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From New York Times Opinion, this is the Ester Clunge Show. Ooh, I'm excited about today's episode. We're getting really into the Inflation Reduction Act Reads. But before we begin, we're doing our quarterly Ask Me Anything.
It's going to be the last to ask me anything before I go on bookleaf. I'll say, I guess, more about the bookleaf in a coming episode. But if you've got questions you'd like to hear answered on the show, send them to ezreclineshow.com with AMA in the headlines that we know what they're about. Again, send your questions with AMA and headline to ezreclineshow at nytimes.com.
But today, we are getting into the Inflation Reduction Act. And there's a kind of meta point I want to make here. I've covered a lot of policy fights and a huge problem in how policy coverage is done. There's all this attention to the fight to pass the bill.
The Affordable Care Act, the Trump Tax Cuts, the Inflation Reduction Act. And then the bill passes. And if the fight stops, attention just drops off a cliff. Implementation matters.
But it's harder to cover because it's happening in all parts of the country simultaneously. There isn't a huge Republican Democratic fight over it. So there isn't the conflict that draws the attention to it. And so we sort of implicitly treat policy like it's this binary 1-0 condition.
1, it passes the bill and the thing's going to happen. 0, it didn't, and it won't. But there's actually this huge range of outcomes in between where the thing passes. And maybe what you wanted to happen happens?
Maybe it doesn't. Implementation is where all this rubber meets the road. And that's part of the journey Ira, which is a very important thing. And that's part of the journey Ira, which has to build all these things in the real world.
I mean, we're not just setting up checks here. We're building transmission lines and green hydrogen manufacturing facilities and trying to create a national network of electric vehicle chargers and on and on and on. I mean, we're trying to do industrial physical transformation at a speed and scale. Unheralded in American history.
This is bigger than anything we have done at this speed ever. And so I want to keep on this. And I want to keep on the question of how is it going? The money is beginning to move out the door now.
But we're on a clock. Climate change is not like some other issues where if you don't solve it this year, it is exactly the same to solve it next year. This is an issue where every year you don't solve it. The amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere builds, warming builds, the effects compound, and it gets harder or frankly more impossible to solve over time.
Solve frankly isn't the right word there because all we can do is bait a lot of the problems now baked in. So how is it going? And who can actually walk us through that? Robinson Meyer is the founding executive editor of heatmap.news, which is a new publication that is doing great work focusing on the green energy transition.
He's also a contributing writer to New York Times opinion. He's been doing for a long time now. I think some of the best work covering what the IRA is, how it's going, and just the sheer messy, difficult task of actually decarbonizing. So I wanted him to come on the show and walk us through where the law is right now in its implementation process.
And what are the hurdles, the challenges between here and some semblance of success. And he really does. He really does. So I learned a lot in this.
I hope you will too. As always my email for guest suggestions for feedback and again for asking me anything questions is as a fun show at nytimes.com. Robinson Meyer, welcome to the show. Absolutely.
Thank you for having me. So the Inflation Reduction Act passed last August. Obviously it's early when you're building big renewable energy projects. It takes some time.
But what can we say has happened or is happening? What concretely can we see where we can track how it's going? And what do we just not know about yet? You can almost divide the law up into different sectors, right?
You have the renewable build out, you have EVs, you have carbon capture, you have all these other decarbonizing technologies, the law is trying to encourage. Where we have the best data right now is any of these. Electric vehicles. And in the effort, kind of this dual effort in the law to both encourage Americans to buy and use electric vehicles and then also to build a domestic manufacturing base for electric vehicles.
And I think on both counts, the data is really good on electric vehicles and that's where we're getting the fastest response from industry and the clearest response from industry to the law. And when you say the data is good, what are you seeing that's good? Factories are getting planned, steel is going in the ground. The financing for those factories is locked down.
It seems like they're definitely going to happen. Companies are excited about them. Large Fortune 500 automakers are confidently and with certainty planning for an electric vehicle future and they're building the factories to do that in the United States. They're also building factories to do that, not just in blue states.
And so to some degree, we can see the political certainty for electric vehicles going forward. I think in other parts of the law, partially due to just like vagaries of how the law is being implemented, tax credits that where the fine print hasn't worked out yet, it's too early to say whether the law is working and how it's going, whether it's going to accomplish its goals. But there's some very encouraging signs. There's something we don't know yet.
So one oddity about the inflation reduction act, or at least the climate side of it, is we don't really know how big it is. So I mean, I was finding a way. The Congressional Budget Office and the Joint Committee on Taxation, they scored it. They thought it would make about 380 billion in climate investments over a decade.
And then you have all these other analyses come out from other groups of the Rodeum Group, which is a consulting firm. They think it could be as high as 522 billion. Then there's this Goldman Sachs estimate, which the administration loves, where they say they're projecting $1.2 trillion in incentives, which I can't even quite figure out what they were saying was happening there. But that's really a bigger number than 380 billion.
So why do all these numbers differ so much? And how big is this thing? All the numbers differ because most of the important incentives, most of the important tax credits and subsidies in the IRA are uncapped. There's no limit to how much the government might spend on them.
All that matters is that some private citizen or firm or organization comes to the government and is like, hey, we did this. You said you give us money for it. Give us money. Because we really don't know and kind of rely on these large scale national energy system models to estimate what the uptake for these things may be.
We don't really know how many people are going to take advantage of each tax credit. And so because of that, different banks have their own energy system models, their own models of the economy. Different research groups have their own models. And that's why you produce these estimates that range from like $300 billion to $1.2 trillion.
One thing we do know pretty confidently is that the initial CBO estimate is probably going to be wrong. The initial CBO estimate is $3.91 billion. I see different versions of $3.80 something in that neighborhood. And it also may be $3.69.
And I think it also depended on what exactly counted as a climate incentive in the bill. We know that's going to be wrong. And we know it's going to be wrong because the Congressional Budget Office is actually quite constrained in how it can predict how these tax credits are taken up. And it's constrained by the technology that's out there in the country right now.
For instance, the CBO really didn't see a very large take up for the hydrogen tax credits. Hydrogen is this important tool that's going to be used in the industrial sector, in the transportation sector, like decarbonize or replace fossil fuels and certain uses. Very generous tax credits for the IRA. The CBO can only look at the number of electrolyzers, kind of the existing hydrogen infrastructure in the country, and be like, well, they're probably all going to use these tax credits.
And so I think they said that there'd be about $5 billion of take up for the hydrogen tax credits. Now, depending on other numbers, including DOE, it's potentially as high as $100 billion. But that's because the whole thing about the IRA is it's meant to encourage the bill out of this hydrogen infrastructure. It's meant to encourage the technology to get billed out.
So the reason I asked about these estimates is when I talked to the administration, one thing they are excited about, one thing the authors of this law are excited about, they're getting these estimates, which have some information coming into them from private sector take up. And the fact that the estimates are going up is to them early evidence that this is going well. There's a lot of applications. People want the tax credits.
They want to build these new factories, et cetera. But right now, what we mostly have to do any information about it at all is people applying to get money. And a huge fallacy that we make in policy all the time is assuming that once money is allocated or something, you get the thing you're allocating money for. Noah Smith, the economics writer likes to call this checkism, that money equals stuff.
But sometimes money gets allocated and costs overrun and delays and can't get the permits and so on. And the thing never gets built. So I want to talk through the road from this money to all of this decarbonization infrastructure that they're trying to build. And I think the place to start is maybe with where a bunch of the money is going out the door.
I don't think people think a lot about who is cutting these checks. But a lot of this happening in this very obscure office of the Department of Energy, the loan program office, which has gone from having 40 billion in lending authority, which is already a big boost over it. Not existing a couple decades ago to 400 billion dollars in loan authority. Gigar Shah, who is not like a household name, has become a very, very important figure in climate money.
Tell me a bit about the loan program office and your sense of how they're doing. Yeah. And so in some ways, I think you're right to focus on the loan program office as one of the best places we've been on this going right now. And one of the offices that's responded fastest to the IRA.
So the loan program office is basically the Department of Energy's in House Bank. And it's kind of the closest thing we have in the US to what exists in other countries like Germany, which is like a state development bank that funds projects that are eventually going to be profitable. But because of how they have to be financed or because of their so expensive or because of like the interest rates they need, private capital is willing. It has existed for some time.
It first kind of was first a player after the Recovery Act of 2009. And in fact, kind of early in its life, it gave a very important loan to Tesla. It kind of gave this almost like bridge loan to Tesla that helped Tesla build up manufacturing capacity and that got Tesla to where it is today. It received a huge bonus in the IRA.
Like as you said, it didn't only give loan to Tesla. Yes. That's not the loan people know that it gave. Yes.
It also lent to Cylindra, which of course went belly up and fell and became a huge issue in a funny collection. The reason I bring that up is not to embarrass the office. No, no, no. It's because one of the questions I have about that office and that you've seen some coverage of them is they're very afraid of having another Cylindra.
They are. They do not want that. And not wanting that and putting every application through a level of scrutiny high enough to try and make sure you don't have another one. So, Cylindra, as many people noted, the issue is not that the technology failed.
The issue is that China subsidized solar manufacturing so much. It became non-cost competitive. But nevertheless, they don't want another of those. And on one hand, maybe that's good.
They're watching over taxpayer dollars. On the other hand, maybe that means they don't make loans quick enough. They don't make loans or risky enough. There's a times profile of G.Garshaw.
And he's bragging in it that they're turning a profit. I'm never that excited when I see a government loans program turning a profit because I think that tends to mean they're not making risky enough loans. The point of the government should be to bear quite a bit of risk. The private market can't.
So that's the meta question I'm asking here. Are they operating too much in your view? Because you're tracking this much closer than I am. Are they too much under the shadow of Cylindra?
Are they being too cautious? Are they getting money out fast enough? Are they getting money too big enough bets? You're absolutely right.
This is the key question. They gave us $9.2 billion loan to Ford to build these EV battery plans in Victoria, Tennessee. It's the largest loan in the office history. It actually means that the investment in these factories is going to be entirely covered by the government, which is great for Ford and great for our build out of EVs.
And to some degree, I should say one of the roles of LPL and one of the roles of any kind of state development bank is to loan to these big factory projects that, yes, may eventually be profitable. They, in fact, are surely be profitable, but just aren't there yet. Or need financing that the private market can't provide. That being said, they have moved very slowly, I think.
And they feel like they're moving quickly. They just got out new guidelines that are supposed to streamline a lot of this. Their core programs, they just redefined and streamlined in the name of speeding them up. However, so far LPL has been quite slow in getting out new loans.
One of the things that I've seen in the reporting here, and this is taking nothing away from the office. I want to say that the pressure they're under is very real. Cylindra was a disaster for the Department of Energy. Whether that was fair or not fair, there's a real fear that if you make a couple bad loans that go bad in a big way, you'll destroy the political system.
You'll destroy the political support for this program. And the money will be clogged back. If you're a public administration, it will wreck the office, whatever it might be. So they're not operating.
This is not an easy call. But one thing you hear from the companies that have gotten loans is like, this is a grueling process. And the ones who get it speak positively of it, right? This is very thorough.
It's really hard, but it does mean you get both the money and this wonderful imprimatur of the government and this thorough checkup. But when you tell me they just made the biggest loan in their history to Ford, I'm not saying you shouldn't lend any money to Ford. But when I think of what is the kind of company that cannot raise money on the capital markets, the one that comes to mind is not Ford. They have made loans to a number of more risky companies than Ford, but in addition to speed, do you think they're taking bets on the kinds of companies that need bets?
It's a little bit hard for me to believe that it would have been impossible for Ford to figure out how the finance factories, like that just can't be true. Now, I guess what I would say about that is that Ford is, let's go back to why it's a Linger failed, right? So Linger failed because Chinese solar deluge the market. Now why did Chinese solar deluge the market?
Because there's such a port of Chinese financing from the state for massive solar factories and massive scale. And to some degree, Ford now has to compete and US automakers are trying to catch up with Chinese EV automakers. And its firms have EV battery technology especially, but just have a kind of comprehensive understanding of EV supply chain that no other countries companies have. And so, I do want to like- Maybe that's the argument for getting forward that money.
I think that's right. Is that basically if we think the US should stay competitive and stay as close as it can and not even stay competitive, but catch up with Chinese companies? It has been required kind of largely all state support of manufacturing. Okay, that's fair.
I will say in general, there's a constant thing to find reporting on government that people in government feel like they are moving very quickly. Because given the procedural work they have to go through and they have been moving very quickly compared to what has been done in that respect before, compared to what they have to get over. They are working weekends, they are working nights, and they're still not actually moving that quickly compared to what a VC firm can do or an investment bank or someone else who doesn't have the weight of congressional oversight committees potentially calling you in and government procurement rules and all the rest of it. I think that's a theme across the government's implementation of the IRA right now, is that generally the government feels like it's moving as fast as it can.
And if you look at the Department of Treasury, they feel like we are publishing, you know, basically the way that most of the IRA subsidies work is that they will eventually be administered by the IRS. But first, the Department of the Treasury has to write the guidebook for all these subsidies. So the law says there's a very general kind of, here's thousands of dollars for EVs under this circumstance. Someone still has to go in and write all the fine print.
The Department of Treasury is doing that right now for each tax credit, and they have to do that before anyone can claim that tax credit to the IRS. The Treasury feels like it's moving extremely quickly. It basically feels like it's completely a capacity with these and it's sequenced these so it feels like it's getting out the most important tax credits first. Private industry feels like we need certainty.
It's almost a year since the law passed and you haven't gotten us like a domestic content bonus. You haven't gotten us the community solar bonus. All these things, you know, some of this just came out. But like generally, I think a theme across the government right now is that the IRA passed.
Agencies have to write the regulations for all these tax credits. They feel like they're moving very quickly and yet companies feel like they're not moving fast enough. And that's how we get to this point. We're three hundred eleven days out from the IRA passing and you're like, well, hasn't made a big difference.
I'm like, well, you know, frankly, wind and solar developers broadly don't feel like they have the full understanding of all the subsidies they need yet to begin making the massive investments. So one of the pensions I'm getting up here with the loan office is a question between what might have happened about the IRA right? Investments that had a little bit more of a sure thing dynamic and things that are much more speculative and where the government is trying to backstop an innovation structure or take out the risk of something that might not otherwise happen if they didn't. And I think it's fair to say maybe the biggest bet on that is green hydrogen.
If you're looking in the bill, I mean, electric vehicles, I think would happen sooner or later. They're trying to make them happen sooner. But green hydrogen is something new and the size of the bet is huge. So can you talk about versus what is green hydrogen because my understanding of it is body and then what's the IRA doing?
What seems to be happening? Like, why is it so important to dispel? That's a place where I think they really have a point of view that might not have happened in another situation. Walk me through it.
Yeah, absolutely. So green hydrogen and let's just actually talk about hydrogen broadly as this potential tool in the kind of decarbonization toolkit. A molecule? It's a molecule.
Yeah, I know something. Yes, exactly. It's a molecule. It is a very light element and you can burn it, but it's not a fossil fuel.
And a lot of the importance of hydrogen comes back to the attribute of it. So when we look at sectors of the economy, they're going to be quite hard to decarbonize. And that's because there is something about fossil fuels chemically that is essential to how that sector works, either because they provide combustion heat and steel making or because fossil fuels are actually a chemical feedstock, where the molecules in the fossil fuel are built in the way of the economy. And the fossil fuel are going into the product or because fossil fuels are so energy dense that you can carry a lot of energy while actually not carrying that much mass.
Any of those places, that's where we look at hydrogen as going. I think it's going to be important to industry. It may be an important tool for storing energy in the power grid. It may be an important tool for anything that needs combustion.
The IRA is extremely generous, extremely, extremely generous in its hydrogen subsidies. And there's actually two different subsidies to care about in the law. The first is for what's called blue hydrogen, which is hydrogen made from natural gas, where we then capture the carbon dioxide that was released from that process and pumped it back into the ground. That's one thing that subsidizes part of this broader set of packages targeted to carbon capture.
There's another thing called green hydrogen, which is where we take water, use electrolyzers on it, basically zap it apart, take the hydrogen from the water, and then use that as a fuel. The IRA subsidies for green hydrogen specifically, which is the one with water and electricity, are so generous that relatively immediately it's going to have a negative cost to make green hydrogen. It will cost less than zero dollars to make green hydrogen. The government's going to fully cover the cost of producing it.
That is intentional, because what needs to happen now is that green hydrogen moves into places where we're using natural gas, other places in the industrial economy, and it needs to be price competitive with those things with natural gas, for instance. And so as it is transported, it's going to cost money as it actually makes the investment to replace the technology. It's going to cost money. And so as the hydrogen moves through the system, it's going to wind up being price competitive with natural gas.
But the subsidies and the bill are so generous that hydrogen will cost less than zero dollars to make a kilogram of it. Do we actually know how to make and use green hydrogen at this level? Because my sense of the bill is its view. Is that this is one of these technologies on the cusp.
They're trying to create these big hydrogen innovation hubs that unlike EVs say, where, yeah, more innovation is great, but we know how to make an electric car. There seems to be a sense that hydrogen, green hydrogen, is something we sort of know how to make, but we don't know how to make a cost competitive yet. We don't know how to infuse it into all the processes that we need to infuse into. And so a place where the IRA is trying to create a reality that does not yet exist is a reality where green hydrogen is widely used.
We have to know how to use it, et cetera. And they just seem to think we don't. So you need all these factories, you need all this innovation. Like they have to create a whole innovation and supply chain almost from scratch.
Is that right? That's exactly right. There's a great Department of Energy report that I would actually recommend anyone interested in this read called the Lift Off Report for Clean Hydrogen. They made it for a few other technologies.
It's a hundred page book. That's basically how the DOE believes we're going to build out a clean hydrogen economy. And of course, that is policy in its own right because the DOE is saying here is the years we're going to invest to have certain infrastructure come online. Here's what we think we need.
That's kind of a signal to industry that everyone should plan around those years as well. It's a great book. It's like the best piece of industrial policy I've actually seen from the government at all. One of the points it makes is that you're going to make green hydrogen.
You're then going to need to move it. You're going to need to move it up pipeline or maybe a truck or maybe in storage tanks that you then cart around. Once it gets to a facility that uses green hydrogen, you're going to need to store some green hydrogen there in storage tanks on site because you basically need to have backup supply in case your main supply fails. All of those things are going to add cost to hydrogen.
Not only are they going to ask us, we don't really know how to do them. We have very few pipelines that are hydrogen ready. All of that investment needs to happen as a result to make the green hydrogen economy come alive. And why it's so lavishly subsidized is to kind of fund all that downstream investment that's eventually going to make the economy come true.
But I think you're actually right that this is something where we know it is physically possible for many of these applications, but it is not being done at scale. And it's certainly not being done at the scale of a national economy. Hi, this is Ashley. I live in San Francisco with my boyfriend.
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It's why we created the New York Times family subscription to get your own login and Mr. elaborate gets his plus room for two others. Find out more at nytimes.com.com. So that's some of the question of innovation, right?
Getting the things that we don't yet know how to build and don't you know how to finance into the world. But a lot of what has to happen here, including what some money is given out, is the things we do know how to build, get built. And they get built really fast and they get built at this crazy scale. So I've been reading this paper on what they call the Greens Bill Emma by JB rule and James Salzman, who also wrote this paper called Old Green Laws New Green Deal or something like that.
And I think they get at the scale problem here really well. They write and they're working off of some printed numbers here. The largest solar facility currently online in the US is capable of generating 585 megawatts. To meet even a middle road renewable energy scenario would require bringing online two new 400 megawatts solar power facilities, each taking up at least 2,000 acres of land every week for the next 30 years.
And that's just solar. We're not talking wind there. We're not talking any of the other stuff we've discussed here at transmission lines. Can we do that?
Do we have capacity? No, we do not. We absolutely do not. I think we're going to build a ton of wind and solar.
We do not right now have the system set up to use that much land to build that much new solar and wind by the time that we need to build it. I think it's partially because of permitting loss. And I think it's also partially because right now there is no master plan. There's no overarching strategic entity in the government that's saying how do we get from all these subsidies and IRA to net zero?
What is our actual plan to get from where we are right now to where we're emitting zero carbonate economy? And without that function, no project is essential. No activity that we do absolutely needs to happen. And so therefore everything just kind of proceeds along at a convenient pace.
So there are two places to go here. I want to put a pin and permitting to it and talk first about that question of a plan. So given the scale of what's being attempted here, you might think that something the IRA does is to have some entity in the government as you're saying, say, okay, we need this many solar farms. This is where we think we should put them.
Let's find some people to build them or let's build them ourselves. And as I understand what it actually does is there's an office somewhere waiting for private companies to send in an application for a tax credit for solar that they say they're going to build. And then we hope they build it. And I mean, we check out for the tax credit and things like that.
The point is not that they just get to walk away with money, but that it's an almost entirely passive process on the part of the government entirely going too far because I do think they talk to people and they're having conversations. But in terms of the literal function of the law, the builder applies, not the government plans. Is that accurate? That's correct.
Yes. And you think that's bad. You sound like you think that's bad. I think here's what I would say.
And this gets back to like, what do we want the IRA to do? And what are expectations for IRA? The IRA exists to build out a ton of green capacity and shift the political economy of the country toward being less dominated by fossil fuels and more dominated by clean energy industry, frankly, than it is working. If the IRA is meant to get us all the way to net zero, then it is not capable of that.
Now, what it is capable of is pairing what we could do for the power sector is to pair EPA regulations that require utilities to do certain things with the IRA subsidies. And then hopefully we get to a place where we have a fairly decarbonized power sector. And I should be clear that I think we're going to build out a ton of wind and so no matter what. The issue is that, and we've known this is a problem with the IRA the whole time.
And I think to some degree, why keep going back to this expectations question is it is like, in 2022, right, we had no way to see how we were going to reduce emissions. We did not know if we were going to climb a little. Now we have this really aggressive climb and we're like, oh, is this going to get us to net zero? But getting to net zero was like seen as really was not even something kind of on the possibility in 2022.
The issue is that the IRA requires ultimately private actors to come forward and do these things and as more and more renewables get onto the grid. Almost mechanically, there's going to be less interest in bringing the final piece of like decarbonized electricity infrastructure onto the grid as well. Because the first things that get applied for are the ones that are more obviously profitable. The ones that build bigger need is that we're saying that in a marginal way that as this goes on, the things we need to do to go to final part or less profitable, et cetera.
Exactly. So I think when you and I look at the IRA, we see all these subsidies. We're like, this is amazing. You're going to be able to make a ton of money doing these things, building wind, building solar, whatever.
And to be clear, most of the build out that's going to happen from the IRA hasn't happened yet. We've a long way to go. I think a ton of build out's going to happen. The issue is when you talk to solar developers, they don't see it like, you know, am I'm going to make a ton of money, yes or no, they see it like they have a capital stack.
And they have certain incentives and certain ways to make money based off certain things they can do. And as more and more solar gets on the grid, building solar at all becomes less profitable, but also just generally like, is less people willing to buy the solar? They have less ways to make money. And to some degree, solar developers are not really, they're competing $4 against any other thing you can do with your dollars.
And so as the log goes on, there is this risk. And as we get closer to zero carbon grid, there is this risk that basically less and less gets built because it will become less and less profitable. Let's call that the last 20% risk. The last 40% of you can probably attach different numbers to that.
But let's talk about the first big church, right? So you have solar developers, wind developers, everybody coming in to get these tax credits. You do have a lot more applications happening now. I mean, there has been a big boom in this industry.
When I hear people talk who are implementing the IRA, so John Podesta, who is a former chief staff from Bill Clinton, a top advisor to Barack Obama now, he came out of retirement to work with Joe Biden on IRA implementation. He gave an interview to Bill McKibbin at the New Yorker. And McKibbin eventually says to him, what were you worried about here? And the first thing is permitting.
And Podesta has become obsessed with permitting. As a lot of us, I've become more obsessed with permitting. I'm not going to be out of nuisance having a permitting fight on California. So tell me about the permitting problem here.
Why is everybody suddenly so focused on permitting? Permitting is the primary thing that is going to hold back any construction, basically, especially out West that we need to do to build green infrastructure. Because right now permitting fights, the process under the National Environmental Policy Act, just at the federal level, can take 4.5 years. And now for trying to cut carbon emissions in half by 2030, as we claim we're going to do under the Paris Agreement, let's say every single project we need to do was applied for today, which is not true.
So those projects have not been applied for. They would be approved under the current permitting schedule in 2027. That's before they get built. That process.
That is just to get your reports done. And then what we're going to build all this data in 2028 and 2030. So I think everyone is obsessed with permitting because everyone has realized, partially as a result of your work, that any kind of infrastructure, including whether we're talking about highways, whether we're talking about solar farms, or about large field factories that requires any kind of federal input and any kind of federal authority. But also many kinds of infrastructure that are happening at the state level where states have their parallel permitting processes, it can take years to actually get them permitted.
And we don't have years to get emissions to the earth. Let me not be coinless because as you said, I've been covering this a lot. And one of the things that has been an interesting dynamic to watch is I would say the rhetoric on permitting has moved at light speed, a kind of speed you almost never see in policy government, right? Basically, nobody on the left talked about permitting five years ago.
I don't want to say literally nobody, but it just you weren't hearing it, including the climate discussion. And now I just did a call about the new some permitting fight. I mean, the stuff he's saying on the record is very energetic, right? Really mad at the environment.
I'm just proposing him. Podesta gave a speech about the White House's permitting principles that again was very stark, right? You know, we have to fix this unacceptable. And then you look at what everybody's proposing here.
And it's fairly modest. It's, you know, let's try that constraint how long National Environmental Policy Act review takes. Let's try to make it a little bit better to coordinate the process across the government. Let's try to get California Environmental Quality Act litigation down to 270 days, that kind of thing.
And it's not that these are bad, nor is it even that they're good. It's just that on the one hand, people have moved to saying we do not have the laws, right, the permitting laws, procurement laws to do this at the speed we're promising. And we need to fix that. And then what you're seeing them propose is kind of tweak oriented, I would say.
And these are tough issues. I'm not saying that I have in my pocket like the permitting plan, but it's a place where it feels to me like the policy is still catching up right now to the sort of principles level understanding that there's like a lag between like the severity of the problem people are now seeing and what they have figured out and figure out the coalitions around to do something about it. That's a kind of my sense of the state of play, but you've been covering this in many ways more closely than I have her and certainly more granularly. Do you think that's right?
I think that there's two things happening. First of all, you're right to see that there's a lag, but I think there's two other dynamics to play here. The first is that permitting reform is this phrase we all use because we know it takes too long to get the government to give you permission to build things. That's like the problem we've diagnosed.
And to say, not just permission, but then there's all litigation risk. Exactly. Let's talk about that in a second because I think that is actually a key issue at play here. Permitting reform could mean a lot of different things.
And Democrats or Republicans have different ideas about what it could mean. Environmental groups within themselves have different ideas about what it could mean. And one thing I want to hit this more directly in a second is that for many environmental groups, the permitting process is their main tool. It is how they do the good that they see themselves doing in the world.
They use the permitting process to slow down fossil fuel projects, to slow down projects that they see as harming local communities or the local environment. They use that exact litigation process. And if you say what that is, give an example. So what happens here?
So we talk about the National Environmental Policy Act or NEPA. Let's just start calling it NEPA. We talk about the NEPA process. NEPA requires the government basically study any environmental impact from a project or from a decision or from a big rule that could occur.
It produces hundreds of pages of study about any big highway, any big solar project, any big piece of infrastructure, anything that is happening, not just like on federal land, but in an area where the federal government specifically needs to grant authority, where the federal government has jurisdiction. That can mean in some cases, like factory farms that use federal loans. That can mean large-scale projects that might infringe on local water, any giant project in the United States goes through this need to process. The federal government studies what the environmental impact of the project will be.
Then it makes a decision about whether to approve the project. That decision has nothing to do with the study. Now, notionally, the study is supposed to inform the project. And as part of the NEPA process, the federal has to consider other possibilities, other options for the project.
But the decision that the government makes, the actual, can you build this yes or no, legally has no connection to the study. But it must conduct the study in order to make that decision. Then any outside group can show up with people who say they're affected by the project and say, hey, look, you've made this decision, but you didn't study this one impact of the project well enough. You didn't study the fact that it might impact or harm this bird population, or that it might disturb this particular wetland.
But any actor can show up and say, hey, you didn't consider something in the study. And the government has to pause what it's doing, whether it's approving the project, whether construction has begun in some cases, go back, amend the study, add the thing that the group has raised, and then kind of make the decision again. It doesn't have to change the decision because of the study. It just has to amend the decision.
This is the prime tool. I think one reason that permitting reform is so tough for the democratic coalition specifically is that this process of forcing the government to amend its studies of the environment. The impact of various decisions is the main tool that environmental litigation groups like Earth Justice use to slow down fossil fuel projects and use to slow down large chemical or industrial projects that they don't think should happen. And so when we talk about speeding up permitting and when we talk about making this program faster and when we talk about making it more immune to litigation, they see it as we're going to take away their main tools to fight fossil fuel infrastructure.
The issue is that anyone, not just environmental groups, not just democratic aligned coalition members like Earth Justice, can bring one of these lawsuits and people do regularly against say big off for wind projects, against solar projects, against transmission projects. And so what we're fighting about and why permitting is so uniquely divisive and also hard and why there's this gap between rhetoric and what's actually being proposed is that the same tool that is slowing down the green build out is also what's slowing down the fossil fuel build out. And for professional reasons, for earnest philosophical reasons, many, many climate activists, many folks are very worried about anything that could kind of allow both to happen faster because what they're worried about is like we're going to build out a ton of fossil fuel infrastructure. I think that's part of what they're worried about.
I mean, a lot of these groups of the city Autobots society in different states has actually just fought a lot of renewable energy infrastructure because wind turbines are often bad for birds. There's a classic conflict here between the environment of movement, classic, let's call it, which was think globally, act locally, which said we're going to do everything we can to preserve the local environment. And what the environment movement and the climate movement, let's say needs to do today, which is think globally, act with an eye to what we need globally as well, which is in some cases, maybe welcome projects that may slightly reduce local environmental quality or may seem to reduce local environmental quality in the name of a decarbonized world because if we fill the atmosphere with carbon, like nobody's going to get an environment. Notice how some homes sell faster in your neighborhood?
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I was reading this piece by Michael Gerard, who's professor Columbia Law School, who was the founder of the Save and Center for Climate Change Law there. It's called a Time for triage. And he's a sort of interesting argument that the environmental movement in general, in his view, is engaged in something he calls trade-off denial. And his whole point, and it's a very real point.
And one reason I think permitting reform is hard, and one reason I say I don't have the solution to my pocket, is that look, you can always come up with the edge cases that make the environmental movement look really bad or look, make these laws look really bad. So a famous one is in San Francisco. You ended up having, like, around a decade of fighting and over a thousand pages of California environmental quality active view to add bike lengths. Just like an obviously good thing for the environment.
It just takes forever. But you do things where you really are pitting interest against each other, including environmental ones. I mean, if we're going to build out two 2000 acre solar farms a week for 30 years, that is going to take up the price. And then going to take up land that did not have anything on it before.
It's plausible that we'll go into the habitats of endangered species or threatened species. I mean, you really will have choices to make. And his view on the view of some people is that, look, the climate crisis is so bad that we just have to make those choices. We have to do things we would not have wanted to do to preserve something like the climate in which not just human civilization, but this sort of animal ecosystem has emerged.
But that's hard. And who gets to decide which trade-offs to make? Like, that's the question, I think. But this is a place where one reason I asked about the gap between rhetoric and policy is one thing I have not seen much of is this is the progressive permitting and procurement.
This is the progressive build-out plan, such that maybe the easiest concern here, which is the concern where this will actually be used to add a lot of fuel infrastructure. We have concocted a permitting speedway for projects that are named essential to climate change. We've all kinds of examples in the past of how we've chosen projects to streamline. I mean, there's like a very famously based closing commissions.
And so one of the questions I have had is that permitting from is been having these weird like backdoor fights. It comes in as a Joe Manchin demand attached to clearance for this natural gas pipeline he wants, or this bit of it in the debt deal where the Republicans want some things. But you're not really seeing, like not really, I'd say from the administration, even though they have some principles now, not really from California, the other governor has a set of early things. It's like, this is what we think we need to make the IRA happen on time.
And this is how we're going to decide what is the kind of project that gets this speedway through, whatever. It's just been very modest, but modest also in a way that doesn't seem to be even really trying to answer the environmentalist concerns. It's been a coalitional fight, but not a coalitional process, especially I can tell. I think that's exactly right.
But I think there's kind of two things here. The first is I think there's a failure on the part of, let's say, the environmental coalition writ large to have the courage to have this conversation and to sit down at a table and be like, okay, we know that certain projects aren't happening fast enough. We need to build out faster. What could we actually do to the laws to be able to construct things faster and to meet our targets and to let the IRA achieve what it could achieve?
So on the one hand, it's a failure of coalitional courage. That's partially as a result of the fact that when we talk about permitting reform and we're like, well, what's the progressive permitting reform? You need to give us options here. You need to tell us like what you think we should change in order to make the IRA happen.
They see any conversation about permitting reform as taking the way they remain full to slow down fossil fuels. Now, I will say that there's a few progressives in Congress, because of the Senate have proposed some reforms here. I was going to ask you about this because there's this bill promoting efficient and engaged reviews act, which, Tom Carper, Brian Schott, Sheldon Whitehouse, who are all climate oriented in the Senate have authored. I was going to ask what you thought about it.
One thing you see in this law in that proposal and other proposals from Democrats is to basically speed up or to grant faster deadlines or accelerated review to projects that specifically help fight climate change or adapt to climate change. Part of the issue is that we're in this environment where Democrats control the Senate, Republicans control the house, and it feels like very unlikely that you could just get we are going to accelerate projects, but only those that are good for climate change into the law, given that Republicans control the house. Part of the progressive fear here is that the right solutions must recognize climate change, right? There's probably no climate change.
Progressives are very skeptical that there are reforms that are neutral on the existence of climate change, and whether we need to build faster to meet those demands that can pass through a Republican controlled house. Will you do an interesting piece on the permitting reforms that almost without notice got made as part of the debt ceiling deal and the political economy and what got traded away of that? I actually felt that one of the implications of that piece was it was maybe a huge mistake for progressives not to have figured out what they wanted here and could accept here back when the negotiating partner was Joe Manchin. I think that's absolutely right.
So can you walk through? So there's a mansion sidecar process that fails? Yes. And what happens in the debt ceiling deal and why are you arguing that Democrats ended up trading something's way that maybe they shouldn't have because what comes next then is going to put them much more against the wall.
So Manchin proposed a set of permanent reforms back in November and December. And not just that Schumer has his stuff in there. Exactly. And this is basically a Schumer mansion bill, which is say, and environmentalists call it Manchin's dirty deal, but let's be.
Fair here that this was Schumer and Biden's support for this bill was the price of Manchin's support of the IRA. And then Biden and Schumer, maybe not as enthusiastically as everyone would like, but again, they're dealing with coalition problems from the green groups. Do go and support Manchin's bill. And basically Manchin's bill is a set of largely moderate reforms to the NEPA process that will describe that because most of them eventually pass, but it also includes a number of reforms to the process of building new electricity transmission, which basically we need to make it easier to build transmission in order to find climate change, relatively famously says 80% of the climate benefits of IRA will be lost if we don't 2x the amount of transmission we build.
As you were building all this new renewable energy generation, if we don't build the lines to get all that new electricity to where it needs to be, that electricity is meaningless. I don't plug my car into a wind turbine. Exactly. And also solar relatively famously only works during the day.
Wind kind of works during the evening hours when it's best. If you build a transmission, you build a national grid that lets you like demand shift as the sun moves across the country. So peak electricity using hours are 5 through 8 p.m. It's sunniest in the middle of the country.
When it's 5 through 8 p.m. and that East Coast is relatively sunny, you can send electricity. If you could send electricity from the plains of the West to the East Coast, you actually use much less acreage for solar, build much less solar overall while having the same kind of zero carbon grid. It's also my vision.
It's cheaper. Manchin's bill is basically a set of moderate NEPA reforms and transmission reforms. Democrats, progressives refuse to move on it. Now, I do want to be fair here because I think Democrats absolutely should have seized on that opportunity because it was the only moment when Democrats, we could tell already that Democrats, I mean Democrats actually by that moment, had lost the house.
And so their next negotiating partner by December 22, if they didn't accept Manchin as their negotiating partner or Senate Republicans as their negotiating partner, if they want to do anything on permitting, it was going to be a bill that Republicans at least had more say and determined what it would look like. I do want to be fair here that Manchin's own account of what happened to this bill is that Senate Republicans killed it. And that once McConnell failed to negotiate on the bill in December, Manchin's bill was dead. It died in both places.
It died in both places. How progressive was it? I think McConnell wasn't helping on it. It didn't have the support at all.
I think that's right. And Republicans already knew they were going to get the house too. They had the time to play along probably the time for this. But it wasn't like Democrats were trying to get through.
No, no, no, no, no, especially not progressives. The point is not that they're bad. They were furious at Manchin for good reason by this point. To your point about this was all coming down to the wire.
Manchin could have let the IRA pass many months before this. And they would have had more time to negotiate together. The fact that it was associated with Manchin in the way it was was also what made it toxic to progressives who didn't want to be held up by him anymore. Yes.
And Manchin was also requiring as part of this bill basically immediate authorization for the Mountain Valley pipeline, this natural gas pipeline. And I think we should be clear too that while progressives were furious with Manchin over a lot of things, this one natural gas pipeline, was like the focus of their opposition to the bill quite ironic because then what happened is the house switched over. We got the whole debt ceiling crisis. What becomes kind of clear by the winter of this year, February, March of this year, is that as Democrats and Republicans begin to talk through this debt ceiling process, where again, permitting was not the main focus, it was the federal budget for the entirely separate political process basically.
I would say the core weirdness of the debt ceiling was there was no main focus. That's what I thought was about the debt. Like Republicans and some stuff that cut spending. Yeah.
It was one of the cuts spending on the IRS, which would increase the debt, right? Like it was a total mishmash of stuff out in there. Totally. As that mishmash is progressing, I think Democrats start to look at what a deal might look like.
And they're like, well, we want to do permitting and Republicans want to do permitting. And house progressives don't really want to seem to play ball here. This is especially in the Senate. So like, what would it look like to kind of get this is something that majorities and both parties would support, but would be very tricky for any party to move by itself.
So what could we get out of this process? Like both sides and there's kind of author meetings. There's just like a slow negotiation process where basically, as part of this debt ceiling, you might get some paper reforms and you might get some transmission reforms. That like alchemy goes into the final debt ceiling negotiations, which are between principal and Congress and the White House.
And what we get is a set of basically the need reforms in Joe Manchin's bill from last year and the mountain valley pipeline. The thing that environmentalists were focused on blocking and effectively no transmission reforms. Let's say the set of new reforms that were just enacted that are now in the law include basically the word reasonable has been inserted many times into need. So the law instead of saying the government has to study all environmental impact, no, it has to study reasonable environmental impacts.
It also, and is the kind of climate win, has to study the environmental impacts that could result from not doing a project. The kind of average need for environmental impact study today is 500 pages and takes 4.5 years to produce under the law. Now the government is supposed to hit a page limit of 150 to 300 pages. Like people think this is going to make things easier.
I'm a writer. It's not necessarily quicker to write shorter. Exactly. And it also has to get the easiest need for reviews done in one year and the hardest need for reviews done in two years.
And if the government agency hasn't made a decision in two years, then kind of the sponsor, the applicant for the project, can sue the agency and get a court to give them a decision. It's not as far as Republicans wanted, but we always wanted to make a law that if an agency went over the need for process, that if it passed a deadline that immediately the project would be approved irrevocably and no court could review it. What emerged was that now you can sue an agency and kind of get an accelerated result. One I think reasonable critique you hear on this from Democrats or from the left or from someone is that if you want to have all of these reviews happening and you want them faster and we're rapidly expanding build out, then what you need is a lot more personnel.
And this doesn't do that. This does not create a huge pot of money for the supply of people who are going to conduct environmental impact reports to increase and to get even better recruitment into that sector of the economy. You're demanding faster, but you're not really increasing capacity that much. Exactly.
And I think if there were two progressive requirements for these negotiations, one was expanding the number of staff that are working on this and making it more of a staffing issue. And there's a study that's very well cited by progressives from three professors in Utah who basically say, well, when you look at the National Forest Service and you look at this 40,000 new positions, what mostly holds up? These NEPA decisions is not like, oh, there's too many requirements or like they had to study too many things that don't matter. It's just there wasn't enough staff.
And that staffing is primarily the big impediment. And so on the one hand, I think that's probably accurate in some cases the beast has been starved and these are very poorly staffed departments. On the other hand, this did wind up being for progressives a way to get around the conversation that we were saying they're not having where the main progressive demand was not like, where can we streamline NEPA? What are we willing to accept here in the changes to the law?
The main progressive demand was just like, we must have it better. If you stare at this for too long, you will lose your mind, right? Like to the point of all this, I mean, I kind of as you're suggesting, I don't really like that study. For instance, the most common form of NEPA report is not an environmental impact statement, which is the one people kind of think of, to the extent of anything.
It's a categorical exclusion statement, which is to basically say, this is the kind of project that does not need a NEPA review. And that is partially a staffing problem. But if it's taking you this much staffing and that much time to say something doesn't apply to you, maybe you have a process problem and you shouldn't just throw endless resources in a broken process, which brings me, because again, you can fall into this and never get out, which brings me, I think, to the bigger critique here. I mentioned earlier this draft law paper I've been reading called the Greens dilemma, a rule of salesman.
NEPA gets a lot of attention here in California. It's cousin in California, environmental quality. I get a lot of attention. But one of their points is that these bills are almost symbolic because there's so much else happening.
And it's really the way all this interlocks and the number of possible chokepoints. If you touch one of them or even you streamline one of them, it doesn't necessarily get you that far. All told, over 60 federal permitting programs operate in the infrastructure approval regime. And that is just the federal system.
State and local approvals and impact assessments could also apply to any project. So their view is that under this system, it's simply not possible to build the amount of decarbonization infrastructure we need at the pace we need it. That no amount of streamlining NEPA or streamlining in California Seq will get you there. That we basically have been operating under what they call an environmental grand bargain dating back to the 70s, where we build all of these processes to slow things down and to clean up the air and clean up the water.
And we accepted this trade off of slower building, quite a bit slower building for cleaner environment. And that was a good trade. It was addressing the problems of that era. And now we have the problems of this era, which is we need to unbelievably rapidly build out decarbonization infrastructure to keep the climate from warming more than we can handle.
And that we just don't have a legal regime or anything like you need to do a whole new grand bargain for this era. And I've not seen that many people say that, but it seems true to me. I'm curious if you think they're right. I think they are right.
And I think I would make two broad observations. One aspect of the environmental grand bargain of the 70s that we don't talk about as much or that I think fits into this is that it was actually part of a much larger set of decisions that were happening in the 70s across the government and across American society that were dealing with the fact that American manufacturing was really no longer cost competitive. The role that America played in the gold economy in the 50s and 60s where we had a ton of manufacturing, but we were kind of a factory to a world rebuilding from World War II was no longer tenable. And that also we wanted to focus on more of these kind of high wage, what we would now call knowledge economy jobs.
That was a large economic transition happening in the 70s and 80s. And it dove to held really nicely with the environmental grand bargain. Today, we're in a place where American policymakers and Americans generally in both parties are not as sure that was the right choice. And they're certainly not as sure that that is the right stance for the US to have if we're facing this kind of decades long competition with China.
And that more broadly, there were good parts of the economy that that moment built in the were bad parts. At some point, the IRA recognizes that that environmental grand bargain is no longer operative, right? Because it says, we're going to build all this big physical fixed infrastructure in the United States. We're going to become a manufacturing giant again.
But like, there has not been a recognition among either party of what exactly that will mean and what will be required to have a take hold. And I want to give an example here about one particular technology, which is carbon capture and how we're seeing a grand bargain get hashed out. But right now, there's no one after or no one party that can kind of be as serious about this as it needs to be. The Supreme Court has said it ruled last year that basically the EPA can't generation shift.
It can't require utilities to change the kind of fossil fuel they're burning or what they're doing to meet climate change requirements under the Clean Air Act. That if the EPA wants to treat carbon pollution as an air pollutant under the Clean Air Act and keep power plants from emitting it, it can't say, well, just shut down your coal plant, shut down your natural gas plants and build a ton of renewables. It must require a form of on the ground inside the fence line, like at the site of the power plant pollution control technology. The only way to do that, really, is by requiring carbon capture and requiring the large construction of major industrial infrastructure at many, many coal plants and natural gas plants around the country in order to capture carbon so it doesn't enter the atmosphere until we don't contribute to climate change.
That is what the Supreme Court has ruled. Until that body changes, that is going to be the law. So the EPA has now, last month, proposed a new rule under the Clean Air Act that is going to require coal plants and some natural gas plants to install carbon capture technology. The EPA has to demonstrate in order to make this rule the law and make this rule pass muster with the Supreme Court that this is a tenable, that this is the best available and technologically feasible option.
That means you have to allow carbon capture facilities to get built and you have to create a legal process that will allow carbon capture facilities to get built. That means you need to be able to tell a power plant operator that if they capture carbon, there's a way they can inject it back into the ground, the thing they're supposed to do with it. Well, EPA simultaneously has only approved the kind of well that you need to inject carbon that you've captured from a coal plant or the kind of gas plant back in the ground, it's called a classic as well. The EPA has only ever approved two classic wells.
It takes years for the EPA to approve a classic as well. And that is an environmental justice group really, really oppose these classic wells because they see any carbon capture as an effort to extend the life of the fossil fuel infrastructure. In fact, in Louisiana, you see many environmental groups including Earth Justice opposing an effort by the Democratic governor of Louisiana to expedite classic as well, and improve it while holding what classic wells are actually required to do to a higher standard than the EPA itself would require. The issue here is that it seems like CCS carbon capture is going to be essential to how the USD carbonizes.
Legally, we have no other choice because of the constraints the Supreme Court has placed on the EPA. At the same time environmental justice groups and big green groups to some extent oppose building out any CCS. And so on the one hand, there's a technology we must build in order to decarbonize. On the other hand, no of the actually existing environmental groups want to see that technology get approved.
And they're fighting any effort, whether open or kind of subrosive, they're fighting any effort to streamlining the possible to build class to build CCS. There's a deep logical disconnect there, right? Between... Well, it's not a logical disconnect because they would say to be fair to them, right?
They would say there are other ways to decarbonize. That may not be the way we've chosen because the politics weren't there for it. But there are a lot of these groups that believe you could have a 100% renewable, do not use all that much carbon capture, right? They would have liked to see a different carbonization path taken to.
I'm not sure that path is realistic. I think that's right, but I also want to say that you hear. In some ways, I also want to differentiate here between, let's say, an effort to block any one individual CCS project and an effort to stop the entire apparatus of approving and constructing CCS projects across the country. Because an effort to stop any one CCS project, to some degree, that might be part of a new grand bargain.
Where basically we say, you can do CCS, that's really already got a project approved. That's a little different from saying from what EP will need to do legally in order to finally pass muster and get clean air act rules, pass the Supreme Court, which is say it is possible to build a CCS project anywhere in the country. So what you do is our environmental groups opposing kind of making it possible to build CCS anywhere in the country at all. I'm not arguing that.
I'm just making the only point I'm making here is I think this is where you see a compromise a lot of them didn't want to take the thing. Which is a decarbonization strategy that actually does extend the life cycle of a lot of fossil fuel infrastructure using carbon capture. And because they never bought onto it, they're still using the pathway they have to try to block it. The problem is that's part of the path that's now been chosen.
So if you block it, you just don't decarbonize. It's not like you get the 100% renewable strategy. Exactly. The bargain that will emerge from that set of actions and that set of coalation will straight offs is we will simply keep running this and we will not cap.
And I want to be also clear here that I understand where they are. I understand why these demands of these groups are what they are. Let's be really clear. If there was a petrochemical refinery in the middle of Washington, D.C., I don't think there'd be a lot of national support for keeping a lot of petrochemical refineries open.
Right. And I don't think I would be very enthusiastic about the idea. That being said, the rhetoric you sometimes see from these groups is that CCS is a false solution that will not actually fight climate change. That is preventing the environmental movement from calling industries bluff here.
Because industry says, oh, we need CCS to decarbonize. What could be possible is that progressives and Democrats and EPA turns around and says, oh, that's fine. You can do CCS. You just have to cap every single stationary source in the country.
Like, if you want to do CCS, we totally agree. Essential. You must put CCS infrastructure on every power plant, on every factory that burns also fuels on everything. If progressives were to do that and forget into law and there's nothing that Supreme Court has said, by the way, that would limit progressives from doing that, the upshot would be we shut down a ton more stationary sources and a ton more petrochemical refineries and these bad facilities that groups don't want than we would under the current plan.
But because it is coalitionally uncomfortable to turn around and say, oh, sure. You want CCS? You can do CCS. You just have to put it on everything.
What is effectively going to happen is that way more factories and power plants stay open and uncapped than would be otherwise. So for obvious coalitional reasons, the dynamics we are talking about here at the state level are stronger in blue states, where you have strong environmental movements that then interact with democratic governments. I mean, even the example you gave of Louisiana, you do at least have a democratic governor. Yeah.
One reason why it's so important is because Texas will probably also apply for this process. And because Texas has a Republican administration right now, that process will probably be easier and more lax than Louisiana would be. Yeah. So something really interesting is emerging with where the money is going.
Yeah. So Republican controlled states are just on track to get a lot more of it. So the Rocky Mountain Institute estimates that red states will get 623 billion in investments by 2030 compared to 354 billion for blue states. Gavin Newsom, Gavin Newsom, and interview recently was complaining about how he's saying the word he's was indignant.
He's like, I'm indignant to see these red states that have fought these policies, like every step of the way, getting this money. So I know there are a number of reasons here, and I want to get into some of the red state politics here, but just at the high level, why are red states getting so much more of this money? I think there's two reasons. I think first of all, red states have been more enthusiastic about getting the money.
They're the ones giving away the tax credits. They have a business friendly environment. And ultimately, the way many of these red state governors see it is that these are just businesses. And yet they may be doing something that at a national level, we don't think we should be subsidizing.
But we're happy to help you come to our state and contribute to our state's business environment. When you say, give me the money, what do you mean that it's a federal government that gives away the money? In some cases, there is local tax benefits. Just local incentives, you know, right off, you get discounts basically on your local business tax, local property taxes, if you come in as a large industrial producer.
The other thing is that these states, many of them, are right to work states. And so they might pay their workers less. They certainly face much less risk financially from a unionization campaign in their state. And so, frankly, one reason that red states are getting a lot of this money to support the new construction of heavy industry and manufacturing is that regardless of the IRA, that's where manufacturing and industrial investment goes in the first place.
And that's where it's been going for 20 years because of the set of business-friendly and local subsidies and right to work policies. So the private companies are applying for this money, like to locate in the red states. Yes, exactly. Because the climate for them is simpler.
And there were a lot of provisions in the bill that were trying to have higher labor standards that were, to the extent that a right to work state is an advantage in this. I mean, you can make the argument from, you know, again, triaging trade-offs to get decarbonization, but that's not the argument this bill made, right? That is not what the Biden administration wanted. Biden brags about being the most pro-union president in American history.