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Mar 16, 2023 35 min

The China Syndrome

from Fourth Estate Hosted by 2SER

This week we look at the SMH and the Age's recent series on a possible coming war with China and ask was this series a timely look at a major coming threat or if was it alarmist as Paul Keating recently claimed. We also look at Aukus and discuss how this week's announcement will be viewed by China. Monica Attard spoke with ABC's Bill Birtles.

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The China Syndrome

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Hello and welcome to Fourth Estate, a show about journalism. We're coming to you from 2SCR in Sydney on the Gadigal Lands of the Eora nation, right across Australia on the Community Radio Network, and directly your device across the globe via podcast. I'm Mike Atard. Last week, the Sydney Morning Herald and the Age ran a series of major articles looking at what it saw as the very real risk of a coming war with China.

The political and international editor Peter Hachar put together a special panel of experts and they were all very loud in agreement, namely war is coming and soon, very soon. Allowing stuff indeed, but for former Prime Minister Paul Keating, the articles were not only alarming, they were alarmist and grossly irresponsible. But as Peter Hachar pointed out, the rhetoric coming from China is loud and clear, for war and soon. So, who's right?

And what about the much talked about reset in relations that Penny Wong and Anthony Albanese have been working on? This week, we also finally got detail about the Arca's agreement, and it's far bigger and way more expensive than anyone was expecting. Has Australia just crossed the Rubicon? Or are we just witnessing more noisy bluster from our pollies, our media, and our punditry class?

To discuss this, we had Bill Bertels, who's the ABC's former China correspondent, his book, The Truth About China, is published by Alan and Anwen. Bill Bertels, thank you very, very much for joining us again, I'll force the state. It's always a pleasure to have you. Thank you, Michael.

First of all, what did you make of the series that the City Morning Herald and the Age ran last week, the three-part series, which many have called alarmist? Where'd you make of it? Well, I just think it's that old battling journalism between doing accurate, truthful, impartial journalism on one hand and then trying to have impact on the other. And it seems to me the editors and obviously Peter Hachar himself, they decided on this time they really want to do something that has impact.

They can interview a bunch of policy wunks and get some theoretical ideas about what could potentially happen. But that's the sort of thing that normally buries itself in the features section or lower on the website. You get the usual crowd reading it. And it seemed to me they were trying to actually have a bit of impact and get a broader audience thinking about the possibility of conflict in the region.

So I can see what they were trying to do. Obviously there are criticisms that a lot of people have made because when you only get five experts out of potentially hundreds in Australia who could talk seriously about these issues, you're going to, well, you could have got a more balanced group of experts, that's for sure. But the flip side is John Lyons from the ABC did exactly the same thing not too long ago. He chose four experts, all credible people like Hugh Weiss, but all people who basically produced a rather different view, one that Australia shouldn't get involved in the US defense of Taiwan.

So it's not like what the Herald was doing was radically different to what the ABC previously did. But on one hand, it did have a lot of impact. A lot of people read it. On the other hand, you could argue that they kind of framed their conclusions as more authoritative than they should have by giving it this sort of screaming front-page treatment.

So they got the impact. Do you think it was truthful and impartial? Well, the thing is, you could argue, and it is realistic to say there's a possibility that there would be a Chinese move on to Taiwan in the next few years. It's just that the lowest spectrum of likelihood.

So it's not a, I don't think it's unreasonable at all for media organisations to be publicly discussing this and getting people to think about it. But it's a fair criticism that in order to try and get a broader audience to think about it, they put that low probability of conflict within three years as a headline and sort of made it sound more authoritative and likely than it probably is. Right. I mean, you can sleep walk into war, but you can also walk into one on purpose.

You know, when you have a media organisation that's beating, the war drum is loudly, is that, I imagine that does have impact, it certainly does on audiences. Do you think it has much impact beyond audiences with policymakers, with government, with the way the technocrats view the situation? This particular series, I think, would have had more impact on a broader audience rather than the policymakers in Canberra, because people working in the foreign ministry, in the, in DFAT, in defence, they're well and truly aware of these issues. And they're also aware of where people like Peter Jennings, formerly of Aspie, where he stands on the issue.

So I don't actually think it would have shifted the understanding of the situation of China and Taiwan and Australia, all that much among people who are already working in that field. But in more general terms, I suppose, if you have the broader electorate tuning in and saying, oh, wow, you know, the Herald reckons, there's actually a decent chance of China making a move on Taiwan and broiling Australia in the next few years, that I suppose has a follow-on effect to the broader debate to local MPs who take that back to Canberra. But among those who would actually make the decisions about Australia's future, I think they've already well and truly got their heads in these issues. Right.

So Bill, you know, in the unlikely event that China moves on Taiwan in a time frame, substantially less than envisaged by the broader community generally. So if they move on Taiwan sooner than we all think they might, does Australia belong in that war? Well, that's a, that's not a question as an ABC journalist, I think I'm supposed to have an opinion on, but I can look at it from the two perspectives. You know, from Paul Keating's perspective, obviously, he's been very vocal about this and many others.

It's just not Australia's fight. And you end up having Australia playing a small, but nonetheless important role in, as you know, opposition the war to China, which would obviously have economic implications and long-term relationship implications for Australia with China. On the flip side, you have this argument that it is not an Australia's interest for China to take control of Taiwan. It's not an interest of Australia's main military partner, the United States.

If China takes Taiwan, that also is a threat to Japan's security. And what's the point of the US being an Asia power, if it can't prevent or try to prevent a nation, an attack by China on Taiwan. And furthermore, what's the point of all these US military alliances in the region? If in the end it's shown that the US is quite effective.

So I can sort of see the arguments both ways. It's certainly not easy to have a yes or no black or white opinion on it. No. So back in June 2021, you were on Fourth Estate, as I recall, and you and I were talking at the time about the strong war talking that was coming out of the Morrison government and some sections of the media are believing non-media at the time as well.

So what's different this time around in 2023? Is this just more of the same or is something changed that has alarmed journalists and media more broadly? I feel it's all the same. I feel people were talking about this a few years ago, but perhaps it's not getting the cut through with the broader population that some people feel it should have.

And so that might be why, for example, at Nine Newspapers they decided to go big with this Red Alert series. I don't think that much has changed. I mean, last year you had the Chinese firing on missile over Taiwan and firing missiles around Taiwan to respond to the visit of Nancy Pelosi, then House Speaker. So you have had a pretty clear demonstration of Chinese military saber-rapling.

As for the talk of war, I mean, for me, I spent a lot of time monitoring Chinese state media, the comments and statements of Chinese officials. I really always found in Australia a bit confusing that people got quite upset about Australian political figures talking about the prospects of conflict in the region when you've got the Chinese leader in self this week saying we need to build our military into a great wall of steel to defend China's sovereignty by China's sovereignty. He includes Taiwan in that. He includes the entire South China Sea in that.

I see incredible amounts of military propaganda on Chinese state TV and Chinese state media. To me, I see so much saber-rapling and military talk from China's government itself, but I see the much more mild language sometimes expressed by Australian politicians or bureaucrats as not that unreasonable in comparison. So does that account then for the way media here reacts to any discussion of China that they're also tuning into that saber-rapling from that end? And they're swayed by that?

And how will this? Yeah, I think the correspondents who cover China and pay a lot of attention to China, they certainly see that. There are a lot of correspondents from Australia now in Taiwan. We were here when China was carrying out those military drills.

We get the daily updates from the Taiwan Ministry about Chinese flights over the median line of the Taiwan Strait. It's a daily occurrence now. So we do pay a lot of attention to that, but I think journalists back in Australia, people like Leader Archer, they too pay a lot of attention to that. Analysts do.

I think even though you could argue that the Chinese Communist Party has been quite militaristic with its language for a long time, and it also does have a habit of talking in two different ways. On one hand, let's say with Taiwan, it says that we will never tolerate separatism or external interference. On the other hand, it says we hope for peaceful reunification. So you do have these mixed messages always coming out of Beijing.

It's not necessarily new, but certainly, I think under Xi Jinping, the invoking of nationalism has been stepped up a notch. And Xi Jinping doesn't mind getting in the khaki and doing the military photo ops or standing on aircraft carriers or what have you. So I do think the Chinese government itself is being more forthright in portraying this sort of strong military image, and that is having an effect on those who cover China. So tell us a little bit about the reaction that you've observed from the Chinese media and from Chinese social media to the Red Alert series.

Has it been explicit? I haven't looked at much Chinese social media because there's so much censorship and opinion guidance on there that it's not a very good gauge, I think, anymore on these sorts of issues. But I do monitor weak-act groups in Australia, of Australian-Chinese, who are Australian citizens, but are very critical of often very critical of commentary that takes a hawkish view on China. And a lot of that too has crossed over with China because it's WeChat.

So a lot of the users and those groups also in China, as well as Australia. But more generally, the reaction has been what it kind of always is that the Chinese government for the years now has seen the Australian media as being very excitable, seeing the Australian media as being very dramatic, seeing the Australian media as basically warmongering in a way that anything that China does in terms of its military buildup is completely legitimate. And for Australia to get upset about it or for the Australian media to pay excess attention to it, then that's the fault of the side of Australian media. It's that sort of reaction.

I haven't seen anything more specific for the Red Alert series because I've just seen so much of this general response from China over the years. It doesn't mean all of it's illegitimate. They have been excitable media reports in Australia about China quite a bit in recent years. But what you don't have in China because of the incredibly pervasive censorship and opinion guidance from the party is much of a domestic public debate about whether the Australian media has a point on any of these issues.

And would they care? I mean, is it, is it, you know, I don't think so. Well, they would you know, you're Dr. Policy analysts, right?

You know, there's this guy in Shanghai who's one of the top universities. He's a US China specialist. But of course, he looks at the broader region as well, including Australia. He's actually pretty good.

He's not a mouthpiece for the Chinese government, but of course, he's within the Chinese system. So he used to be one of the more reasonable, one of the more matter of fact people I could go to for commentary. He's been banned by his university from accepting foreign media interviews because he's regarded as a bit too moderate. And there's now a more conservative bunch running the university.

Likewise, a guy up in Beijing, sure, in Hong Kong, who has been pretty good over the years accepting foreign media interviews. I don't think he's been banned or anything, but he's been mobbed recently on Chinese social media by nationalists for being a bit too accommodating with his commentary towards the US, even though he's no one would ever accuse him of being anything but a sort of patriotic observer of the Chinese perspective. So there is this massive huge problem in China that unlike Australia, we have a country where a former Prime Minister can tear strips off the current government over this. The media can go multiple ways on these issues.

You just don't deal with that equivalent openness of debate, unfortunately, in China itself. Bill, you mentioned earlier that the weak chat groups that you've been having a bit of a look at in Australia. What do you think the dangers are for the Chinese community in Australia as a result of this kind of war-mongering journalism or conflict escalatory journalism, if you like? Are they dangerous?

Or do you think that the Chinese community, as you know them, as a reporter, would just take all this in Israel? So there are people in the Chinese community in Australia who are very, very concerned in general about the worsening of relations with China, even though things have diplomatically got a bit easier in recent times. It's certainly never going back to how it was 10 years ago. And I think they're worried about a follow-on effect of possible racism towards Chinese Australians in Australia, or things like academics or researchers of Chinese backgrounds facing barriers to get to positions at universities and things like that.

So there's certainly, in this isn't just Australia, there's concern in the US as well. So this is certainly something that people talk about when they refer to social cohesion. You see some people writing, some respectable people recently have written articles where they've said we need to consider the impact on social cohesion of not necessarily journalism about China, but Australia's various policies towards China, including potential involvement in a war over Taiwan. The thing is, the difficulty with all this is Australia's multicultural nation as a secular post to China, which despite claiming it has 56 ethnic minority groups primarily, is pretty monocultural.

And one thing that Beijing does appeal to publicly, and she did it the other day and he's closing speech to the Congress, he calls on Chinese both at home and abroad to all contribute to the great rejuvenation of China. So that's basically a signal that even though Chinese government does respect foreign passports and foreign nationality, there is this vague term overseas Chinese where they don't define whether that means foreign nationals. And there's this expectation, not explicit, but implied that all sons and daughters of the Yellow River, as they're sometimes referred to, should contribute to the great rejuvenation and thus be loyal politically to Beijing, or at the very least stay out of the way of Beijing's ambitions. So this is a real difficulty because Chinese Australians, like all Australians are Australians, and of course you assume that you don't want social cohesion problems as a result of Australian foreign policy.

But you already are seeing some people in that community worried that there is starting to be issues around discrimination or so forth. But also too, you wouldn't want to want to want to want to want to be foreign policy to be basically determined by another country because Australia is a tolerant migration country and therefore we shouldn't be too firm in our opposition to Chinese military ambitions because we're worried about things being unsettled at home. You can understand as a bit of a contradiction and a bit of a sort of difficulty with this issue and it's not one that's easy to resolve. Well, talking about Australia's foreign policy being determined by another country that's probably a very good segue, so very full points to you, Bill, for doing this for us, but it's probably a very good segue into August and the agreement that has been signed between Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom.

It's far more ambitious, also way more expensive than anybody was expecting. What are your thoughts and how do you think that it's being viewed in Beijing? Well, the first thing with August is it's clearly a plan where everything has to go right and there are a lot of moving parts over many years. You can imagine it, first of all, needs congressional approval and then it needs continued support from possibly a Trump or DeSantis administration or at least several future administrations need to continue to back it.

You need to pick up the pace of construction in US shipyards to get those Virginia-class subs to Australia. You need robust budgets to continue in Australia decade after decade in order for the Australians to uphold their end of the bargain. You then need the Brits to get their design production capabilities together on time without blowouts. Then eventually, you need Australia, which doesn't have a sterling track record with submarine construction being on time or being kept under budget to then manufacture or produce these subs with British and American health.

You need budgets and timelines to stay close to their original plans. There are just so many things where this plan could go wrong or at least could be delayed or the costs could blow out. Yes, it's one heck of a capability if Australia can actually get a long range more capable submarines. But I think most people, when they saw the details of the plan, were a bit overwhelmed by its complexity and its cost.

For Beijing, no surprises with the response from the Chinese government. China operates at least 12 nuclear-powered submarines of its own. I've seen slightly higher estimates, although most of their submarine fleet is still diesel-electric powered. On one hand, from China, you've got this general thing saying this is part of a Cold War mentality in Australia and the US and the UK are walking down a dangerous path.

This is consistent with Beijing, which has been building its military up at unprecedented speeds for peacetime. It gets very annoyed when any of its neighbour countries more modestly build up their militaries. Look at Japan, for example. Japan is starting to rearm properly now after years of the pacifist constitution because they're very worried about China.

China is going there saying you can't do that. We can build up our military, but how dare you do it. There's a little bit of that as well with Orkis with the Chinese saying how dare you have a far more modest submarine fleet than what we have. But the real issue with China trying to support this plan is that they're going for it on nuclear non-proliferation grounds.

That would be the interesting thing. The IAEA, the Global Nuclear Watchdog, even though thus far they haven't been able to lobby successfully member countries to oppose this plan. They will keep the lobbying up and no doubt about that. What they're ultimately trying to do is force the IAEA to move away from its standard practice whereby the agency strikes a deal with the three Orkis countries where they provide safeguards and information on how they're going to do this all safely.

What Beijing is trying to do is override that and have some more government approval process where Beijing could obviously get in there and try and veto it. Why do they want to do that? Some Chinese analysts actually believe that there is genuine paranoia in Beijing that long-term this is opening the door to Australian nuclear weapons, but not many analysts outside of China think that's the legitimate reason. It appears the main reason is Beijing doesn't want long-range submarines lurking around borders in Asia, which it wants to dominate because it thinks the United States will have the hair for now to force Australia to use those submarines for US containment of China.

Right. Another aspect of the whole deal, which I think is really gaining traction and has been pushed along by Paul Keating today in a speech to the National Press Club in Canberra, is that essentially what this is all about is the underlying premise of the agreement that because China is the United States enemy, it is therefore our enemy and that we are not in a position to be taking on America's wars and should not want to be. What's your take on that? This is the main, one of the main criticisms of Auckland's side from the cost and the process and everything else is that Australia goes well beyond Australia's defence needs and at the only purpose Australia would have for these long-range subs that don't need refueling is to join with the United States to do missions closer to China's coastline in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, but also too I suppose to contest with Chinese long-range subs in the South Pacific as well, which is a bit closer to the home for Australia.

So that's the main argument and I think it's actually quite a good point that despite assurances from the Prime Minister and President Joe Biden, etc that Australia will have sovereignty over these subs, there clearly is going to be a lot of co-crewing for many years. There will be reliance on the United States to service the reactors. For this reason, China believes that it will be very easy for the Americans to pressure Australia to use these submarines with US missions to contain China. So, Paul Keating, raising that issue again, we've seen others, I think we've seen Malcolm Turnbull talk about this sovereignty issue a bit, and it's a real issue and I don't think China is paranoid about it at all.

I think this is precisely one of the reasons the Americans want to do this and I don't think necessarily that you would straight off argue that this isn't something Australia should do because Australia is a US ally and you can make an argument that they should work together, etc. But there's certainly an argument that this is something Australia shouldn't do, picking being part of a fight that is not necessarily Australia's fight. Keating is probably the strongest voice on this and I notice he's been at the press club making that case again. Yes, he has been and his speech before has been published by the Australian it's appearing on its front page online at the moment so it'll certainly get a lot of media attention.

But I guess there's also the risk in tying ourselves to the hip like we are with this deal to the United States because of course there's no guarantee that a future Republican administration for example would follow the same brief or even have a coherent set of foreign policy objectives generally speaking, not just in relation to China. Yeah, a lot could go wrong on the US end. We don't even know if Biden can get this plus through Congress at the moment. So this was, I was speaking to a Thai one, he's military analyst, he's quite good and he was saying, I said, what do you think of this whole thing?

And he said, I think this is a plan that will change several times. It doesn't think this piecemeal plan, if we're going to do this in stage two and stage three thinks there will be many adjustments going forward because circumstances will change, budgets will change, the enthusiasm of US administrations or Congress will change. So for that reason, I don't think this timeline of what we're going to get and when is set in stone at all. One interesting thing though, so people who think that this is primarily about deterrence on Taiwan, they make the argument that if you take Xi Jinping at his word, he's going to make a move on Taiwan before the turn of the century because that's when the so-called great rejuvenation has to be completed by.

And therefore, we probably by the 2040s would only have what a few of these Virginia class subs at best. But this analyst in Taiwan, now by no means indicative of everybody's thinking at all, but he doesn't believe China will invade Taiwan by that deadline, he doesn't believe in the deadline. He thinks it's too troublesome and that Beijing will wait and wait and wait decades until it feels that it can do it in a peaceful way where they won't be pushed back. So his argument was, look, these subs, I don't really think that if they're not ready in time for a Chinese move on Taiwan, that doesn't necessarily mean that it's a waste of the program.

He was saying, I think long term, this is more about the bigger battle between the US and its allies in China, and these submarines would be contesting waters in the South Pacific and the South China Sea, Southeast Asia, for many, many decades. It's not all about Taiwan. Can you see much good media discussion analysis of those issues, either in Australia or elsewhere, in the international media? Yeah, a lot.

There's a lot of sort of chin scratching feature stories that are in Reuters or in US media, like the Wall Street Journal. But it's all very elite. It's the sort of stuff that people who need to read it have been reading it for years now. It's more, I think with the China coverage in Australia, it's more the tabloidy sort of South China reach a broader audience where you get fast and loose playing with the truth a bit.

And you see that sometimes with the news limited papers or news.com, the ABC even sometimes a little bit like that. You could argue there was a bit of that going on with the Hartcher article the other day. But I don't think there's a lack of sort of nuance coverage about all this sort of stuff. I think you just have to actively search for it and you find it in the usual suspects, the old school broadsheet websites or the US, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the FT.

You're not likely to see it so much in the kind of more parochial elements of the Australian media. So Bill, a final question to you. Do you have hopes of it being able to get back to Beijing as a correspondent, as a resident correspondent? No, it's not my plan at all.

I think it's not set to be going there next at all. And I think it's a great folly for anybody to completely make their career all about China in the 21st century. Because I'm hanging out here in Taiwan with a bunch of journalists, mainly from American media, who have been forced out of China in one way or another. Some of them have been waiting on visas to go back to China for the last couple of years and they're now starting to give up.

Others are sort of holding out hope that one day in Xi's China, they'll be allowed back in. I just think, I really do think we are in the midst of an unofficial new Cold War. Luckily one where there's a lot more interaction than the old Cold War, but the idea that you want to make your entire career about China, when there is a very little chance of actually going back and spending substantial time there, I think it's a great mistake these days. So I'll be keeping an eye on it, but I do intend to cover other areas soon in future.

And I know I said that was the last question, but this is about another journalist, and that's the Australian journalist, Cheng Li, who has been in detention since 2020, August of 2020. She was working for CGTM, which is an English news service, although State controlled. Now, there have been some back-channel moves to free her, but she certainly hasn't generated the same kind of online heat as somebody like Julian Assange, for example. It kind of feels like we've forgotten about her.

I'm sure you haven't, but do you hold out any hope that she may get to come home soon? Well, I feel she's had a fair bit of coverage. We've done our part to cover the case when we can, but we interviewed a family once, but the thing is a family keeping a low profile, and that makes it more difficult to sign just a rather different character. You have all these online, these people who are really anti-U.S.

Bro-China, they always say, ah, you're not covering Assange, you're not covering Assange. Well, it's not my job at our London correspondent certainly do. On the flipside, you have people accused of not talking much about Cheng Li's plight. But I do think the Australian media has.

It's just that it's a very different system. China does not like it when people point out publicly that they're treating somebody pretty appalling way. This is a woman who's never been convicted of anything. They tried her in secret.

They've held her in jail for two and a bit years, close to three, I think now. And she's still there with no end in sight to this ordeal. So, I think even the Australian government are pretty careful with how they raise her case. I would assume that she would be getting out of jail this year, or hopefully, certainly, hopefully by next year, you'd hope it would be straight away because the Chinese government is well aware that this is a big problem in them trying to improve relations with Australia.

But they're quite obviously still holding her as a form of leverage as they are with the other Australian, and we shouldn't forget there's a third Australian, a bloke named Carm Gillespie, who was caught red-handed smuggling methamphetamine through Guangzhou Airport about seven years ago. Although, it seems like a rather silly thing for anyone to do to take it on the carry-on. So, I do wonder if he was a bit duped or something. And he was ceremonially sentenced to death in the form of a press release on the court website right in the middle of heightened tensions between Australia and China.

So, I see it as three Australians who are either in jail or have been in the case of Gillespie, being sentenced to death. For what appears to be diplomatic political reasons, or at least that's a major factor in their plight. So, yeah, it's not just a lay, and you would hope that if the Chinese government wanted to be sincere in generating good will with Australia, instead of holding these Australians in one form or another as a form of leverage, they might actually start to release them, or in Gillespie's case, down a radius sentence. Something like that would be a practical step in trying to improve the bilateral relationship, which is something that they so often accuse Australia of not doing enough on.

Well, Bill, we'll leave it there with that. As always, it's a pleasure to chat to you and the best of luck. Thank you very, very much for coming on the Fourth Estate. Thank you, Monica.

Appreciate it. And on that note, I'd like to thank Bill Burtles for being on Fourth Estate, and thanks to you for listening to the program. This edition was recorded at the studios of 2SER and heard across the country on the Community Radio Network. Fourth Estate is produced with the assistance of the Community Broadcasting Foundation, thanks to the foundation for their continuing support.

Make sure you subscribe to Fourth Estate on your favourite podcast app so that you can hear us talk about media and politics and, of course, everything in between. We'll be back with more next week, but in the meantime, you can stay in touch with us on Twitter. Our handle there is Fourth Estate AU. Thanks to my producer, Anthony Dottport.

My name's Monica Atard, and thank you for listening.

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