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Apr 30, 2019 47 min

The Assad Dilemma

from CNAS Podcasts Hosted by Center for a New American Security

The Assad regime has been in power in Syria since 1970. For many analysts, the Syrian state could not exist without the regime, and the regime could not exist without the leadership of the Assad family. However, there still is a debate whether an alternative power to the Assad family could run the Syrian state, in a hypothetical transition period from Bashar al-Assad's rule. Alexander Bick, Research Scholar at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs, Faysal Itani, a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East programs at the Atlantic Council, and Kaleigh Thomas, the Research Associate for the Middle East Security Program at CNAS, join Nicholas Heras to discuss.

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The Assad Dilemma

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Hi everyone, my name is Nick Harris and I am a fellow in the Middle East Security Program at the Center for New American Security. The Middle East Security Program is wrapping up a year-long project where we investigated different policy options for the U.S. as it charts out a new approach to the Syrian crisis. In particular, our study investigated how the U.S.

could leverage serious fragmentation in a way that it could affect an outcome that benefits the United States and the broader international community. We are conducting a series of podcasts that look at some of the thornier issues that have impacted U.S. policy towards Syria since 2011. For today's episode, we will be investigating the Assad dilemma.

Since 2011, the United States has sought a post-conflict Syria where the Assad regime has been transitioned out of power. The Trump administration has recently modified that objective to simply changes in the Assad regime's behavior. Still, whether or not Bashar al-Assad remains in power in Syria is a thorny issue and it significantly impacts how the U.S. will approach its policy towards the Syrian conflict moving forward.

Joining me today for this episode are three distinguished guests. First, we have Alexander Beck. Alexander is a research scholar at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

From 2014 to 2016, he served as Director for Syria at the National Security Council. Previously, Alexander served in the State Department's Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations and on the Secretary of State's policy plan and staff. Before joining the U.S. government, Alexander worked on Libya as Director of the Carter Center's International Observation Mission for the country's first post-conflict elections.

In regard to Syria, Alexander played a lead role in developing and coordinating the Obama administration strategy to defeat the Islamic State and support negotiations with Russia to advance a peaceful settlement to Syria's civil war. We're also happy to have Faisal Itani join us today. Faisal is a resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council's Ruffbeat Hary Center for the Middle East. He focuses on the local dynamics and geopolitics of Syria conflict at the Atlantic Council.

Faisal also teaches Middle East politics at George Washington University. In particular, regarding the Syrian conflict, he has analyzed the Assad regime's strategy, U.S. policy towards the Syrian conflict, regional competition that's resulted from the Syrian conflict, and approaches to stabilize in Syria both during the conflicts and in the aftermath of the conflicts. And last but not least, my co-author on this report, Kaylee Thomas.

Kaylee is a researcher in the Middle East Security Program here at CNAS. Previously, she was program coordinator for both the Middle East Security and Energy Economics and Security Programs here at CNAS. In addition to her work on the Middle East, Kaylee is currently conducting research on the state-sponsored terrorism-sanctioned designation, and she's an expert on how the U.S. approaches economic strategies to impact international affairs.

Thank you, Alexander Faisal, and Kaylee, for joining us today. Since August 2011, President Barack Obama has called for Bashar Assad's step aside. U.S. policy since that statement has been shaped by a goal to seek other post-Assad future in Syria, or a future Syria where Assad's regime has changed its behavior significantly and can be welcomed into the family of nations.

Alex, my question is, why has it been so difficult for the U.S. to achieve these goals? Thanks, Nick, and obviously, it's a pleasure to be here at CNAS, and I would faisal in with Kaylee to talk about this set of issues. It's a really, really difficult one.

You've titled this the Assad dilemma, and I think, you know, I'll just start off by saying I think it is a genuine dilemma. This is a really, really tough problem. Within the administration, the Obama administration came back to this issue time and time again. President Obama personally is cabinet an enormous amount of intellectual energy was spent trying to figure out how to deal with this problem.

And I think it really is a good illustration of where America's values and their interests have been at odds with one another in different ways as the conflict has evolved. Maybe a good way to start out in answering this question is to really kind of demythologize a little bit what the U.S. position was. Assad must go, is the mantra that everybody returns to.

But if you look at that August 18, 2011 statement, what President Obama said was the time has come for President Assad to step aside. This was in the context of really escalating violence against the Syrian people by the Syrian government, particularly the statement cited violence in D'Irosa and in Hama. But the very next sentence, which gets almost no attention now, said it's up to, excuse me, the United States cannot and will not impose this transition upon Syria. It's talked to the Syrian people to choose their leaders.

You've heard they're strong desire that there not be a foreign intervention in their movement. But the United States will support his efforts to bring about Syrian's democratic just and inclusive for all Syrians. We will support this outcome by President Assad to get out of the way of a transition and by standing up for the universal rights of the Syrian people along with others in the international community. And I think clearly that statement was intended to not paint the Syrian opposition as stooges of the United States.

That was its immediate intent. But within it, I think is a very clear demonstration of how the President viewed this issue, which was this would not be a military project with the shadow of Iraq, Afghanistan, and then shortly thereafter. I think Libya would fit into the same pattern. The President is very hesitant to use military force to bring this about.

And I think that element of the statement has been lost and I think intentionally misinterpreted by many actors all the time. So I think if the question is, why was that objective not achieved? There are a whole host of different things that we can point to. Clearly sanctions didn't work.

Mass insurgency didn't work. And negotiations essentially have had almost no effect on Assad's determination to stay in power. And I can lay out just a few reasons for that. I think the first one is, although there were some really important affections early on within the Syrian military, the regime and the military overwhelmingly remained loyal to the President.

That's a very different picture that you had, particularly in Egypt, but elsewhere in the Middle East. Secondly, many Syrians, even those who find the regime odious and oppose it ideologically, were even more frightened by Islamic extremism than they have been by Assad himself. And I think that's particularly true for religious minority groups, including alawites, who have viewed this conflict as an existential one for the group. So you had a core around Assad that he could count on throughout the war.

I think those two factors are really very, very important ones. Let me add three more. I think the Syrian opposition, in some ways, is understandable why this was the case. The opposition was divided intentionally by the Assad government over many, many years.

But it also failed to cohere effectively. It failed to overcome divisions among its external sponsors and fail to put forward, I think, a unified front, which was effective. I worked, as I think you heard in the introduction I gave, I worked on Libya before working on Syria. And there, the opposition cohered much more effectively.

Even with that coherence, we ended up with three governments in Libya. I think the contrast was one that the people were paying attention to. Two more. I think the support, obviously, of Russia, Iran, and China has been decisive in encouraging Assad to remain firm in his positions.

I don't think it's just the military support. I think it's also for China and Russia in particular, the ability to keep there from being a consensus within the UN Security Council that would have made a big difference in the way the United States might have responded with, at least created opportunities in the United States. And then lastly, obviously, the United States decided not to intervene militarily with the exception of two strikes related to chemical weapons in 2017 and 2018, but those were limited. So my own personal view was that it was unlikely from the beginning of Assad, but when you put all of these pieces together, I think it gave Assad the view that he could persevere and didn't really need to make the compromises that were being asked.

That's an excellent rundown, and it really does help us get a sense of the Assads of the U.S. perspective, especially in that early part of the uprising that then became sort of an armed revolution in the Civil War, where it was kind of difficult to sort of get who was who in the ecosystem of the Syrian opposition and the impact of various foreign actors that were in some ways approaching their own agendas in Syria. And I think the point that you raised about Assad was stronger than the perception of him was, is a very important one for Assad's understand, as we look at the Assads of the level moving forward. And if I saw you have had significant experience trying to get into the mind of the regime, so I have sort of a two foot video on this point.

How true is it, like some analysts say, that the Assad family is the regime and the regime is the state in Syria? And how has the Assad family and the regime that it has built around it changed since the Syrian civil war began, and how has it survived? Thanks. Thanks, Nick.

It's a pleasure to be here. I think actually the question you asked Alex and the questions you raised now are pretty intimately, intimately linked. Is my sense of whether the Assad regime is the same thing as Assad. I'd have to say no.

Remember that it took several years since the year 2000 essentially for Assad to consolidate his position inside the regime, eliminate some rivals, win over older ones, and build new constituencies. I think the best analogy that you was, and I don't mean this in a good manner at all. I think it's a good one. Even if you dig deep into it is a kind of organized criminal enterprise where you have somebody obviously who is the nexus of trust and fear that everybody else has to kind of either dance around, please plot around.

And they understand that in his absence, all sorts of uncertainties would be created that would make life difficult for them, risky, and make a lot of comfortable people uncomfortable. So in general, he's a kind of center of a center of an enterprise. I don't know that that means he's irreplaceable, but I do think that in the context of a kind of existential civil war that they were facing was probably not the best time for them to test that out. And so they decided that they are going to act as if they're one of the same insofar as it relates to the insurgency and the foreign threat.

Yeah, I think I agree with most of what you just said. I would just add a couple kind of details to it. One is that if you think about the period before Hafez al-Assad took power, the period in other words between Independence from France in 1946 and 1970 when Hafez took power, there was seven coupes. There was a country which essentially was created with artificial borders, with real concentration much more than many other places of religious and ethnic minorities where they fairly well developed ideological spectrum of political positions.

It was highly unstable. And I think about Nasir's comment in the 1970s as Syria and Egypt were considering experimenting with unity, Nasir is reputed to have said Syria is ungovernable. And what these factions know was more than he was able to deal with. And the fact that Hafez came in and was able to create a system which is endured as a long as it has is a testament to having figured out something about how to control Syria as an entity.

I'm not saying that it's a positive thing or a negative thing. And part of that is a real cult of personality. There were by the time of Hafez's death, according to the one that joined me, there were 3,000 statues of the president not at around the country. That's a lot of statues.

And it's a cult of personality which was one of the ways of legitimating the state. And I think the real question that gets to the heart of the dilemma, the policy dilemma for the United States at least, I think for others, but certainly for the United States, is if you pull out, can you pull out the top and the deck of the House of Cards remains intact? Where if you pull out the top, does the House of Cards collapse? And I think some analysts have confused the question of the relative density and experience and coherence of the administrative system of Syrian state, which I think is pretty strong with the elite, that top group of people who have been dependent on Assad.

And I think the judgment within the United States government was that it was a real risk that if you took that top card out, the whole thing would collapse. Kaylee, I want to ask you, we've seen this before time and time again, the US and other international actors have recognized these dynamics that Faisal and Alex have made out with other regimes in Sudan and Iraq, North Koreans, and now also with the Venezuela crisis we see, that there is this sort of tendency to turn to sanctions in the tools of economic statecraft to either force changes in the behavior regimes or to put the pain on certain key sectors within regimes to try to get them to come to an agreement that the sanction in countries want. From your perspective, how would you characterize the US approach to the Assad regime from the perspective of sanctions and the tools of economic statecraft? Yeah, thanks, Nick.

I think there has been definitely a reliance from the United States on economic and financial pressure in incentivizing Assad or members of his regime to change their behavior in a way that is amenable to the United States. But some of the points that Faisal and Alex laid out earlier, such as kind of the criminal enterprise nature of the regime and its elites, as well as its increasing reliance on Moscow and Beijing, definitely interrupted and inhibited the ability for the United States to use economic warfare to affect the changes that it wanted to see. I think it is important to note that sanctions alone generally have not changed regime behavior in the past, and I don't think there's a sanction expert who would say that that is achievable. But usually if you use sanctions in accordance and accompaniment with other tools such as military force of public diplomacy that they can play an important part.

However, in Syria, we saw both Russia and China step up militarily diplomatically and then also financially to kind of cushion the impact that US and European measures while intense had on the regime and specifically the elites within Syria. So what we saw is that the economic impact that these measures had as they did impact a Syrian economy and immediate aftermath of those measures that went into effect in 2011, that even in that aftermath that the regime elites were willing to see the Syrian people suffer as long as they could maintain their own financial gains. So that has really inhibited the US's ability to affect change. I do want to agree, absolutely.

I want to add one more point that links back to your original question, which is why is it that we have not been able to affect change of behavior. I think from the very beginning, the kind of macro problem was, and I'm not saying each president believed this, what I'm saying, people were thinking a lot about Syria, misunderstood the zero sum nature of the way the regime saw their situation, which is what is what constantly people shoot protesters and in Homs, et cetera, because they've viewed that if they make any concessions at all, what they're actually admitting is we can't do whatever we want, we have to make concessions and therefore this whole thing has been unraveled, and that circle of fear and trust unravels too, the criminal enterprise doesn't work. So when we come up to them and we tell them we designed a policy like we have now, for example, around maximum economic pressure, because we want to instill regime change, change behavior, whatever. What we're asking them to do is actually dismantle themselves.

Whereas if you go up to, I'm not saying you're an expert, but if you go up to both careers and you tell them what you want you to do with your velocity visa program, or you tell the Iranians, here's what we want to do by the way, and you're rich, but they might tell you, no, but at least it's consumable that they might say, if you give us this thing, we'll give you that thing. What are we going to give the Syrian regime that would make it worthwhile for them to essentially dismantle their regime, by changing the kind of dynamics we've identified as unacceptable, the role of the security forces, the corruption, the cooperation with Hezbollah, etc., the repression of people, political prisoners, the regime can not survive without doing these things, certainly not after six years of war or eight years of war. So I think that kind of goes back to the fact that I think we've misunderstood their calculation to begin with. And I'm not saying I'm assuming to that mistake, but I think it became clear early on what the asking price was at its unacceptable.

So I don't see how we can make a strategic and moral case out of sanctions. Other interesting, look, we don't want to have nothing to do with this regime. That's it. I would take issue just with that very last point, because I think the sanctions were partially meant to be punitive against individuals within the regime, but fundamentally, strategically the goal of the sanctions is to increase the cost for Iran and Russia maintaining the government.

And so I come back to the House of Cards metaphor, because it's not that we thought, we knew the Obama administration thought that it wasn't preferable for Assad to leave. It's that we wanted the other cards to stay in place. The only way for that really to happen in our estimation was for Russia to play the role of coping to bring about a political transition where most of the state will remain intact and go through with one process subsequently. And that does put obviously the onus on Russia and the onus, the Russians have not been eager to take up.

But the assumption of the sanctions, the critical assumption of the sanctions is that if it became expensive enough for Russia and now also for Iran to maintain Assad in power as opposed to supporting some kind of a political transition, then that could play a potentially constructive role and can change what states are supposed to do. I would also add that when the sanctions were initially, or at least to the sanctions, the sanctions that was from 2011 were initially imposed, that there was an effort there to have these sanctions be a focus around which the international community could build a coalition and a consensus to put diplomatic pressure on Assad as well. Obviously that worked in the case of Europe and the European Union as well as Turkey and some members of the Arab League. But that did not, obviously, convince Russia and Iran to turn their backs on Assad.

So I mean, that takes us back to Alex's point of how do you change Russia and Iran's calculus today and then hopefully change their behavior in the way that they deal with the Assad regime. So I want to pick up on this thread because the three of you have really given us this really excellent way of looking at how different levels of American power that have been attempted try to change the Assad regime's behavior or as some would say fundamentally lead to changes in the regime or the exit of the regime from Syria, have sort of run up against the wall. And so my question is, is it useful this late in the Syrian crisis for the U.S. to continue to try to keep insistent on changes in the Assad regime's behavior?

And can we say that there are fundamental differences between how the Obama administration approached it and how Mr. Trump's administration approaches achieve in this goal? I'm happy to take a first stab at that. I mean, I think those are two separate questions a little bit.

The first question is it worth continuing to press the regime to change its behavior. The answer to that question is undeniably yes. I think it's a strategic moral responsibility for the United States to try to get the Assad government to behave in ways different than it is. And I could enumerate a number of areas where I think even absent upon political transition that major improvement could be made to treat new detainees, the allowance of humanitarian assistance to come into the country, and a number of those steps that the United States has called for for many years.

More ambitiously, I think, some kind of agreement which would limit a re-escalation of violence, particularly right now thinking about Idlib, is a place where changing the Assad regime's behavior, they're running for that operation, I think, restraining them is something that's very, very important. And more ambitious than that even would be some kind of agreement where Syria's unity would be maintained and foreign forces would leave. I think that's the interest of most Syrians. I think it's the interest of the United States.

So are there things that we would like the Syrian government to do even if it remains in power? Yes. I think we should have extremely modest expectations about they are interested in doing any of those things and the interest of Russian Iran and pushing them to do those things. The question that you asked about Trump and Obama is a little bit more complicated.

To me, the fundamental transition or shift in Syria policy from the United States took place not in 2017 when President Trump took office, but in late 2014 in response to ISIS spreading across Western Iraq and East of Syria. And at that point, I think the United States can find a very basic and fundamental dilemma which was slightly different from the Assad dilemma but in foreign very important ways, which was, can you organize a counterinsurgency and support an insurgency in the same country at the same time to which the rational answer is no and a prioritization had to be drawn between defeating ISIS on one hand and dealing with the political situation Damascus on the other. There were versions of arguments represented at that time which was that that does not have to be a contradiction. You should overthrow the Assad regime and then work with the new transitional government to fight ISIS.

I personally didn't do that as a credible approach given the capacities of transitional governments elsewhere in the world. And I don't think the president saw that as real as the driver. But in any case, that was an option where we could have partnered with Assad to fight ISIS but we saw that as morally indefensible and strategically probably otherwise. So we were left with a situation where we had to choose between those two and we chose ultimately to focus on the threat from ISIS.

What I think Trump did was say out loud and make explicit and bald and rough around the edges essentially what the United States had already been doing for at least two years, which was to prioritize ISIS to work with the Russians to improve the situation's theory but not have high expectations that would succeed. And I think that is the approach that in macro terms of the Trump administration's taken. Of course, they veered wildly back and forth from Nikki Haley saying early on that removing Assad was not a priority and the president tweeting that a covert program had been ended, which appeared to fulfill Trump's campaign promises to subsequent statements from pretty much every senior administration official. But the United States remained committed to removing president Assad from power in the U.S.

military presence in the country would be contingent on that. So I think the public statements from the Trump administration have veered back and forth but the direction of U.S. policy since late 2014, early 2015 has been one way. I have obviously not much to add to the Obama worldview, to what Eliot already said.

I agree. I think there's more strategic similarities than the difference. Obviously, it was a much more complicated problem at the beginning than it was by the time the Trump became president. From the outside, one cosmetic difference that leads to being that there's so much more contradiction and flipping around and change from within this administration on this topic than there wasn't the Obama administration.

Obviously, my assumption is that not everybody agreed on the Obama administration about everything. But in this case, we have such wildly different points of views asserting that thing X or thing Y is U.S. policy. So there's an agreed confusion to someone who's not sitting on the inside that I think wasn't really there during the early years of the war.

But I do want to circle back to your original question, which is, I guess, the question we're all wrestling with. Is it worth staying on this tack that we have on Syria? Now that what's happened has happened and we know a little bit more about the regime. Well, first of all, I guess, that depends on whether we think of a work.

I think there are some things of use that could be accomplished. Alex mentioned the release of prisoners and the resettlement of refugees on adding that, etc. In return for some quick pro quo on sanctions. I mean, I think that's a good thing to do.

I think it's realistic that it might work. It may not, but it's worth trying and it's a noble cause. And if it doesn't work, we are where we are. The more difficult question is the kind of more ambitious of political change in Damascus, whether that's because we managed to compel the regime to change something or we managed to make the price of life for the Iranians and Russians that they will basically do the regime change work for us, but in a different way.

For a number of reasons, then I'm happy to speak about that, but it's very long and complicated. I don't believe either of those things will happen. And therefore, my assumption is that that particular track won't work the ambitious economic sanctions track. So that leaves us with two options.

Do we stick to goals that are, on theory, good goals? I mean, we all want to see that happen in Damascus. I certainly do. Even though there is no reasonable expectation that will happen anytime soon and acceptable costs unless we go to war in Syria or do we say actually we should not be in the business of asking for things from much weaker parties that they won't deliver only because we don't want to take on that same risk.

I have to say I lean towards not asking for something you're not going to get as a super power from a much weaker party and just kind of defining down your aims and your goals to sort out what your appetite for risk is and what you think the realistic policies are. That's what I'm going to do. Kaylee, I want to jump in and ask you a question regarding this. You get the sentence when you talk to Trump administration officials and you see some of the statements that have come from senior Trump officials, particularly regarding Iran, that there's the sense that by having a maximum pressure campaign on Iran through sanctions, you can stir up the hornets nest within Iran that therefore forces the Iranians to sort of diminish their presence in Syria.

To my mind, that policy seems to appear with this other sort of idea that you can sort of sanction Assad to his knees and make it difficult for Russia to carry him. What is your perspective on the use of sort of economic statecraft to achieve those types of goals? I think there has been a tendency in the Trump administration to both be attracted to these maximum economic pressure campaigns. They've been talked about in the context of North Korea, Iran, even Venezuela now, as well as Syria.

And there's also the subsection with a kind of Trumpian big for big deal, which is what is an agent in the case of North Korea and Iran and potentially Syria. And so there's definitely a lot to unpack when you look at how maximum pressure can play a role in achieving some sort of big for big deal. I think overall the idea of kind of at the base saying we have this long, long list of things that we're asking for, very meaningful reforms from the Assad government in exchange for a single kind of large lifting of US sanctions and restrictions, something like that, as for a number of the reasons that I saw pointed out, is probably not achievable. So when you look at using economic pressure to seek an effect change within the Assad regime, you do need to be very specific about what changes you're looking for.

I think it's important to note that when President Trump renewed the national emergency in the context of Syria in May of 2018, that he did say that he intended to renew the national emergency the next year unless there were changes in the policies, composition, or behavior of the regime. And that's kind of been the top line target, I think of the United States. And then alternatively, you've seen the US Congress try to parse that out a bit more in pieces of legislation, potential laws like the Cesar Civilian Protection Act, where they've enumerated a very long list of changes, including adherence and fulfillment of the requirements of the chemical weapons convention, release of prisoners, irreversible progress in the Geneva process, and a number of other things, actions to be taken by Syria, Russia, and Iran, which is asking for a lot of things, all at the same time. It's not a staged out progression of changes.

And I think that usually when you think about using economic pressure, you do want to envision a bit of a ladder. So if we're going to ratchet economic pressure up, which there is potential to do in the case of Syria, as is outlined in the Cesar Civilian Protection Act, you want to be clear about what will lead to the ratchet and get pressure down. And I think it is led to service to United States and to US policymakers to make that a one-for-one. We're asking for all of this lump sum and change for a significant lifting of US sanctions and to identify and to delineate that ladder a little bit more specifically.

Yeah, just to come in briefly on that, I think that's exactly right. And it gets a bit to something that falls also a moment ago, which is a superpower shouldn't be out publicly asking for things that's going to be embarrassed on. I don't disagree with that. But I think now about the op-ed that Bill Burns had in the New York Times yesterday about the practice of diplomacy.

The diplomacy is routine and systematic and continuous activity between states. What you want to see is a clear set of expectations from the United States, which represent what the United States wants to see from other states of the world. That should be clearly communicated and consistently communicated. And it may be that the answer is no over and over again.

And it may be that the circumstances change and the answer suddenly becomes yes. The problem with a series of diplomacy right now, and obviously I'm not pretty as everything that Jim Jeffries and Benjamin Epstein are doing. The problem is that the demands are public and inconsistent. And if I was sitting in Damascus, I wouldn't know what I had to give or what I might get or that if I gave what I had been told I might have to give that I would actually get what I had been offered by one official that contributed by another official.

And I think that creates a real problem for the exercise of US diplomacy. Assad has time on his side, not in every respect, but in multiple respects. And people talk about normalization with regime or rehabilitating regime in the international community with the opening of embassies, the sanctions. I am not a view that we're going to get a lot out of these on regime right now on any of the fundamental things that we would like to see.

However, I think we have to factor in the possibility that absent any effort to present a clear ladder, as you can just say, eventually we will normalize anybody and we'll get done. I absolutely agree with that. I think the normalization thing is pointing on our current president to leave and attention to shift elsewhere. But it's eventually the natural momentum of the region is that either someone is an enemy and they work on subverting them forever or they come back to the club.

And now with this anti-Islamist sentiment floating around a lot of regimes in the Middle East, there is a tendency to see Assad as at least not on the Islamist side. And there's the old probe about maybe we can drive a wedge between him and Iran and so on and so forth. So I think that's the natural side of things. So, you know, there's there is a sort of devil's dilemma to the Assad dilemma that I want to put on the table.

And it's something that has sort of come into public focus over the last year. You know, Bob Woodward, the Intrepid, you know, generational White House reporter in his 2018 book, Fear Trump in the White House states that in April 2018, President Trump would have then Secretary of Defense James Mattis to kill Bashar al-Assad and I'm quoting the whole lot of them, mean and senior members of Assad's regime. The Assad regime can be credibly linked to crimes against humanity, the widespread use of weapons and mass destruction over the course of one of the worst crises in modern human history. And it is a crisis that the Assad regime has done to lion's share of the work precipitated.

So my question to you is this, why doesn't the U.S. simply remove Bashar al-Assad and his regime from power once and for all by force? As I said, I mean, you know, this is the dilemma and I'm not sure I answered your first question fully, but the dilemma is do you take the enormous risk of overthrowing a government in order to try to create one that is more amenable both to your own interests and to the livelihoods of Syrians? Or do you accept that the cost of that is too high and then figure out how to deal with all of the problems that that regime has imposed on its citizens and in the region?

That is a fundamental dilemma and I don't believe that the dilemma is very – but the core element of that dilemma is unchanged today as it was before. I do think that some things have changed. There is not an active opposition of the sort that the United States could conceive of working with at this point. It doesn't exist if it ever did.

The fact that Russia is now militarily involved and invested to the extent it is is not simply a question of where the United States through this kind of a strike or a set of strikes. It's not just a question whether there would be a confrontation between the United States and Russia. That alone, I think, is potentially a prohibitive issue, but it's also that Russia has deeply invested now its international reputation and its ability to stabilize the Assad government. We would be doing something that would fundamentally damage Russia's international reputation in a way that's actually more problematic now than it would have been in 2012 or 2013.

And so I think that has to be taken into account. So you have the how questions, strikes or opposition or some other mechanism by which you think you're going to affect this change. And then there's the implications question, one of which I've just said, which is about Russia's response. But the other is, I think there's a sense among some analysts of Syria that it just can't get any worse.

And I'm not at all of the view that the situation in Syria is in a good place or never has been in a good place at any point during the war. But there are more than 10 million people who live in Assad-controlled territory or who live in Turkish or American-backed territory where the fighting has decreased substantially. And many of those people, although not all, have chosen stability over revolution for their own reasons and to risk the collapse of the regime at this point and the millions of additional refugees who would almost certainly flow into Lebanon, potentially try to flow into Israel, Turkey, Jordan, et cetera. In other words, to take that enormous risk to me is in consonant with the living conditions and situation from many, many Syrian people.

And it's also totally out of step with the United States' strategic priorities around the world. We have real potential, we have a real existing challenge in managing North Korea's nuclear program. We have an enormous challenge with the rise of China as a geopolitical force around the world. We have a research in Russia in Europe and affecting democracies around the world.

We have a crisis in Venezuela that's brewing to me to add another large-scale crisis to that list would be strategically compromised. Whatever I think about this question, I feel slightly differently today that I would have felt a few years ago about it. Partly because I don't think that a revolution that breaks out in a country and the decision of what to do about it is the same thing as let's go over through that regime and I don't think it's the same thing. And I think now would be a little more akin to the latter situation and what we did in Iraq in 2003, not exactly the same, then it would be to a situation of total flux where we have 100 actors, some of which kind of like us, a lot of which don't, et cetera.

And then when you try to move that in the direction, it's less involved, the responsibility is a bit more spread and morally I think it's also more justifiable. But we are where we are now. The question of, yes, you're right, things can always get worse. The thing about all these changes is either they get worse and then somewhere goes somewhere better, or they get worse and they go somewhere worse and say, and we don't know what the answer to that question is and if we did, we probably want to be having this conversation.

But it still wouldn't answer the question of how you raised some excellent points and you anticipated something I was going to say, which is, first of all, there's no more opposition in Syria, not that the opposition was ever great, but it was a grassroots armed opposition to a regime that at least in theory could work with us. There isn't there anymore, whatever's left of the opposition has become something a bit different, proxies in the classical sense. And so it's harder now, the other problem is the set of circumstances and assets. So in addition to the China problem, that's a bigger problem than just, oh, it's one of the things we're worried about.

It's a huge problem. And the fact that we have a general dissonance within the Western alliances about how to approach the world, we also have problems here. And I don't mean that as a kind of throwaway. First of all, I don't think that, I can say this on the government, I don't think this president is someone I want taking me into that adventure.

And second of all, I don't think there seems to be almost no consensus within the American public about anything that America should be doing abroad. And something like this tricky and this ugly would be something you at least want a bit of critical matter. You want no one to care or you want people to broadly agree that it's a good idea. And we'll see it through.

And that's not there either. So I'm very uncomfortable doing anything kind of adventurous with America for a policy at a time at a time like that. I think I would also just add that this would put extreme pressure on the United States relations that are already tenuous with its European partners, who I don't believe would be in favor of such an action and who I think are already frustrated at the fact that they are kind of bearing the burden of keeping Iran to adhere to principles of the JCPOA. And that this kind of chaos potentially in the region would make that more difficult, as well as potentially exacerbate the refugee issue that at least the European public cares about.

And it's putting domestic political pressure on a lot of European leaders to think about that and to think about what steps you've taken for refugees to be repatriated in large numbers and significant numbers to Syria. So I think that that's just another vector of risk and of serious negative consequences that the US will be managing and that's not worth taking on. Well, thank you very much, Alex, by salam. Taylor, this has been a very robust discussion.

So I'd like to end on this note. Let's say President Trump is about to get on his golf cut, Marilago. He's got about a minute for each of you to sort of give him one last thing that he should think about as he approaches the outside dilemma. What is something that we have in touch on that you think should be put into that reverse?

I'll repeat a bit some of the things I said before, but I think what Syria policy has suffered from for a very long time is this schizophrenia on this question and a swinging from one side to another about our expectations of what might take place in Syria. And I think at this point, we need to have sober expectations which should be very, very clear in communicating those. I think preventing a bloodbath in Idlib is a central one right now. I think sending a clear message to the Assad government of what they would need to do for us to begin to engage with them in a more meaningful way and holding to those positions consistently is the most likely to get us somewhere.

It's not where we would like to be. It's not what we would like to get. It's not the theory we would like to see, but we will get very little if anything, if we're not consistent and clear on those things on the note of potentially ratcheting up the economic pressure and in the context of the White House's vocal support of the Caesar Civilian Protection Act, I just want to ask that President Trump and US policymakers consider the lives of those who are still living and residing within Syria and regime controlled or allied controlled areas because a ratcheting up of pressure is likely, despite the grave human rights situation, to also have a humanitarian impact on the country and US sanctions have already had a humanitarian impact on the country. That's something to consider, especially if you are unsure that ratcheting up the pressure will actually get you a change in anyone's calculus within Syria.

You both said more profound things than I would say. I would say that this tendency or temptation to think that your regional allies would take care of some of these problems for you is probably dangerous, partly because I think that he or his administration seems to be overestimating the capacity of the military and economic capacity of some of our regional allies. Also, I think misreading their commitment or the nature of their commitment to the Iran problem, such that they see most of their problems through the prisons of regime security, including their international relations problems. That's why the Saudis go into Yemen, but don't want anything to do with Syria.

That's why the Emiratis complain about Iran, but actually, what they really hate are the Islamists and they go into Libya and stuff like that. So I don't know where this idea came from because I haven't seen it in my policy interest of lifetime, that this burden will be shifted onto these states. I think if you believe, if he actually believes that, I think his nature is, it needs to be reconsidered when he decides what he wants to do in the north of Syria. That should be taken with the assumption that if America has not physically present in Syria, everybody's articulation is going to be reset and we're going to go towards normalization, finding some sort of foreign assistance with Russia and the Turks, etc.

Well, thank you everyone for joining us. This has been an excellent discussion and look forward to the next discussion in the series. Thank you. Thank you.

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