"The primary sources of near-term cybersecurity risk" by lc

[Some ideas here were developed in conversation with Chris Hacking (real name)] I have tried and failed to write a longer post many times, so here goes a short one with little detail. Discourse has primarily focused on models' ability to develop new exploits against important software from scratch. That capability is impressive, but the tech industry has been dealing with people regularly finding 0-day exploits for important pieces of software for more than twenty years. Having to patch these vulnerabilities at a 10xed or even 100xed cadence for six months is annoying, but well within the resources of Mozilla, the Linux Foundation, and Microsoft. Additionally, the lag time between "patch shipped" and "patch reverse engineered and weaponized by a criminal organization" was longer than the cadence between high-severity CVEs for this software anyways. And importantly, such capabilities are dual sided; the defenders will have access to them and There are lots of capabilities that are not like this, however: Weaponizing recently patched exploits for common software. Right now, for widely used C projects, we get enough publicly disclosed vulnerabilities to develop exploits with. Every amateur computer hacker has the experience of seeing a CVE for a [...] --- First published: May 14th, 2026 Source: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/gutiw8MBrYDiD2u5z/the-primary-sources-of-near-term-cybersecurity-risk --- Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.