The Illusions of Bare Awareness and the Panpsychist Fallacy

In this critique, philosopher Bry Willis challenges the logic of panpsychism, specifically targeting the arguments made by thinker Alex Connor regarding the nature of consciousness. Willis contends that proponents of panpsychism fall into a logical trap by first stripping consciousness down to a "bare awareness" only to later treat it as a substantial, irreducible entity. The author highlights a contradictory equivocation where consciousness is described as a divisible bundle of traits when seeking simplicity, yet an indivisible substance when arguing against emergence. Rather than choosing between the ideas of consciousness as a fundamental building block or a complex byproduct, Willis advocates for Dis–Integration, a method that rejects the traditional framing of the debate entirely. Ultimately, the text asserts that the very terminology used to define consciousness is incoherent, rendering the search for its origins a misguided pursuit of a reified concept.👉 https://philosophics.blog/2026/06/29/deconstructing-consciousness-without-panpsychism/