The Demise of Frege–Geach?

Let's follow language philosopher Bry Willis' intellectual journey in addressing the Frege–Geach problem, a philosophical dilemma regarding how moral statements retain meaning when embedded in logical arguments. The author argues that analytical philosophers mistakenly assume natural language possesses the same rigid strength as formal logic, leading to a misunderstanding of how syntax functions. By consulting various artificial intelligence models, the author refines the hypothesis that language is inherently insufficient and lossy, rather than a perfect vehicle for truth-apt assertions. They propose a new category called performance-sensitive expressions, which suggests that the meaning of a moral phrase changes depending on its linguistic context. This approach seeks to move beyond merely dissolving the problem by providing a generalisable framework that explains why grammar cannot always support heavy logical burdens. Ultimately, the source serves as a reflective journal on the process of polishing a theoretical essay that challenges traditional ontological grammar.👉 https://philosophics.blog/2026/03/26/the-demise-of-frege-geach/