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Dec 18, 2018 32 min

The Iran Nuclear Negotiations

from CNAS Podcasts Hosted by Center for a New American Security

Ambassador Wendy Sherman discusses her unlikely career, which began as an advocate for women's issues. Then, she went into politics, and eventually wound up at the State Department, where she was the lead negotiator for the Iran nuclear deal. In her new book, “Not for the Faint of Heart: Lessons in Courage, Power, and Persistence,” Sherman writes about long hours of work and having to persevere through tough negotiations with the North Koreans and later the Iranians. In this final episode of the first season of Stories from the Backchannel, Sherman speaks with host Ilan Goldenberg, Senior Fellow and Director of the Middle East Security Program at the Center for A New American Security. She talks about what it was like to be sitting next to the late North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and the challenges of negotiating with Iran. Sherman's story is a candid portrayal of what it's like to be a diplomat and how challenges can sometimes be turned into opportunities.

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The Iran Nuclear Negotiations

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From the Center for New American Security, this is Stories from the Back Channel, the podcast about pivotal moments in national security as told from the inside. I'm Yulan Goldenberg. Today, negotiating with our adversaries. Wendy Sherman had an unlikely rise to becoming the lead negotiator of the Iran nuclear deal.

She got her master's degree in social work, which she says was actually great training for her future role at the State Department. It's about deciding with a community what the objective is, seeing the entire landscape, all of the elements that you have to have in that 360 degree view of things, much as you have to do in a negotiation. While she honed her negotiating skills through years of experience, something innate to Sherman is her tenacity. In her new book, Not for the Faint of Heart, Lessons Encourage Power and Persistence, she writes about the long hours of work and having to persevere through both mental fatigue and physical injury.

I ruptured my pinky finger going down a stairwell to a senate briefing, got my staff to get me an ice pack, slapped my hand on the ice pack, gave a great briefing because I had to be focused because I was in such agony and then went to the emergency room afterwards. Belongable for briefing the senate, she was the director of Child Welfare in Maryland. That's when her then boss introduced her to Barbara Mikulski, who at the time was a congresswoman from Baltimore. And she was looking for some policy ideas about how to finance shelters for battered women.

And I had some ideas of how to do that. So we became very good friends, movie buddies actually, and I was her chief of staff for three years. Then I left because I was a brand new mom and I just couldn't take care of everybody at that point. But less than a year later, I became her campaign manager.

When I go to the United States Senate, I'll be a voice and I'll be a vote and no matter what, I won't be overworked. I'd helped her sort of strategize what she'd need to do to have a shot at being a senate candidate and being a successful one ten months later. Congratulations, Ms. Mikulski, you've won the election.

Now comes the hard part, doing the job. She and her campaign chair came back to me and said, okay, you wrote the strategy, now you gotta make it happen. And I did that and went on from there to be the executive director for Emily's list sometime after that, to work on Michael Dukakis' campaign. Or a new era of economic greatness in America, Michael Dukakis for president.

So then you move on from, it sounds like pretty intense rough and tumble world of politics to intense rough and tumble world of foreign policy. So you go work at the state department and you end up on the North Korea file in the late 90s. When Madeline Albright was about to become secretary of state, she asked me to organize a group of people, some of who were going to go into the administration, for sort of get together at her house to think about what the priorities might be. And virtually everybody in the room thought within two years the North Korea regime would fall apart.

And that was conventional wisdom at the time. And I was going to be her counselor, which is really sort of a minister without portfolio. You do whatever the secretary needs you to do. And so I said to her that I really wanted to work on the Korean Peninsula because I thought a lot of change was coming as to everybody else in the room.

So wrong where we all. We discovered that North Korea, in fact, was quite resilient, had decided that the United States was an existential threat to them. And the only way they could survive was to get nuclear weapons to deter our actions. We worked at this not getting very far.

And we started to get very concerned in the second Clinton administration when Madeline was secretary about missiles that they launched over Japan that had two stages. And up until then there'd only been one stage missiles and we were quite concerned. So the secretary asked in President Askel Perry, former secretary of defense to come in. And Bill and I and Ash Carter, who was part of that team, went on to be secretary of defense, went to Pyongyang with our team.

It truly was more a cult than a country. Pyongyang was a beautiful city because it's basically made up of monuments to Kim Il-sung, the founder of, quote unquote, modern North Korea. And now Kim Jong-il, the leader at that time, lots of parks. A woman would stand on a pedestal in the middle of an intersection in a blue uniform, signaling traffic except there wasn't any.

So it was all sort of very bizarre. We went to a rice paddy field where they wanted to show us how great communism was and what they were doing was. It was an oxen plow. There were signs along one bank revolutionary signs to egg on the workers.

And at the far end of the field was a military band dressed in white uniform playing revolutionary songs. It was sort of like going to a stage campaign event. It was meant for us. So we brought with us a letter from President Clinton where we said that if North Korea entered into negotiations and moved toward a moratorium on their missile launches, then we would be open to having relations with North Korea.

It basically took 10 months for North Korea to respond to that invitation when in October right before the November election, Kim Jong-il sent to the United States, Chome Young Rock, the second in command of the defense forces, to bring a letter from Kim Jong-il inviting President Clinton to come to North Korea, but also bringing a rather detailed missile proposal. We engaged in those negotiations. The president of course did not go right away. He had a different approach than the current president, but he did send a metal and awbrite to make that historic trip and I was privileged to go with her.

The first day of metal and awbrights kicked in North Korea and her host climbed up an unusual visit. She was taken to a kindergarten in the communist country to have a little lesson about how to dance North Korea in style. Only about 10 days later, which was extraordinary since everything had to be brought in overland. Even Marine guards entered North Korea to protect the US delegation.

So it was really an extraordinary event. We must each meet our responsibilities to fulfill commitments and eliminate threats. We must move in steady strides away from the bitterness of the past and persist in the search for common ground. So what is it like, meaning engaging with Kim Jong-il and you're sitting there dealing with the regime that is pretty much the most closed off and maybe most repressive in the world?

What is going through your mind when you're trying to really reason and negotiate with these people? Well, one has to be very focused in the room on what's going on. You've had a very complex interagency process before you get there and agreement all the way up to the President of what your talking points are going to be, what the script is. You have to be extremely well prepared.

There were 14 points of concern, disagreement between us. We walked through the secretary, walked through those 14 points. Kim Jong-il knew something about virtually all of them, except the ones he didn't much care about. And on a personal level, do you have a chance to actually interact with Kim Jong-il in any kind of a real way?

What was he just sort of boggles of mine? Not many Americans, certainly not many foreign diplomats have had that opportunity. Yes, it's an experience to be sure. The secretary would sit on one side of him and I on the other side of him at the banquet's side, and I put on, which were sort of gross in the sense that so many of the people in that time were in the midst of a famine and had no food at all.

We're living on sticks out in the rural areas, which is most of North Korea. And here we were having a banquet, so it was a little obscene. But nonetheless, he didn't want to talk about his family. He did want to talk about sort of economics and as often authoritarian leaders want to know about Sweden's socialist economy, I sat next to him on one side during dance performance.

And at one point I said to him, obviously all of his interpreters, Mr. Chairman, you clearly might have been a director in another life because he clearly was very engaged in all the details of the performance. And he said, yes, that he had every Academy Award performance film on tape. Where's I go watch my dude?

Frankly, my dear, I don't give a damn. He watched them all. We'd also learned from Kunk Suckjoo that he had every Michael Jordan NBA game on tape. Jordan has had with it.

He really in many ways saw himself as the great puppeteer, the great director orchestrating everything that happened in his country and everything that would happen to his country. But the end of that chapter of North Korea was of course. And by CNN right now is moving our earlier declaration of Florida back to the too close to call column. The Democrats did not win the election.

Hanging Chad in Florida meant the end of our negotiations and the Bush administration took a different approach. It's the intrangigence of the North Korean leader that speaks volumes about the process. It is his unwillingness to choose a way forward for his country. So then moving on from there, obviously as you said, Democrats are out of power for the next eight years and then come back in with President Obama.

And then you come in 2011 into the State Department as the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. What does that mean? What does that job? I think the Under Secretary of Political Affairs is probably the best job in the State Department.

You're responsible for every regional bureau and all international organizations. So it's an incredibly broad mandate. During the four years that I was the Under Secretary, I went to 54 different countries, several of them multiple times. I dealt with a whole range of issues on every continent.

And the Under Secretary of Political Affairs and the US government is the US government's political director. And the Iran negotiations were done at the political director's level. So that's why I ended up being the lead negotiator on the Iran nuclear deal. And so while I was worried and had to worry about all the rest of the world, I had to do the Iran negotiation over here with my pinky finger.

Our worst witness is Winnie Sherman, the Under Secretary of Political Affairs at the State Department. Distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for inviting me to appear before you today to discuss the Obama administration strategy to address the continued threat posed by the Iranian regime. Its support for international terrorism, its nuclear- I worked at the Pentagon from 2009 to 2012 on Iran. So I described it as, the Pentagon is a department of what if everything goes wrong.

We were preparing for all the things that happened if what you guys didn't work out. I left that job in 2012. And if you had told me we were going to have a major breakthrough in 2013 and a whole new negotiation, I would have told you were totally insane. So when do you start to realize around that time, hey, maybe there's an opportunity here.

And when does all that start? Well, it's funny that you should say that because we'd sort of traiced around the world, including a stand storm in the middle of Baghdad, not accomplishing a whole lot with Saidy Jilili leading the Iranian side. They'd speak in Farsi, we'd speak in English. The permanent members of the Security Council, Great Britain, France, the United States, Russia, the Germany, the European Union, we all got to know each other well, which was valuable.

But we didn't make much headway on the negotiations. But when Rouhani was elected president, things did start to change. In Tehran, thousands of jubilant Iranians hit the streets to celebrate their presidential election results, a victory for moderation. In the words of new president Hassan Rouhani himself, the result was a resounding child.

He was elected on a platform of reform, which the economy of Iran needed badly, of trying to remove the sanctions. The majority of Iran is quite young. And I think he well understood that if the economy did not improve, then it would become a threat to the regime, though they're pretty good at oppression. So things began to change.

The back channel, the secret channel, had actually started under Akman Dinsad. And when Rouhani became president, he was shocked to find out that the United States and Iran had had a secret discussion. It had accomplished a lot, and it had actually gone in sort of a hiatus during the election in Iran. But now it looked like indeed we were going to begin to get some traction.

He discussed all the issues that need to be resolved, and I think we made the progress. Shahad Zarif was named as the lead for Iran in the P5 plus one negotiations. As I've said all along, Iran has made a decision, a political decision to go for engagement with dignity. I believe our negotiating- So it was a whole new ballgame.

All of the negotiations were done in English. Zarif knew the United States extremely well. He lived here 30 years of his life. He understood media quite well, as we all have seen.

And we entered into very, very serious talks. So the big moment starts, as you said, when you're negotiating, you know, Man, you're negotiating quietly in this back channel. But the rest of the P5 plus one don't really know that this is going on. And you're the representative of the P5 plus one, so you sort of have to show up and say, surprise, we have this document that's mostly done, that we're reckless.

And you're honest, you know, how does that experience, how does that go? Well, that's a tough experience. It was not the easiest flight over to Brussels. I was headed to Brussels for a coordinating session led by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton.

And the President, Secretary Clinton at the time, had decided that it was time to tell the P5 plus one, and they thought I should do it. I don't think anyone was completely shocked that the United States might have been doing something in secret. They weren't thrilled. They were very frustrated because I could not hand over the document to them.

I had to describe first to the Europeans and then to the Russians and Chinese what we had done, what the parameters were, told them that when they got back to capitals, our embassy would make a hard copy available to them, but we were very concerned about something leaking prematurely. We were going to be meeting with foreign ministers in Geneva two weeks hence in hopes of closing the brackets and getting an agreement. So it was not the most comfortable thing I've ever done. And what I think it really said to people is although they certainly were critical to this negotiation.

They certainly brought ideas to the table. They certainly could veto an agreement. No agreement could be made without the United States of America. And the power that we had at the time, and I still think we can have, is awesome.

But it is also daunting. And just I'm going to do one technical intervention, which is just to say when diplomats talk about brackets, whether they're talking about language that is not agreed to necessarily, you're sitting there with a document with different options and you're trying to negotiate, what is that perfect language so we can take that bracket off and have clarity and agreement on what the language is. And this brings me also to an ex point, which is you're negotiating this with the P5 plus one, you also have challenges at the same time from others. I was working on Israeli Palestinian issues at the time and we had to break it to the Israelis that we were doing this.

But I'm sort of curious about the relationship with the Israelis and trying to break it to them that we were doing this. And others also, like the Gulf states who were really opposed to this pathway we chose to take, how did you deal with that? Well, first of all, the Gulf states were not initially opposed to us working on a nuclear deal. In fact, they said to me, often at the beginning, only focus on nuclear issues because the regional issues require us to be in the room.

And we're not in the room as we were getting closer to success, then they said, how could you do this deal without including all the regional issues, which I understand from where they sit, but nonetheless, things did change over time. Before and after every round, I consulted with the Israelis before and after every round, I consulted with the Gulf states. With the Israelis, we often did this by secure video conference with the national security advisor and all of their technical professionals. The Israelis have tremendous expertise.

So they knew all of the details of everything we were doing in the negotiation. In fact, when we had ideas, we ran those ideas past them because we wanted their technical expertise as well. They did not appreciate that the secret channel was kept secret as long as it was. When we asked our friends in America, they hesitated, they didn't tell us what exactly is there.

I had some very difficult conversations with then Yaki Yamajur, the national security advisor at the time. They decided to change the policy from dismantling the Iranian capability to postpone the Iranian capability and they understood that the Israelis will not be ready to take part in any negotiations, which are leading to legitimizing the Iranian military project. We've since kissed and made up, but it was tough going. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu says such a deal would be a hit.

It's a historic mistake, allowing Iran to retain the capabilities to make nuclear weapons. So one of the things about any of these negotiations is you have to negotiate as you know well inside the administration. You have to negotiate with Capitol Hill. You have to negotiate with all the interest groups domestically, all the think tanks who have ideas.

You have to negotiate with each one of the P5 plus one and the European Union bilaterally. You have to negotiate with them as a group. You have to negotiate with Israel. You have to negotiate with the Gulf States.

You have to negotiate with other allies and partners like Japan, Korea, India, others who have great interest in what's going on and great stakes. And then yeah, you have to negotiate with Iran. It is a very complex tedious time consuming process if it's done right. Well, then maybe let's focus on the negotiate with Iran and then we'll come back to a couple of the other actors too.

You started to talk about Javad Zarif. What was it like negotiating with him and the personal relationship you have to strike with him and also John Kerry had to build with him. I mean, he was obviously a critical intergo player in all of this. I'm satisfied with this first step.

Now we have to see whether we can match our positive words with serious needs. He is quite skilled. He knows the United States well, so he knew us. The Secretary Kerry knew him some.

We all did. I met him when he was at the UN myself. But you have to find some common ground. You have to build a personal relationship.

That doesn't mean you aren't tough in the negotiating room. These talks aren't going to suddenly get easier just because we've seen them. They're tough. And they've been tough in the state.

If it were easier, if used on both sides were as deeply held as they are, then we'd have reached the final agreement months or even years ago. You have to stand your ground and you have to work on behalf of your country's interests. And objectives, that's what you're there for. But building a personal relationship is critical.

Secretary Kerry believes very strongly in the power of personal relationships. He put in an extraordinary amount of time. All of us did in working with other countries. If he thought stopping down on his way somewhere else in Paris would help this negotiation move forward, he would do it.

You also get to know each other. So you know, as I say in the book, Minister Zarif would know if I called him a Javad after we'd spent so many hours with each other, we were working really well together. When I switched to Minister, you know, I was sort of ticked off and we had to find our way back. And I can definitely, Secretary Kerry, I've sat in video conferences with him when he's in Indonesia talking to Israelis and Palestinians at three in the morning, Jakarta time, just to try to get people to move forward.

I always thought the interesting compliment that him and his dedication to the personal relationships and then President Obama, who was so disciplined about an issue, this complex, like that's what a great compliment those two together, I always thought was effective. But I want to talk a bit about Congress and their role in this because they were not supportive of the agreement. Though in some ways they also allowed you to play a little bit of good cop, bad cop. When I talk to negotiation classes and I've taught a lot of them now, though I've never taken one in my life.

I say, you know, nothing has ever wasted a negotiation if you're conscious of everything that's going on. And so when indeed John Boehner invited Bibi Netanyahu to a joint session of Congress to castigate us for the Iran agreement that we were working on without consultation with President Obama. To defeat ISIS and let Iran get nuclear weapons would be to win the battle but lose the war. We can't let that happen.

Followed by a letter authored by Senator Cotton signed by 47 Republicans to the Iranians saying, you know, unless Congress has a role here, this isn't going to stand beyond President Obama. It's going to be a letter to Iran. But you know what? The message I was sending was to you.

The message was to President Obama that we want you to obey the law. Neither of those were particularly wonderful from our perspective to say the least. We also made use of them so that when the Iranians said to me, you know, well, is us. We'll never get this through.

They can impeach us, which can happen in their system. I was able to say to them, excuse me, we both have problems. You saw what happened in our joint session. You've seen this letter sent by Senator Cotton.

So if we're going to get to a deal, it has to meet both of our interests so that it can survive domestically in both cases. Everyone is weighing on to this letter, including Iran's Supreme Leader, who said yesterday that it is ridiculous, disgusting, and gross, and bail he added. So nothing has ever wasted. At the same time, all of these are difficult, just as after we agreed on parameters for the final deal, which were much more detailed than anyone expected coming out of a meeting in Lausanne, the Supreme Leader of Iran and made a speech.

Basically saying none of these parameters were real, and here were a whole new set of thresholds that had to be reached, which was not a pleasant moment at all. The President said what has been achieved so far in the talks, neither guarantees a deal, nor gives any assurances that any of the negotiations would come to a conclusion. So you have to sort of get through these things or find out you can't. You have to be ready to walk away if you cannot meet your country's national security interests.

Well, good evening, everybody. Let me start by thanking all of you for your remarkable patience. I know, in fact, all of us involved in this know that this has been a very difficult couple of weeks for the many journalists who are here in Vienna with us. Tell me about maybe what is it like those last few weeks when you're sitting in the rooms in Vienna for weeks on end at the hotel trying to negotiate the final end of the deal.

Do you know what's going to happen? Are you very uncertain? And what is going through your mind? So we went to the end of the Pellej Cobourg, where we've been before, for what we thought would be the marathon end.

We had no idea what a marathon it would be. I spent 27 days in that hotel. I ate one meal outside of the hotel. No, you don't know that you're going to get to the end.

There's a lot of momentum to get to the end. But there were many setbacks during those 27 days and a couple of points where I was sure we were going to have to call the President and say it wasn't going to happen. As I have said many times, and as I discussed with President Obama last night, we are not going to sit at the negotiating table forever. President Obama was fully engaged.

We would have secure video conferences with him at like three in the morning the end of time because that worked for his schedule back in Washington. You know, to say here's where we are, what's acceptable to you because at the end of the day we were coming to the point where the President has to call the shots. He has to say whether what you're arriving at is sufficient. And remember, there are other countries that are at the table.

So it's not your decision alone, but no other country put in the time that we did, though every country was essential to this negotiation. So towards the end, we all had run out of sleep and run out of patience. The last 48 hours were very tense with a couple of confrontations. There were times during these days where the Secretary went to Zarif's room and said, you know, if you can't do this, go get more instructions or tell me it can't be done.

And you just have to be ready to do that. In the end, we got to an agreement. Today, after two years of negotiations, the United States, together, we're international partners, has achieved something that decades of animosity has not. A comprehensive long-term deal with Iran that will prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

It was terrific on one hand, but for the United States, we really couldn't celebrate because we had to go back and make sure the Congress didn't disapprove the deal, which is how the congressional review process was set up. It was a disapproval. Congress will now have an opportunity to review the details. In my administration, stands ready to provide extensive briefings on how this will move forward.

And we knew that we had only so many days to work that because the time limit of the legislation met that we had to resolve this by September 17th. So we got on the airplane, we had a quick toast, and then we all passed out because we were exhausted knowing that we had to go back and immediately begin working the Congress. So we can't talk about the Iran deal without talking about the aftermath and what President Trump has done. I am announcing today that the United States will withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal.

So where do you think now that President Trump has chosen to walk the U.S. out of the Iran nuclear agreement? Where do you think this all goes now? I think we don't know the end of the story.

I'm not sure I understand what the President's strategy is. Stensively, it's to push Iran back from its malign behavior in the region, which we all agree is a serious matter. Obama had started to work on that quite hard. We had left all the sanctions in place on that bad behavior.

But the President believes, I think, and a national security adviser, Bolton, that if enough pressure can be put on the Iranians, they can create some kind of soft coup or soft revolution. We're going to do everything we can to squeeze Iran hard, as the British say, to make, to squeeze them until the pips squeak. And we're going to do everything we can. Their choice and the mull is in Tehran either change their behavior dramatically or face economic disaster.

Clearly, things have not improved in the Middle East, and they've even gotten more complicated, particularly with the recent assassination of Khashoggi by the Saudis. It's going to be espoused American values all around the world. And to say, well, now they're going to buy some arms from us, and so it's okay to kill a journalist, sends exactly the wrong message about who we are as a country. I think we're in a much more difficult time, a much more precarious time, and wrong moves on anyone's part could lead us to an Arab Persian war, which would be disastrous.

Do you think there's a possibility, especially let's say in a couple of years, the Iranians stand at the only way back into the nuclear unit for the United States? I think it's possible, but I think that if that day happened, the U.S. would have to be prepared to put more on the table. You can't get more for less.

You can only get more for more. And so it is potentially possible, but a lot of things can happen between now and then. And one thing we know about diplomacy is there are often events that mean you cannot control what happens. There was progress being made in the Middle East peace, and then a right wing Israeli, who did not believe in the peace that Minister Prime Minister Abhin was trying to seek, assassinated him.

And it sent Middle East peace in a very different direction. So one never knows what events will change the course of history. That's Ambassador Wendy Sherman, who her new book is called, Not for the Faith of Heart, Lessons Encourage, Power and Persistence. By the way, if you want to hear the full story of how our beans assassination altered the course of Middle East peace, check out our earlier episode with former U.S.

Ambassador to Israel, Martin and Nick. We hope you've enjoyed our first four episodes of Stories in the Back Channel, and that you'll subscribe to us on iTunes or wherever you get your podcast. Our series will resume in the spring. This is a production from the Center for a New American Security.

Our producers are Rob Sax and Shoshishumulovitz, music from Nolan Schneider. Hi, I'm Yulan Goldenberg.

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