Skip to content
The End of 'The Everything Bubble' episode artwork

Jun 17, 2022 1 hr 11 min

The End of 'The Everything Bubble'

from The Ezra Klein Show Hosted by New York Times Opinion

This week, the S&P 500 entered what analysts refer to as a bear market. The index has plunged around 22 percent from its most recent peak in January. Many growth stocks and crypto assets have crashed double or triple that amount. New home sales declined 17 percent in April, causing some analysts to argue that the housing market has peaked. And, in response to rising inflation, the Federal Reserve just approved its largest interest rate increase since 1994, meaning asset prices could dip even lower. To understand what’s happening in the stock market right now, you have to understand the era that preceded it. Rana Foroohar is a columnist at The Financial Times, and the author of several books on the economy including “Makers and Takers” and “Don’t Be Evil.” Her view is that a decade-plus of loose monetary policy has been the economic equivalent of a “sugar high,” which kept the prices of stocks, housing and other assets going up and up and up, even as the fundamentals of the economy have been eroding. This “everything bubble,” as she calls it, was bound to burst — and that’s exactly what she thinks is happening right now. So I wanted to have her on the show to discuss the economic choices — and lack thereof — that led to this point. We also discuss why the increasing power of the financial sector hasn’t resulted a stronger economy, whether the housing market has indeed hit its peak, the massive missed opportunity for public investment while interest rates were low, why policymakers treat asset price inflation so differently from other types of inflation, the true costs of the meat we eat and clothes we wear, why crypto represents the apotheosis of hyper-financialized capitalism, why I’m skeptical of the argument that we’re moving rapidly toward a less globalized world and more. Book recommendations: All That She Carried by Tiya Miles Beautiful Country by Qian Julie Wang The Rise and Fall of the Neoliberal Order by Gary Gerstle We're hiring a researcher! You can apply here or by visiting nytimes.wd5.myworkdayjobs.com/News Thoughts? Guest suggestions? Email us at [email protected]. You can find transcripts (posted midday) and more episodes of “The Ezra Klein Show” at nytimes.com/ezra-klein-podcast, and you can find Ezra on Twitter @ezraklein. Book recommendations from all our guests are listed at https://www.nytimes.com/article/ezra-klein-show-book-recs. “The Ezra Klein Show” is produced by Annie Galvin, Jeff Geld and Rogé Karma; fact-checking by Michelle Harris and Andrea López Cruzado; original music by Isaac Jones; mixing by Jeff Geld; audience strategy by Shannon Busta. Our executive producer is Irene Noguchi. Special thanks to Kristin Lin and Kristina Samulewski. Subscribe today at nytimes.com/podcasts or on Apple Podcasts, Spotify and Amazon Music. You can also subscribe via your favorite podcast app here https://www.nytimes.com/activate-access/audio?source=podcatcher. For more podcasts and narrated articles, download The New York Times app at nytimes.com/app.

Episode details come from the podcast's RSS feed.

Embed this episode

Ready to play

The End of 'The Everything Bubble'

0:00 1:11:53
of matches

Transcript Auto-generated, may contain errors

Hi, I'm Solana Pine. I'm the director of video at the New York Times. For years, my team has made videos that bring you closer to big news moments. Videos by Times journalists that have the expertise to help you understand what's going on.

Now we're bringing those videos to you in the Watch tab in the New York Times app. It's a dedicated video feed where you know you can trust what you're seeing. All the videos there are free for anyone to watch. You don't have to be a subscriber.

Download the New York Times app to start watching. I'm Mr. Clung. This is the Ezra Clung Show.

Before we begin today, we are looking for our researcher on the EK Show, somebody who is going to be diving deep into our craps with us, helping us get ready for the episodes, figure out the episodes, my questions for them, to make sure you're watching. It's a great job for somebody who is unbelievably obsessive about going down information rabbit holes, unbelievably capable at inhaling a lot of reading and a lot of data all at once and then synthesizing it into something comprehensible. If that sounds like you, we're going to put the job description in the description for this podcast. You can also find it at nytco.com if you go to the careers tab, but we're only going to keep this open for probably about two more weeks, so the time to apply is now.

But onto today's episode. We did it everybody. We're officially in a bear market. The S&P 500 is down about 22% roughly from its January peak.

Inflation is really, really high. Recession is very possible. Mortgage rates are rising pretty sharply. A lot of analysts think the housing market is already peaked.

Crypto crypto has just been hammered. Crypto markets lost 200 billion just over the last weekend. So we're seeing valuations collapsing across asset categories. Stocks.

Houses crypto. It's not obvious that these should all be correlated. For instance, wasn't Bitcoin supposed to be a hedge against inflation? The thing you bought so you didn't lose money when inflation began rising?

But nope, turned out to be highly, highly correlated stocks, just one more speculative asset. So what is behind all the correlations here? And that answer I think is pretty easy. The lines all begin going down when the federal reserve began tapping breaks, signaling an end to the era in which they flooded markets with easy money.

For a decade or more, it is seen stocks only go up. Home prices only go up. Investments only go up. The big problem investors had was what to do with all this money.

The big problem that a lot of companies had was what to do with all this money began stockpiling these huge hordes of cash. And a lot of companies and investors and startups, he always came out looking like geniuses for a while. But it is easy to look like a genius when you can borrow money for nothing, when investors are trying to give you money for nothing. My guest today, years ago, called this era that everything bubble.

And now she thinks it is popping. Rana Fruhar is a columnist at the Financial Times. She's the author of multiple books, including 2016's Makers and Takers, which is a look at the financialization of the US economy. And her argument is that loose monetary policy has been the economic equivalent of a sugar high.

This kept markets and portfolios looking good, even as a fundamental of the economy been eroding. So we talked about that. And about whether or not there's more we could have or should have done with all this money. Could we have made more out of that opportunity, even as a fundamental to the economy have been eroding?

As always, my email is as recline show at endmytimes.com. Rana Fruhar, welcome to the show. Thanks so much for having me. So I want to start by looking at the last decade or so in the economy a little differently.

Tell me about what you've called the everything bubble. So the everything bubble is the fact that when you look at basically all the prices of everything you can buy in asset markets right now. So that stocks, bonds, I would call housing an asset. All this stuff is going up.

Crypto is going up. I mean, until quite recently, we'll get into that in a minute. But for the last decade, actually decade plus, the price of pretty much everything you could buy as an investor has been rising. And I believe that large swaths of that are a bubble and you can call it the everything bubble.

Was it rising in an unusual way? If we look historically, have the valuation increases we've seen in stock prices and home prices. And I guess you can't say historically in prices of Ether and Dogecoin. But the money you made in the last 10, 15 years by being just a banal investor, normal in the sweep of American history.

Well, so your question is really interesting. I'm going to come to the main question, but I wanted to give you a little caveat. No, you can't look at crypto historically, right? Because it's only been around for a few years.

But if you look at how gold prices were rising in the Weimar Republic and compared to crypto until quite recently, very similar boom bust. And we can get into why that might be. But to answer your core question, yeah, they're absolutely rising to historical records in some cases, records that we've never seen before for these types of assets. And that's really down to the fact that Washington has, in particular, the Fed has been manipulating the price of assets.

Certainly for the last 15 years or so following the financial crisis, we saw even more of that in COVID because it was a way of uplifting the price of assets and making people feel little richer in the midst of a global down turn. That could have been catastrophic. It wasn't in many ways in a human sense. But even before that, if you go back decades, we have been manipulating the economy in a way that is fundamentally disconnecting Wall Street from Main Street.

Manipulating is a very sinister sounding word. Yeah. And I know people to Fed. I know people who work on these issues and they would tell you they've just been trying to keep the economy afloat to keep out things from happening.

So when you say manipulating both, what do you mean mechanically? What were they doing? And what do you mean, motivationally? Why were they doing it?

Or why do you think they were doing it? Okay. So I love that you're breaking out the question now. And first of all, let me say I 100% agree with you.

It's hard for me to think of anybody at the Fed that I know that I don't think of as a pretty good person, a pretty moral person. I put Janet Yellen right up at the top of that list when she was at the Fed. Now at Treasury, it's not that they are trying to do something nefarious, but the Fed has limited tools in its toolbox. So for the last, I would argue really since the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, policymakers from both sides of the aisle, Democrats and Republicans have been able to shift the tough process of what we might call guns.

And what we might call guns and butter decisions using the Vietnam War terminology. You got a lot of stakeholders in the economy. You got the Defense Department. You got folks that want to see more spending on social programs, education, whatever it is.

All these people are competing for money. When you have a fixed pie of money, you really have to make those choices. But when we actually delinked from gold and that enabled central bankers have a lot more control over how interest rates could go up and down, how much money could go into the economy, that sort of unleashed that. It unlocked that peg of decision making.

And so politicians were able to say, you know what, Fed? You deal with the guns and butter decisions. You keep interest rates low. You stretch out the business cycle.

And so the Fed, understandably, with its mandate of keeping prices stable, keeping unemployment rates looking good, you know, basically keeping the economy afloat. They're saying, okay, this is our official mandate. So what do we do? Well, we better keep the party going.

We could keep rates lower a little longer, put a little more money into the economy. And that's basically what we've been doing, more or less since the early 1980s in particular. And you can actually see that in the statistics. So business cycles, and by that what I mean is boom bust.

So recoveries in which the economy is growing and then recessions in which there's a correction and some weaker parts of the economy, companies, et cetera, being weeded out. Those cycles used to happen, you know, every five years or so. We are officially in the longest business cycle expansion since records were actually tallied in 1854 right now. So we've been in an expansionary cycle for over 10 years, actually.

You know, we've seen some hiccups because of COVID, but we're stretching out the time that the economy is growing, growing, growing because nobody wants the music to stop, right? But the problem is if you keep rates low, if you put a lot of money in the economy and that happened especially after the subprime crisis. And then again, after COVID, what you're doing is creating this kind of stacker and high where asset prices are growing. Because that's really all the Fed can do.

It can lower interest rates. It can make credit flow more easily. Rich people have most of the money in the economy. They tend to use it to buy more stocks and more houses and the price of those things go up.

But the Fed can't do what policymakers can do. It can't change the story on Main Street. It can't build a new factory. It can't reskill all of us to do better jobs that are higher up the food chain.

It can't change that story. So what you do is you almost get the sugar high where, you know, there's these headline number, stock prices are up, housing is up, things are booming, but nothing at the ground level is really changing. And so when I say manipulate, that's what I mean. It's not nefarious.

It's more there's limited things that a central banker can do. And they're pretty much at the limit about. Well, let's play with the metaphors here for a minute because one metaphor here is the sugar and high, the the saccharin high, which is a sense of superficiality that we have energy, but we don't really have it. The economy looks good, but it really isn't another metaphor I sometimes think about, which is a different way of thinking about the problem is blockage.

And I think of Ben Bernanke, Fed Chair Ben Bernanke going to Congress month after month after month after the Great Recession. And basically begging them to spend the easy money he was creating. Basically saying, listen, we can create money. We can do quantitative easing.

We cannot build a road. We cannot build a bridge. We cannot invest into carbonization technology. Use this money for something.

And then for the most part, they did it. And so one hypothesis I've sometimes had about the economy is basically that between the paralysis of our political system on a lot of issues and some of the difficulties we simply have deploying money because of how hard it's become to build things and the regulatory state and for other reasons that what happened is it created a bunch of money and the political system didn't take the handoff. And so all that money simply pooled in assets, right? Things where you could increase the amount of money without having to increase any kind of real materials or anything real in the economy.

How does that strike you as a theory? I think that makes a ton of sense. And it's very much in line with what I'm talking about. I totally agree with you.

That's exactly what happened. I mean, if we go back, I'm sure many of us can remember in the wake of the financial crisis. So we get the initial hit. Bernanke comes in with the helicopter money.

We fix the banks. We don't really fix homeowners. Everybody's talking about, you know, this is a great time to rebuild America's infrastructure to fix our highways to invest in education. And we've heard that basically for over a decade since.

And you're right. No president. No administration has been able to push through those sorts of investments. Meanwhile, as you say, companies are able to leverage the low rate environment and the printing of money that the Fed was doing, the distributing of all that money into the economy to their own end.

So if you look at stock prices since 2009, I mean, they're just except for the last few months on a completely upward trajectory at the same time corporate spending on things like research and development. Again, until very recently because of some shifts that we can get into has been going down. And that's been the same really since the 1980s. You would look at share prices going up real investments going down and every time a company, not just the government, but a company tries to do something like, you know, invest in a technology that maybe isn't going to pay off for seven years or 10 years and maybe it'll be a little pricey and it'll mean that you get a little hit to your quarterly profits.

They're stock prices tank. And so you have an entire financial system, not just a political system that is locked into a very dysfunctional way of doing things. Well, this gets to this story you tell in your bookmakers and takers and something I've been thinking about since reading it. And it's a book that came out some years ago, but I think very prescient about where we are.

You really show the way a lot of companies that we think of as main street companies as companies that make real things in the real world also became hedge funds, also became investment firms. And this is of course true also with a lot of universities that have big endowments, right? This one is cliche to say that Harvard is a hedge fund with a small university. It's actually attached to the side of it.

Yeah, that's right. And this is a, I think on some level, very unintuitive and on some level, an intuitive thing that when an institution or a person has much more money than they know how to spend, then the next step is from become an investor. And what you show is that begin to happen in increasingly broke ways with corporations. So can you draw the connection there, the way potentially a lot of easy money for the system actually changed what a lot of people in the system spent their time doing with that money?

Yeah, for sure. A couple of examples come to mind. You know, I led that book, which actually came out in 2016 and you're very kind of say, it was a little too early. It was an author.

You know, you want to kind of be right where people are. It was a little bit, you know, it was a few years too early because the trends just kept building. My intro chapter was actually about Apple, which is not a financial company, except it kind of is. And what do I mean by that?

Well, all right, biggest, most profitable company in history by many measures, Carl Icahn, you know, the famous Robert Barron activist investor, depending on which thing you like to use was tweeting regularly that Apple, which he held a big chunk of the time, should do more share buybacks and pay out bigger dividends and essentially reward investors. And just to unpack this for listeners, share buybacks are when a company goes into the market and buys its own stock, which has the effect of kind of artificially elevating prices because it cuts the number of shares prices go up. That's really good for the top 12% of people that own over 80% of stock, but it really doesn't, again, doesn't change anything. Doesn't build a new factory.

Doesn't create a new iPhone. So investors like Icahn are tweeting to Tim Cook, you got to do this guy, do this. And then he does it. He'll go out and use those low rates to borrow tons of money in very cheap corporate bond offerings and then use the proceeds to give it back directly to the, I'll say the top 12% really.

If you look at the bulk of it, it's the top 1%, the top 0.1%, which again, it's literally just making the rich richer. And this is a company that is using the financial markets to do this rather than to actually raise money for daily business. So that's a really weird perversion, I think of our financial system and it has the effect of increasing inequality. That's one example.

The other example I would use in this has been publicized recently in the book about Jack Welch, a company like GE, great American innovator under Jack Welch, who is sort of the epitome of the downsize and workers and distribute profits to investors sort of model, basically turned the company from a company that's been able to do that. And so I think the company from a company that made things into a company that issued loans so that people could buy things. He cut workers, he cut investment, he turned the company really into a financial firm. And this is a model that's actually been repeated widely in the rest of the economy.

There's some great stats actually by a University of Michigan scholar that's looked at the way in which companies today get about five times as much of their business from doing financial things, you know, lending to allow people to buy their products but really kind of using debt to paper over wheat consumer markets and low income. So if you had a more traditional economist here on the other side of the microphone, like Larry Summers, perhaps? I'm not naming any names. I'm just channeling an industry here, a way of being the Dow of neoclassical economics.

They might say, well, look, it's true that a lot of money came out of the Fed and then a lot of money went into the hands of people who owned assets because what the Fed was able to do was pump up asset prices, right? What quantitative easing is is they pump that money into asset markets. And then that did lead to investors and companies for various reasons having a lot of money. But if they can't spend that money and so they put it into some kind of investment arm or buybacks or whatever it is, that money is still flowing into the economy.

That money is being used by people who are trying to find the highest rate of return and the highest rate of return is going to be ultimately something that matters in the real economy. So at the end of this very long chain of money passing around from companies to companies that are going to be able to buy things that are going to be able to buy things. So when you're sitting around from company to company person to person, there should be something that creates economic value, right? I mean, it's a value machine is supposed to equal value and values.

What we all experience. What holes do you think there are in that story? If you do think there are any holes in that story. There was a very succinct way of thinking about you.

I think you said neoclassical. I would also call it neoliberal economic thinking. Let me break that down and look at it through the lens of an individual and then through the lens of a company. So if I look at an individual and I think I go back to that number that when you pump up asset prices, you're essentially rewarding the top 12% of the population that owns 82% of the stock and probably more housing wealth than that.

Well, even for the super wealthy, there's only so many houses, only so many diamond rings, only so many pair of jeans that they can buy. And as somebody that's been covering business for over 30 years now for my sins, it's been interesting to me that retail CEOs have for a decade or more been coming to me and saying, we're really worried about this because they can see that if you don't have a middle class that is big enough to support an economy. If you've only got 12% of the people that have all the wealth, that does not a healthy economy make. So that's how I think about it at the individual level.

At the corporate level, it's interesting and a little more complex corporations. And this is part of the whole neoclassical fallacy and I would say neoliberal fallacy corporations have really certainly since the 1980s been able to fly 35,000 feet above any of those issues of distribution in the nation state because companies are global. So if you look at where wealth has landed in the last half century, it's basically been in multinational companies headquartered mostly in the US and in China. So there was a trade off of cheap capital flowing to places where labor was a lot cheaper.

There was also the effect of companies buying and investing in a lot of technology to displace workers, very cheap to employ a Chinese worker as opposed to American one, even cheaper to employ a robot, which are now disintermediating Chinese workers. So companies are able to put that money to use that enriches the top of the C suite but doesn't actually create a broader shared prosperity. And it's very interesting because if you look at a chart, for example, that would have, say, the numbers of GDP growth of America and how companies are doing and how your average household is doing. In the 1970s, those lines would be pretty similar.

If you look at those lines now, you might see them all over the map. You might see a country going one direction, certain kinds of consumers going either down or very up depending on where they are socioeconomically and companies kind of floating over the whole thing, which is what I believe the core fallacy of both neoclassical and neoliberal economists are, which is that the market was going to always know best. The market was going to distribute absolutely properly and we get this trickle down effect. We are not getting a trickle down effect.

None of the statistics show that. But I want to hold on the question of why, because Steven just got back to the story you just told, which I think is in large respects a true one. So they begin outsourcing a lot of labor to China, which has a very bad effect on many, many, many American workers, but does lead to what they say lead to, which is much lower prices for many consumer goods. Beyond that, you can invest in both work and displacing, but also productivity enhancing technology.

True enough. If education keeps pace, that's an important caveat. Right. We don't think it's a bad thing that we've automated most of farm labor, right?

So if you get robots doing more retail work. So in theory, again, right, this is the theory that this is supposed to lead to these investments that boost productivity. Boost overall living standards and the money is supposed to flow to its highest use. And at some point, that highest use is supposed to be something that drives a lot of value.

And I think you brought in something really important there at the end, which is then if you look at GDP in this period, if you look at median wages in this period, if you look at a lot of places you might look to for that value to show up, you're not really seeing it. It's like the money somehow stayed in this financialized space in the economy. Actually quite a lot of money went into crypto. I mean, trillions of dollars is not an insignificant amount of cash.

A lot of money went into wild. I mean, if you look at the rise in Tesla prices, I mean, now they've gone back down, but that was really big. That's the thing I'm trying to get at, that it actually breaks the theory a little bit for so much money to be able to remain in financialized uses without eventually creating something in the real world worth having on average. But it seems that for some time that's actually been happening.

True enough. I love this question. I'm going to try and take it sort of in three parts. First off, I would note that this classical theory that says if consumer prices are falling, and it's amazing to me that there's still many neoliberal economists, you know, we don't have to name.

As long as consumer prices are falling, everything's fine. The problem is that a cheaper TV, even if it's $100 cheaper, $800 cheaper, it doesn't make up for the fact that all the things that make us middle class, education, health care, housing, have been rising at multiple times, core inflation rates for decades now, way before COVID, way before the financial crisis, the price of housing, education, and health care, these things were all rising faster than anybody's wages. So that's one reason why a lot of us haven't been feeling wealthier, despite all this money sloshing in the economy. The other thing is, why is it all going to Tesla stock?

Why is it going to crypto? Well, over in particular, the post financial crisis era, but again, I would go back farther decades of low rates. What that does, the Fed sort of manipulates the economy, keeps rates low, keeps borrowing costs low. That enables a lot of creation of debt.

It enables risky or assets, which may not even be profitable in many cases, or it could be totally speculative. It allows them to get inflated in price because investors of all kinds are looking for returns. So when a Fed pumps a lot of money into the economy, it means you can't get a great return in something like a bond, or even a plain vanilla stock. So you're just like, oh my God, how am I going to make money?

All right, let me try and go into a riskier than trying to go into text docs. My poor mother, a school teacher, and thank God she's got a pension still, she went into text docs pre-1999, lost a third of her retirement savings. The fact that we allow individuals are forced to make these decisions as a whole another podcast, don't get me started. So you get these really risky assets soaring in prices, and eventually the little guy, and it's always the little guy at the end.

Comes in and says, I've got to get a piece of this. I've got to get a piece of this. So crypto makes me crazy. And I'm so worried about it because the real profit says the New York Times did recently, not brilliant piece, kind of unpacking who the real investors of Bitcoin are a lot of people really making money or a concentrated type of the usual suspects.

But a lot of retail investors got into this stuff too, and they got into it late because they're not insiders, and they're just thinking, God, I'm losing out. And so the people that bought crypto, many of them were younger than average, many of them were poorer than average, many of them were people of color. And they're sort of saying, wait a minute, we're still waiting for trickle down. Let's try and get into some of that trickle down.

This is how boom bust cycles look. You know, if you look just at the period from COVID onward, there's been a fourfold increase in the number of retail investors. That means little guy investors in the markets relative to the institutions professionals have been getting out since really 2018 or so. But little guys are getting in because it's the tail end of the cycle and the Fed in its best efforts with a good intention has been trying to smooth things out.

But really what it's been doing is making things that have no value look like they have a lot of value until they don't. Let me come back to crypto because I do want to talk with you about that, both as an economic end as a cultural or almost metaphorical phenomenon. But I want to get it something that I think is implicit in this argument and see if I'm understanding it correctly. So during this period of easy money, there are consistent warnings.

It is going to unleash wild amounts of inflation. You go back to what Republicans are saying in 2010, in 2011, and you hear a lot of that. And it doesn't. If you track what the Fed understands, what the economics profession understands to be inflation, core inflation, look at the other measures to, until very recently, the pandemic period, it's very stable.

And so the people saying easy money is going to create all of this inflation are somewhat discredited. They look like cranks. I understand what you're saying. And I've come to believe in this view more that there was a lot of inflation.

It was just asset inflation. And we understand asset inflation, not as an economic problem. When asset inflation begins to go nuts, we don't report it like we do core inflation, where we say, there's a huge problem happening in the economy. We say, Hey, look, the line is going out.

Everybody's getting out. And so is that the argument here that it actually did unleash the promise inflation? That inflation was just somehow weirdly confined to assets. And so we did it.

We experienced it as a boon and not a problem. Yes, in answer, yes, that is one prong of the argument. I would say that there's another prong too, which is, I think just now starting to get talked about in the post COVID post Ukraine war era, which is there were a lot of false deflationary headwinds. And by that, I mean, all right, what's the real cost of a product?

What's the cost of a product, say a t-shirt in Walmart, if you're not using cotton harvested with concentration camp labor in Shenzhen? What's the cost of something if you actually have a real price on carbon? And then you have to tally in how much it cost to tote it over tens of thousands of miles from the South China seas? What's the cost if you have proper environmental and labor standards?

This is the conversation happening right now. And once you start pricing all those costs in and you start really thinking of the economy in a different way, then yeah, it is certainly as inflationary. And this is something that I think, unfortunately, no politician, particularly the Democrats right now in advance of a midterm or presidential one-a-land on, which is some of the transitions to a kinder, gentler, I believe, more stable and ultimately more resilient economy are going to be inflationary in the short to medium term. Ooh, there's a lot there.

I'll do one minute on this just because I love this topic. The false low prices we have. I'm a vegan and an animal rights person. And one of my arguments to people is always that meat should be expensive because you are not paying the price of the suffering of animals and factory farms.

You have made them pay that price and so the meat looks cheap, but it's not. It's just the suffering is being paid by the animals as opposed to the cost of animals raised well being paid by you. I agree with that, but it's also being paid by the labor. It's also being paid by the land.

The big food. I mean, this was one of those wonderful telling stories that COVID was like a scrim that got pulled up on it. And I know COVID hits suddenly, nobody's in restaurants, but yet everybody's lined up at grocery stores. Their food shortages, producers are dumping milk and meat.

Wait a minute, what's happening here? Well, we have two highly concentrated supply chains, one for restaurants, one for grocery stores. They don't talk to one another. Big food, a handful of companies have gotten monopoly power and use highly toxic and very hard on the land, industrial farming techniques, because that's how you get cheaper prices.

But what was the cost for that? It was the devastation of many communities in the Midwest. I grew up in the rural Midwest. I saw this play out in Indiana.

It was toxins in our water. It was health care. I mean, don't even get me started on the cost of obesity and all the kind of disease and health problems that come from that model, that neoliberal neoclassical model of cheap is everything. When you see the real cost of things cheap is not cheap.

Right. And I'll say too, I might be on this as never that everybody should become vegan. It's simply that meat should cost what it costs to be raised environmentally sustainably and humanely. And then you would get into a much better equilibrium for everyone involved.

Hi, this is Ashley. I live in San Francisco with my boyfriend. We would love to officially share my near time subscription with separate logins. We both love cooking, living in the kitchen, but I'm a 30 minute and under efficient dinner.

GIRL-E. I want a sheep meal. He is very elaborate. He wants to get into the storytelling.

I want to be able to save my easy meals and check off the ones I've completed. And I think him having his own profile would be great. Ashley, we heard you. It's why we created the New York Times family subscription.

You get your own login and Mr. elaborate. It's his plus room for two others. Find out more at nytimes.com.com slash family.

I want to pull us now into this era because this has been a critique burbling around the edges. I think it has only been in the last four or five months that some of it has moved into something almost proven. And so what happens now is the pandemic and the Fed goes into unbelievably easy money mode. They do things that you can read about in Adam toosis work that they've never done before.

The amount of money they're printing, the way they're buying things. This is truly uncharted territory. And in a way that is different than what happens in 2010, Congress really steps up because Donald Trump, as leader of Republicans, can get them to spend money and Democrats want to spend money. They spend a ton of money and cares.

They spend a ton of money then later with Joe Biden as president in the American Rescue Plan to bring up Larry Summers, who says I think incorrectly that was a little bit too big. But the moment that money begins getting moved directly into the pockets of most people, then you begin to see inflation happen. And the moment inflation begins to happen, then you begin to see the Fed tap on the brakes. And the moment the Fed taps on the brakes, then you see the asset economy pop and pop much quicker than people were expecting, suggesting that it's underpinnings are more fragile than they had admitted.

So can you talk a bit about how you understand that part of the story? Like what has been revealed by the kind of policy experiments taking place in this period? Yeah, you're making an important point. And this is where, yeah, Summers got the timing right about, wait a minute, fiscal right now at this moment, going to be tricky.

Now, I would say Larry is not acknowledging the fact that some of his own policies during the Clinton administration actually led us into a highly financialized economy, which is why we are where we are. And that's the thing that I would want to connect is whenever you have a crisis, there's always a trigger. There's always something that seems small that happens, and then it just explodes and the shrapnel of everything that was wrong starts to go everywhere. And so our trigger this time was COVID.

And what did COVID do? Well, for starters, it illuminated these highly financialized, highly globalized, highly fragile, efficient, and I put efficient in quotation marks, supply chains that actually turned out to be none of that resilient, you know, pandemic hits. You can't buy masks. Why?

Because China's hoarding them. Well, China's hoarding them because it makes them because that was the bargain, cheap capital for cheap labor. And it wants to put masks on its own people. Well, that's kind of understandable if you're sitting in Beijing, but if you're sitting in North Carolina, it's a problem.

So COVID hits, we start to see supply chains breaking down that paradigm of efficient, but cheap suddenly disappears. And so you get blockages and then the fact that each individual country, because suddenly we're not the world is not flat, you know, the world is not flat. It's not one big happy global economy. It's every nation for themselves and every nation deciding differently how to deal with COVID, how much to lock down when to let people back out on the streets.

And because the virus is moving in different ways in different places, there's asymmetry between recoveries and when people have to go back down into another lockdown, then you get the war in Ukraine, which just adds no pun intended, but fuel to that fire by knocking out a good chunk of the world's excess gas and oil reserves and also creating a food shortage because Ukraine is the bread basket of that particular region. And so that creates more inflationary pressures. Now, all this was happening in very complicated and asynchronous ways at the same time that you have a president who let us remember is one of the most labor friendly presidents, probably that we've ever had. Comes in and is like, you know what I'm not going to do?

I'm not going to do what my predecessors did in bailout banks while letting homeowners go down their own. I'm going to make sure I'm doing the right thing by individuals by labor, even if that means going a little overboard. So I think that's what happened. And that's that complicated confluence of events.

But basically what it did was just light the fire that then kind of exploded the whole system and the pressures have been building for decades. I've had trouble figuring out how to make this point correctly, but it revolves around what you're talking about here. I think it's really powerful. What problems we understand how to see in an economy and what prioritization we give to them.

And I was mentioning earlier that, you know, assets go up. We look at that. We think, great, right? Our first response is terrific.

You look at cornflation going up, even if some of the reason is wages and it is immediately treated as a problem. And I'm not saying that inflation getting out of hand isn't a problem because it really, really, really is. But nevertheless, it is coded inflation almost always and everywhere. It is coded as a problem.

And one of the dynamics of this period in the economy that I think deserves more scrutiny than it's gotten is the way that we can give a lot of money to rich people without the distortions coding as an economic problem. And then the moment you begin giving a lot of money to folks who aren't as rich, the distortions do code as a problem. And you might say that that's because in the short term, we put a bunch of demand into a supply constrained economy, and that really did create an inflation problem. I truly don't want to be seen to be diminishing, but I think it's a genuine economic challenge.

And at the same time, putting all that money to the economy really did create a housing boom and a housing prices rise is going to be a problem. It is a problem for anybody who wants to buy a home. It's nice for homeowners, but it's difficult for anybody who wants to buy a home. Or you can say some other things about dimensions in the stock market.

So I wanted to talk about this piece of it. The differential ways that we are able to see problems among a lot of money sloshing around the working class versus a lot of money sloshing around the very, very wealthy classes. Yeah, it's such a great question. Let me try and nail this because it's a hugely important thing for people to understand.

I had a conversation once with a union representative who was actually on an advisory board that the Fed created, the following financial crisis decided to actually put some real people on its advisory boards to ask them some questions about, Hey, what are you saying for Main Street? Because we're way up here in the ivory tower. And I was raising this issue because I'm a card-carrying Democrat, but unlike most liberals, I actually do think debt matters. And I think that financialization, even though some wealth, like a little bit, will eventually trickle down to people that make $15 an hour.

It's just so disproportionate to the amount that's gone to the rich and to the risks that have been brewed up in the system as a result of that strategy that it actually ricochets and creates the very problems that you're talking about, which is now a housing market that is so out of control that even a lot of middle or even upper middle class people that I know are saying, my God, we can't count on the housing ladder period. And he said, it's true. There are these risks. But one reason that a lot of labor leaders supported all that quantitative easing and that kind of post 2009 monetary saccharine high that we've spoken about was that they keep waiting and waiting for everything to trickle down.

And just when it's about to trickle down, that is when the money classes, the investors in the policy making classes decide, not as little too much risk now for us. Let's pull the plug. We'll stop the music. You can stop dancing now.

And they're like, wait, we just want to drink. I'm like, my looking for that little dropper. And I have got so much sympathy for that. I mean, it actually almost makes me a little tearful because I have so much sympathy and time for that argument.

And I understand that the labor left that has supported some of the easy money policies has been doing the best they can for working people within the context of a totally effed up system. I don't know if I'm allowed to say that on podcast. But what we have got to do now, because I frankly think we're at the end of this whole neoliberal neoclassical economy, making any sense for anybody, what we now have to do is tell a true story, which is trying to get like 50 cents for the working person at the end of creating a bubble that makes it impossible for you to ever become a homeowner. That doesn't work.

What we need and other countries make these decisions. I mean, you can look at Germany, Germany is not perfect in many ways, but it's made some decisions as a society to have an income led economy rather than an asset bubble led economy. And that's something Biden, I think, messaged quite well, work not wealth, right? Unfortunately, going back to your one of your first points, we have a gridlocked political system in which you can't get through those very basic, very smart investments in education and the caring economy and highways and all the things that we did at certain times in our economy as a society that created broad-based shared prosperity.

And that's where we've got to get to. I believe we will get there. It may take a lot more pain, but we're going to get there because there's just really no other alternative. It's not the tragedy of this period, because I think one thing people could hear when we talk about saccharine highs or when we talk about easy money or bubbles is there can be a sense of inevitability in it, right?

If it was always an illusion, it was always a hologram, then eventually somebody was going to touch it. But I used to run one blog at the Washington Post. And I remember that one of our main stage charts for just years is we would go to the government website that tracks real interest rates, real rates at which the government can borrow treasury rates. And they would be at the five and ten year frame negative and we would like sit there pounding the table that the market is basically paying us in relation to just the terms to issue treasuries so the government can spend money.

And the government did spend money on a bunch of things. Like if you look at government spending in this period, it's not that it was low. But when we look at this period as the great tragedy was we could have functionally been paid to decarbonize the country. We could have functionally been paid to upgrade every school into a palace.

We could have functionally been paid to build a lot of things that would have generated returns for a really long time. And for a bunch of reasons, instead of doing that, we sloshed money around and subsidized Uber rides for all generation of people and post-made deliveries and crypto bubbles. And I was saying nothing came out of it. I mean, I think something's did come out of it.

You know, there are companies that invested the money well and whenever his other problems, I admire what Elon Musk did with Tesla and SpaceX. I mean, there were things that happened that got built. But we could have built nationally a lot because we had this period of investment opportunity. And I worry that when we look back, we'll just look at this as a bubble.

We'll look at it as a miss. There's a period of easy choices when we could have made great investments. And now we're going into a period of hard economic choices where it's going to be a lot harder to make investments that are still needed. Yeah.

I'm just so sad as I hear you talk about it because I 100% agree with that analysis. I was thinking historically, if you look back on what are the decisions taken by the public sector and the private sector that actually lead to broad-based shared prosperity. And they tend to be in periods like this where you have a potentially world game changing transformative technology coming down the pike, which is in our era of clean energy, that you typically have the government come in and kind of put a floor under that with some kind of investment. You could look back to the period, say, of the building of the railroads.

The government incentivizes the push to the West, land grants, even something like creating standards for the kind of gauges that would go on a railroad. And then the private sector is like, OK, we've got a floor, we're going to come in now and we're going to privatize this. And that's when you get real growth. That's kind of how the internet was created, right?

You post World War II, you have this investment into telecoms and tech and you get the internet and then it gets privatized and people make money and real productive things get created. We had, I don't know whether to say had or have, honestly, it tears at my heart because I feel that we have this window and it used to be really, really big. It was like not even a window. It was a huge door.

It was like a bridge that was being lifted up and, you know, come in and make this happen. And it is closing very quickly and it's going to make a huge difference to our lives, not today, but in absolutely in 10 years, 100% in 20 years or 50 years. It may look a lot more like an emerging market country in America because we didn't make these decisions. Let me get another piece of financialization here, which will bring us back to crypto.

So one of the things I find interesting about crypto, again, as a metaphor, as an ideology is a concept, is that it really is on some level the financialization of everything. It is a whole new way of structuring the internet built on how you would structure a currency, then how you would trade the currency, then how you would verify that the currency is being traded and the ownership of the currency was validated. And I find something about it very poignant, actually, this whole technological structure and idea that is in many ways a critique of hyper-financialized digital capitalism that is itself at its heart, hyper-financialized digital capitalism, such that the contradiction is baked into the center of the entire thing, right? All these people who don't like how, say, the feds ran money, surfing these waves of fed money, going into how they don't like how Web 2.0 companies took over the internet, but then were perverted by capitalism, they need to make money becoming part of this Web 3 that is at its core perverted by capitalism.

The whole thing is so unsettled, but it's also a little... I mean, when I say it's poignant, I think that you're really watching people struggling with the inability now to... It's the only way to imagine escape from capitalism is more capitalism. It's very strange.

I'm curious what you make of it. It's a fascinating topic, and I feel like we could almost do a whole other podcast on crypto. When we talk about crypto, most people use that term to talk about private coin that is not backed by a central bank, right? But that's only one part of the digital currency story.

So crypto is exactly what you say, kind of naively, optimistically and wildly speculative on one level. But it's also telling us something very important. An investor once said to me, and I thought this stuck in my mind, that he saw Bitcoin not as something that he wanted to invest in, but as a kind of a canary in the coal mine for the level of trust in the existing systems. And that's sort of interesting because it gets to your point that, well, wait a minute, you're serving a wave of central bank backed money, so you're kind of part of the system.

You're sort of the icing on this very large financialized cake if you're in crypto. On the other hand, the notion of a privately issued currency that is can be in some way, and this is sort of unclear whether this is really true or not to, but controlled in the way that gold was, where there's a limited supply, that appeals to a lot of both techno-utopians, but also kind of average people. And again, this gets to young people that are totally cut out of the existing system of wealth, to people of color who are disproportionately invested relative to their wealth in crypto, that they look around and think, well, god, this system is not working for me. I want something different.

It's almost like, I mean, this just came to me. I'm thinking, is it sort of like the people that voted for Trump and Sanders like that weird overlap of, well, I know that Main Street politicians, a vital political stripe are not serving me, so I'm going to go outside the paradigm. I think there's some of that there. Let me draw on that Trump analogy because I think there's something very, very viable in it and put aside a lot of Trump's personal characteristics because I don't want to over-polarize this metaphor.

But one thing that's always been interesting about Trump's 2016 run to me, I've always loved a line he had. He said, I've been greedy my whole life. Now I want to be greedy on behalf of America. And I'm doing that for memory, but that's basically the structure of the line.

And the point of Trump wasn't to break the system, not really. People talk about him as a wrecking ball, but that isn't what he actually promised. The point of Trump was to have somebody who knew how to gain the system, who was on your side in it. And it also has a very, very important subtlety.

And there's a way in which I think crypto reflects that, the way people participated in both the currency and ultimately in the NFT markets, was it wasn't an escape from financialized capitalism. It was a hyper-financialized digital capitalism that you could be on the ground floor of. It wasn't the end of it, it was your version of it. There's very much something to that.

I'm thinking of two things. First of all, I'm thinking of an article that I wrote a while back on Robinhood because I was just horrified. I didn't even know about Robinhood, but my now... You mean the company here, not the old guy who lives in the woods?

No, I mean the company, the trading platform, for average dough investors, you can go on and do super fast day trading and they do a lot of crypto, a lot of meme stocks. I learned about Robinhood. I mean, I'm embarrassed to say because I covered the financial markets from my then 13-year-old son, who told me at one point, he's like, Mom, are you going to buy the dip? I'm like, Oh my God.

Did you just say, buy the... Wait a minute, what? How did you even know that term? What are you doing?

And he was on Robinhood, you know, like a bunch of his friends that apparently have made money on these platforms in crypto. And I thought, Oh my God, okay, yes. And I wrote an article saying how frightening this was to me. And then I got a bunch of angry responses from individuals who said exactly what you just did.

Well, wait a minute. This is our way of getting in to do what the big guys are doing, and that kind of speculator, which ties directly to your point about Trump, which I 100% agree with. You know, I said this actually in the intro to the paperback of makers and takers because he had been elected by then. I'm like, this guy is the president for a financialized era.

You know, he's like a, he's like Melville's con man. You know, he takes one truth, which is the system is broken and corrupt and kind of embeds it in a welter of lies and somehow won't want like the space-time fabric is bending and he's able to get elected. One of the things about that, it makes me think of when I first heard of Robinhood. It's a real story for the art, right?

Where were you when you heard of Robinhood trading platform? But it was by an investor in it. And he was saying, this is the big thing. This is the next really big thing because it is going to democratize trading.

And one way of responding to that comment, if you're me and you cover financial crises in that period is, well, is democratizing trading such a great idea? But to the point of our larger framework here, in an era of easy money and in a long era, whereas to Mospechetti has said it's R over G, right? Returns over growth. If you think basically the line does always go up, then democratizing trading is really, really important.

We talked about trading as risky, but for a long time, it actually hasn't been. If you've been able to be part of the trade and you can wait out some risk now again, then you've done great. And you've particularly done great in the last decade. So I think a lot of economists and economic writers and so on scoff at this idea that everybody should be piling into what look like these risky markets.

But I think it's because on a generational timeline, they haven't actually felt that risky to people. And in fact, even things like the financial crisis, which we call the financial crisis, if you just stayed in the market, you did perfectly fine. It was no crisis for you. The crisis was if you weren't in the markets and lost your job.

It's a great point. You're also getting to something. I mean, I literally spend most of my day these days as an economic columnist thinking about this very topic. Will the paradigm hold or will it break?

Because I do think that we are really at a pendulum swing of a 70 year neoliberal paradigm. And I would go back and I'll just be super wonky and used to run one vlogs that you want mine to the 1930s when we had the beginnings of really of our current monetary system of our current system of global capitalism, which was invented in Europe in the 30s and 40s by a group of economists and policymakers and thinkers that were trying to figure out, okay, how do we take really super polarized societies that have been just completely torn apart by war and connect them together? And they thought the way to do that was by connecting capital and global business. And that made a lot of sense at that time.

But the pendulum of capital being above everything else has just swung so far to the extreme. And I really do think that in some ways, Trump was the apex of that because already you can see Biden little by little, you know, this administration pushing back on those policies. I really do think we're at a turning point where the paradigm is going to break. And one thing I would give to support that, you ultimately do reach a point.

This is true in hundreds, thousands of years of financial markets where Wall Street or, you know, the financial markets, let's say Wall Street and Main Street will meet. They will meet at some point. It may take years. It may take decades.

It may take half a century, but they do reconverge. And I believe that point is coming. And I think it's coming in part because if you look at where the growth is in the world, it's mostly in Asia right now. And this is definitely going to be the Asian century.

We're going to get cut out of that growth and not because of anything that the US policymakers done, but because the Chinese policymakers have decided we're going to own our own supply chains. We're going to have, you know, they call the dual circulation economy, but basically it's about producing local for local. I think we are moving to a much more localized, regionalized world. And again, this is actually the topic of my next book, Homecoming.

And I think in that world, you have to change the paradigm because you cannot surf the way of a financialization and globalization anymore because the paradigm is shifted. So you have to create some more income-led growth at home. So let me offer two points of skepticism here because I've been thinking about the same thing. And depending on which day you catch me, I have some of the reviews, but nevertheless, a month ago, six weeks ago, you know, as Russia invaded Ukraine and people began to absorb the implications of that and possibly the long-term implications for us in China.

I was much more of the view that this might represent a fundamental turning in our attitude towards globalization, whose supply chains we'd be in Hawk 2. And now I'm not sure. And the reason I'm not sure too, it isn't that we're not going to try to re-shore some critical supply chains. I think there's no doubt that we are going to very likely pass a big bill this year to try to re-shore among other things semiconductor manufacturing.

So there'll be a couple of critical chains that we are going to try to get back here. But in general, even Biden, they're not going out there saying, hey, you know what, we've lived in this low price era. Actually, the cost of that we're much higher than we ever level with you about. And it is time to accept that we're going to make this transition.

And until I hear that, I think what everybody wants is to get back to what has passed for normal for a long time as quickly as humanly possible. And they might do that. I mean, Europe is still not even off Russian oil and gas. Like, it's amazing to me actually how much sticking power a lot of this has really had because prices, you know, you see us in America too.

Democrats are going to get hammered in 2022 and part on prices. There's very little that is as devastating to a political party than price increases. As it increases, everybody loves. Price increases.

That's the end of you. No, I think you're making a very powerful point. And truth be told, I wonder about this too. But I guess what I would say, first of all, if you go back to the, I believe it was, I'm trying to think when Biden put, I think it was the summer of 2021 that he actually did make a really, really important statement, which I think was way underplayed and overlooked in the media, about shifting the economy from low prices to being one that was more about workers and about labor.

And it was a very broad speech and it went across all different industries and sectors of the economy. So there was a stake in the ground put down and you can see those policy tweaks happening really throughout the administration in many, many ways that I won't go into right now. But yes, okay, so we get to COVID. We've suddenly got all this inflation.

Janet Yellen is saying, maybe we should take the tariffs off China. Sure, take the tariffs off China. Honestly, tariffs are kind of a red herring in this whole thing because I think that the forces that are pushing, you call it de-globalization or call it regionalization or localization or the moving closer of production and consumption. I think those forces are going to stay with us and be more powerful.

And they would include everything from the fact that China really does want to own its own supply chains and be independent. So that's Asia right there and potentially a pathway through the old Silk Road into North Africa and parts of West Africa. There's of course an amazing opportunity right now for the US and Europe to come together on climate chain standards and maybe even put a price on carbon, which would just immediately knock out Chinese mercantilism because it would actually help us to tally the cost of cheap labor, child labor, long supply chains that take up too much energy to taupe cheap stuff to us to put in Walmart or sell on Amazon. All of these things are happening and what's more, there are two other factors.

We have some really interesting new technologies, not to be a techno utopian, but 3D printing, additive manufacturing, things that actually allow you to build stuff. Like entire houses or cars in one place in a few hours with a machine that can essentially lay down materials and print. That's a real deal. That's growing 22% year on year.

And it is a paradigm shift of a kind that's going to change manufacturing. We also have a new generation of consumers, of citizens, of workers that are younger and they just really care about the environment and they care about food and they care about where they don't want fast fashion. They understand the cost of these things. And I think we also have in a funny way to go back to the Trump and Sanders metaphor, we've got some weird and interesting territory in which the far left and the far right can kind of overlap.

You have security hawks on the right that say, yeah, we need more secure resilient independent supply chains, which means we need to produce some chips here and we're probably going to need to produce some rare earth minerals and secure those mines and maybe some lithium batteries too. And you've also got some green new dealers that say, you know what, that's not a bad idea. I think we'd like to support labor in America and have jobs and we'd also like to be better for the environment and make sure that we don't have these long supply chains with heavy emissions. And so I just see so many tailwinds and I think ultimately we're going to be in for a lot of turmoil, but I think they're going to take us to a better place because as we've talked about for the last hour plus, the old system was untenable.

I want to end by talking about the asset class that sits most squarely in the middle of all this to me, which is housing in real estate. So there's been a tremendous multi trillion dollar run up in housing wealth over the past couple of years. At the same time, it's not a rarely held asset, right? The homeowner should rate is about two thirds.

At the same time, there's a housing shortage. At the same time, there's been a huge investment coming in from private equity and other kinds of more financialized investment firms buying up a lot of homes. And meanwhile, we are seeing new home sales fall. They've all got about 17% in April.

How do you understand the housing market here? Has it peaked? If it has peaked, what does that mean for this main engine of wealth? What is your take on that space?

So there's a few things happening in the housing market and I'll just do a real quick run through history. If I may, you remember the term ownership society, which was, I believe, a bush word. You know, we were all supposed to be encouraged to become homeowners to own homes. That was encouraged by the right, but also by the left that wanted people who hadn't had access to housing credit to get more of it.

That eventually did lead to predatory lending, lower lending standards. And of course, when the subprime bubble exploded in 2008, poor people, more vulnerable people really suffered the most because when they have debt, it's much harder for them to pay it off. There's a wonderful book by a couple of academics, Sufi and Mion called House of Debt that explores that topic. Anyway, right after the financial crisis, I was actually exploring for makers and takers.

In fact, I was out in the inland empire in California, you know, a couple of hours east of LA looking at this weird phenomenon where you had really still pretty high unemployment rates devastated communities, but rental prices that were wildly increasing. And I'm like, how can they be raising rents this much? Well, it turned out that a big private equity firm has become the biggest landlord in town. And in fact, Blackstone's invitation housing, they have spun it off since, but it became the country's biggest homeowner.

So you have a remote private equity firm that is the landlord of the country that can raise rents at will that actually was able to buy up cheap houses on literally on courthouse steps after the financial crisis in ways that even big banks couldn't do because they were not as highly regulated. So you get that investor class starting to actually like be your landlord, own the little pink houses that are part of the American dream fast forward to the last few years. You have that now happening in multifamily housing, you have private equity buying up trailer parks, you know, and raising the rents. I mean, it's just really, I think of seeing, and I think that there should really be limits on that kind of investor led housing.

There already are limits in fact in many European countries. Now, COVID of course, further distorted and potentially changed in interesting ways, the housing market. And I'll just note that you saw people decamping right for two or three hours outside of big cities where they could get cheaper rents or buy cheaper houses, but then suddenly those property prices shut up to and all that financialization and all that fiscal stimulus. Then of course, you know, helped put a little feel onto that market.

I think we're at a tipping point now. It's funny. I've been hoping for years to be able to buy like a small cabin somewhere in the Catskills and I couldn't. I was priced out of the market during COVID.

I watched these, you know, things that literally look like meth shacks were suddenly doubling or tripling and prices and I'm like, Oh my God, what's going on? Now those are starting to correct. So you are seeing that bubble beginning to deflate. But to be fair, I think COVID, you know, pandemics and wars sometimes fundamentally change things.

And I do think that they are changing the geography of work in this country. I think that you are going to see a more permanent move south and to the west, to the mountain regions, to places where taxes are lower or property prices are lower and there's less density. I think that's probably going to last as long as work from home lasts. And so that may, that may be the real dynamic that also sits alongside the more financialized dynamic.

Is this the way in which the political economy, though, of easy money becomes very, very hard to dislodge? Because if you want to say that, well, we should end up so much random money sloshing around. I think people will agree with that to somebody, at least. But it's when mortgage rates start going up, when they feel that their homes, which in this period have been, I mean, the engine of middle-class wealth in this country are going down, that you might think that this policy equilibrium is fairly fragile because sure, you know, rich people have a lot of political power, but there aren't that many of them.

But it's actually in many ways that same source of money that is powering a lot of the housing market. And that's not a fragile political constituency. That is most families and a lot of voters. How do you see that as playing into the decisions that the Fed is going to have to make?

The decisions that the other parts of government are going to have to make? I guess I see it in two ways. To go back to that paradigm, I just sketched out where pandemic hits, you suddenly see the rings that are two or three hours outside the main urban areas, housing prices just skyrocketing. So suddenly the Catskills is like, Aspen, you know, you can't afford to live there and work there.

You have to be an investor. That's deflating because rates are rising, and that's actually a good thing. We need that kind of correction. I mean, that goes back to this problem, this kind of fundamental problem of the stretching out of unsustainable business cycles, you need there to be collapses, even though nobody likes them.

You know, you need the market to correct at some point to kind of weed out things that are unsustainable and speculative. And so I'm glad that there's a correction happening in some of those markets. I am worried, however, as you say, what will be the effect on the consumption economy, which is 70% of our economy, as people, you know, consumers spending amongst Americans, what happens to that when our home values are suddenly half of what they were and more people are actually invested in the stock market the number before now. So when stock prices collapse, what happens to consumer spending?

And I'm actually already starting to see little glimmerings of this. Consumers kind of going on buying strikes, particularly things that are really dispensable, you know, like all those streaming services, for example, you saw Netflix had some bad results recently. Well, I think people are looking at all those hundreds of dollars that they're spending yearly on streaming services and saying, okay, I don't need that. Maybe I don't need that new gadget.

You know, what do I really need? I need to heat my home, fuel my car. I need shelter of some kind. Everything else is maybe dispensable.

That, of course, is going to create a snowball effect where once main street starts to meet Wall Street, you're going to get that asset price correction. It's going to be painful, but it'll be... Do you really think that's plausible? We're going to have a major housing asset correction.

I've heard a lot of people say they think the housing market is peak. Not immediately, but eventually, yes. I think there are two trends here. Just to speak about housing, it's overvalued, just like stocks in many places, but there's also some legitimate supply and demand issues.

And you've seen the administration calling those out zoning issues, supply chain issues that are just making it hard to get building materials. That's going to take a couple of years to work its way out of the system. And then at that point, we're going to see, are we in a Mississippi land bubble where everything's going to collapse? Or were we actually building the railroads to LA?

We're moving around after the pandemic and we're working from home in Iowa somewhere. We don't know the answer to that yet. I suspect it'll be a combination of both. But I think in the really frothy markets, you are going to see a correction.

Although, I'll say one thing, which is that in the markets where the super-rich controlments of the real estate, like Jackson Hole and Nantucket, I think they may stay in the clouds. Unless you see real corporate lobbying, dark money limits and tax reform, you're going to have a class of American oligarchs that are living in the clouds. It's a good place to end it. So always a final question.

What are three books you'd recommend to the audience? So one book that I read earlier this year that I really loved was All That She Carried, which is this wonderful non-fiction exploration by Harvard Academic of an African American artifact, really. It was a sack that was passed down through a family and it was given by a mother to a daughter as she was being sold during slave times to another family was being taken away from her and she gave her the sack and packed it with these things with a handful of nuts, with some things with a cloth that she could keep warm with on the journey. And it is a fascinating exploration of an academic that is desilowing all these different areas of study, black history, anthropology, the economy of America and how it's run, how you actually track and tell a narrative story about a person whose name you don't even know.

And I just found that really, really powerful. I also read another book called Beautiful Country, which was a story of an immigrant family who'd come from China to live in New York and what it's like to be undocumented, what it is like to be living in the shadow economy. It was a memoir and a narrative tale, which I often give memoirs a hard time because I think there's a lot of people that should not be writing memoirs that are, but this one was a real keeper. And I guess my third book would be Gary Gerstil's The Rise and Fall, The Neoliberal Order, which I reviewed recently in the FT.

It's an instant classic and you can barely use that phrase for most books, but it really is. He looks at a lot of what we've just been talking about. This half century of neoliberalism, financialization, globalization, all those threads pulling them together. What did it mean?

And where is it taking us? And I think that it really asks and answers some of the big questions today. And your books are makers and takers, which we've talked about a lot here. And don't be evil.

You're big luck at how the tech industry got a lot more evil. Rana Ferrer, thank you very much. Thank you so much, Ezra. Mr.

Conchor is produced by Annie Galvin, Jeff Galad, and Richard Carmel, back checking by Andrea Lopez-Busado, original music by Isaac Jones, mixing and engineering by Jeff Galad, audience strategy by Shannon Basta. Our executive producers are Riena Gucci and special thanks to Kristin Lane and Kristina Samuliski.

Frequently asked questions

How long is this episode of The Ezra Klein Show?

This episode is 1 hour and 11 minutes long.

When was this The Ezra Klein Show episode published?

This episode was published on June 17, 2022.

Is there a transcript available for this episode?

Yes, a full transcript is available for this episode. You can read the complete transcript on the episode page.

Can I download this The Ezra Klein Show episode?

Yes. Use the download control on the episode player to save the publisher-provided media file.