Skip to content
The Structural Evolution of Morality episode artwork

Jan 21, 2015

The Structural Evolution of Morality

from Center for Advanced Studies (CAS) Research Focus Reduction and Emergence Hosted by Jason McKenzie Alexander

One general problem faced by attempts to explain the origins of morality using traditional rational choice theory is that the demands of rationality and the demands of morality often fail to coincide. This can happen in at least three different ways. Sometimes our moral intuitions recommend actions which are identified as irrational (such as cooperating in the prisoner's dilemma or in the centipede game, or rejecting unfair offers in the ultimatum game). Sometimes our moral intuitions recommend an act which is only one of several recognised as rational (as can happen in games having multiple Nash equilibria). And sometimes we have multiple competing moral intuitions in cases where rationality recommends a unique act (such as in asymmetric bargaining games, in contrast to the Nash solution). In this talk, I present a number of results drawn from agent-based models of imitative learning on social networks, showing how this single framework manages to explain many of our moral intuitions across a wide variety of diverse cases. | Center for Advanced Studies & Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy: 13.12.2014 | Speaker: Jason McKenzie Alexander

Episode details come from the podcast's RSS feed.

Embed this episode

Ready to play

The Structural Evolution of Morality

No transcript yet.

Requests help us decide what to transcribe next.

Frequently asked questions

When was this Center for Advanced Studies (CAS) Research Focus Reduction and Emergence episode published?

This episode was published on January 21, 2015.

Can I download this Center for Advanced Studies (CAS) Research Focus Reduction and Emergence episode?

Yes. Use the download control on the episode player to save the publisher-provided media file.