an assistant of one of the more senior kind of FSB kind of officers way, way above this guy. That's not too bad. It's a good question. It's a good question.
I want a very simple question. And demanded a full report on what happened. And it was if we hadn't called it on camera no one would have believed us. Novani basically believed him into doing it as well.
Because the guy was like are we sure we should be doing this on an Instagram line. And he was like oh this is really urgent. It has to be done now. You must tell me.
And then he was like asking him to give performance reviews for each of the people involved. And then we had all this information about the case. We could give him names. I'm like what should we call?
What should we call? And he would basically say oh yeah he did this. He did this. And that was confirming every single part of our investigation.
Now we didn't publish that on the day because when you put him we'd be giving his big, easy press conference and he would be asked about this. And we wanted to see his response before we published the audio of this conversation. So he gets his press conference. He's asked about Novani.
And he basically says it's all quite a little bit. If we were going to kill him we would have done it properly. Then on the following Monday we published this video of this guy saying oh I don't know why it went wrong or it's probably because they got off the claim. And he said he had to put the poison on his underpants.
All these different kind of details. And that made it a really really big story in Russia and internationally as well. So essentially you pantsed Putin. Yeah I mean we knew he would be giving this talk.
This was a kind of strategic choice when we were publishing. Because we knew if we had something on record about it and we still had this thing in the tank it would be more entertaining for the readers. Well this is dangerous work. Going after Putin has put you on the Kremlin's radar.
They have no problem killing people. They referenced Belling Cats work before. You have a family. How worried are you about retaliation yourself?
I mean it's certainly a lot more careful. In a sense, Prenovirus has been always a blessing because I haven't had to go to on foreign trips where you know, stuff could happen and have them staying at hotel rooms at balconies. But you have to have that kind of level of paranoia. There's one time I was staying at hotel in the Netherlands where I'd stayed there several times before for previous years.
And there was a knock on the door one evening. I was there. And a door opened and there was a guy in a suit with a name badge for the hotel saying oh we're mistaken. Thank you for staying here so many times.
We'd like to give you this gift. I was like oh okay this is a bit weird. But when I closed the door I thought that guy could have been literally anyone with a name badge he picked up from reception. And I can't eat these cookies.
Even though there's a lot of them. They look delicious. So I ended up throwing them in the bin. And it was quite gutting when I came down the next morning and checked out.
And they said oh we hope you enjoyed the cookies that you gave you yesterday. You suddenly become Jason Bourne in the situation. Like I'm not going in there. It's the crappy parts of being Jason Bourne.
It's the kind of having to be a bit more careful. What about your family? Do you think about that? Yeah I mean it's again my wife she kind of is concerned about my safety and you know that kind of stuff.
My kids are quite young so they don't quite understand what I'm doing. I mean there's six and nine so maybe as they grow older and get a bit more context to what I'm doing they might start wearing a bit more. We'll be back in a minute. If you like this interview and want to hear others follow us on your favorite podcast app.
You'll be able to catch up on sway episodes. You may have missed like my conversation with the CIA's chief technologist Don Myricks and you get new ones delivered directly to you. More with Elliot Higgins after the break. So let me ask you about the ethics because the New York Times doesn't partner with Navalny in that way.
You see a problem in part because you're doing journalism in a different way. Why didn't you do the investigation on your own or at least out of an arm's link relationship with Navalny? Well and we do a lot of collaborative work at Ballenk anyway. I mean it's not usually with the you know the targets of four good things but it's just kind of our natural way.
You know if we are working on our topic we'll find another media organization who's working on the same topic in a more local sense. And we're going to have a range of topics. It's just in the case of Navalny. He was the victim of poisoning attack and he was also this big kind of media figure in Russia.
So he's really the ideal person to approach with this. Plus it meant by working with him we could get more details of his kind of travel records and information that we didn't have which is unusual. Well most journalism organizations would want to do that maybe but don't do that right. I think as well because Ballenkat is kind of this weird hybrid of an organization as well in a way the journalism is one outcome of the kind of investigations that we're doing.
I think primarily we're investigators and then what we do with those investigations can be a whole range of different products. To become journalism. Yeah we break down our process to three steps like identify verify and amplify. So we identify material verify and then we amplify it but that amplification stage can be a kind of more traditional kind of journalistic output or it could be a document for justice and accounts because it's a process.
It could be a YouTube video documentary. It could be all of them because it's all using the same verify information. So journalism is just a byproduct of the investigation. It could be a byproduct.
So Russia's state run Russia day did come after you. They honed in on one line item for 1800 pounds paid to Bellenkat from the UK foreign office in December of 2018. It was for quote consulting management public relations. Can you explain what that was about?
Yeah so basically we run workshops that publicly available. You know anyone can join them. Someone did a freedom of information requests and founders and kind of one of these kind of things. And basically there was a journalist from Eastern Europe who went to more of our courses and then had their course fee paid by the foreign Commonwealth office, which was 1800 pounds, which was the same as the other 20 participants paid.
So that's pretty much the entire story. But of course Russia today has been desperately looking for proof that we're secretly working for MI six and you know this was all the proof they needed. It's kind of six degrees of CIA station they like to play if they can find one connection and the rest just come naturally. I mean the things that's evolved over time and early on it was really a couple more of the Russian media who like Russia today and spot that.
Can we even say I'm so much of a no one should listen to me or that I'm probably connected to the intelligence services. That's a intelligent service angle certainly round up after the scribble thing. Sure. So let me ask are you connected to the intelligence services?
No we're not and it's you know many many people seem to think that one of the fun things about the internet is the people who think that or find each other and then constantly tell each other that we're working with the CIA and make all these connections. But it's like when you've got Russia saying that and like the Russian ambassador to the UK gave a press conference for the triple poisoning where he repeatedly said that Balencat was working for the British Deep establishment as he called it and was paid for by the intelligence services. But when the journalists asking for evidence he said oh well we have a feeling I can't show you the evidence and this is a thing if Russia cannot show evidence that Balencat is working for the CIA. Then what helped us you know a bunch of conspiracy theories on the internet have because Russia has the resources behind it.
But has the CIA or any other intelligence service like MI six ever offered you leads and information or you say you don't do sources but would you accept help from those sources. I suspect they're a little bit worried about exactly what we would do with that I mean I probably came to me I'm probably tweet obviously I hate to speak because I'm not I'm not the kind of person who's great keeping secrets I mean it seems like spy work but it's like all public available information we're using it's not often like really big secrets. Right so you wouldn't want to accept their information. Yeah I mean the thing is it would be again not open source if they did that.
Like if they came to us with a list of YouTube videos that would just be one thing for anything so if they came to us with a bunch of secret videos saying you can't tell us you know telling where you got this from then that we completely serve situation for us to be in and we wouldn't accept any information from any kind of intelligence service anyway. So I want to talk about Bellinkets methods because you do things like paying for data sets like you talked about which is probiev as they call it in Russia. You're buying black market data essentially. It's basically Russia is a huge corrupt bureaucracy so you can buy any data you want from from records but to pass application forms of anyone you want.
So if you're using that data which obviously is an open source in a traditional sense even though it's very available to anyone. But there we would use multiple other sources to cross reference every single piece of information to make sure it's correct and hasn't been altered and it's like okay there's one assassination here there's one here is the secret weapons lab and it was all coming from this data so considering the value and the importance of this we thought it was kind of justified ethically because if we didn't do it then there was a good chance that these guys would still be doing what they were doing today murdering more people. Okay so you weigh that in a way the journal is in wouldn't pay for it. Now would you pay for controversial facial recognition software like Clearview AI have you considered that?
The thing is it's difficult I mean having kind of facial recognition kind of reverse image search is something that we've used elsewhere in other investigations like in Russia there's sites that basically scrapes the entire social media slightly become factor and use facial recognition so if you plug in a picture that you've taken or found online it will find a matching face in that entire data set and that will include Russian soldiers or Russian spies like really useful information so I can see the value of that but we wouldn't be like going okay we've got this facial recognition match that's the job done that's going to arrest that guy is often happens with some of the people using these platforms especially US police. It's tricky as well because you know clearly describing a huge amount of information that I suspect it doesn't necessarily have the choice to be scraping. Are you using Clearview? No we're not no I think as well because of our position we scare off some organizations like you can have a slight degree of shadiness around the way they collect data because they don't want to be as article on Belling Car.
Talking about information like TMZ, Pays for Information, I know Harvey very well the National Choir Pays for Tips, Rupert Murdoch pays for it. Should in the future American news outlets think about paying for data is that the way journalism is going bought and paid for in a way? The thing with Russia is it is extremely unique in the way that you can buy this kind of data it's not like you can do this in any other country in the world that we've looked into or invested investigations in so it's very unique. It's also very unique of the severity of the case that we're looking into you know a no-vigorous assassination program starting obviously.
You didn't pay to tack into her phone. You can't pay people to like hack into stuff or anything like that. One thing we did when we published an Evani case when you straight away that Russia would say this is MI6 or the CIA giving me information. We did a very long piece explaining where this information came from what those sources were without linking directly to the sources.
But that meant media organizations inside Russia as the story was being attacked by the Russian government actually went and brought the same data and said this is exactly what Belling Cat says it is. And that actually undermined the attempts to attack Belling Cat for doing this investigation. Even though it's not open source in the traditional sense it's so freely available that even with a little bit of understanding you can go and do it yourself. That's why I think when we're having this conversation about the ethics of using this kind of data is very difficult to put in the context of other countries because you don't have a situation where you wouldn't be able to do that in the US.
But you certainly can buy information. Oh yeah absolutely. And but it's also what you're buying it for. I mean if you're buying it for some celebrity gossip then I don't think there's any justification for that in my mind.
Yeah so Fusion GPS is another entity that says that open source investigations are famous for commissioning the infamous steel dossier on President Trump. That work was thought to be funded by unknown Republican client during the Republican primary fusion was founded by a former Wall Street Journal reporter Glenn Simpson who left journalism to make money. We don't use the word sold out we use the word cashed in explain how Belling Cat is different. Well Belling Cat now is actually a chance for foundation in the Netherlands.
So we aren't a private company that's trying to do this work for profit. We're funded through donors you know small donors and kind of larger kind of organizations. We're funding from running workshops. So it's for us it's not about making a profit to kind of make ourselves rich and happy and you know we don't really care about you know what's happening.
We're doing this because we want to grow and develop a field of online open source investigation and look at where it can be applied in a broader range of different fields. That's why at the moment we're doing a lot of focus for example on justice and accountability and developing online open source investigation methodologies and processes that we can. Using these kind of justice accounts really focus investigations knowing that they need to stand it that they can be used in a courtroom. I get that but any of the question I think it's a fair one to ask is who are you actually accountable to now I know your chair builders nation the Netherlands.
You have an independent supervisory board oversee Belling Cat management but it's and if you say if we fail to board members scrutiny they may take action against any of us. There's only three names listed a tech entrepreneur and Amsterdam a pretty well not international policy director at Stanford Cyber Policy Center and a director of Cultural Center Amsterdam so they don't ring out you know Bob Woodward to me or something like that. Not that he would be necessarily the right person to hear but who are you actually accountable to. Well I mean this comes in a number of different forms I think we do have the area of the supervisory board and you know we are accountable to those people and something that we're growing as the organization is growing as well.
We're also you know legally accountable as well there's any organizations when we publish something you can be super. Yeah plus also cancel in the sense that we're willing to go to court with the information that we have and see in front of the judge and explain it in detail and be cross examined as well. I think it's something that's very unusual as well so there's that at Kat's been to there also for published stuff that's untrue you know we're accountable to the people are reading us. So we have to kind of be very careful about making sure that we're publishing as accurate that it can be stood up not just for our audience but also you know to a courtroom both from the perspective being sued but also actually using this evidence for accountability and you know also just accountable to the super advisory force.
Who chose these three individuals did you? Not myself personally it was we now have a management team as well so it's not a kind of weekly situation where I'm the junior sergeant for Bellingcat. No then you'd be in an embassy with a cat an actual cat but go ahead. Then I'm part of a board of directors at Bellingcat so it's myself but I business director and my colleague Eric Toller who's one of the first people who joined Bellingcat.
But how did you get these individuals and can they fire you? No yeah they can fire me. Part of the reason we came to charity was to make sure that I couldn't become the king of Bellingcat and do what I wanted to also because we're quiet to have a yearly audit because we wanted to be trans man who was funding us and where this money was coming from. So you know we approached figures so largely shactus on that I had known from doing some work around Brussels.
You have a few people I didn't know but they were recommended to us as people who kind of understood the areas we were working in and wanted to supervise people that wasn't just made up of investigators who could get very excited about investigations who wanted people who had an understanding of you know when we're getting a bit overexcited when. Is that going to get larger? That board going to get larger? Absolutely.
We're growing as an organization. I'm a generally doubled in size every single year since I launched. I launched in 2014 with a Kickstarter for about $80,000 and we've basically doubled in size every year since then and now we have a budget is about $2.1 million now. There's no journalist on that on the board.
That's really interesting to me. Yeah I mean we did have a journalist on the board. The thing is the journalist we know are very excited about Bellingcat's work and we want to get excited about Bellingcat's work every single time we go on the investigation. Because they want to be 100% sure we had a reason for doing what we were doing.
You could put Dick Cheney on it? No I really don't. Don't touch it. That makes me feel dirty if I did that.
I say any doesn't like media and he does a lot of spy experience. I think you. That would be terrible. So let's finish up talking about the business.
You mentioned the workshops. How are you paying your bills? So I think about Fapes percents of our yearly income farm running workshops and they were in person but they're now all online. We have about 10 to 15% come from small individual donations.
So this would be from things like Patreon or direct donations for the websites of our readers. Then the remaining income percents comes from a combination of different funding organizations. I think we've got eight or nine. We're actually about to publish our yearly audit.
So everybody really cares about them in the secrecy of it. Okay, but not a big Bill Gatesy and kind of thing or something. Yeah, it would be nice if someone came along and gave us a billion dollars to do with what we want. But we actually rather prefer that we have lots of different sources of income because then we're never really kind of like someone says, you know, I'm not going to pay you any more money unless you do this.
We can say, well, goodbye. We'll post an article about that. And then don't be beholden to a billionaire. One of the things you do is these workshops retrain people in open source investigations.
Do you ever worry about putting powerful tools in the hands of bad guys or teaching people wrong people to avoid detection? We're pretty careful about who we invite. I mean, there's only so much we can do to the background of people. But generally we all have people coming from places that are kind of big NGOs or news organizations.
We sometimes get private individuals who want to learn how to do open source investigations. But if someone comes to us saying, I'm from the British Ministry of Defense or I'm from the CIA, then we say no, because we don't train military or intelligence. Well, they don't tell you that. Well, this is a thing.
It's also how do we know who they are? But fortunately, being open source investigators always have a bit of a dig into people to make sure they're representing themselves because equally it could be someone coming from Russia today or the Russian Ministry of Defense or the GRU who's coming to our workshops. So we have to be careful. But now everything's online as well.
There's less kind of worry that our subsidies are going to get poised under a workshop. Fair point. One of the things you also aren't to train your competition, news outlets are hiring your own visual investigation teams. The New York Times poached one of your investigators, Christiane Trebert.
Do you worry about giving away your secret sauce? I think we still quite unique in the sense that it's not just about doing open source kind of journalism side of it, but the other kind of outcomes that we have. So that keeps us fairly unique in that sense because, you know, the New York Times team does really amazing work. That kind of stuff for me is actually good to see because that's bringing the work we're developing into the mainstream.
Would you consider selling Bellingcat to a major news outlet? Well, I mean, we can't sell Bellingcat because it's a chance for foundation now. So it's not something I could do. But I wouldn't want to do that anyway because once you set it to one specific kind of organization, like a news organization, it becomes a news organization.
So is anyone trying to buy you? No, I mean, I've been trying to... When I first started doing this, and I realized it was something I wanted to do, I applied for jobs like the BBC and ITB as a trainee journalist. And I immediately got related.
And then now I'm training them. So that's a sass thing. The things it's like now when people actually ask me if I want to work for them, it's like, no, I'm really happy with why I am at Bellingcat. That's funny.
I still keep all the rejection letters I got from every newspaper and there is a pile of them. And sometimes I really admire you care as a journalist. I'm like, you wouldn't hire me. Anyway, so Bellingcat is choosing specific cases and stories to investigate.
There's so many to do. Some critics question your impartiality. How do you answer people who said, what's your agenda? Why do you pick what you pick?
I mean, like with the Russia stuff, it's not like we wake up thinking, well, investigate Russia today. It's more like Russia wakes up and someone decides to assassinate someone and, you know, we just have that. There they go again. But, you know, we're looking now at topics, for example, we've been looking at Columbia, working with local journalists there, drawing protests and kind of mapping out the police and security forces violence there.
There's like a million things we can do across the world. And we're already 20 people. We have to select a topic, a region where we can kind of start actually building the capability there through education through collaboration. Regional versus you were looking into who is cute, essentially tracing metadata and looking for cute drops occurred.
Yeah, and that's actually come from a small community of kind of researchers who've been looking into that independently of Bellingcat. We're now kind of giving them a platform where we can kind of review their work, have it edited properly and then published on the website. So what would you like to investigate most of all right now? What is it interested?
Elliot Higgins? Oh, God, that's so, I mean, the situation in Ethiopia and the fair trail was really interesting because we did a bit of work there. There's a lot of video footage coming from there that shows some really horrific stuff. But then you look at, you know, another part of the world where there's new stuff, like the stuff that's happening, you know, is real and Bellingcat is worth investigating as well.
For me, it's always about, you know, seeing if there's any kind of sense of accountability that can be brought to what's happening. I mean, even in the smallest kind of sense, I've been helping an organization, you know, just a few hours here and there called DogLost.co.uk, which is a website for people who've had their dogs lost or stolen. And we've been using number plate analysis technique we developed to investigate murders to help detect dog thieves. And we've already reunited two dogs with their families.
It's literally just like a couple of hours. And it's like, you don't usually get that if you investigate a serum or crime, it's like, okay, I'll just have a result in 10 years. So the cats are saving dogs, right? So really pretty much.
The mice saving dogs. The mice who bell the cats are saving dogs. It's very confusing. All right.
Elliot, thank you so much. I really appreciate this. Thank you. Bye.
Cheers. Sway is a production of New York Times Opinion. It's produced by name, Maraza, Blakely Shick, Hibba Elurbani, Matt Quang and Daphne Chen. Edited by name, Maraza and Paula Schumann, with original music by Isaac Jones, mixing by Eric Gomez and fact checking by Cait Sinclair.
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