The (feeling of) Respect: Kant and Schopenhauer on Moral Motivation

In his "On the Basis of Morality" (1840) Arthur Schopenhauer criticizes Immanuel Kant's ethical theory as being "cold," "unsympathetic" and "without feeling". Schopenhauer claims to depart from Kant's view as found in The Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and Kant's later essay, The Metaphysics of Morals (1797). But is Schopenhauer's critique of Kant valid? And do Schopenhauer and Kant hold radically different views of morality? We attempt to understand this criticism and to grasp a deeper understanding of Kantian ethics by focusing on some of the concepts central thereto: The Moral Law; Inclination; Respect/Reverence; and Will. Foundational to this discussion is Part II of Paul Guyer's 2012 article "Schopenhauer, Kant and Compassion."