You can report to CISA. You can report to EPA. You can report to Water ISAC or HHS. But you can do so so that they can share the information with other organizations in an anonymized fashion. You're listening to Tap Talk, the drinking water in rural America podcast. We believe everyone has a role to play in protecting public health. And together, we're connecting water and health professionals with ideas to extend and enhance our work. Whether you operate, educate, or regulate, this show is for you. Welcome to episode 44. In this episode, we're chatting about helpful cybersecurity resources for small systems with Jennifer Lynn Walker, the Director of Infrastructure Cyber Defense for Water ISAC.
So today we have Jennifer Lynn Walker from Water ISAC with us, and we're so glad you could be here today and meet with us. Cybersecurity and just general cybersecurity issues are such an interesting and timely topic, if you will. And so I guess to start off, Jen, could you tell us where you work, what's your role, some of those things? Sure. So as you said, I am from the Water ISAC, and I'll explain that a little bit more a little later, but ISAC stands for Information Sharing and Analysis Center, for those that may not be familiar with that. And I am the Director of Infrastructure Cyber Defense for Water ISAC. And Jen, what do you love about your job and the work that you do? Sure.
And honestly, I love when opportunities arise to be able to help actually small utilities, small water-based water utilities, or other critical infrastructure organizations with cybersecurity. Essentially, those kind of have-nots, right? And being able to not, you know, just bring awareness and, you know, maybe little tidbits or things that folks didn't think of, like, oh, wow, I guess I really do need to pay attention to this, but it might not be, you know, all this doom and gloom and as scary as I once thought. So that's kind of what I love about it. Well, that's cool. Yeah, I bet you do probably ease a lot of minds for those that are in the know, so to speak. I hope so.
So we always ask everyone for a fun fact about you personally or something that the rest of the world won't know about you. Admittedly, I always cringe at these types of questions because I feel like they're kind of social engineering based, if you will. I try to maintain good opsecs all around, so I hope these occasional shares shouldn't be too bad. So a fun fact about me, I suppose, while not as active as I like, as a matter of fact, quite inactive to my embarrassment, I'm actually a licensed private pilot. So for more than 35 years, I got my license the day before I graduated high school. Wow. That's awesome.
And also something I would never want to do personally. Yeah, I'm colorblind, so I don't think I'm allowed, is my understanding. There was a time, but again, I am so not active. It's beyond embarrassment. But I know there have been over the years some disqualifications that were around when I started. And then I'd see some updates where they relaxed some things. I don't know if colorblindness would be one of them, but I'm just saying for other people that may have some impediments that may have been interested in flying, I thought they would never have been able to do it. Check into it. You might be surprised.
It's certainly neat. I, you know, one of my colleagues, son is a pilot, you know, all the stories I get there and it's, it's pretty cool to be able to just hop in a plane and go somewhere. Absolutely. So Jen, we also like to ask our guests about their water hero. So someone past or present whose work has inspired you. So that was an easy one. That's an easy one. So his name is Gus Serino. He is the president of a little business called I and C secure. That's I with an ampersand secure, although I and C all right now.
Gus is a licensed professional engineer. He has over 25 years experience in control systems engineering, ICS, OT, cybersecurity. Most of that time was spent at a very large water resources authority in New England, where he, of course, designed and implemented this safeguarding of control systems, where he also has a background to take the new technology and retrofit it into existing industrial architecture. So needless to say, after many, many years at the resources authority, Gus does have a profound understanding of water and wastewater systems, process control, automation, SCADA, OT, and as well as the cybersecurity of said systems. one of the other things I love about Gus is that he has a heart for smaller systems, which is why INC Secure was birthed. And in between INC Secure and the Resources Authority, Gus spent about four years at Dragos, among other things, as an adversary threat hunter. But today he still partners with Dragos as a contractor helping their OT-CERT program, which is a free program for operational technology environments. And it's something that OT-CERT is actually, Dragos is a champion of Water ISAC. Again, they offer a free program for largely smaller utilities or smaller critical infrastructure organizations. It's not just for water-based water utilities. That is one of the segments that they're in.
Well, that's cool. Yeah, I guess it's, you know, some folks have been around doing this work for a long time. Absolutely. And Gus Serino is one of them. So yeah, he would be my hero. Wonderful. So today, obviously, we want to talk about water security and water ISAC and their role in the industry and stuff. And so really, to start off, could you tell us a little more about water ISAC, what it is, how it started, and really how it serves the water and wastewater industry and systems specifically?
Absolutely. So again, ISAC stands for Information Sharing and Analysis Center. So again, for those who weren't familiar, ISACs were actually formed due to multiple White House initiatives, a presidential decision directive and some executive orders that initiated beginning back in 1998 to encourage cyber threat information sharing between public and private sector critical infrastructure organizations and government, as well as among the critical infrastructure organizations themselves. So Water ISAC is actually one of over 25 information sharing and analysis centers that are focused on critical infrastructure sectors. So there's the electricity ISAC, there's the downstream natural gas, healthcare ISAC, health ISAC, financial services.
There's one for real estate, which really covers, it's named real estate ISAC, but it's actually for commercial facilities. And there's even one for tribes. So the tribal ISAC, tribes being part of that, the T in the SLTT, state, local, tribal, and territorial. I love tribes because, and the tribal ISAC and what they do too, because tribes are epically unique in that they operate across most critical infrastructure sectors, whether it's, they have water infrastructure, power, huge healthcare, and of course, you know, government and tribal government. So Water ISAC isn't just a one-off, like, what is this? It was a, you know, a White House initiative. So Water ISAC specifically, though, was established in 2002.
at the urging of the White House, the FBI, and the EPA. And again, this was on the heels of that 1998 presidential decision directive. This was to enhance the security of the sector by providing threat advisories and mitigation practices. Water ISAC was created by Water and Waste Water Utilities through various sector associations, to name a few. AMWA, the Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies, AWWA, American Water Works Association.
WEF, which I believe everybody, and WRF, and on this call, probably familiar with WEF and WRF, as well as ASDWA, the Association of State Drinking Water Agencies, NRWA, National World Water Association, and NACWA. And I'm losing track of all the acronyms there. But essentially, Water ISAC tracks the threats, the incidents that we are privy to, and available reporting from government as well as non-government, other ISACs and private organizations, and then report out what's most relevant and should be top of mind for water and wastewater systems. So essentially, so the systems themselves, utilities don't have to. The larger utilities may have resources to do.
that and we can still help, you know, play a role there. But for the medium and the small, I mean, tracking the threats and vulnerabilities and what's going on is a full-time job. And we're already, you know, working everything that they don't necessarily have time for cyber. So we're actually all hazards too. It's not just cybersecurity, but we do look at the all-hazard threat environment, including physical threats, natural disasters, and threats to public health and safety. But again, distilling all of that to what's most meaningful for water and wastewater systems so that they don't have to track it. I mean, we're fortunate to work with you folks and, you know, there's an email almost every day or it is every day. It's, yeah, it's got a lot of really cool information in it. It's such a benefit to have someone else doing that, I guess.
When I think I had forgotten that there were other parallel organizations. I had no idea. I'll be honest. I didn't realize that's really cool. So I learned some today already.
Yes, there are several ISACs. I mean, some that I didn't even mention that just aren't popping into my head for whatever reason. And they're all important. And then there's, for more information on that, all the ones that I've mentioned belong to the National Council of ISACs. So it's kind of an ISAC, 40 ISACs, but it's the ISAC so that we can all come together and collaborate and, you know, brainstorm and, you know, be advised of, you know, there's always, almost always cross-sector implications, especially for water. You know, if something's wrong with water, you know, there could be an issue of power if it impacts health and public health. So it's, again, the National Council of ISACs. And if you go to their website, we call them the NCI.
National Council of ISACs, and you can see all of the ISACs that are members of that. There are more. There are other ISACs that aren't members, but for the most part, you've got the ones that belong to critical infrastructure that are members of NCI. And we also have other ISALs, so information sharing and analysis organizations. This was a few years later because there was some success with the ISACs. So there was a later initiative to implement information sharing and analysis organizations that weren't necessarily, they were for communities that weren't necessarily considered, even if they should be in some cases, critical infrastructure, but they were still valuable to the function of society. So like there's a faith-based.
ISAL. So for the whole of the community of faith, for example. And then there's other sub-sectors where they may be part of critical infrastructure, but because there's, say, a communications ISAC, maybe, you know, I think the broadband, I can't remember if broadband has an ISAC or an ISAL. Please forgive me. It's hard to keep track. There's financial services ISAC, but then the National Credit Union ISAL. So they can be long, they're still financial services, but maybe they're a smaller subset. So instead of an ISAC, they would have an ISAL and things like that. So probably more than you ever wanted to know about ISACs and ISALs. No, it's all good. Yeah, no doubt.
So we often hear in the new mainstream media about major cybersecurity events, for example, when the system in Florida was hacked. But how often do these things actually happen where a crisis was averted or the security was in place to stop some sort of event? So a couple of things there to unpack. One, unfortunately, a lot of times that's where we hear about incidents, major incidents as well. So that's kind of that's that's another issue. We're not going to not going to fully unpack that, but that's kind of a challenge and a concern. The second one, this is what occurred to the system in Florida. The original public information that was disclosed in 2021, you know, I just kind of was that they were compromised or hacked, if you will. But I noticed that not everyone was aware that there was information that came out about a year ago.
Was it a year ago or two years ago? My brain has just now, time flies, right? I think it was a year ago where a former city manager, I think it was a former city manager of the city of Oldsmar, actually came forward and added to the narrative that this was not believed to be an external threat actor as initially disclosed, but that it was essentially a human error, insider threat from a control operator within the plant that made a mistake. It was an accident. Nothing went wrong, but it was not an external attack. It was still an incident.
So activity, it still needed to be addressed, but there, again, reason to believe that it just may not have been all that it was originally disclosed. Not to say that findings after the fact are still relevant in the issues and the challenges and deficiencies and lack of controls and stuff that were found as part of that investigation aren't real or representative. But I just have the opportunity to kind of bring clarification to, you know, the incident type may not be as originally disclosed. And it had more of the earmarks of an insider, accidental insider threat than it did an external threat act. So laying that out there.
Before you continue, I have, like, I guess a related follow-up question. Can you talk a little bit about the why or why not certain things can or cannot be public? And in terms of news media within the industry and then things that are, you know, for national security purposes, like what's the intersection between all of those things so that we can just understand the lay of the land for our audience? Because our audience is both in the drinking water sector as well as in the public health sector. So you hit the nail on the head with kind of the last thing that you said, Jennifer. Can I call you Jen or is it Jennifer? Jennifer's better. Yeah. Okay. Jennifer. Great. I understand that. So to, again, you kind of hit, hit on it, things of national security. So first of all, I'm going to be, I don't have a clearance, so I can't speak to certain things because I don't know. I frankly.
Don't know. But, you know, there are times where, you know, the government might tease. I don't say tease in a bad way, but kind of like hint at certain things, but they can't divulge the full information because if the wrong people got the information, the attackers namely, then obviously that that's a problem. I can't again, I can't speak to how they secret top secret classified information and classified information because I'm not in that particular circle, but it's the same. And it's the same on the other side. There are some time, you know, kind of on the unclassified side, if you will. You know, there are times where, say, a member has an incident. A lot of times those members or those entities, whether it's a utility, whether it's a healthcare organization or any small business.
They don't know where to report. They don't know they need to report or they should report for the greater global good or they just simply don't want their information. They don't understand the anonymization. So those that care or that have lawyers that say don't say anything to anybody, then you've got others that will maybe they've gotten guidance from federal authorities, say in the case of Oldsmar or whatever the case was in Aliquippa. I don't know if they had guidance from federal authorities or if they just decided that for the greater global good, they were going to come out in public and explain what they did. And that's that's right. And that's fine. I think this is kind of more of my humble opinion that when.
Some utilities or even small healthcare organizations see an incident in media and immediately they're like, well, you know, something happened to us. We don't want anyone to know anything happens to us. I think they don't understand that you can report in an anonymized fashion. I think there's lack of awareness in some cases. You can report to CISA, you can report to EPA, you can report to Water ISAC, Health ISAC, if you're, again, healthcare organization or HHS, but you can do so so that they can share the information with other organizations in an anonymized fashion. So you don't always have to go, it almost seems like feast or famine, right? We're not going to report anything, but then somebody goes and reports it to mass media.
And we kind of miss this in between where, you know, we can say, hey, we're aware of five incidents at water utilities and never say a word who they are. But, you know, we're drawing a commonality of what happened and, you know, so that others can be aware. So I just think in a lot of cases, there's a lot of lack of awareness on why we don't get reporting. I think I tangent it off there, but hopefully still address the question. Well, and the important thing I think is what you're saying is if you're in a utility and you've had an incident, even if your lawyers say you shouldn't tell anybody, you should let at least like you all know, because it does matter for the greater good or somebody else may have the same issue. And even if they were able to stop something from happening, somebody else may not have the resources to do that. And then if it does cause a problem, I would think it's maybe not a liability, but it certainly would weigh on your conscience. And it's certainly not being a good steward for the general public, in my opinion. Yeah, absolutely. Yeah, exactly. Yeah, not being a good steward and not helping the greater global good.
I have to admit, even though this is where we see a lot of incidents in mass media, I cringe when I see it. Not knowing the background, right? When you first see it, you're just like, ah, who, you know, and then you start processing it. Who did they talk to? Did they have CISR involved? Did they call the FBI? Did they know that they could or should, you know, to get that level of assistance? And did CISR or the FBI say, oh, sure, it's okay to go to the, you know, go to the media? And I just, I kind of wonder, you know, what took place. Something tells me, no, they probably didn't. CISR or FBI didn't say that. I think it's important to report. There's a difference between reporting to mass media and reporting in a closed environment. And I'm not saying that the media shouldn't know about certain things or the public shouldn't know about certain things. But again, we can do that in an anonymized fashion. Yes, there are incidents that occur at water utilities.
And yes, we know there are instances of current hospitals and public health institutions. And we as consumers need to know that. But it should be up to the organizations, you know, when they do their breach disclosures to their customers or their members in the case of, say, a healthcare insurer or something like that. But then work gets out eventually. And, you know, we all know that cycle. Well, and somebody pushes and pushes and pushes because they've just got to know who it is instead of thinking about the greater good. Yeah, it's frustrating.
So, yeah, so going back to the original question of how often are these things happening, I'm thinking there's like there's a scale of like minor security failure to something actually bad happened to the water and there was contamination or critical failure. How often are these things happening and how many are being docked before there's a problem, I guess? So we just don't have that level of visibility. To be quite blunt, we don't. And I envision this having been on the, so I work for a major financial institution, global financial institution that has a presence in Pittsburgh and New York. So being on that side of the cybersecurity thing and when an incident would occur, I'm not saying a major incident, but maybe a minor incident where, you know, someone clicked on the link, you know, just a simple phishing or something like that. You know, where's that line? You know, maybe something a little bit more.
in depth that you're dealing with. But then when it's all over and you finally got it solved, reporting it wasn't in your response plan. And so you didn't. As a matter of fact, for some medium or small, you've had a cyber incident, could be the first time you've had one and you didn't know what to do. So you were kind of engineering in place, if you will, because you weren't sure what to go through. And so reporting it just never even entered into your mind. So we don't hear about anything majorly being impacted. We get the commodity threats, I call them the phishing emails and the malware and things like that. But on a scale of what the OT...
Operation technology impacting systems, ICS systems impacting events. There aren't that many on record. I'm not saying they haven't happened, but we're not aware of them being reported. Well, and you're talking about the events that you do hear about are mostly things that happen to anybody and not things that are specific to a water or wastewater utility. And, you know, for the reasons you already mentioned, you may not even hear about, which I don't know how we change that, but it sounds like it would be best for all of us if we could.
Agreed. Yeah, agreed. Again, there's goodness in having these incidents be known to a closed community. And I don't mean restricted. I don't mean classified. I just mean a membership, say like an ISAC membership, whether it's water ISAC or electricity ISAC or something or health ISAC for the members to know so the members can protect themselves. And then there's a level of anonymization, another level of anonymization, I suppose, that could occur outside of that so that non-members but still within that community can be made aware of those things. And then eventually, like we've said, it gets into mass media anyway.
But at least if we start with that close community and then graduate to partners and others, but still maintain that smaller information sharing level, folks have a chance to secure their systems from that incident or similar incidents before it gets out. Well, it's also helping to drive the conversation in the right way, because if some utility just goes and talks to a reporter, what gets put in the paper may have much less bearing on reality and the issues that are important as someone who speaks to a lot of reporters. And some are great, some are not. Yeah, I think having that chance to put all the facts out first certainly is better for everyone, including a reporter and a newspaper and the media. So one thing that really interesting this last year in cybersecurity was, you know, EPA submitted a rule on requiring cybersecurity reviews as part of sanitary surveys. And then there was a huge backlash and they eventually rescinded that. And why was there so much backlash over that idea? Seems like a decent need, honestly. But I just wondered, you know, from your take in the industry.
So I can't speak much to this, but as I understand it, it wasn't the what they were doing, what EPA did, having the checklist. It wasn't even as much about the sanitary survey, perhaps, even though there were, you know, kind of the detractors that there aren't the technical skills with the, you know, with the sanitary survey and stuff like that. And that's understandable. But it really, the concern wasn't the how, or it wasn't about the what, it was about the how. And kind of folks thought there was kind of some regulatory overreach that was occurring and they didn't want to set a precedent with that and felt that the best thing to do was to kind of challenge that. So again, it wasn't the what, it was the how they were doing.
it and just kind of wanted to get that cleared up. That's really above my pay grade. So in the words of Forrest Gump, that's all I have to say about that. And I guess that's our follow-up. I mean, it still was a positive step forward as far as what they were trying to do. You know, I noticed, even I looked on EPA's webpage, now they have a list of voluntary steps that are related. If you're giving advice to a water or wastewater system, they should take a look at that and consider those things, right? I mean, shouldn't they consider voluntarily implementing some of those ideas?
Absolutely. And, you know, and I believe it kind of like shoot first, ask questions later, I don't know, or ask for forgiveness or whatever. I don't, you know, I'm not accusing EPA of anything malicious there, right? You know, what they did got the conversation started. I'm all in favor of having those cybersecurity conversations. Even when the technical, you know, kind of underpinnings weren't there, you could still have that conversation. Like, where are you at with cybersecurity? What do you mean? What do you mean where am I at with cybersecurity? You get that conversation started. We don't have to be experts to talking about cyber, right?
It got that conversation started. So despite the withdrawal, though, of that memo, there are several states that are proceeding in that spirit. So it didn't matter that it's not regulatory or mandatory now. There are multiple states that are like, this is what we're going to do because this is the right thing to do. And we can leverage that or, you know, we can set the standard for that among the states. And so they are proceeding in that spirit. As far as those practices, absolutely. The practices, the cross-sector cybersecurity performance goals, that were the practices that were.
completely drawn from, highlighted, are a good start. There's also things like the five ICS cybersecurity critical controls. There's only five of them as opposed to 38 or 43 of the cybersecurity performance goals. And then we just implemented, published an update to Water ISAC's foundational guidance that we call the cybersecurity fundamentals for water and wastewater utilities. We're doing this in kind of small manageable chunks. It was originally 10. In 2019, it was rewritten significantly to include 15 fundamentals. And then just this year, I have...
crunched it back down to 12, but we're releasing them in small manageable chunks in three per quarter throughout the year to try to keep that kind of practical. But we're not reinventing the wheel. We're highly referencing and just kind of emphasizing the guidance that's out there with the cybersecurity performance goals or the five ICS critical controls or audiences probably familiar with AWWAs. cybersecurity guidance and tools. So we're not looking to reinvent any wheels, but just kind of, it is another resource, hopefully thoughtfully done for utilities to help determine priority and relevance to their systems. Whether they're, you know, the large ones have it under control. This is more designed for the medium and the smaller utilities to leverage. Well, I'm pretty sure I downloaded that from your website and it's free. I mean, I don't think you have to be a member. Nope. Free to everybody and it doesn't even have a paywall. So we ask for no contact details. This is the greater global good. Yeah, I agree. I want to specifically...
You mentioned the word practical and that the things that we're talking about are not necessarily things that have any cost or difficulty in completing. Some of it are common sense best practices that people still just don't do, for example, with passwords and multi-factor authentication. Can you talk a little bit about why that's important just for our listeners in general as maybe a helpful place to start? Absolutely. Oh, I have that note, you know, that came to mind. So that's a great point. So yeah, even taking some, so all of the things that you mentioned are in, you know, everybody's version of that guidance, right? And one thing I like to think in the respects of those more simple, probably low to no cost things is that, you know, cybersecurity, I think a lot of people stray away from any of that because they don't realize cybersecurity doesn't have to be about the next shiny thing. To your point, there are plenty of fundamental no cost, low cost solutions that help reduce your risk, you know, and reduce, you know, what could be a really bad day, you know, from becoming the victim of a cyber attack.
smaller systems or less resource systems, you know, I understand. We understand that they don't know what they don't know or they fear what they don't know. They understand, oh, I need to do this, but it's going to cost a lot and they don't know where to go to ask. And there are plenty of other resources to ask that don't like, I'm going to have to call a contractor or a consultant or an integrator to help me through this. And that's going to cost money. That's not necessarily the case. You can call CISA, you can call EPA, you can call the Water ISAC or other sector association or, you know, other ISAC, again, for health and public health, you can call the Health ISAC. And there are, you know, free, you know, there's free guidance out there to help guide you. So from a cybersecurity,
perspective, if you were to pick up the phone and call CESA, you could get a cybersecurity advisor for your region and they can walk you through some of these things and at least help guide you. At some point, you may need to make that investment. Maybe multi-factor authentication does cost a little more, but the impact that it has towards risk reduction is huge. Is it foolproof? Absolutely not. And that's where, you know, talking to someone from a frequent, not having to pick up the phone and call a contractor, I guess is the point I'm making, you know, to try to emphasize that there's free resources, there's free help, there's free controls. Yes, you don't necessarily know anything about cyber, but there are free resources that do.
I hate to keep emphasizing CISA and EPA and water ISAC or your other ISACs, but those are such a resource to use when you don't know what else to do. Sure, sure. Can you talk more about how small and very small systems have unique issues or considerations? Well, in one case or in one respect, you know, in cases they don't know. So that's unique because we still have we still haven't reached them yet. And so we're still struggling to reach those utilities. But there's so many small utilities, you know, the large and the very largest and the metropolitans can't remember how. I don't know how many, but they're a fraction of what exists in the smaller and the medium and the very small segment of the sector of the sector. And they know what's going on. So the small ones don't. But then I also heard, you know, they're unique in that not we understand that not every water utility operates the same way. I heard someone say one time.
that if you know one water utility, you know one water utility. So I'm learning, you know, everybody, they've been implemented over the years and their processes are all different. Some don't have SCADA or whatever. Well, I know one of the conversations with the EPA memo was this definition of operational technology. So my initial reaction was, well, just like Steve's, well, small systems don't have fancy SCADA systems, but it's my understanding that more than we might think have operational technology. Can you talk about what that includes? That would include any of the all water utility. Oh, I shouldn't say all because I don't know, but almost all. I've never been an operator in the field.
Please take this, you know, kind of not with a grain of salt, but like, you know, but many, most, yeah, anything that operates a pump or, you know, something that's controlling or a sensor or trying to pressure. So kind of thinking in terms of pumps and sensors and pressures, you know, that need to regulate how water, you know, comes in, how it gets treated, what chemicals go into it. That's all part of operational technology. In some cases, in the smaller ones, can they be operated manually to this day still? Yes. So that seems to be more of a, you know, as the utilities are, you know, not focusing on cyber because they're upgrading their technology or upgrading their water infrastructure. At some point, they're putting in controls that are now, they can't be run in manual mode. And I guess they, as I understand from Gus, there's an option to do that, but it's not by default. Doesn't it come down to if they have a PC even running things in their plant, if that PC is not hooked to the internet, then there's really not, I mean, the risk is different, clearly, right?
Most don't do that, I realize. If they have a PC, it's probably connected to the internet. But it really comes down to, or if it's a control system that's inherent to itself, maybe it's automatically feeding chlorine, but it's not hooked to anything outside where the world can get to it. That's what I think more small systems would have, where they're not trying to operate everything on a more complex system together, in my opinion. That's a fair opinion. That's correct. And if that's the case, even if it's not connected to the internet, which is control number one, right? Don't connect it to the internet. Check for your externally facing assets and don't connect that to the internet. And if you're not, so then you don't have to worry about getting email on that device. But the problem becomes, to your point, when they're connected to the internet, now you open up that whole big can of worms. But yeah, if your PC is sitting there operating an HMI attached to a PLC, that human machine interface, connected to that SCADA device, then it's part of your operational technology. There's kind of a candid example that came to mind as you were speaking. Recently, it was, I think, AT.
had a major network outage and that led to a lot of situations where they had to go into manual mode and guys were running around trying to make sure things were operating correctly. Does that create, I mean, obviously it creates a kind of a security window. How does that connect to some of the things that we were discussing? So from a small system, so I was actually kind of, I was out on leave for a few days during when the AT&T thing was kind of blown up there, and I didn't follow those details as closely as I might normally. But from a water utility perspective, the smaller ones are still really good. They have their processes for running in manual mode.
The downside there might be, you know, it might be in an engineer and operator's head and not written down. So that becomes a problem when they retire or go away or are out, you know, when something happens and you can't call them or reach them. So we need to have that documentation for that. But nonetheless, they are really good at running, probably as I understand, more than any other sector running in manual mode at this time. Now, communications, that's the digital implications are so far reaching that I quite frankly can't imagine what went on. Honestly, like that blows my mind knowing how interconnected. I mean, I think.
of communications and, you know, the power grid, you know, that mesh, that network is just so expansive that I don't have the background in communications to understand what that looked like trying to, you know, flip all the switches or do what they needed to do to make sure that their, you know, their trunks were running or anything like that. I can't imagine. Okay. I want to just mention, since we're talking about small systems, as you know, that's who we deal with really. And that's at least our focus.
And so I know this today, we're not really talking about physical security, but that ends up being an issue as much for smaller systems, I think. What advice do you have for small systems regarding other things like emergency response plans or what other types of security issues that they should understand? Sure. I think that the smaller systems have kind of emergency response from a natural disaster or weather event or something. I get that. I think that's ingrained and embedded into these utilities. I don't want to say that they're 100%, but if I could kind of turn it back onto the cyber side of things, is take lessons from the emergency response side of things and kind of apply it to the cyber side. So they've got this. You can, I would say, customize, adapt those emergency response plans to the cybersecurity side. Is it a one-to-one correlation? Absolutely not.
from the importance, understanding the importance of, it's the same importance if the cyber thing, cyber goes down, whether you have a cyber event or a physical incident. I think a lot of utilities use FEMA's incident command system. There's also, I'm not sure, you may be aware that there's also, they call it ICS for ICS. So there's, based on the FEMA incident command system, there's an incident command system for industrial control systems. So again, taking that incident command system for first responders from FEMA that has worked so well and has been adapted by the global cybersecurity, ISA, Global Cybersecurity Alliance to apply to industrial control systems.
control systems. They kind of take the guesswork out of that, you know, whether it's a one-on-one correlation and, but apply that structure so you can respond to that incident from that respect. Yeah. I kind of turned that back on to make that a kind of a cyber answer. No, I think, you know, the physical security is something we could even have probably a whole episode on, I think, at some point. Well, one of my kind of takeaways from what you said was, let's say like late 2000s, like the message that I heard being delivered and we were also delivering was to make sure that water is part of these emergency response conversations at the local regional scale. And now we're adding cybersecurity on top of that, you know, not just in the water sector, but on top of it as well. So it just increases the needs for multiple types of experts and a lot of communication to make sure that everyone's on board and can make sure the response is effective.
Absolutely. Now, I think to that, whether it's the physical environment or cyber environment, the emergency response perspective, it's having, you have to maintain some level of awareness of the threat environment and what's going on. You know, from a water ice act perspective, we look at all hazards, cyber, physical, natural disaster, public health. And then that way you're tracking one resource as opposed to the fire hose, you know, or multiple fire hoses of all of the resources. So I guess it's just, it didn't occur to me, but it is, it's something as simple as maintaining awareness of the threat environment. And, you know, but then again, it's.
There's there are a lot of tools out there. And we just those of us that know the tools just kind of keep like the ICS for ICS. Or, you know, if you don't use the FEMA incident command system, you're not familiar with that. That might be a good thing to look into, you know, from that respect. It seems that most water utilities that I've had the pleasure of being involved with maybe an exercise or something like that. It seems like everyone's pretty familiar with that. And it's such a great foundation just to kind of apply that across your whole threat environment. So is there anything else that you think that our audience should know about just how things are rapidly involving in water and wastewater cybersecurity?
It's, it just, it's on the move. You know, we're definitely everybody from CISA, EPA, Water ISAC, all the associations I mentioned before, we all have a cyber initiative. So it's, it's just a conversation that's happening everywhere. The White House. Fortunately, we're all working together to express cohesive messaging so that we're not, you know, operating in a vacuum and having different tools and different resources. Yes. Some of the organizations have, you know, CISA has their controls and they came out with the water sector, the eight control. I can't remember the, I'm so sorry. Forgive, forgive me, CISA. I can't remember what the title is. So many, so many, so much activity. I can't remember all the titles, but they came out with the eight, you know.
things that water and wastewater systems can do. EPA has their checklist. We have our guidance. AWW has their tool. But again, we're really trying to share each other's resources that we have and not reinvent the wheel and have, you know, have that cohesive, you know, cohesive messaging and share each other resources, share each other's resources. A couple of, I don't know, kind of closing thoughts, I guess. One, it was brought up a little bit earlier on things that, you know, what could a small system do? And I've kind of thought of it recently. If you can only do...
Like you don't know what to do. You want to do one thing that might hopefully meaningfully make a good positive impact or reduce your risk. Again, this is a plug for CISA and their vulnerability scanning service for water and wastewater utilities. It's non-intrusive. It's free. So reach out to CISA. You can go to cisa.gov slash water and find out all the information about it. But it gives you that look to your external network.
And it sees exactly what an attacker can see. So, you know, if you think, oh, we're just a small little water utility, nobody has any interest in us. Well, Aliquippa proved that. The incident in Aliquippa in November proved that, you know, it was just a little water utility, but there was something interesting about them. You know, we won't go into that, but there was something interesting that could have had an impact. Fortunately, it didn't. It defaced a device, but it didn't cause any environmental or public impacts.
It'd have the potential, depending on how things were set up. But external threat actors found that, and they can find other things just as easily. And CISA's vulnerability scanning service, again, free, and gives you that visibility so that you're informed. Because just because you don't know, I might have said this already, just because you don't see it doesn't mean it isn't happening. Threat actors are looking for our attack vectors every day, and we need to know what they are so we can prioritize and close them. Well, we can certainly put a link to CISA with the notes for the show, as well as the 15 things that you've updated and some of those. Everything you mentioned, we'll try to link in the show notes for the episode. Hey, thanks for spending time with us, Jen. Yeah. Sure. Thank you.
Are you on social media in any professional capacity where our listeners might follow you? Not as active as I should be, but I am on LinkedIn. So Jennifer Lynn Walker, that's one N in Lynn. And then WaterISAC is also on LinkedIn and X and of course, WaterISAC.org. But I pop onto LinkedIn every so often. I'm usually reposting stuff that WaterISAC has posted or others in my network or within the ICS cybersecurity community or posting and things I find valuable. I don't do a lot of independent posting, but sometimes I'll make a poignant comment.
And share good resources from good folks. Sounds good. We'll add those links as well. Thank you. Thanks again. It's great to meet you. Great to meet you soon. Appreciate all the work you all do. Thank you. I appreciate this opportunity to talk about Water ISAC and forwarding, you know, moving forward, the security of the water and wastewater sector as well. I'm a huge fan of health and public health. Awesome. TAP Talk is a collaboration between the Rural Community Assistance Partnership and the University of Illinois with funding from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The show is hosted by Steve and Jennifer Wilson of the Illinois State Water Survey. You can visit drinkingwaterpodcast.org to find the full show notes for this episode.