How has Enduring Management changed in the last few years? Will Larson is one of the best people to talk about this. He's been an engineering executive for the last 10 years at four different companies, wrote some of the most widely-earned books on engineering leadership and selfless levels, and I really appreciate how deep and thoughtful of a thinker he is. Today we cover, How Zero Interest Raised Heavily Influenced a Decade of Management Habits in the 2010s, Many of these habits no longer helpful. How the role of engineers is changing, and why solving problems that the business cares about is becoming much more important to thrive inside of companies.
The path to becoming a CTO today, and why line managers often make better engineering executives than middle managers do, and many more. If you're an engineer or engineering manager and are wondering what your query path could look like with AI changing the industry, and how the path to CTO looks like today, this episode is for you. This episode is presented by TurboPuffer, a ridiculously scalable fast-and-cheek hybrid search engine built on top of object storage by an engineering team that I've really gone to like after spending time with them. The TurboPuffer engineering team is doing something really cool. They are completely redesigned their storage architecture from Per's principles to make sure it's faster, cheaper, and more reliable at scale.
The new system, called TurboPuffer V3, is not yet impawed, but it already passes CI. Still, it's not nearly as performant as a current production version, V2, and so the T-Buff team is now perf-maxing query plans until they are as fast or faster than V2. They are doing all of this in public documenting how they increase performance all the way up to the V3 production launch, and so cool to follow along and see the performance wins and how they did it. For example, we see how full-text search, the red line, started out as 129 times slower than the current system, but now it's only 4 times slower. And in the development log, we can also see that the team use things like max scoring or bash reads to increase performance. A lot of these wins are basic foundation work right now, but the team will
be sharing some very cool systems work over the next few weeks. But hang on, why is the team doing the floor rewrite? It's because search is changing as so as TurboPuffer. T-Buff started as a vector database, but no longer a vector DB. It has evolved into high-performance database for search.
The V3 discards the vector primary index, and all indexes will share the same columnar source system. Every query will run on vectorized query engines, which is something you don't usually see in search databases, but which will also be in both very fast search and just generally a very fast database. The TurboPuffer team is keeping a work log of their journey, and you can follow along at www.tribbuffr.com.v3. It's a blast to see how it's being built. We'll look into the podcast.
Thanks for having me. Excited to be here. Finally, chatting person. Finally, because we know each other for so long, both started writing. We will talk about that writing as well, and also just hung out before, but this is nice.
I wanted to jump into the beginning. How did you get interested in computers? Where are you interested in computers to start with? From time I was five. We had a Mac 2C or something like that.
This was not black and white, not the very earliest one, but it was pretty basic. I think I understood how to use a four and a half or five year old, which is a kidpix, which you've maybe... Did you ever use a kidpix? I know of it, but I never used it. It wasn't a super sophisticated thing. I don't even know if you had save files, but it was
basically a graphical program for children, and you could make squares and circles and little graphics, but that was the introduction to me. I remember using that computer a lot. This is an era where there was really no internet to speak of, really no way to figure out how to do anything other than just banging on it, which is the fundamental of writing software in some ways. It's just banging until you figure out how to make it work. I think that was a great introduction, but to be honest, I wasn't doing a whole lot in software other than multi-user dungeons. Did you ever play a mud growing up?
Multi-user dungeon. What's a mud? It's a text-based game. Basically, the idea is that World Warcraft is actually a graphical text-based game. It would basically derive from these ideas of mudds or multi-user dungeons, but when I was a kid in high school, that's when I started doing more software. A little bit you start with Burke, I was a senior in that relay chat, and Merck,
which I already know is M stood where to be totally honest. I was a client, get a little bit of scripting with Regexes, but then a lot of the mud clients as a kid go do a ton of triggers, Regexes, and that's where I got it a little bit further into it, learn my Regexes there, but really didn't start writing software at all until I got to college. And then at college, what did you start writing? How did you get into a more serious level? So I came into college not really knowing what I wanted to study, and I thought of my D physics or English or economics. My father was a professor of economics, so there's some family
lineage to try to live up to. But ultimately, I fell in the computer science at my school, which was a small private school in Kentucky. There were 13 people in the computer science program that I graduated, and that was the entire program. So I think there were four graduates my year, and then the juniors and sophomores in total were 13. And so it's quite small. So I
think it were four that graduated my year, but really that was when I got into it. And why? I just enjoyed how to intro course that we're required to take. And it's funny with a lot of American colleges, especially smaller private ones, they've landed on requirements. So I was required to take an introduction to Christianity course, like the history of Christianity, but also required to take an introduction to computer science or some other course I forgot what the other alternative was. So I really enjoyed computer science one.
Did you decide that you're probably going to be a professional software developer, engineer, programmer, whatever we call it back then? So I think one of the interesting things when you talk to a lot about careers is a lot of folks go to elite schools. They talk to someone from Waterloo and they go, how did you get your job? They go literally everything that Waterloo's coached on how to go do software. They're literally trading the answers to interviews with each other. So they know the interviews and drill on the
interviews before they go in. They also like amazing program. They've been doing co-ops for years. They're great. They're great candidates. They tend to do really well. But if you go to Waterloo,
you go to MIT, you get to Stanford, you really, there's like this path and you just kind of put your foot on it and you do well and it carries you there. And these are amazing students. But it isn't as later. If they're good enough to stay in the program, they tend to get there going to a small school with, again, like four-ish folks that graduate in computer science. There really was no path. I remember one of the folks that graduated the year before
that was working in software. He went to go work on a horse racing betting software company in Lexington, Kentucky, which I don't think there were more than like five engineers there. And this was like a really talented, really capable person. And this is kind of what they knew out of mine. And so for me, it actually was interesting. I wasn't quite sure what I was
going to do. I actually ended up teaching English and Japan on the CHEP program. The Japanese exchange teaching program. So I was in the middle of nowhere in Japan in the geek group, for a year. But that's when I started writing a lot. I'm definitely not going to be an
English teacher for more than one year. So when you were contracted, I did that one year. I had no thoughts about doing this second year. And I came back and started trying to figure out actually breaking the Silicon Valley for there. And you have the goal, breaking the Silicon Valley already. Why Silicon Valley? Can you take us back to what Silicon Valley was like back then?
First of the time, I didn't know what Silicon Valley was. I just wanted a job that paid well. And I think this was so I graduated in 2007. And then the next year I was teaching English. And then I actually started working for Yahoo in, I guess, maybe early 09, something like that.
Really interesting time though. So initially, I was working for Yahoo from the East Coast as a remote contractor. It was an interesting moment. So I started working with Yahoo because I wrote a series of blog posts on something called Gahu Boss, which is Build Your Own Search Service. And this was a product that they launched on this one team. I think it wasn't getting a lot of
kind of traction in the industry. But when it launched, I was writing a lot. So I did three or or four tutorials on building boss things and Python, boss things with Django, kind of made a Django, forget the name of my then Django Springsteen was like the name of the search library to use Yahoo Boss with Django. And so I think they got excited because someone was writing about it, which also got me excited and that ended up ultimately in this contract job. And then ultimately, they had the policy where you had to move after a year as a contractor and go full-time.
And the reason I started as a contractor though is they had a hiring freeze for basically that entire year. Because this was right after a financial crisis. And so they're just going through layoff after layoff. And so they get higher a couple contractors, couldn't hire anyone full-time. And then at 12 months, they are like, hey, now I got to go full-time or not employed because there's kind of compliance obligations to avoid. And so they're like, hey, and if you have a full-time,
you've got to move. And so basically I had a job at Yahoo if I moved or I didn't have a job at all. And so I moved from the East Coast out to California pretty easy at the time, didn't have a lot of obligations other than employment. Yeah. And back then, Yahoo, I guess their star was kind of fading with Google, but they're still pretty good company, right? And good engineering challenge.
Like what's up founders famous that came from Yahoo. I think Yahoo honestly is really interesting company, right? And so I think one of the challenges for Yahoo is if you came into tech in 2007 and 2008, a lot of open source sort of made things easy. Yahoo though, it was a company that pregated all these open source libraries. And so how do you run a server at Yahoo in 2007 and 2008? You run Y Apache?
So they had their own fork with Apache with a Y in front of it. What programming do language you run on Y Apache? Well, of course you run YPHP, which was their fork of PHP. And what UI library would you use? You might know this one, but it's YUI. And then how do you install things?
So if you think about like a month ago, you'd use Y-nced, which was this Perl script that would navigate dependencies for installation. And so it's a really, really fascinating place to come up. But every single thing they're, they made from scratch. Even they had like a precursor to Kafka, which I think was called Y-Rebel, which basically would be like a read log, do replication kind of outside of the database. And that was like a core tool for managing state. Just like a fast
dating place. And I think if I just had like one quick Yahoo story that I loved, so David Fylo kind of famously approved every server that was allocated in the company. And so one of the founders like would review. And so the theory was this would drive accountability, right? You had to prove you needed more servers. What it actually did is created like a black market of servers.
And so on my team, there was like one engineer that had 30 servers from a prior canceled project, he never gave back. And so he would basically sell them to you effectively, right? And so if you couldn't get approval for like favors, I owe you and that kind of stuff. And so it actually meant they had massive numbers of outdated servers that were like using like inefficient like power wattage because people would never give servers back. And so you had to find like someone who liked you with servers to loan for your projects to launch, like fascinating how these incentives drive just like wild, wild situations. I guess that's one thing you'd do remember it for when you
later became an engineering leader. Yeah, it was very instructive, right? And I'm sure I'm curious like a David Fylo know that people were literally out of black market of servers. Like I assume he probably did know, but it didn't didn't change the kind of the top down mandate. Then after Yahoo is that when you ended up at big? Yeah. At the time very famous company for
very amusing story. Can you tell us about how he decided to switch because it was a startup, like big was a startup back then. So planning you talk to, it's going to be different narratives, but I think the the dig narrative is basically it was like the before Reddit, it was the big community site, but it was centrally curated. And so Reddit had these sub communities or communities kind of voted with the algorithm on what they wanted the Reddit algorithm. Dig was actually centrally curated on what went on to the front page. And so I had a very different experience, but it also
meant that the quality was consistent and you had less of kind of the bias and subreddit problem. Instead you had a bias and central moderation problem. And there were communities, there are IRC channels where people would basically trade favors trying to get things on to the dig from page. And in fact, on for the day before we changed the algorithm and I had people saying they had come murder me for stealing their livelihood because their entire livelihood was selling access to the front page, the new algorithm didn't support that. And they were literally threatening our lives. And so it
was a fascinating place. But dig was a really important website. And when I joined Yahoo, this wasn't true, but a little bit before I joined Yahoo, literally the front page of Yahoo was a static file on a net scaler, which was basically like a filer, which is like a way to store files. And Yahoo's works was just like a static page, right? And so dig in that era, like early on was like a very important static page, but then it became not a static page, like a dynamic of sports community. I think really was extremely important to folks at the time, though it's
faded into slightly less relevancy over time. And it's been restarted a couple of times since we never really picking up the traction. I think it was a top 10 website at one point. Yeah, it was top 10. And that's why the story that I remember is they did a big rewrite. I think it
might be the V4 one, right? And from the outside, what I remember is that while dig was doing good, it was popular. They were complaining a bit like with Stack Overflow maybe a few years ago, and then dig this massive rewrite and disaster followed. And it was like a very juicy story everyone was talking about it. What can you tell us like what actually happened and what it looked like on the inside? Because you were building this thing. Yeah, so I was there. I was
there for that launch. And I was there after that launch. And so I joined dig about three to six months before that launch went out. And it was fascinating time. So I joined. And then the
Friday before I started, the CEO got removed. And then Kevin Rose came back in as he was founder, right? Kevin Rose was the founding CEO. He was there for a while. And then he kind of stepped back.
And then he came back in. But he came back in and we had this very hard deadline to launch dig before, which was a rewrite. And so dig, V3.5 was the prior version before dig four, basically entirely a PHP software running on distributed MySQL. And this was a different era, right? So dig was running on hardware that we owned in a colo. And so it wasn't just spin up some
capacity or whatnot. But dig before was trying to solve a bunch of problems. But first and foremost, the internet was changing at that time. So this dig at one point at top 10 website was starting to lose traction in the Facebook. And I was starting to lose search traffic as well. And so
there were a series of large Google changes. And I think we don't hear about Google search algorithm changes that much these days. But back then there was a Google Panda algorithm change and there were a handful of others. And they were starting to really reshape how traffic flowed through. So if we're coming to dig a substantial amount of the traffic, I want to say 60 to 70%, the traffic was actually coming into a search. Oh, into something called the Permalink. And so
the Permalink pages would be like, say, write a great blog post, we'd then get posted to dig, and then we'd have the reference to the Permalink and also like a small into your site, of course, and comments about it. But we would take a ton of traffic through these Permalink pages that would be higher page rank than the original source themselves. And you can argue, now, maybe we shouldn't have them. Probably not. I think that would be kind of perspective today.
But from the respect of that moment, we were actually creating the discoverability and the conversation around it. This was before Twitter. This was before Facebook got like substantial distribution. This was really early moment. And so for us, that was the core of where people came into.
Also, it was really where we sold the most ads. And so losing that traffic was basically tanking the company's financial prospects. And so dig before from the outside, it was working pretty well. It was, you know, seemed like maybe was growing. But really, like what we knew was like dig was shrinking. We had one beautiful month of profitability and then algorithm change hit.
And we started shrinking. And we knew that this is existential for us. We were going to simply not exist, not that far down the path. And we were, when I joined, I want to say like 110, 120 people, something like this. But this was in 2010 when funding rounds were a million dollars or $3 million dollars or something. It's not like today when people are raising, you know, $500 million and you
can have a team of however many or it was a very different moment. So even with 110 people, that was pretty substantial. And we were running down, you know, the remaining coffers pretty fast. The launch in Toronto did it go poorly, did it go well. Because from the outside again, there was a perception that it went terribly. And people, there was a bit, I think a lot of
it was community was upset. And then there was a bit of celebration as well. Like, well, dig, they messed it up like they kind of deserved it. You know, the mall, the people, especially who were very involved, they like change. First, there's like a really fascinating set of cartoons. Someone
made was like dig versus Reddit and like dig as like blue and then like read its red and there's this like giant war that someone did like a four or five part. It's like a very intricate comic someone wrote around this time. And it is kind of interesting to see how much energy people put into it. But yeah, there was a lot of passion. And I think it's one of the challenges of like a really passionate community is like when you foster a passionate community, you think change what you are community doesn't like that because I mean, there were literally these folks like Mr. Babyman was
like a really big one like one of the top dig kind of curators on solicited curators of content getting from page. And he, you know, he and many others were they lost kind of their business, right? But the launch went pretty poorly and widely to go poorly, it went poorly for a lot of reasons. So first, the launch technically wasn't really right. And so we made a lot of really aggressive technology decisions. And again, I came in about three months before this went went live. So I don't
personally take a ton of responsibility. I also again think about where I wasn't my career. I was basically was my second job at then I got over it for two years. So I won't own this one. I later my career will own all alone. But this one wasn't really by fault. But basically, we made the decision
to launch into Sandra. And there's like a joke at the time, which is that Cassandra was a Trojan horse face could launched to basically ruin competition in the industry. Because anyone who launched into Sandra was basically screwed afterwards, which I think was certainly was true for dig. And so running to standard replaced the chart of my SQL system, the chart of my SQL system was pretty complicated. But it definitely worked. And to Sandra, I argue like basically didn't work. But I remember there's
a team responsible for low testing Cassandra before launch. And two days before the launch, this other guy, Rich, he was fantastic. He and I were pulled aside. Like, hey, well, they never did the low testing. The two of you to the low testing before, you know, in the next two days.
And so Rich was just like a software engineer like me. And so we're like, well, I guess we'll like install Jmeter and try to figure out how Jmeter works to do some low testing. And we had this like really interesting conversation with Chris, who's kind of the head of the Cassandra initiative. He's like, hey, like, I can't do the reads on Cassandra. He's like, that's not true. I
was like, well, I can't do the writes. That's not true. I'm like, okay, Chris, if I'm writing to Cassandra, I can't read from Cassandra, but I'm reading Cassandra, I can't write to Cassandra. He's like, that is true. It's like, we're supposed to launch in two days. And then we launched and we
didn't fix it. We just launched. And so I think the company thought we were literally dying. And the company was literally was done. It was running out of money. But it was like the most interesting
day I've ever had professionally. Can't remember when I got the office probably around 8am. When you say interesting and stressful, you can judge. Let me like paint the scene a little bit. So it was a launch, but they also decided to have a launch party. So the entire day, there were caters kind of Intuxedos
with like Sufi trays, champagne. And so the entire office was there to have this kind of celebration. And then in the center of the room, there was this table. I might have been like a boardroom table or something that pulled out. It was a giant table. Maybe three or four times the size of this,
where the engineers were sitting. And we didn't have enough hardware to run the new system and the old system concurrently. And again, this was hardware we owned. So they were literally wiping the old servers and installing the new software. So we couldn't roll back. We didn't have the
money to or the end-to-again, we were running out of money and a bunch of the party, but not enough budget for the servers, right? So we were wiping server by server, spinning it up. And ultimately, the damn thing didn't turn on. It was functionally what happened, right? And so we had this down for maintenance page up for roughly 24 hours. And then we were able to scrap it.
Well, while the champagne and the duetos are coming around, surreal. And there were people upstairs getting massages. I remember certain groups who won't be names playing ping pong while we were trying to get this out. And it was sort of like a magical realism. I see what you mean by interesting. This is not how I imagined a launch like this.
You can never imagine a launch like this. It was just so surreal, true like a magical realism moment where there's all this normalcy happening while this site's literally imploding. And it was just, it was unlike anything I've seen, but it's also like a moment I take a lot of pride in. And so I've been there three months. I think interesting thing is we dig at the site kind of working, but there were a lot of issues. And so people just gave up in like day by day.
Like people just stopped showing up. And like a small group was really the only group left of maybe like six people trying to keep it working. And we didn't. And so we, in the first few days, like the same guy, Rich and I wrote like a catching system from scratch on top of rest, which helped the site stay on for hours. But we're still had huge memory leaks. And so we're
actually like restarting every process every, you know, like hour or two. And the only way to keep it up was rolling restarts at every, every process. And so it took us, it took us like a full month debug and I have like a blog post a long time ago about it. But basically the core bug was we created an API service that could be used for like third parties. And it was in Python. The people
writing it didn't know Python very well. And this was Python and calling like another Python gRPC, those hitting Cassandra. And basically in Python, when you instantiate a default parameter, if it's mutable, I don't know if this is so true, by the way, I hope it's not so true, but at the time it was true, where if you basically put a list as a default parameter and then you mutated it, like a pended ID into it, it would persist in memory. And so each time that function was called, it had the same diction or the same list. And so the memory of these righties, basically every time they call this API to look up user IDs, they get the user objects back.
All the users that were ever passed into it would still be there. And so it just cascaded over and over and over until we restarted and we installed memcache kind of in between these and then mem cache would start falling over and then it would destroy Cassandra. So really finding that bug that it took me, I think four weeks to actually find it, once you found it trivial to fix, we got it up. And then our new CEO started, I think that basically the same day that I fixed that. And then we basically the entire company got laid off over the next year. So pure victory
in the sense that we did solve it, it was working. But I think you can't really have the central site be hard to use or down for a month. But if you go to the counterfactual, what would the company have done differently, if they had simply kept up the old site, they also would die. And so I don't know that they made the wrong choice, but at the time I certainly was pretty salty about it. Yeah. How did you eventually get into engineering leadership? I know you and the
overlapped a little bit of you were actually both work there, but we never worked together. So the end of the dig story was we got acquired. And so they sold the patents for digged a lot of innovations. So in add, or in-stream ad units, basically, like on EC on X now, we'll have like an ad that kind of looks like the stories from people that are posting. They did own the patents of that. They
were the first company to do it. They owned like a variety of other patents. And so the patent portfolio got acquired by one company, digged.com, like the actual brand of the website got acquired by I think BataWorks at a New York at the time. I think they've sold it subsequently a few years ago. And then the team got acquired by a social coach, like other company, a subsidiary of the Washington Post Company from the time when that was a holding company that owned to post Kaplan and this company's social code, which basically did advertising on Facebook. And so the
team went there and I was there for a couple of years. But when I left, I was thinking about, okay, I want to be kind of an engineering leadership, but I can't get hired into a really large role because at that time I was managing maybe a team of 12 engineers or something like that. So I can't get hired into this big role because I haven't done the big role. Like how do we hire into this big role? And so if you're out of small startup, like you just, the scale is not there, even if you go be ahead of engineering at a 15% startup, there's just five engineers there. And so
you can never get into scale. They're looking forward for these large roles. And so my, what I was looking about at the time and my thoughts on this topic changed a lot since then, but it's just like honestly where I was, it's like, well, if I want to manage a large team, I got to join a company that's running really quickly. I kind of looked around like where's running really quickly. Like Uber was growing really, really quickly.
16, 16, I think this is 2014. This is one growth just started to kick off. And this was very early. This is pretty early. You have to be in San Francisco to know that Uber was doing really well. Like
outside of a step, I think, I think new start to spread in 2015 and then by 2016, it was a global news. That sounds right. But the way I knew was that one of the engineers, Jeremy Grocer from Dig, who was on infrastructure there left and joined Uber. And actually this is like an interesting technology adoption curve is Dig made all these technologies. One of them is called Closto, which I think Dig, Uber, and then like a second life that that company, I feel they're their actual name, but whatever it is, maybe the only three companies in the world that ever adopted this tool, plus so, but it managed basically a key value store to manage kind of state infrastructure, but like a console from from a HashiCorp is very, very similar. So years before console was out.
Yeah, it was probably made originally in like 2008, 2009, something like that. And so he had actually brought a ton of the Dig stack over into Uber. He was one of the first infrastructure engineers there. And so, you know, his team was hiring. And I really was like a generalist engineer. Like,
I got, he was actually hired to do front end engineering, which I don't know if I super qualified for. And then at at dig, I was doing, you know, front end Cassandra work back end, just like everything. And then they hired me to kind of run this SRE team, but it wasn't really an SRE team. It was just like an infrastructure team that they called SRE. You know, I read like an SRE book like the week before trying to figure out what the job was. You probably read the SRE book that existed,
which is the Google SRE book, right? I don't think that book existed then. It might have. What book did you have? I think there was a DevOps book might have been what I was saying.
Yeah. And it might have been like the Phoenix project might have been out around then. I'm forgetting it's at the exact timeline. But there was something like the Phoenix project, and there was one other. And I just showed up. And then of course, like a classic interview, I remember the traveling
salesman's problem on a whiteboard and Python stuff like that, which didn't really evaluate my DevOps acumen very well. But you somehow, I think the company was a little bit desperate on hiring at that point, but did get the job and started. And then you were leading a team already, you were going a team. So the team when I joined, I probably was managing like six people, but it was managing an incredibly broad range of responsibilities. So Uber when I joined was 2000 people, was 200 engineers. And this team of about six was managing our databases, our Kafka, like our actual
servers, not the management of the servers. There was a tech ops team that managed literally racking them and installing them that once they were racking, we managed that our service provisioning, like we own basically everything other than there was like a two person developer experience team. There's this tech ops team that actually racked and installed the servers, but we owned all the other infrastructure and it was own. It was quite an experience. And then in terms of just focusing on your leadership journey, your management journey, so at Uber, you started at this team, how far did it grow? And then what were the next steps between
Stri, Carla? Yeah, absolutely. So when I joined the team was, I think, roughly five or six folks. When I left two years later, that team was 70 and that was all external hiring. And I think that that was like the most kind of amazing thing about Uber at that point is like Uber doubled and had counted at least six months. And so you can't just like steal people from other teams,
because those teams are hiring a ton too and also really underwater. And so I really learned how to hire at Uber. I had no idea how to hire before I joined Uber, but they were just hiring so many folks. I think one of my favorite stories, there's this guy out of the them bright that I managed for a year and a half that would give an offer at like 4.30 pm on a Friday and he started Monday at 8. But I have so many like Uber hiring stories, like some of them like funnier than others. I
remember someone who interviewed with Uber four times and I saw him interviewing with fifth time. They got rejected four times and interviewed him at fifth time as like we cannot hire this guy. We've already interviewed him like four times, like stop wasting his time, but he got an offer for that team and he joined and then he quit within six hours and took a different offer that because he got an offer from Twitter, which is right down right a block away or a block away or somebody was all about. He spent more time interviewing for Uber than working there despite accepting the job. And there are just like so many, so many wild stories from the Uber experience there. But that team, six to 70 over two years and our scope increased a lot in that time.
It was just like a really wild time and it's hard, you know, some of the companies today, I think remind me a lot of that Uber experience, but Uber when I joined basically every Friday, we were literally manually reallocating software between servers trying to keep the servers up because typically Friday rush hours are peak times of the week. So a Saturday you might have more volume, but that would be right over more hours because people weren't all leaving work at the exact same time. So many kind of wild stories of just like what a manic place that was to work at. But I was there for a couple of years, then I went to Stripe as I tried for about four years in 2016 through early 2020, then I was actually a con for three years. You're a CTO a con right? Three years? CTO,
a thousand per CTO job. It was really kind of deliberate at that point. I think I was really worried. So I've done a Stripe before years, you know, Stripe had done really well. I think I joined at five and a half billion and I think it was at ninety six billion four years later. Company
valuation really came together. But that also I think the quality of the work we're doing was going really well. And I want to say I was roughly someone that joined the day I joined at Stripe was employee 500. I don't know if that was me or someone else in the batch. But I think by the time I left, it was 1.5 to 2,000 folks, something of the company. So Stripe grew about 70% year over year,
the career that I was there, which is a lot less than Uber, which doubles every six months. And obviously Subsequently contracted much more aggressively than Stripe ever did, which is the natural consequence of doubling every six months. But at that point, I was just worried that my entire kind of savings are all in one company that was never going to go public, which I think has been true. And so it's like a bit of a diversification play, but also the desire to what does actually feel like to fully lead. And so for my entire time at Stripe, I was basically one step away from the CEO reporting into Jeff Winter from my first year, then into able to singleton who was my manager for the rest of the store stripes CTO later, maybe at the time as well. He joined as a CTO.
Also, no, that's not true. He joined as a head of engineering and then he became a CTO maybe a year or two later, something like that. But I was referring to him from when he joined through the Army Department early 2020. So I was only one step away, but I was like, what if I could get into that seat, could I do things better? And that seemed like the the right thing to try for anyway, and has an educational ever since. And then you have had several CTO gigs. And so it was calm
three and a half years CTO, then you were at Cardo. So I was at calm for I think three and a half years and I was at Cardo for two years and then I joined in France a year and a half ago, something like that, which is where I am today. Okay. So now I think CTO, what does CTO do as an engineer? Like, if you put yourself back as being an engineer, of course, I think I myself had aspirations when I was an engineer, like, oh, it could be nice to want to be a CTO because in your mind, it's like, well, it has some management, but it's also a lot of CTO, you see are technical and close to the thing.
How do you find the CTO? I know you have a book on this as well on engineering executive careers, and there's a lot of answers. But what is your mental model? How was it? And how is it now, especially because now with AI, I think your role has changed. I think one of the worst parts
of being an engineering manager in the 2010s is I think like when you joined the ranks engineering management, like one of the first lessons you get is like, hey, you need to never make a technical decision again. And so it used to be right. I remember that that is that's like literally, you know, what I was told. And I think you'd see people like the most important thing is to let go about technology decisions. And this was the ethos then. And that's definitely not the ethos today.
But I think the thing that I kind of aspiration really loved is the CTO was like the only place where there's like engineering kind of career, this technical oriented one, and this managerial one converged. And so one of the things I believe strongly in and continue to do today is having both engineering managers, but also like individual and contributor engineers report directly into me and CTO roles. And so today I have 14 direct reports right now, and I think four or five of them are ICs and then the rest are managers. But having that balance is like really for many roles in management, you're just not allowed to be a technical leader or you weren't for a long time. And so to me actually getting to level where you're they converged again and you were allowed to be a leader on the technology and the management side was like one of the big appeals. But also there's so many like
bad CTO decisions out there. And I don't mean this reflect to any of the individuals I talked about. I think David in particular was like really excellent. And the decisions that strike were generally decision quality at strike was pretty high. And so sometimes you could be like, I disagree, but you couldn't be like, this makes literally no sense. But often like, you know, especially outside
of the strike experience, there are decisions that like just didn't make sense. And I thought like, maybe I could do it better. But I think the thing that I've really loved and the most recent kind of era is like you're really like not just allowed to be in the details again, like a really sort of required city. And that to me has been like the very most fun part of being back in software in this era is I think, you know, I've done over 500 or four requests in a year and a half at imprint going all the way to production, which is substantially more than I did in my prior career combined. And that's pretty cool. And that's in print that's CTO or are you more than CTO in print? So I joined
as the CTO. And right now I'm also kind of leading the product design teams. Those are product design and engineering all reporting into one person. Yeah, it's like a unified EPD structure. Is this a new trend? One person, because CTP
I started to hear about two years ago, Chief Technology and Product Officer two, three years ago. And I was starting to hear design also going into one person a little bit. I don't know if it's a trend or not. I do think that for one challenge I've been seeing with like the agents kind of getting more mainstream is you actually have to be able to make decisions and make them quickly. And how do we do things? How do we not do things? How do those agent adoption work for products? How does it work
for design? Hey, design, if they aren't using the new tools like design or the thing that MCP or whatnot, then they're really the bottleneck. How do you kind of split the responsibility there on loans to sign now? And so in print, for example, is when experimenting with this developer-led design model for kind of second tier features and it's created a ton of friction. Like it's solved this bottleneck. It's also created a lot of like who's responsible for these design gaps that show up when
engineers do redesign and sometimes like don't follow the design system properly. And so having a unified kind of point that can actually make these trade offs, I think this moment of like a mens change I think is pretty powerful. I do think just in my core, I believe the industry is changing more in terms of how we create software than it ever has in my career. And you know, I started in late 2008. I've never seen a change like this. A lot of the changes I've seen were more subtle or
more kind of cultural or social, just how I create software is really different than it was even a year ago. And having a centralized kind of mechanism during this moment of immense change, I think is really helpful for us. But I don't personally think it's like a long term friends, but I don't know, I'm trying to avoid predictions about too deep in the future at this point. Everything's changing a lot. We'll just set how he's never seen the way we will software change this much in his whole career.
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companies. We know they're about their useful bubble to talk about how the building software changed, leading teams changed over starting from like what like 2007, all the way to today. I don't know what your first experience was like kind of as an engineer, but when I was first engineer, I was a contractor, I was like 22 for Yahoo working remotely. No one else in the team was remote. And then when I went full time at the same manager, so I had the same manager two years, I had two one on ones with that manager over two years. I had no one on ones or like once a year
or for performance, not even performance, for pay conversations. And then they would say, yeah, good job. Here's your raise. Or like, oh, and then promotions used to be like, congratulations are now promoted. And it was more about like, yeah, you're making more money.
Cool. And I didn't have any expectations that I'd have more than two. And the first one was basically he wanted to talk about another employee's performance, trying to get like some signal about whether they were doing poorly. So it wasn't like feedback from me or something. And the second one was like, oh, you gave him that necessarily thing.
Like, what's going on? Right? And so, and that was just kind of normal. And so his job, the way he saw it, and I think he was like, really good at it was his job was to go find an opportunity to the company for the team that impact that was going around the company searching for something we could do that was really valuable. And he kind of like brought that back, and then our job was to implement it and make it work. And that was just like how the work was done.
And there was no idea that he was like helping me have a rewarding career or something like that. Like, I think was irrelevant. We're talking pretty 2010. Yep. And then when I, you know, got to dig, I think all the managers basically got fired.
I actually became a manager at dig because I was the only one dumb enough not to say no when they asked me. But you know, I had I like two and a half, three years of experience top. So that went, and I knew nothing about management. Right. And again, I never interacted with my manager at my prior job. I interacted with, I got a tech lead kind of set technical direction,
and then got upset about something up. But that was kind of the entirety of like the leadership model there, right? So I came in and I was a manager, but I there was really no management at, at dig other than, you know, me for the last year. And I, I didn't know what I was doing whatsoever. So really, I learned a lot at Uber. But again, at Uber, everyone's so busy. There was no management
there either. It was really a synchronous swim. And either you figured it out or and your team really struggled because if you didn't get the decisions right, the scale of the growth around that you would just crush your team. And so again, like really, really no support. It was interesting because by 2017, when I became manager, Uber put together as first apprentice manager program, which actually taught me with people. So when I became a manager there,
I had like a few days of getting together mentors assigned all that. Most injury managers never ever had that. And Uber, it was brand new. They made it more formal. So they actually did some internal DIY training, honestly. But yes, before that, nothing. Oh, and they did it because I think
they realized that bad managers were becoming a really problem. Yeah, which makes sense. I think people were just figuring it out. And I think the Uber I worked in was extremely kind of myopic. So one of the kind of values I get wrong was basically solve it yourself. That's like not literally
one of the state of values, but people didn't go get blocked on other teams. They just get it themselves. And maybe let builders build might have been like a very into this. There was the let builders build be on or not a renter. And when you combine it to, there was something about principles, but it was like just this wrong your way and don't ask for forgive.
I'll just get it done. And there was sort of like a no dependency is culture, which I found really empowering, whereas like, oh, I'm blocked. It's like, you're not blocked. You need to go figure it out. And that that was really painful sometimes. But it really meant you could always take
responsibility just to figure it out yourself. Sometimes, I remember signing like purchase orders for Uber China, where we couldn't get anyone to sign it. And I ended up signing like a multi $10 million purchase order. And I was probably like 27 or just there was no one to approve it. And we had to get done. And so, you know, a mirror that had to talk to an I was kind of staring at each other.
And like the thing that I love about Uber that era is like, no, we never talked about it. Like there was never, there's never like a follow up, probably not good either in a corporate governance perspective. That's like maybe a little bit like a talk, but we really didn't get each other's way and we're able to do like amazing things. Also extremely challenging place to work in its own right. Yeah, people left and burned out for a reason. A lot of them. 100%. But really,
so I all the way through then I finally get to Stripe around 2016 and Stripe sort of famously didn't have a management culture either. So when I joined there, I think three managers, one of them, who I really love working with, really lean, I think had somewhere between 40 and 50 direct reports, because I read the paper from Google when they used to have basically no managers for some period of time. And how didn't work? Initially, no, they initially followed that the model where they were no managers for a long time. And so I kind of joined in that the wave of managerization as like one of the early managers in that wave. But I think there were three or four managers,
Raylene, Jorge, and they're like one or two others. Jorge was managing a team of I think 30, with maybe one one manager underneath him for those 30 folks, Raylene, I think, and no managers. It was just like a very chaotic time as well. But again, kind of coming out of the Uber experience, they're very familiar with chaos at that point. But there also business was growing really, really fast. And so I think really, that three at Uber though, is one of the cultural change
around what is the role of manager, I think started to like cement itself a little bit and kind of this role of manager not as kind of a court viewer or a decision maker, but as a facilitator, really started to take hold. And that was like pretty, pretty fast knitting to watch. And one of the reasons why I wrote Staff Engineer, which I think came out in 2021, was actually like collecting feedback for some of the staff engineers I'd work with. Because one of the, one of the ideas that I was really frustrated with at the time was this idea that staff engineers principally got to work on interesting, fun problems that they found personally rewarding, which wasn't what I needed for my staff engineers at all. I needed them to go work on the business problems and the scalability problems that I as a leader, and when I left, I want to say my team was like 250, 260, something like that.
I had all these problems. And so some of my very dozen years were like, I want like a more interesting problem. It's like, I only have suffering to offer, but this suffering will make is like, what's going to make the business succeed? And so how do I refocus them? And I think many of them at the time felt like that was a violation of the management contract, like my goal and my obligation was to give them interesting work they wanted. Oh, interesting. How, when we look back, just how
it changed for my 10 years before, totally. Right. And so I think that was like a fascinating time to be in. But I don't think that perspective was ever really right. If you like the people who were really senior at Stripe, but also everywhere I've worked, those folks were doing the really valuable work that the company needed. You never saw that perspective like really take hold in the executive
ranks. But a lot of the folks coming in really had that belief. And I'd say like, without naming names, certain companies that they came from had very strong versions of that were kind of the obligation to manager for senior hires was to give them fun work. And I think the industry is really reverted on that one for sure. Was this something to do with zero interest rates? We have been come
back to this, which is so curious. I wrote about this as well, how an interest rate, which feels so abstract. And we sometimes hear about it, how it probably impacted funding, in tech for a very long time, probably hiring startups, started up that were funded that maybe didn't have a business model, but they were still funded. And ultimately software engineering, archetypes, manager types, management decisions. And then the music stopped sometime around 2022, where efficiency became more important. And now we're kind of seeing this. And now I think a lot of us are asking myself
the question like, everything that we did during that time, was it right at the time? Did you ever read? I'm going to get his name wrong. I think it was like Ron John Roy's like, a zerp explains everything. A lot goes from the margins.
Yes, the margin. Well, also, I love his writing. Yes. Well, one of my colleagues I did who then I hired at Uber was John Derek, who's the other writer on the margins, along with, I think it's Ron John Roy. But so I read that piece. And it
really resonated, right? I do think that zerp has explained the entire like 2010s in terms of how management styles changed, salaries went off, then competition for hiring became your ability to hire and close and retain became the differentiator between these successful companies, the less successful, because you simply couldn't retain great people. And that pulled kind of leverage back into the engineer's hands and created like a very different environment. And so part of the way companies were pitching themselves was like more relaxed, more focused on you, more career development. And I think in ways that I think we're often like kind of self-defeating. So I think there's this kind of broad judgment of like the Google Perf culture.
And I don't think any company that did incredibly well other than maybe Google and that level of perc orientation. But I do think ignoring the perks, there are many other ways that companies try to focus on rewarding work, interesting work, you know, companies like, oh, engineers, maybe shouldn't be on call. That's right. That's the second tier SRE is to be on call, which was interesting, because that was actually a place where every single person I've worked with knows engineers being on call for the work makes the software better. And yet companies were still kind of like, oh, maybe for the enjoyment of it, we should let folks not be on call for the work they're doing.
And instead page other people that aren't involved in the creation of the software, and that orientation really reveals, I think that the shift in priority is in this company. Well, I also wonder if that was a time where managers were rewarded for having low attrition on team, meaning few people left being able to hire on the team to build had count because often there was a time that's might sound crazy, but filling had countless difficulties. You were given, let's say you had a team of 30 as a director or senior injury manager, you had 10 headcount this year. And if you couldn't fill that, meaning you couldn't hire the right people, and this was like, let's say senior and above. So it was like, you can just get new grass because that would be too easy.
Then it kind of counts a little bit against you. Or if someone else would get that headcount, which might help their promotion because it was kind of obvious if you have 40 plus people, you're now, you might be senior manager, that's your director title. And so managers who did well in this environment became a bit of people, pleasers. And also they started to shield their engineers from the business, for example. And I wonder if this shielding from the business has bitten back a lot of people, because now as engineers, you're increasingly expected to be savvy about the business, understand the business. That's when you're going to be in demand, that's
when in a startup or other places you get hit the ground running. And I still hear stories from people who worked out this big company, the big observability company, any of them, and they want to start up, 7% start. And they say, it's terrible. Like, they're not letting me do things. And I'm like, hang on, you're a 7% company. Like, how is it? And you're an experienced person, how is it that you're not
asking, what does a business need to do? Let's do it. Boom. And they've been socialized in a different place for a while. Yeah, I think that is like a huge part of it in terms of the incentives.
I do think the orientation around like headcount filling team kind of management, like the employee kind of survey results. These are really valuable tools. I get like a lot out of them. But I remember spending a lot of time at these faster-going companies, like analyzing the quality of manager based on the survey results, but survey results are like, you have to really interpret them. Like high scores are low scores don't mean good or bad manager. There's like context to ask other
questions about like, hey, why is your team all upset about this? That doesn't mean you're the manager or not, right? And I think these became a little bit a goal of their own rather than interpretation mechanism, which, you know, in a lot of ways is just like lazy kind of middle management in terms of how these are deployed. But I definitely, definitely saw that. And I think in general, I think I hate headcount conversations. And right. I think they're almost never the most interesting conversation.
But I think in a world where managers are not allowed to make technology decisions, the only lever they have to actually execute faster is headcount for privatization. Oh, so are you saying that at that time, and during surf where managers were the commissioner wisdom was do not make technical decisions, this force, savvy and smart managers to put way more focus on the non-technical side, essentially under investing in the technical things, maybe just not making decisions that should have been done and over indexing on the soft side or maybe shielding their team from the business or all these things, because they put their energy there. Oh, 100%. I think that's very true. Like for most, like what I tell my teams that I work with now is like, hiring is the least interesting way to solve every problem. Like we almost always should never
talk about hiring. But the core area to that is like, if you have open headcount, that's from more headcount, we shouldn't talk about headcount either. Because like what matters then is like the hiring throughput, and you actually like can't use more like anyway. But yeah, I think we basically told managers they couldn't think about technology solutions. And then what do they have? They have
like process solutions, they have scheduling, or they have people. And so I do think this was the natural consequence of the bifurcation of these two roles, which isn't to say we shouldn't bifurcate at all. But I do think we need effective leadership out of both or they over anchor on kind of hiring and that drives a lot of the bloated orgs you saw in the past. Let's talk about careers, career development. Let's start with individual contributors. How do you think career opportunities
are have changed for software engineers working at startups, midsize companies that you see? Because we used to have a pretty good career ladder, end one, end two senior edge staff and it was clear on how you get promoted to start with AI switch or out. You know, they're writing the code, which used to be like, engine one and inch two, they're now getting better at like architecture, we're talking about loops. Do we have a career ladder? Should we have a career ladder?
If you are a manager at a company, should you be worried about putting together a career ladder right now? It's a good question, right? And I do think the expectation is certainly from the teams that we should have career ladder, right? And that is, so the belief, which I think is backed up in research is that like having rubrics drives more fair decisions than not having rubrics. And so I think this anchoring on career ladder is something that's secure to stay. And I do think if you don't
have that, then you do undervalue certain things, right? And so maintenance work, blue work, gel work, whatever you want to call it, I think it's like under emphasized and flashy things that actually work and get over emphasized. I think that's definitely true. So I'm still a believer in career laddering, right? I think it's still valuable. But what should be there, I think it's
like complicated. And I think it's like much less clear about what should be it. I think I don't know which consultants he has in selling on some of these career ladders, small company by small company, you see the exact same career ladder from some like, I don't know, like the packet you can buy somewhere. And so I think all of those are just really outdated, but we don't have the next version of it. That said, when I think about folks getting to like staff or principal, these days, like what I really care about is I'm thinking about doing like an add-on to staff engineer, I'll get to it in like the next decade sometime. But it's really about decision making
uncomplicated situations. And so first, this idea of navigating ambiguity. And so at Stripe, I remember working on this project where we wanted to go multi-region and kept getting commanders trying to lead it. Like we need product to decide how cross-region replication works or what's the product behavior that we support if there is like a only consistency and availability, but no partition ability. They wanted the product team to make these like cap their own trade-offs, which the product team can't possibly make cap their own trade-offs, right?
And what they were doing is they're finding a way to get stuck. And instead, what you need like some of that staff or principal level to do is to navigate ambiguity by making some trade-offs, build the conviction, figuring out how to make a prototype that tests whether the prediction, the assumptions that made are valuable and workable or not. And so I think these ambiguous problems are still a really challenging one. And to me, like a strong marker even today, even with agents, you still have these complicated trade-offs that you have to make. And some of the trade-offs to your point about kind of understanding the business earlier do come from not just understanding how the technology works, but the product implications and to understand product implications. You have
to understand what your users are actually trying to do. You have to understand the economics of the product that you're offering and the cost to the service it and to actually what you're charging. And so increasingly, I think you have to be quite broad to actually work these ambiguous problems. But I do think decision making has always been for staff and principal engineers have to make the impact. And that hasn't changed at all. I don't actually think agents are exceptionally good at
making these trade-offs, maybe agents often don't even recognize the trade-offs because they're not in the context window, kind of subtle implicit things that live kind of outside of the software. What about Eng1-Eng2 careers? I just had a senior engineer ask me saying, so AI clearly has gotten as good as an Angelica writing code because that's what we expected a lot of times from them. And then this person was saying, well, somebody will come to senior but it's not there right now. But I still remember this one because obviously there's truth to it, but I in your org, how do you think of Eng1-Eng2 new grad or people who are under a senior, they don't yet have the battlescars or the expertise or the judgment that you can fully trust them both in terms of hiring but also developing them? So one of the things I try to stay away from is I call artificial specificity. And so what's
difference in Eng1-Eng2? And I think it's actually pretty hard to be super concrete about it. I think a lot of companies successfully say the difference is like three years of work experience. And they can say is that equitable? And I don't know if there's any super equitable way to evaluate Eng1 versus Eng2.
And again, a really bad Eng1, you can identify. But there's been a really good Eng1 and Eng2 often is time and role in terms of just building more context over time. But it's not super, they can do this or can't do this, especially with the coding harnesses. They can do anything, but actually deciding whether they should be doing it, increasingly tricky. And in the wrong situation, you're getting a lot of direction. You can't even perceive their judgment in a lot of
cases, right? So I actually care less and less about some of these things, where I think just general things like time and level, stuff like that is probably good enough for a lot of these. I do worry that getting incredibly detailed on these criteria is a bit of a fake victory where it's made it really precise. But often, you've been in calibration meetings where there are people who play to the rubric. I remember at one company, I worked at we had to get to staff, there was a mentoring requirement. And so we'd have people that literally went out and would talk to
someone and then be like report them as a mentee. And they were collecting mentees. And then you talk to that person, you don't know why I was talking to them, they just talked to me once. And so this is where if you actually create the, you know, you get what you measure. So I really think for promotions, there's always been a lot of judgment. Whenever you try to remove the judgment,
I actually don't think you get good outcomes there either. And so having the rubric to help guide people, I think that's useful. But ultimately, it's like pretty subjective. And for a lot of these things, I think it actually having kind of constraints is more interesting than having really comprehensive rubrics that are used to make judgments. So here's an example of something that a card at, well, as a card, there's a lot of cost pressure. Cost pressure, meaning that like to reduce costs
off the, let's say, or, or improve what a managed cost. Yeah, exactly. And so actually, I had like a ratio, we can't have more than this number of staff engineers relative to the number. And they're just, you was not possible to exceed that ratio. That was very annoying to a lot of folks, right? But I think it actually is more honest where the industry was like 15 years ago, 15 years
ago, I think there wasn't a role past senior in most companies. Like senior really was the ultimate role for almost every company. And so, you know, as people have gotten further along their careers, and we have more people with like 20, 30, 40 years of software experience, we have opened up more of these levels. But like a lot of these levels are like ultimately more like time and role kind of titles rather than like really like a definitive like obvious like change in the capabilities and individuals that are doing it. I try not to worry quite as much about like the details. And I do
think having like a hard block of like one or one to eight or whatever it is is really helpful. If like what you're trying to do is manage costs, because when you're managing costs, what you have to be honest about is that you're managing costs. And so at Carter, that was kind of the situation we were in now in front like we're not trying to manage costs, we're trying to manage velocity and quality level. And so we haven't thought about that at all. But this is where I think part of leadership is knowing what you're doing, explaining how you're doing it, and then letting people like accept the consequences of that. And so because at Carter, we were going to have like a fixed ratio,
that meant we had to start shifting on hiring to be less senior. So we could actually have more of a pipeline of books coming in and fill in those levels from that fix a lot of things came from it, and which works which works really well. But it wasn't if we had just tried to fix it without figuring out the other parts of hiring earlier in the funnel wouldn't have worked. But I don't know, I'm less of a believer in kind of like a perfect description of things that are true than I was earlier in my career, just some exceptions to everything. The thing with like the rubrics and expectations, like it used to mean, when both of us worked at Uber, you later worked at Stripe, it was pretty well understood what was expected of the role. And you know, with the levels, I guess I agree that
I just want to end you to seniority, but there was a pretty clear expectation at some point. For example, a senior, you could trust them typically, I think the industry starts to understand at some point for like closer to decade, a senior could trust them with a project if they had junior and junior, they would mentor them, a staff, you could trust them with a separate direction of a unit or multiple projects and so on. And the engine was executed well, coding without too many issues, took feedback. They were kind of like almost like, they were like, at princess levels, like I think I was an inch to it wasn't a serious promotion in terms of it, it was just it wasn't a destination, it was just they're growing. Some companies even had the experience of you were like, you need to grow at a certain level. But they were like, almost like a princess, honestly, like they were just kind
of getting to have good judgment and all these things. Now that we're all using AI harnesses a lot more, including for reviews, code reviews are slowly going away as well, we're doing less of the what we used to do, which is coding and the very visible feedback between each other. How would you define what the role of a software engineer is? And is it different from before? Is it more ambitious?
Is it how do you think about it? It is changing. Like I feel it's getting more ambitious somehow, but I'm not sure I'm able to put my finger on exactly how, especially with C2 perspective. And is this like a general role or is this like the level three? No, this is the general software engineering role. How? Because I think I feel each role has
changed a lot. Maybe the staff role is not engineers never did too much writing code at like mid-size and above companies because they were busy making sure we're building a right thing. So maybe it's hard to separate because now no one is writing too much code. And even the smallest roles they will have, they will just need to decide are we doing the right thing. Am I doing it right?
First, I think we're still like early days in terms of where we're going. And there's certainly people you're going to talk to. They're like, Hey, like the software teams, the future are five people for any size company. And maybe that's true. Maybe they're at some point, but we're definitely not definitely not there right now. And I don't know if we're going to get there soon,
but there's certainly other companies that are, you know, have a small number of engineers sending us a staggering number of tokens in productive with. And that's like a pretty cool thing to see. Where is the role of software going? I think we're going to find out. And this is actually why it's such a fun time to be in the industry right now, right? The most fun thing is like,
I think our profession is changing in a much more extreme way than anything I've seen since I entered the industry. And for me, like someone who's always been very oriented around the outcomes of the work I'm doing, it's just been like the most fun time I've had. But I've also spoken to folks who got basically joy from, you know, being in the zone, being in that flow state. And they like, fallen out of love with software because what they loved was like the actual art of doing it. And for them, like, you know, a few folks like, one person I was smoking recently, he actually, he's retiring. It's like, I just don't enjoy writing software anymore. And he's lost this
flow state. He's like, I'm more productive, but like, I just don't enjoy it. And so I think the role is shifting. But I think it's shifting in a really interesting way. And I, to me, I've had this kind of idea of software where the time to actually implement is approaching zero. These systems are
still very slow in terms of like, you know, okay, let's take an instant, we implement stuff, you still have to make all these decisions. It still doesn't work in all these ways. It's still going to scale poorly in all these ways. It's still going to break the user expectation, still going to have the wrong unit economics to actually be like a profitable business. And so I do think even if software were literally free to write, it's still really, really hard. And so like today, you'll see this like,
if software's free, then all of a sudden engineers are running ahead of the PRDs from product and running ahead from the high fidelity mocks from design. And that's creating a ton of issues for design teams trying to work with this engineering lead model. And something we're still trying to figure out it imprint totally honestly, right? That also could create opportunities where like, well, if if an engineer also with some design hat or a business domain hat and now, and now like runs an experiment for long, and obviously now you get to like, there's only so many experiments, you can run without confusing you customers, which now it goes back to strategy, someone having to say no. And also like, who are you building with? Like if it's for people, like they will have
any number of attention like Netflix has, I don't have any movies they bring out, but I know that when I will Netflix, they don't overload me. I mean, they do, but they have, they have, they don't show me all 8,000 movies. They, they figure it out. And so I wonder if if software is going faster, like as engineers, we will need to discover the constraints of the other parts of the business, that the main the customers, the, the reality, like you said, unit economics, how money can be made. I think something I thought about a lot working at Carta. So Carta is a low scale business. So I
was, I mean, there's not like hundreds of thousands of requests per second coming in. There's no like, massive infrastructure problem there, but it's incredibly detailed business. How cap tables work is really, really, really specific and it's very complicated and there are tons of exceptions. And then doing it. Right. As well. Right. As well. But you need to get that right.
Actors is really important from like an audibility perspective. I'm also working with law firms that have like a real strong point of view about everything should be done very particularly as well. And you could be in a legal battle between two founders who were arguing about how much equity was actually vested or something like that. Similarly, the other businesses Carta went into like the Fund administration, also incredibly detail oriented. And so there are a lot of business up there where the domain context has always been the hard thing. And it's not super clear to me if businesses
where the domain context is really the hard part have benefited that much yet from kind of all the AI tools. It's still incredibly hard to do cap table management because of the details that the laws, the relationships, the law firms in terms of training like the paralegal is there. There's like all these little pieces that I think domain like complex domain businesses still have like a lot of defensibility and in this day and age. And I don't know if that's how that's going to change. I think it will change every two to three years. There's a kind of like the product engineers are the new king
product engineers are the new superhero kind of like meme that comes around. That was AI engineer. Now it's the AI engineer who really are like product engineers that use AI techniques, right? And so the question is which is pretty much every product engineer is like 100% right? So it's unclear. I mean, I've never really quite understood what AI engineer means. I think it means someone
who uses harnesses and wants to get paid a lot of compensation as I think what it means. But it probably means something else too that I've just sort of missed the nuances on. But like, can you actually get individuals to hold all this context in their head? So even today, you know, people used to talk about like the front engineer who's actually a good designer or the designer who could actually write production running code, that person's always been rare. And our designer was like a little bit of taste can write production code, right? And vice versa, front engineer with a good design taste can
do do design. Why don't we sing more of that yet? And so I think that's like a social constraint. Well, it's a really good question because I was asking the same thing. I saw some data from linear showing that PRs for designers and product managers are off. And I was like, oh,
actually some of some message that this to me, a fellow engineer manager said like, hang on, I've been asking around like, we should be seeing more designers push to production, right? Or product managers, ask around 10 companies. I asked around another 10, including the likes of linear RAM opening. I have yet to hear except for like some exotic edge cases or like I just one example of designers pushing production code, they will find bugs, they will identify them, but they will still get an engineer involved who confirms this approach works in the code base, especially we're talking about outside of prototyping, they do prototype more. But even here, we're not there.
It's I wonder if it's an accountability thing. It's like, you know, like when even though like I can change a light bulb, I will still call the electrician when I need to do something a bit more on my house because it's electricity, right? And I can read the book. I wonder if it's this or specialization. I don't know. You know, one of the things I think a lot about is like, there's
one worldview right now, which is like, if you have a great design system and you've actually used that design system, you don't need product designers anymore. That's like a viewpoint that a few people have. I haven't found that to be true though. Even with the design system, understanding all these different components fit together, understanding the missing components in your design system, figuring out when you have like trade-offs across different screens, how you manage those trade-offs while presenting like the unified experience for the user. These are still really hard things to do. And so, you know, I know attention is all you need is actually not about human attention
at all. But these things are some dimension where people are still constrained on attention and great designers and great product designers and great design system designers as well are all still constrained on like the details of what they're doing to do it well. That they just don't have a ton of time to also be branching out. Does that inherently have to be true? I don't think it's inherently has to be true. And I do think in theory, they have a great design system and they have a ton of
consistency and a ton of linter's in terms of like it has to be used this way. All of a sudden, your design system folks, your product designers are just looking at the exceptions much more aggressively. That is where we're trying to get to at imprint for what it's worth, where the base case is just done by engineering using the stock design system and product design is more working on the really complicated versions of it along with extended design system design system folks. It's not working that way yet though. Like it's still a little bit tricky. But you know, as like the folks even I say,
like I kind of do assume this is like a quote unquote skill issue and that we will like get to the other side of it. But it's still a skill issue for us for so big things that I know. One thing related to this is you wrote revised rules of engineering management to read the next article we'll link in the shown below. In one of the rules that I want to highlight, you say we wrote durable high ownership team, I'm quoting you durable high ownership teams with domain context are even more important. One of my biggest lessons that we were was that persistent durable teams work magic by accumulating domain context building a sense of camaraderie and feeling increasingly strong sense of ownership over in the area as they continue to work on it. Now this was from Uber like
what like 2014 15 so like more than 10 years ago and you're saying that you feel this is very relevant, right? I think this is the only way to build skilled organizations and it's interesting though. I think this is this seems kind of like obvious but it's actually a bit of like a non-consensus take if you will. So a lot of times you're at a company say there's 50 engineers and you have a really important project for a partner that projects late. There's still the Mythical Man month thing okay. We're moving 15 more people to work on this key project and you know the Mythical Man month
I want to say was written in like 80, 84, 75, 75 and the second version 95 and it's that's a while ago and so more than 50 years we know this doesn't work and so like first like when people do things like this a lot of it's like optics and creating the perception of doing everything possible. Yes. So that when you miss it's not it's not your fault but actually not only does it not work it also destroys thing that does work which is creating little pods that are able to own areas and so when I joined Stripe I had you know I took over kind of the team who were a was leading up the time and he moved on to a different part of the company. I think to lead connect and so I had 30 people and one manager was managing like four or five of them and then I was directly managing say like 23, 24 people. The first thing I did was like all right what are some pods and figuring out like some areas I could put together who could own areas and then once I saw some progress I just stopped thinking about them entirely till something went really wrong. So I could focus on the bigger
priorities for me which is like the problem sequence of solve this works so well and so I over did the same thing and I came into imprint did the same thing as well same at calm card it was like a really well kind of scaled organization by the time I joined it so I didn't need to do the same thing there. I think this just works incredibly well. I think if you do this well that people actually do better work than you will from top down to station simply because they understand it really well and it gives you the ability to actually put your attention on the highest leverage or most painful parts of the company and so yeah I think this is a strange nonsense take but just works incredibly well but optically it almost always looks wrong and that's like one of the reasons it's hard to do where you have like a partner launch and you're like hey I'm not gonna I'm not gonna move these folks I'm gonna let them say what they're doing it's really important instead the team that's on the critical path we're gonna work hard as hell together but like we're gonna burn to get through it we're not gonna pull everyone over because if you don't do that or what you might have done in the past is a session in SERP where it was meetings recruitment all that you would say like for this team on the critical path we removed them from all of the BS totally the recruitment of the university
trip you don't need to attend all hands and all these things so you can be has actually by the way works so much better than adding people and also sometimes some people like look this will be a two-week push anyone who can commit to it please do so including putting extra hours and in return you can take time off afterwards or or you know like you create incentives and you just treat them as adults and you're saying like can you and oftentimes people will like I know in my life outside of work sometimes you are okay taking a thing for this one thing especially when you know that I will repay you in kind somehow if you don't do that the thing that happens is actually at a real growing company there's a crisis every day and that means if you rotate people to crises there's a crisis for everyone every day and it creates the sense of like devastation and so I remember talking with someone that's right one or two years in we're talking about this and he's like the way Strife had run up to that point his metaphor was like it was like people on a wall trying to attend a castle and they were always running to the place where they're about to get like overwhelmed but they just couldn't be everywhere because they were getting faster and faster at running but they still were not everywhere all at once and what we were trying to do with switch this metaphor was like we had many people
in many places and so the people working at one spot had to solve that spot but I meant they didn't have to be everywhere those are kind of the two trade-offs but to be a successfully scaling company that's growing quickly you do have to a mode where it's not the same people running everywhere at once because those people just completely burn out over time and there's a certain point where they just can't manage the coverage anymore no matter how amazing they are although I think the question of the AI is at point much further than it was before but I'm not sure if it is I still think their attention runs out before their ability to write code does. Also recently something I was thinking about this with the dribble high and ownership teams is just an example with Slack on how you have Google chat you have matter most you have Microsoft Teams and Slack let's say these are four big competitors for the chat market and it's pretty well understood was there and oh when you have AI your startup you could also instruct an AI to like copy Slack and here's the interesting thing you know if you do have the AI will copy Slack's UI and or find open source things first of all there's a lot of decisions that I've never been documented that are behind the scenes that people at Slack will know and they take their take-years which will be built if you'll figure it out if you're big enough from the concurrency
deliverability platform the other way but taking that aside Slack launched Slack agents which was a super sweet integration with coding agents and that do the work inside of Slack it just works beautifully has been well thought out clearly like this is a team that has the main context and they could have been working behind the scenes with teams partners I'm kind of like hang on why has none of the other competitors launched it why has Google chat who have amazing people as well these are all people that have the domain I think this is where I'm starting to this one example just starting to realize like there is probably value in like Slack having all these people who are working I'm sure there's will be verified of how many people work there I know some people are like why does we have this many people but they're working on this but they're not only able to operate what they have but they are they keep reinventing what customers will want as the world changes you know no their companies seem to have not been responded even though agents have been here for a while they just haven't responded slack as not only respond that they did something that is objectively good and now it's copyable but how did you get there right there's some paper about the the size of the bureaucracy of managing like the British kind of empire and the size of bureaucracy of the number of bureaucrats kept growing even as the territory getting managed
ship shrinking and this sort of is an inherent kind of thing where companies do just expand and create like bureaucracy and create like more kind of overhead because there's something there where like sometimes companies have just kind of like lost the plot under ability to actually move but like my assumption I think this is true for the muse work on Vermeira my impression is that when really interesting good products come out there's one or two highly empowered people that are connected to the founder of the CEO the executive team that are pushing it through and that are able to make painful trade-offs that are not well liked and those can be like legal versus like company trade-offs those can be product trade-offs those can be there are you know the sacred kind of elements of how things have to be done not doing it that way and so like my guess is like for a first lack there was some sponsor and look people hate overemphasizing executives but I do think executive sponsorship to actually empower folks to do something difficult imprint moved over to linear you know like three or four months ago from jira we did it like less than four weeks and there were basically zero people that thought it was a good idea when I decided to do it we still did it less than four weeks and now people are really glad we did this all the lot of
problems you had about having centralized issue management so the agents could actually know where tasks were pulled them down work them actually do kind of task unification etc we're having a really hard time managing workloads that passed without that but there were like maybe three people out of like a 230 that thought it was a good idea before I did it and that one I just you know pushed through and I think now people I go that was a good idea but they just didn't think it was and sometimes you do have to have someone who's willing to take the risk and then you know the flip side is you then need to judge execs and others you know leaders on are the risks they made us take good and so I think three months into the linear migration I think you know no one talks about the sort of you know one's upset about that the change people are really glad with it but conversely if people had hated it like they should be like you know rallying to get me fired right but I think a lot of times people don't get held account to this and so that's the flip side of that highly power executive sponsor that does make these great products sometimes we let them do incredibly boneheaded things and don't hold them to account which is great segue to talking about executives now you can see to which is a former executive can you tell me what in your integration
executive is and how what is the career path today to get to that level from an engineer like okay like I like the executive I like that to have be able to make decisions including unpopular ones helping people helping companies what was old path and what's the new path if there's any so I think the old path your your software engineer for some number of years could be pretty short then you get in management and then you climb from middle management and then you get to the CTO role middle management and manager senior and director exactly and so I think there are a lot of problems with that first it means that often the people that were selected for management initially weren't like the most focused on the technical pieces of work because they're trying to get promoted into management and then the selection bias is really towards people they're able to operate well which doesn't necessarily have a whole lot in common the technology side often they happen to be really good technology but there wasn't like a strong kind of selection bias for it but you really do have to be a good bureaucrat to be an executive and this is like one of the interesting challenges where a lot of my work is incentive management it's knowing hey if we roll out this sort of performance review here's how it's going to fail and so we just shouldn't do that we should do this other thing instead and so if you haven't done the reps of being like a bureaucrat you actually like can't run a function because a lot of running a function is in fact being a bureaucrat how did you learn to be a good
bureaucrat I wasn't bureaucrat right and so I mean out of necessity so at uber we weren't like really like rubrics there wasn't like an interview we didn't have any structure how we interviewed when I was there so to make it all up yourself for your function and again we were doing tons of interviews and each time we didn't give an offer out I was like so painings because I was doing so many interviews so I had to figure that out and then I started like a much more structurally cohesive company and so we had had a lot of structured process and then I got to work on a lot of that and learned a lot of yeah I got pulled into it you picked up the pace a hundred percent and a lot of structure I thought wasn't working well at the point that I joined to kind of like work to try to iterate and improve little pieces of it because we were you know growing growing pretty quickly and so really you know working these middle management jobs I think did educating on how to be a good bureaucrat which is part of being an effective executive because you can just allocate processes that work and avoid processes that don't work think about incentives that work and don't work structure that does work and doesn't work you know the Jabba Reed seemed like a state like not allowed to be in Silicon Valley if you haven't read seeing as like a state but it's basically on a book about how states see citizens and accomplishments and how that shapes how policy works it's the same thing like if you've never been a bureaucrat you don't know how to see things as a bureaucrat but also like if you
can only be a bureaucrat you don't know how anything actually works you don't know how software actually gets made so it's like very damaging so you're am I getting this right that you're saying to be a good engineering executive so VPN engineering or CTO you want to be excellent at technology knowing how it works being hands-on if you need to be or just be hands-on and also be a good bureaucrat where you can manage it and you want both and you're saying that if you go out the middle management route oftentimes it might happen that you either never work a technologist or you stop becoming that by the time you get up there so you're a great bureaucrat but not technology but if you just go from like an engineering great technologist straight up here let's say like you're a startup tomorrow congressional CTO you will not be a good bureaucrat and that's exactly right and it's interesting where oftentimes I think line managers are better kind of instinctual executives than kind of middle managers because they're used to working in the detail so they can make better calls for the team or the company their judgment's just better on all these like non-viewerocratic dimensions of the job but then their judgment's terrible on kind of the bureaucratic dimensions of the job and so this is why I think being executives hard and why it's a hard career path is that it was you know into 2010s in particular you had to climb these like letters of middle management to learn this kind
of bureaucratic component of it and that was the only way to get scaled to actually understand that now those letters are kind of gone but the interesting thing is like the other half of the job is now really emphasized in terms of better decision-making understanding the actual product understanding the actual business understanding how software ships in a way where we kind of de-emphasize that so I think you know people like is it easier is it harder I don't think it's like any easier or any harder it was it's all harder to come like a bureaucrat now which again like negative connotations right but this is like learning how to actually operate a function is really difficult work and I was like a C level like you'll often end up running three or four functions often one you don't know much about yourself so for example at in front I was running the customer operations team for you know much of the last year which is not something I am incredibly detailed on I had like some exposure to and had like an amazing leader in place but I had to learn how to do that and I had to do that you know a number of times I'm at strike by is managing support engineering which is not something I've done personally myself I was running data engineering it's not something I personally done myself and so you know you learn how to run that way when you have to it's really hard to get the job to learn how to like operate the function that way where you don't actually know the details of the work but you get
to be a much better more detailed oriented leader for longer and that's that's really where I think the best future executives are are line managers because middle management has historically selected for totally different set of skills how do you get both it's incredibly hard now and it was always hard in different ways and what's your take on middle management slowly dying you agree it's definitely a hard time to be a middle manager right now especially if you came up in the 2010s you were kind of selected and trained in this more of this empowerment model more of this like functional like bureaucracy model and now people are like we don't want it and so you kind of risen into this pinnacle but you can't get to the next step because these other skills that are more kind of in the details execution really de-emphasized and kind of people have changed that the rubric on you know which is like super super frustrating for folks to kind of get trapped by that that's definitely the challenge that folks are in now and I I don't know I don't know how this wave of execs are gonna happen but it's always been a hard role to get well and I do want to ask you a two people ask me for advice and I'm a terrible to their stories and you can decide if they're similar or different one is a head of engineering who has about seven people reporting to them at a company and was thinking I wonder about my future because I'm seeing about this middle
the other one was a story from another head of engineering who has three ems reporting to them and three ICs reporting to the VP of engineering they've been shifting to AI transformation and the end department also doing some other things the VP engineering is satisfied with their work with their under the VP engineering and this person also wondering like both people are wondering am I in a bit of a career trap and they ask me to ask you well you have a lot of experience what tactics would you be able to suggest them to figure out what career path to be to for them to figure out what they might want what is possible and again I think the tricking in both cases both people have spent a bunch of time in middle management there's not that they're not technical but you know they they had this path and it was pretty clear where they would go next will be VP of engineering for both of them but in a current company clearly will not happen or unlikely so it's a hard time in middle management right there's a lot more competition for these roles and so I think what I found personally very rewarding is I ended up getting back into the details of writing software and so when I left part of my team was 250 maybe something like that when I joined imprint the team I was leading was I think 25 and so for me this is kind of like a
unique moment to actually reskill well if you're in management I think right now either you have to get back into the details or the world is changing so radically that like the profession you know will not be valued in three years and I think you sort of have to decide like am I retiring now or am I reskilling and I thought about that too like I you know a card I could just I could just be done right is this this is what I want but it's not what I want right I really want to still be participating and I really genuinely believe the way that we work has radically changed in the last year it hasn't changed everywhere there's like a long tail that's going to take a long time to catch up but in the places I work it's changed a tremendous amount and for me personally it's a lot more fun so first I think there has to be some like openness to like taking a backward step or a lateral step just what people want is very different and you have to be open to like getting a different like look at it and so I think going back into like a line management position for example is actually much more educational than a middle management the tools for line management and writing software are so good the tools for headcount planning or doing performance reviews are basically terrible
right like all LM applications for these things are not good so I do think you're missing a lot in middle management right now I would I would try to find my way out of it but thinking a little bit about some folks that I hired at iimprint one of them that comes to mind is jasmine who I worked with at karda came over and she was she was hired as a VP but she was a VP that was hiring or managing a team directly she was a line manager she was a line manager a really experienced line manager I was running engineering at mux some time ago and she came into line manage and she's doing just a tremendous amount of software which she would have never done at karda because she could have never gotten time to do it and mux she was also like way too busy like running the function to actually be in the details of writing those people that are willing to actually go back and get their hands onto it are so valuable and if that is you are you have to let people know because other people think you would never take that opportunity but I would hire more people like this all day long you know what we're talking about in the 2010s on the reserve how engineers got a got a little bit too used to like oh yeah my company manager is here to do what I would like to do I would like to do platform no no product sorry even if the business needs it just not for me you know I'd rather quit
and sometimes they quit I wonder if there's a little bit of this with management or like look I don't mean to imply too many things for these folks but generally some of it I have been I have this path I thought I would be VP of engineering soon and I want to get there but does that what the industry wants is that we'll get a company's well no right now they want really good let's say line managers and either similar to those engineers the best engineers I know they kind of put their ego on the back and the business said like look we need product to build their like look I'm great at platform you know what let me be the best product engineer I can be I felt with you as well that you you know you have 250 people I assume you know compensation equity status and you went down to lesser known startup with not as a well-known brand yet or at the time taking a lot smaller team smaller responsibility you let the ego at the door if you know what I mean and then you learn so much more I think in a lot of ways it was just like a much better situation for me and so like there are a lot of pieces that weren't like kind of like this is a hit that's not really how I thought about it it was the perfect situation for me because what I knew what I wanted was getting back into the details relearning how to do software in the current age that's what I believe is going
to be the unlock to kind of the longevity of my career also though it's just like much more fun and so like to me it's just like more energizing and I've always been someone who kind of got tricked into management going back to the big story where they just needed a manager and so I said yes you can trick the version and then they made a director so it looked like they had a director in the acquisition conversation so they they was more palatable but I didn't know how to line managed to let her own direct I just they kind of needed one on paper um so you know very kind of them so for me this has been kind of what I wanted and this has been like a unique opportunity but I think for a lot of folks there is this sense the industry has betrayed them and that they're owed something that they've worked for and the thing is like they're right like they have worked incredibly hard but the rules have changed and so I think that at certain moments the world looks very stable and our industry looks very stable and I think in the 2010s we forgot that our industry is actually very volatile our industry has changed just a staggering amount and the last every decade things are just radically different than they were in the decade before and we've sort of like lost sight of that and I think that people that kind of came up in the era of a lot of stability don't
remember that sometimes and so I do think we have to be willing to kind of take lateral moves we have to be willing to be a little bit humble if but if doing the actual work that's like the thing that matters to the company's humility then we've sort of like lost lost track of what we're doing here because we really do just get paid to do things that are valuable to the companies right like they don't there's no like entertainment or orientation into why these companies employ us yeah what about the TLM role tech lead manager this was a role that we declared dead um both the clare dead as a dead end it is there but this was back in you know like the tech leads who gave who were given a very small team to manage as well and we were clear like an insert that it's just a career rough and if your experience is great I think you also made it clear that it's a trap I think you have an article what do you think about this role now it's funny it's still a trap but it's a highly demanded trap and so and I think in many cases there's no way to actually there's no alternative so kind of it's less a trap than simply what's there and so I think in a lot of companies management he is getting flattened so we're starting to see like a dart or let's say have a bunch of like tech leads and like a or of like you know 30 people and a couple of tech leads here and there yep and I think you're either seeing kind of two models you're seeing there are engine managers but they're managing
much larger scopes and so they're actually like less kind of hands-on the individuals in the work before because they're managing say like 12 13 14 people before instead of like you know like 4 to 8 and then we're also seeing kind of directors of managing tech lead managers instead of managing kind of these nine managers in different companies are growing different things but I think this is where I see the industry kind of asking for folks right now and I do say like some of the best folks we've hired at at imprint have been folks that were in like more pure management roles that came in but really wanted to be writing software you know just been doing an amazing job of kind of like doing a blend of both it is hard to find those folks where it's almost like interview them to be a great yam and then like do you just get frustrated you're not writing more software it's really that person it's kind of what you want but it's hard you know not how we've been interviewing them so far I think we've just found a few great folks but that is the role that we really want and again it kind of goes back to this thing where you want people who have the capability to do the bureaucratic arts but don't want to like that the capability but not the desire because those are really the folks that I see super effective these days they can use that when they need to but they default to actually writing software which is really where most of the value is
as cool as topic I wanted to ask you about how you write you've been a terrific writer you still I really enjoy your blog whenever there's a new article I check it out there's also you can subscribe there's an email that I actually get in my inbox how you approach writing and what you think about AI and also what is your take on there's a lot of AI writing going on not just for social media on LinkedIn we know that but also for some authors who before AI they didn't write with AI but now they're starting to a little bit so I've been writing for about 20 years online and my blog and I founded a rationalistic brands in 2007 and then you know in next year I actually I did like May or June or something when I started writing so I'm getting close to this 20 year kind of anniversary and when I first started writing I was simply trying to figure out how to like network my way into a job basically but I did a ton of tutorials just like here's how I did this and this was a different era now sort of thing that you just asked you know in AI like how do I do X and it would write a great tutorial just for you or maybe just do it for you directly right then as I started working over on I started writing a little bit more like the things I've been learning in hyper and then it really took off when I was writing a strike because I think strike was a place that
both had a lot to learn but I really like love of writing and that to me like really energized my work and then wrote my first book kind of the culmination of the things I'd written at Stripe and Elle Gimpusl and then got a lot of momentum I think a total of four books probably not writing another book for at least a decade maybe not ever but I think it's just been so transformational for me I think like so much of like when people know me which is not that very often really but when people know me it's exclusively from the books that I've written or the blog and I really believe writing is like a unique way that we as individuals can actually change the shape of the industry and I think when you've done that there's like little things that kind of pop up so for you like the trimodal kind of like salary piece right and that is first like a memorable name that helps but also like I think it was like a really important observation that a lot of people didn't understand I think you've changed a lot of people in how they approach compensation and then Patrick McKenzie has his work on negotiation so impactful probably created so much wealth for people in the world I think he might try to track how much he's created on it but I'm not sure if that's still true
but for my books I really think I've changed the industry with I think staff engineer I think notably I think like a staff plus kind of concept that that book created staff plus that was like a concept right and there's other things I think are like less like quotable but I've been mattered and there's just like there's nothing I could have done in my work in any company that could have impacted the industry in this way there's many people and so positively or I remember that both the elegant puzzle and staff and I read it and I took a lot of guidance from it and that's just so powerful and then I think about writing with AI and like I've spent tens of thousands of hours over 20 years creating this writing this stuff I'm not like super craft oriented my writing which I mean I'm really trying to get ideas out more than trying to write like the best blog post I've never been craft oriented in terms of writing great blog post I'm just trying to get the ideas out written somehow I think I like what I like about your writing is there are very punchy ideas it's it's not about the writing per se like you're I would say you're a decent writer it's enjoyable but it's not like I don't like it because it's enjoyable to read the idea comes and is there and it makes me thinking and I'm not thinking because of how you presented
it and again the presentation is fine but the idea is what brings me home yeah it's pretty minimal some of your articles are short yeah it's not even about the length I'm way more worried am I writing them than you are which you will know but it's just my natural stuff but in yours it doesn't have to be like what I like about yours you don't waste a breath in your writing when there's not much and that's complete and then I think about that um all the stuff I put together all the things I've tried to change people's minds on and to me like writing with AI was like throwing that away and so I think you know like I've never done a newsletter trying to collect a huge number of folks it's more if you want to read what I'm writing this is what it is it's not like my business like it like it is for for you but still like you know I've gathered like some number of folks and like they I think they read what I write and that's really powerful and I know I know if I write something like often there'll be hundreds of companies talking about the idea there and the next week and that's just such like a privilege spot to be in if I just wrote swap I would just throw it away and it's I could never get it back like I'll never I'll never spend another 20 years doing this right and so when I think about the advantages I have that I kind of
carefully built over like two decades why would I throw that away and so if I don't have something to say I just don't say something I'm not trying to manufacture content or something like that I think it would be such like a devastating moment to me to throw that all the way for nothing like I was throwing it away for something I could maybe get there but I think it would just be like an uncompensated loss if I were to write AI stop articles like I don't think anyone would read them and then I would throw away this this thing that I've spent so long putting together and I assume that you feel the same way it's that true yeah well I feel that to me writing is how I think and when I write the drafts I often like a lot of my social media activity actually I never talked about this before but sometimes people ask somebody's or social media strategy I have a large number of followers which is just a byproduct of doing things because this and thing and in my case honestly is researching and thinking about like I almost do full-time or close to full-time thinking about stuff that's happening in industry and I'm talking with engineers usually what happens I start writing a draft about something and I have this idea I put it in a tweet just like another window and I keep writing it and I later look back it's now got it's gotten traction because I guess it was an interesting idea sometimes it's controversial sometimes I actually test them
up I'm not quite sure I'll just put it out there I call these a little bit like brainfarts which is not entirely true because I am thinking about things but I don't really care about them and I actually am more interested in the conversation so sometimes it then distracts me when I go back but it then makes my ideas form and a lot of my ideas are about observations as is happening are you seeing this which just generates conversation so and to me that is that is the writing like and what I found with AI there was a time where it was popular to like feed all your writing and have a ball that you can talk to and some people wrote a pragmatic injury in bot which I didn't like the idea to use but anyway I still tried it out and it was almost hilarious because for example it would my opinions changed all the time my views changed and it was kind of spit back something that I said you know like years back and I know that we started with TLM if you had a will or some bot it would say TLM is a trap and now we're talking about like well actually there's way more to it I tell people like don't put your thinking whenever I see someone write on LinkedIn especially a professional or they message me up they often comment with their real voice and I'm like what if I just write that imperfect that's you I like the you and I don't like the sterile thing I also don't like how with AI it's got the same voice for millions of people using it whereas millions of people
talking have millions of their voices so this connects to something I think is really related to this which I think is a lot of people believe that he's successful they need to be writing content but they don't really want to be writing content and so they're like I really hate writing content but to get my promoted to get my next job I need to be writing content like how do I do that and it's like obviously AI right and I think something I've been trying to push back on folks on for a while I wrote a piece of good exact name out of you like a attack influencer or something like that that we're gonna link that that post it's such a like not catchy but almost a click baiting name it is the single best post about how to be influential in tech and I will link it to one of my favorite articles I forward to have so many people so by the way thank you for writing that of course and the reason I read it was like these people are like oh I need to write 200 things 300 things I need to write every week I need to do this and it's like well if your goal is to be visible what you need to do is write one thing that gets traction spend a lot of time on it test it like figure that out you don't actually need to write a ton of stuff there's almost no value in writing a ton of stuff unless you are you know running a business that is based on the subscription if you're just trying to get your ideas out if you're just trying to be a little more visible
trying to show proof of your ability to write by cogently can write like two things you can write three things and write one thing every two years and you don't have to write a lot I think about Tanya O'Reilly who has not written a lot on her blog but when she writes something it says something really interesting right and so she's not like a volume writer but she's been able to have really impactful pieces that I think no glue is like the most obvious certain one that has really been transformative and so I think even for people that do write a lot people don't remember the vast majority of things right there's like a few pieces that stick out so I really think that if people reoriented around the real goal which is maybe thousand visibility one or two good things matter so much more than volume and so I wish people would stop creating volume if they don't actually I think it doesn't serve their goals and in fact like I've seen some candidates that I've interviewed you know over the last year where they have just like AI slop content and like a huge volume of it and I don't know I'm pretty conflicted on this candidate because it's like hey people aren't reading it you keep doing it and it's sort of like why are you continuing to do something that doesn't serve any purpose because it no one's responding to it so it just feels like people who are like running
but aren't tasting the product and it's cargo culting right they don't actually know why they're doing it and so to me it actually implies like poor judgment rather than showing like a sign of like oh this is an ambitious person trying hard yeah in this clothing what's a book that you would recommend or books that you enjoyed reading certainly I think I recommend kind of my books to anyone who enjoys spending money on things your books are all excellent really thank you and certainly I think crafting and journe strategy came out last year and I think it's you know the newest one but I think there's like a lot of interesting ideas in there for sure I think you know thinking in Systems of Primer by Donnie L'Oe's is like one that I read based on your recommendation I think it's honestly the book that kind of formed my view about management and kind of operating in companies I think that it's not really about operating companies but it's like a mental model you can use that book I think it's incredibly incredibly helpful but really like any book that forces you to have a different perspective on something and so I spent you know a decent enough time thinking about typing a couple years ago like not typing like on a keyboard but how to have like better type systems which is not a relevant to my work on a day to day basis and then there's another
book whose name I'm losing on tla plus and using that is that a little Wayne yeah exactly yeah he has a famous tla plus fantastic book and look like I'm not using a lot of tla plus on a day basis but I think just the ideas they are incredibly powerful in terms of using languages to increase the verification their viability of your software which is one of the biggest challenges of our time right if all of our software is being written by someone else which is an agent making verification cheap is really critical and even if tla plus is not the tool for that in many cases thinking about that problem and this is the same reason why typing is really interesting really really valuable and so I think right now those are some some useful ones thank you well it was awesome to have you finally have this super nice conversation like us thanks for having me I've known Will for so many years and it was great to sit down in person and we did it at a time when there's a lot of change happening with traditional best practices when it comes both to engineering management as well as engineering career progression one really interesting topic was how far managers used to bend backwards to find interesting projects for their engineers we'll recall how it stripes some of his best engineers ask him for more interesting problems back then he already pushed back saying that the only thing he has is suffering to offer meaning not particular glamorous problems
but that suffering is what's going to make the business succeed the back in the 2010s and the early 2020s lots of engineering saw this approach as not particularly great management behavior and yet today it's kind of a default for career stability and promotions as an engineer especially the senior plus levels you will want to help the business solve their most pressing problems and this includes having empathy for those problems I also found it eye-opening how Will thinks about what it takes to be great CTO he thinks of it as you need to be two things one a great stand out technologist who knows what to build and how to build as well as a bureaucrat who can run a whole function including a function you might not be an expert on like product or design in the 2010s lots of managers learn mostly about the bureaucracy part and by the time they became CTOs they lost the technology side today with smaller teams and less mental management many CTOs will be technologists first which will thinks it might be better overall and I have to agree with it finally I appreciated Will's advice to middle manager middle managers being injury managers who have teams that are managers reports to them Will did not beat around the bush yesterday it's a hard time to be a middle management two passes he's looking forward or either you go back to being closer to where software is being built work on a smaller team where's a line manager
role or just accept that your expertise of mostly being a bureaucrat but not a technologist could not be valued that much in a few years time Will himself took it backwards when he left the 250 person engineering team at Carda set up a 25 percent team at imprint but he did it consciously to learn how to build with AI changing the injury profession I do find it inspiring that Will not only talks about the importance of learning the new rules of software engineering but also walks the walk do check out the show notes on related the pragmatic and your deep lives on to your interest rates and engineering and EM careers if you enjoy the podcast do subscribe in your favorite podcast player and a special thank you if you also leave a rating on the show thanks and I'll see you in the next one