Welcome to the Daily Standard Podcast. I'm Eric Felton. I'm joined by senior editor Lee Smith of the Weekly Standard. Lee, how are you doing?
I'm doing great, Eric. It's great to be with you. You've been writing today about the Kurdish independence vote, the referendum happening over the weekend and the results having just been announced or predicted what's... Right.
No, the president of the Kurdistan Regional Government, and Iraq, announced just a little bit ago that the vote shows that residents voted in favor of independence. Now, I should just remind everyone that this is a non-binding vote, and so it doesn't mean that the KRG will automatically turn into an independent of the central government and Baghdad. But why would anyone want to leave something as wonderful and beautiful as the Iraqi state that we know now? Well, that's a very good point, Eric.
I mean, it's not clear to me actually that the KRG indeed wants to leave the central government. I mean, there's some speculation that this was mostly done as a bargaining chip for Barzani who wants a better deal from the central government, and I assume that won't just include cabinet people. I assume it'll include a better deal for the oil that's in the KRG. And also, Barzani's fending off internal rivals inside Iraqi Kurdistan as well.
And so I think for him to say that he's the man who won or he's the man who's really pushing for Kurdish sovereignty, for an independent Iraqi Kurdish state, I think that goes in his plus column. Now, what did the Kurds do to be the people that nobody wants to have an independent state? I mean, they have... When you hear about the Iraqi army collapsing and running away at the first shot, which seems to happen every time, they're not talking about the Peshmerga, the Kurdish military units.
People I know who have visited Iraq and Kurdistan talk about how different the Kurdish part of Iraq is from the rest of Iraq, sort of it almost seems like a normal, normally functioning country. Why is it that everybody, all the regional players, the European players, the US are all telling the Kurds not to vote for independence? Right. Well, I mean, as you noted at the beginning, you're quite right that the Kurds have been...
The Kurds have won an independent state for a long time. This is not just in Iraq, but a greater Kurdistan. You know, there are Kurdish populations in Syria and Iran and Turkey as well as Iraq. And so there's been lots of talk about independent Kurdistan that encompasses all of these more or less continuous regions throughout these four countries in the Middle East.
One of the big problems is that people recognize very early on that the Kurds are not a strategic actor, by which I mean, if you look at a map, and it's important to remember when we talk about geopolitics, to keep in mind the geo and geopolitics geography, the Kurds have no... The Kurdish regions touch no water anyway, anywhere. They have no port. It's very hard for them to trade.
They're dependent on their larger neighbors. Historically, the Kurds have been sandwiched in between these two enormous powers. Going back thousands of years, these have been empires. We're talking right now about Turkey and Iran, before there was an Ottoman Empire, the Byzantines, before that you have the Hittites.
When we're looking at Iran, we're talking about the Persians, we're talking about the Safavids, we're talking about these have always been larger, more powerful neighbors, and the Kurds are squeezed in between them. It's a buffer zone. So that's why it's not... Again, it's not a matter of what this Kurds deserve.
There are plenty of people throughout history who have deserved a state, and if we're talking about who deserves a state, then certainly a very strong and powerful case should be made for the Kurds. The fact that they don't have a state already suggests that there are other factors, it's not a matter of people gathering at the UN, saying here, you can have a state. There are other factors that are much more significant than what people want to have happened. And yet, it would seem that the strongest argument for them having a state would be that they are a culturally sort of homogenous people, which is not to say there aren't Turkmen in Kurdistan.
But that they're also a sort of highly functioning society in the midst of a lot of not so highly functioning societies. Yeah, I mean, we're talking... I think it's very important for people to keep in mind that because the Kurds are this... they constitute a buffer zone, these Kurdish regions constitute a buffer zone.
We're talking about not just one Kurdish entity here. The KRG is one Turkish political institution. There are many other Kurdish political institutions around the region, including the Kurdistan Workers Party, which is the main grouping in Turkey and which has been at war with the Turkish state since 1984. If you look at the PKK's ideology, it's very different from the KRG.
Again, the KRG is pro-Western, very pro-America, which is terrific. I think that they're a terrific American ally. If you look at the PKK, we're talking about entirely different thing. We're talking about a Stalinist group that the State Department has designated a foreign terrorist organization.
And they've been... they've been responsible for tens of thousands of deaths in Turkey during the course of this war. So it's... we're not just talking about one Kurdish political institution.
There are many of them spread out through the region. So that's why I think it's important to be specific looking at the KRG. If the KRG, which is the Kurdish regional government, if they are at odds with the PKK, which has been a terrorist group afflicting Turkey, why is Turkey not enthusiastic about embracing the KRG as a way to further put pressure on the PKK? Yeah, that's a very good point.
I think that a lot of this has to do with internal Turkish dynamics and a lot of the problems that the Turkish government, Recep Erdogan, has at home, including members of this governing coalition. It's important to remember that even while PKK has been at war with Turkey since 1984, it was Erdogan who opened up a peace process with the PKK. So it's not like he loves the PKK, but he wanted to open up a peace process with him, a peace process that is opposed by many, many people in Turkey, including members now of Erdogan's governing coalition. So I think that's one problem.
To reach out to them is one problem. I mean there are other regional dynamics as well. But one of the other regional dynamics is that the KRG, the Kurdish regional government, the sort of main political organization of Kurds, their biggest friend in the region seems to be Israel. That's not a problem, that's not the problem for Turkey.
That's certainly a problem for Iran. Iran is right to be nervous about this and this is why Iran opposes the referendum. The Iranians and their typical with the Iranian government and their typical paranoid fashion has been saying, well, the KRG is going to become another Israel. And they have a point.
I mean Israel does see Israel sees the KRG as a solid ally and it became an independent state. It would become a very solid. It would become an independent entity on Iran's borders. And Israel certainly sees that as a huge strategic asset.
Where Israel also, I mean Israel also recognizes what you were describing before. It's a pro-pro-western democracy. It's a functional state, a more or less functional state in the middle of the Middle East. And those are extremely rare.
Right now there's only Israel really. So Israel would like to be able to welcome other at least semi-functional states into the region and into partnerships. Why is the US so recalcitrant on this issue and not supporting the aspirations of Kurdish society to be independent? The United States right now, the issue to statement, I believe it was yesterday saying that the State Department of Initiative everything was deeply disappointed in the fact that the KRG had this referendum.
Right now the United States wants a unified Iraq, which for certain reasons is understandable. This is what we like dealing with. We like dealing with central governments. We also committed many resources to liberating Iraq from Saddam Hussein.
Lots of American lives and lots of American money. So the United States would like to keep that whole and keep the central government in bag that as powerful as it is. Even if it's a central government that is effectively being controlled by Iran. Yes, unfortunately that's exactly right.
And that's an enormous problem. And so I think that the fact that the United States wants the KRG nonetheless to be holding to what is no doubt an Iranian asset is a very big problem. And so I think the American position on this is terrible, not only more for strategic reasons than for reasons of morality or what the Kurds deserve in terms of a state. It's a huge strategic problem for the United States.
Strategic blunders by the US and the Middle East and shocking. Lee Smith, thanks for joining us on the Daily Standard Podcast. Thanks for having me Eric. Support for the Daily Standard Podcast comes from Tracker, your phone, your wallet, your keys.
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I'm Eric Felton. Catch you next time.