We're here today with Ben Fitzgerald and Alexander Sander of the CNAS Technology and National Security Program. They've just written a new report, seizing the initiative, turning 18L reorganization into technological advantage. So this report is about the reorganization of acquisition technology and logistics, the office at DOD, which is mandated by the 2017 NDAA. Can you discuss the reason behind these reforms and what's really required here at DOD?
Sure. The split of 18L is probably the highest profile part of two years' worth of big reform legislation by the Congress, both the 2016 and the 2017 NDAA. And the theme that runs throughout all of that is increasing innovation and also finding ways to help the DOD generate military technical advantage. And this split is intended to create one undersecretary who's focused purely on innovation, technological innovation, and developing new military technologies, and then another undersecretary who's focused on the acquisition, management, and sustainment, all of those things.
So much, it's less about the nuts and bolts and more about developing new ideas and then doing all the management and oversight of big programs is the way that I would think about it. So what that means in terms of DOD action that needs to happen within the next year is they need to submit an interim report to the Armed Services Committees by March 1st. And what needs to go into this report is really their assessment of what the new organizational structure under research and engineering and acquisition and sustainment should look like. And then by August 1st, they'll need to put together their implementation strategy.
And what's important about this timeline is that it allows the DOD to take advantage of congressional support for reform and request any additional legislative support that they'll need in the 2018 NDA. So let's talk about then what they should do, not just what they have to do. In the report, how do you recommend that DOD respond to this congressional mandate? So it really leaves the DOD a lot of flexibility in terms of how these offices should be structured.
So there's a huge opportunity for drastic change, but of course, this is not the only thing that the DOD has going on right now. There's the demands of multiple operations, reinvigorated great power competition, nervous allies, and the president's calls for military buildup. So what we really don't want to happen is for this opportunity to get lost in everything else that's happening. And what that concern is, is we don't want the office to just be reorganized on the organizational chart.
The secretary really needs to take a look at other reforms and processes that he can implement in this time. That's right. So what we recommend in the paper conceptually is that senior leadership, and we mean the secretary and the deputy secretary, and that senior card rate needs to define very specifically what problem is it they want to solve. And we lay out three sort of candidate problems that they could address.
They could look purely at the innovation problem, which would be focused on that new Under Secretary of Defense and research and engineering. They could look more broadly at the bigger acquisition and technology strategy and the processes that run that and the organization that support it. Or they could go even bigger and look at the higher order management architecture of the Pentagon. So looking at this new chief management officer, potentially chief innovation officer, thinking about the controls role and PNR, all those kind of things.
So sort of ascending orders of difficulty. Yeah, all of them will be challenging. The important thing here is for the current Pentagon team to figure out what's the most important problem and then match the resources and the sort of political capital for change that they have available to them to that problem. What would be problematic would be if they went, if they said I said, right, we're developing a new one of everything.
And then they only had the resources to do a small part of that. So establishing that balance is going to be probably the most consequential thing that they can do. So you mentioned that all three problems dealing with all three problems would be quite difficult. You often hear about turning bureaucracies around as like turning a battleship around in a puddle.
So this is, but if this is a big opportunity for DOD and for Secretary Mattis, what do you see the prospects for change actually being? So I think the first thing to spur change is that they do need to view it as an opportunity, not as an encumbrance that has been pointed upon them by the Congress. The timing obviously is challenging. Secretary Mattis doesn't have all of the team that he would ordinarily have to make this stuff happen.
I think that in terms of prospects of change, change is going to occur. It's going to be mandated by law. So come February 1, 2018, there will be two undersecretaries. The question is going to be how smooth is that change?
And also what's a long term impact will it have? So I think that if the secretary and his team can move beyond all of those of all quiddness that we're going to see over the next 12 to 24 months, I think the prospects are very positive. It's really just going to be a question of getting strategy right, tying our technology strategy to the national defense strategy, and then doing the change management. So in theory, I think it looks good.
In practice, it's going to be absolutely going to be challenging. And especially when we still have McCain and Thornberry running the Saskinhask respectively to German who are really invested in pushing these reforms forward and instigating effective change, even if the DOD doesn't fully leverage or take advantage of this opportunity that they've been provided, we can be sure that they'll continue to push reforms through Congress in whatever way they think it's best. That's a great point. So while there's still this question of, will that change, will we see the change that we need?
I think there's more likely that that change can occur in the short to medium term that we're living in now than at any time in the past 20 years. And it's not clear to me after this moment when will we have this type of opportunity again? And then let's talk again after the recommendations come forth and we'll see if they followed your recommendations and instructions. Cool.
Thanks a lot.