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Watching sponsors, IDA Island and Schneider Electric. Learn more at blumberglive.com.com. Tech London. Tracy, I think a comment that you've made a few times over the episodes is like, no, no, it's not. It's like we have these conversations.
And then usually or frequently, whether we're talking about trade or AI or anything, there's usually, oh, and it seems like Europe is getting the short end of the stick here. Or it seems like it's all going to end up being kind of bad for Europe. Well, yes, I would say that I'm sure I have in the past. However, what I would say is if you are bullish on AI and its ability to boost productivity across the board, in my mind, you have to be bullish on Europe because there's no region out there, perhaps more motivated than Europe, to try to eke out every extra ounce of output per work hour. Like if you want to long lunge in France, if you want to take a long vacation in August, you should be very, very interested in AI.
And if you think those gains are going to be widely spread through businesses in other countries, think about Europe. Did you purposely just say this? Did you see the red headline that just hit as you were talking? No. It's so surreal.
So we just got a red headline the moment you were saying that BMW target shedding of fifth of manager roles with the help of AI. I don't think that could be more perfect because, hey, this is the two sides of the coin. So you have a lot of big industrial behemoths in Europe. In theory, like you're like, we've talked about this for years, actually. You know, if AI is going to diffuse across the economy, suddenly maybe these companies can be more lean, et cetera.
But then this also gets to two things. OK, what does that mean about jobs themselves? And then also it's like, OK, maybe they can modestly trim some of their management layers with the help of AI. But can that actually make these European car companies competitive with the Chinese companies? That still seems like a tall order of the trajectory.
But it's very funny that you said that the second that headline crossed the term. Plugged into the zeitgeist. I guess one other thing I would say is speaking about the zeitgeist. And since you mentioned China, we are recording this on September 30th. And Europe seems to be gearing up to take some sort of action against China in order to boost their competitiveness against it.
We're not entirely sure just yet what that's going to look like. But people are definitely talking about it. I mean, there's this very deep concern about all of the industrial behemoths. A lot of the German chemical companies, the German automakers, et cetera. And like, you know, five, 10 years ago, they were like riding high.
And then suddenly in a few years, people were talking about potentially existential risk to them and so forth. And it's sort of wild to me, you know, thinking back to how much the mood has changed from say the first Trump administration and even the Biden administration when the idea of like, you know, there was the European anger, the inflation reduction act and so forth. And you know, just this concern, they got the trade issue that was sort of really catalyzed by the US and Trump a decade ago is now just sort of becoming just very mainstream. Well, you use the word diffuse the benefits of AI. And I think, you know, the idea of having to compete seriously against China and take actual steps to do so has diffused across many places in the world.
Very well put. All right. Well, I'm very excited to say we do have the perfect guest. Someone who's writing I've mired for a long time and who has interesting takes about all these things, including debates about European economic productivity, whether they're falling behind, et cetera, nuanced positions on various trade questions. We're going to be speaking with Dominic Leuster, economist policy analyst, former researcher at LSE and author of The Leuster of Last Resort, Substack.
So Dominic, thank you so much for coming out. Outlaws. Thanks for having me. So I was going to be great for Europe, right? Because then during the working hours, the stress inside of the workers can get more output than they can expand their lunch breaks and their vacations in August.
I mean, you know, if you look at how Europe has done in the last, you know, the last few decades of booming tech sector elsewhere, despite never having been the major innovator itself, maybe very early before the 90s, Europe made a contribution to some of the foundational research that, of course, American companies are very good at extending and commercializing. It seems that consumers have pocketed the welfare nonetheless by low prices for like tech goods and services. And that's despite the fact that US tech companies are pretty decently entrenched, you know, modes in Europe, legally entrenched ones. And I think with AI, it's going to be much the same. That's my impression, at least.
I think it's probably true that Europe will not be able to create a frontier model anytime soon. I think it's a good case that I shouldn't try to do so. And that it should instead focus on this issue of sovereignty of being not being dependent on either the US or China for its tech stack, which it currently is very much. And on focusing on whatever actually suits the business needs of most European corporates, my impression, talking with people who are in this field, or who regulate AI at the European level, in their opinion, you know, near frontier models like Mistral are totally fine for the vast majority of business meets of most European firms.
I think the fact, of course, that the fact that Mistral is launching models with a Chinese chassis, so it basically would be the weights of a Chinese model, because you're going to have the computers to actually train their own weights. Raises also have other dependencies, I suppose. But so far, I'm pretty sanguine on Europe when it comes to the AI race. So if Europe has gained from a lot of technological developments in recent years, why all the hand-wringing over competitiveness? And when you see something like Draghi's competitiveness report, which I think came out what?
Two? Twenty-two? Twenty-two? Twenty-three? Twenty-four?
Twenty-four? Okay. It shows you how much has happened since then. But when something like that comes out, like, what is the basis for the existential angst, I guess? Yeah, I mean, in a way, that was the last sort of...
It was one strand of a set of arguments that was pretty much the... That were quite similar. They're all about, you know, in relative terms, Europe is falling behind, and it's losing a competitiveness race versus the US. Jamie Diamond has been making these remarks frequently, saying, he came to Europe last year in a couple of months this year as well. You're losing because European GDP was 90% of US, 10-15 years ago, now it's 70% and this is not good.
Now, there are a couple of reasons to assume that it doesn't really matter if that were true, because, as I said, it's a very produced, centric view of competitiveness and also of welfare, because the debate is kind of relating competitiveness to future welfare, saying if you're going to fall behind on competitiveness, and we define competitiveness by output or output per hour, and otherwise, labor for activity, your living standards are going to go down in material terms relative to the US, and you're not going to be able to maintain your social model. That's the main part of the Draghi Report. My understanding that there's a different case for why Europe may not be doing well, economically, in its own terms, but even if you accept that this is a relative to Klein is relevant, I think there's a problem with the data.
So the Draghi Report was published in November 2024, I believe, as commissioned by the European Commission, obviously, or by the Hero of the Year of Crisis for me, the President's President, Draghi, is also distinguished economists, overrights. It argues a lot of things that I think I agree with and that many other people would agree with, that Europe has to remove internal barriers to trade and the movement of capital and credits. It has to try to get capital investment up at quite a very low level to the US in particular, and it's falling behind in the tech sector in particular. So Draghi, this obviously written well into the AI boom, Draghi is ever such in the tech sector as the main driver of the American Proxivity Advantage.
It's just the question of how big an advantage really is, and I think that the centerpiece of the report is this notion that the Proxivity ratio, so GDP per hour in PPP terms, has gone from 97% to 70% to 85%, depending on how you measure it, since 1995, when the read of the tech boom in the US begins. And that implies a downward trend, a very sharp downward trend, and that it will continue if Europe doesn't do X, Y, and Z. I think that's where the problem lies because it's, I think there's really a lot of evidence to actually suggest that true really, even if you accept that Europe might have not been off-grown as much as the US in recent years.
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Ask radio to join the conversation right here on Bloomberg Radio. Well, why don't you explain what you see as the issue with the data then? The core disagreement. So okay, total GDP in dollar terms was 90%. Now it's at 75% or 80%.
That sounds like decline. It sounds like, quote, falling behind unquote. That sounds alarming. I can understand why Draghi wouldn't like to see that trend. Why?
What's the other spin on the same numbers? Or why do you think that's not the complete story? So I think you can definitely make, I mean, there's a fundamental difficulty with comparing economies. If you think that's important to organize your policy efforts around, you might want to have you want to compare yourself to your economies. And you can do that statically.
So every given year you can compare yourself or as a ratio. So what is the US, the share of global GDP? It was Europe, Chef, don't you do P. But the specific statements that people make, Jamie, Diamond, everyone else, Draghi, you're also quite online. So you know that this is a constant theme online as well, is there's a trend, there's a level trend over time.
And the problem is that because economies are very different, because they measure economic activity quite differently, we can't actually say anything about levels over time. So just to get to the actual sort of the beef, which is the PVP adjustment of the GDP figures, you can't obviously just look at nominal GDP and exchange rates, like Diamond does, for instance, because all you're measuring is how the dollar is fluctuated over time, right? It doesn't do with real output or anything. So you need to control for the exchange rate fluctuations. And you control for things like the difference in working hours between the US and Europe, which are institutional, they're political choices about how you want to utilize some labor inputs, how you want to trade productivity gains for later time.
The US doesn't have any statutory limitations in working hours, and Europe has consistently decided to work less, but has remained employed at the same rates, basically. So it's totally a choice to try to work less. And if you're just working hours, and if you're just for the relative price level, which is what purchasing power parity should do, so in other words, what does a French euro, how many French euros do you need to buy a dollar worth of consumption, basically? You construct a body that will bank, and you have a comparison that allows you to compare price levels across time, in theory at least.
The problem is with the drug either measure, which is a frighteningly common measure, but I think it's a well documented to be the wrong measure, and it does so by fixing prices at a given year. So basically it's measured in the drug report in 2010 dollars. So PPS are expressed as in international dollars, which is synthetic currency that has the same purchasing power as the US dollar, and it's benchmark to a PPP year in which people have gone around and collected prices in different countries and created these ratios that are consistent with each other. But if you fix a certain year, you have to use something to extrapolate between these different benchmarks, and the drug measure uses the real growth measures, that's the national accounts produced in the US and the European countries.
What happens as a result is that you get this upward trend, but that shows as a climb over time, that you don't see in PPP measures that don't use the national accounts, real growth rates, but they use relative inflation ratio. So how has the inflation ratio and inflation rates, how have they compared to the US inflation rates in Europe? And the problem is that we calculate those real rates differently. So in the US, what the BBA does more aggressively than the European offices for economic analysis is that they adjust prices, particularly in the tech sector, this was very relevant for drug is particular arguments, much more aggressively for improvements in quality.
So if the computers on the MacBook for instance, sells at the same or a similar normal price, even though the specs are much better, that's measured as a decline in the quality adjusted price. So the same amount of nominal spending on tech services on goods shows up as more real growth in the US than in the EU, because applying that deflator more aggressively means that inflation in that sector is lower, so real growth is higher. At that point of mind, we don't know exactly how much of these are buying around 2.3% annually according to some studies, but over time, it compounds every year, and that creates this wedge between the EU and the US, and that is a recent theory to a large part, you should simply be method different as well than actual economic underlying productivity growth.
And that's I think the main issue. And then from there on, I think the other issue is, well, should we then look at the economy in purchasing car terms at all, or should we look at it purely in real growth terms? And that's a whole different discussion all together. I think when discussion has been going between Paul Krugman and some European economists who are trying to argue between each other over whether we should reform and become a bit more likely US, which would result in loosening labor regulations, cutting welfare spending, and of course, making it easier for tech startups and so on to spend and invest in everything. Wait, can you say a little bit more about political choices here?
Because it does strike me when we make these comparisons, that it often feels very apples to oranges. And if as you say, the US is choosing, basically to work more and European countries are choosing to use productivity gains so that they can go enjoy an extra glass of wine to redeploy that cliche or whatever at lunch time, then it might make sense to focus on real growth and output for the US and something else for Europe. So how do you incorporate political economy differences when it comes to these different stats? What the GDP discussion ends up as I think is, do you think the GDP is a more reliable than real growth measures for measuring the relative performance over time?
And it depends on whether you think these differences in deflators between countries are actually that severe and why they actually occur. But you can of course, and we end up, by the way, with the notion that we don't have a good measure to compare trends over time. So whatever your judgment call is, the thing that's presented as a robust stylized fact in the Drag Race Report, but also by Diamond and other people, is simply not a thing. It's not established by any sort of solid economic data. What we can do is we can use PPPs in current prices to compare levels snapshots.
So we can say in the year 2024, what is GDP per hour? Pretty much just it in the EU and in the US. That comparison, I think, puts the US slightly above the US and European aggregates. I also show that if you actually then exclude the top 10% of the income distribution that advantage goes away entirely. So the US is slightly richer in aggregates, but not at least on this measure, but not quite as at the level of Germany some of the lower countries and Nordic countries.
But it's very top-heavy. And indeed, the bottom half is actually significantly worse off than any single European country but for Portugal. Now, we can say, well, this was the principal output measure in my view comparatively, but we can say, maybe people care about income, money in the back. And politically, it's so different that people don't care about digital time that much, and people are fine living in a more top-heavy society. How much money do the US individuals and households actually have?
Because consumption is a large part of what we can define as material well-being. So I think it makes sense to look at consumption, in particular, what's called actual individual consumption, which I think it better measure than income because income is hard to compare as well, it's measured differently, but also actual individual consumption includes, in-kind, benefits and includes the benefits of publicly provided health care and so on and so forth. So it should control for these political differences that you were hinting at. The fact that in Europe, there are sizable welfare states and greater, larger protections and greater amount of public good provision.
If you adjust that for working hours, the US is pretty unremarkable. And what you also have to do, because of these political differences, that you have to look at the way these consumption figures are distorted by some of the things that the US has contributed to. I choose, I think, health care as an example and writing about this because it is quite unusual if the only advanced country that doesn't have a publicly funded system, despite it being very well established for many, many years. By American economists, that actual aerial insurance of private insurance doesn't work for healthcare for various reasons and you end up very high costs. And poor provisions and indeed the US spends much more on healthcare.
Both as it spends, I think, much more with the fiber system, at least as a share of GDP than most other European countries. It's a function of having this private system that costs the great deal and still doesn't provide the same kind of coverage or quality. It's, I think, quite useful to look at empirically how healthcare spending actually compares to other OECD countries over time. And one model that I run myself on this is that the US spends around 50% more on healthcare per person than you would expect, relative to what advanced countries actually spend on healthcare, what their consumption implies in other words.
So the level of consumption that you have, how rich you are in other words, predicts a certain amount of spending. But the US residual, say, the difference is 50% higher. And in total, the results in around between $1.7 and $1.9 trillion a year that are spent in excess of what happen, what you would expect of a country at that income level. And the difference is, I think this goes back to these critical economy differences. The reason is prices, really, and the fact which is well established by people like the Uvarinha, the great Princeton professor and health economist, that the US price of per unit of care is much higher.
And utilization is very, very poor. And I'll cover generally worse if you look at average life expectancy and mortality rate for certain procedures. So this is part of this political economy which is more dominated by rent extraction and middlemen. So prices are high in the healthcare sector because you have hospitals, insurers, these trade associations that can take a cut, administrative costs, and all these things which make a large part of the income distribution at the top 10% or 20% very wealthy. But the trade is enormous costs for much of the rest of the population, especially those uninsured, which I think $27 million by some accounting.
And even those who are insured by the employees have large out-of-pocket costs. And the headline is, well, some people object to using purchasing power powerities to actually adjust output figures and indeed income figures, because they say, well, it's kind of hiding something that makes the, that is actually a sign of strength. In other words, they assume that the reason why costs in the non-tradeable sector like Health Care are very high is because, well, you have this very powerful productivity growth in the tech sector and elsewhere and very high incomes. And people are sort of wage arbitriding themselves into the non-tradeable sector and it's their high incomes that are inflating those prices in healthcare, legal services, education, whatever.
That assumes that these prices are not a function of rent seeking, which unfortunately I think the preponderance of the evidence shows they are. Yeah, Joe, I keep thinking back to the episode we did recently with the authors of, was it Main Street Millionaires? And if you looked at their list of top earning professions in the US, how much of that was an industry like healthcare or legal services that you could tie either directly to rent extraction or some form of regulatory capture, where for instance, a dealer has the rights to a particular locality or something like that. On some level, when I think about how crazy our health and healthcare system and health insurance system is, I'm even more impressed by the rest of the US economy that we have this big, what's the...
We've succeeded despite a couple of years. Yeah, the Elbert Rosser on our neck, healthcare and still we do okay, it actually kind of makes me impressed. So, let's go back to the cliche about the long lunches with wine because I actually think this is, it's a joke, but it's also real. So the diamonds of the world, et cetera, and they say, you got to stop with the long lunches and work hours. And then the dominance of the world say, no, we're just as productive, we're very close to as productive as you and we enjoy life and leak and that productivity into more leisure, which is arguably what the whole point is, et cetera.
But then the counter would be like, that's just cope. And in the sense that, yeah, I know people who live a leisure life and stuff in Europe and they take nice long August vacations, et cetera, but I'm only getting access to an elite slice because I work in media and journalism and finance and I don't really have a good look into like the broad European middle and lower classes, et cetera. Is there like, in your view, does it diffuse? Like this thing, I know it from my elite contacts, like you and elsewhere in Europe, but can we substantially say that the broad European middle class does in fact have, you know, substantially more leisure and time than the counterparts here?
Yeah, I mean, there are some aspects here. So, especially in countries like Spain and Italy, there are a lot of informal hours that are not captured by the headline figures. There are adjusted series for that, but my own crunching with numbers doesn't make that much of a difference. For the bulk of the European economy, the richer parts of the European economy, so the central Europe, the lowlands, low countries, the lower countries, they do work much, much less. And if indeed it meant that Europeans were employed at lower rates, it would be concerning and it would probably point to the fact that this is a labor market failure and people might not be able to work or they're not working because they're getting diminishing returns.
But there's, again, there's good empirical evidence, including by people who co-authored the long run productivity figures that go into the drug report that show, well, actually, it's sort of a substitution effect, but productivity is causing hours to go down and hours going down is actually increasing productivity. So it's not really, it's not evidence to think that, so first of all, it is real. People do work less and it's not reason to think that that's a sign of dysfunction underlying it. I think I would also say it's kind of become one-on-one. So labor is a disutivity and it's precisely that because the value of the time is greater than nil.
If you assume those are sort of contributing to a very basic macro principles. I know what I should say is that there's good reason to suggest that the Western Europe is probably more wealthy than the US in the aggregates, even if it has probably declined relatively over the last six, seven years, and I do think there's robust evidence to show that. But of course, internally, there are huge differences. I think we should care that Europe in its own terms has been doing incredibly poorly over the last 10, 15 years, but that's due to policy choices, especially macro policy, which the US does comparatively very well. And of course, there are internal differences.
We should care that the Italian south is extraordinarily poor. It has been declining in absolute terms, when the entire economy has been staggering for 20 years, unique in the G7 economies. But we shouldn't care, for instance, that Michigan, in the US, we shouldn't be, you wouldn't care that Michigan has been outgrown by California for 20 years, even if Michigan has been doing well and it's been diversifying its economy. And I think that is, I think, the main takeaway between when comparing the EU as an aggregate to the US. Like, we have our own problems.
That the relative picture shouldn't matter that much. I don't think. There's a lot of work to be done, but it needs to actually mean becoming one of the US, which may not be politically a minute or two most people here. But you can't really simulate online shopping without the cost.
So you can buy items, but they're never going to arrive. Yeah, it wants you to feel good. Feel the car, it makes you feel good. The blue part this weekend, podcasts subscribe today on Apple Spotify or wherever you listen. Do political choices or concerns slash incentives start to change in our current era, though such that maybe it was acceptable that Europe didn't have to be on the front line of technological advancements, making its own frontier models or, you know, making massive productivity gains in the same way as China or the US.
But now that there's renewed security concerns in the region, now that we've had years and years of worries about resource allocation and choke points in the global economy, that actually, if you really want to re-industrialize, if you want to build some sort of resource security, if you want to build up your defense industry, that actually, economic growth starts to matter and strategic tech development starts to matter in the same way. So I mean, one thing, I mean, just to make one of the things clear, economic growth matters, I mean, even advanced countries in the long term. Yeah, I realize this as I said that, I shouldn't have said economic growth, but the idea of, I guess, relative gains start to matter. Yeah, I think I do matter. Not necessarily on output, but obviously there are relative shifts in Europe's competitive position that have a consequence for employment and long-term productivity prospects.
And the US is, of course, it has a sectoral advantage in tech in other places, far more, for instance. But really, the US, I think, is stronger in, you know, manufacturing, your merchandise trade. And unlike the US, it's the biggest economic block that's still open to the world economy, because it hasn't been a real tariff institute and so far. And that, I think, opens up the question of how is Europe doing competitively with regard to China. And we talked about AI. People in the Europe US discussion have sort of shifted the
goalposts a few times by saying, well, I forget about PPP, I forget about real growth then. Whatever, even if there hasn't been any decline relatively so far, Europe is sort of renting the future and will miss out on the big capital expenditure generating technology of a day, which is a genitive AI in these different models. Again, I don't think that the sort of near frontier models are really bad, that they can serve as most of the needs of European corporates. But I don't think that there is a competitive race specifically in the area of AI.
But I think that in legacy manufacturing sectors and other high-tech manufacturing sectors, there is, of course, and it is still a large part of value added in Europe, particularly in countries like Germany, of course, which is a lot of chunk of European GP and which is currently experiencing, I think it's fair to say, what looks like a disorderly decline in industrial employment. So the first China shop, so to say, was positive for Germany, but it was the provider of high-tech manufacturing goods for China and it benefited from Chinese demand in other European countries. This has flipped entirely. China has moved up in value chain while remaining in other parts of the manufacturing value chain. I should also mention that IP transfer, legal or otherwise, to China is by far the greatest from Germany. And the fact that the industrial heartland
with the central Europe still is declining at this rate because it's still exposed to China and China, I should also mention, is undergoing domestic inflation, particularly export price inflation for the export bubble. So after the housing bubble burst, it has intensified this network of subsidies for the manufacturing sector. It's experiencing its own dislocations domestically on behalf of the economy or third of the labor force works in the economy. It's weakening domestically, demand for cars and other manufacturing products is going down or trending down. And it's become quite reliant on net exports for annual GDP growth, a friend of mine and I think for sure, I think Brad Sethsler has done great work on sketching out the empirical position here both in terms of what's going on in China domestically, so that more than half of GDP growth might depend on net exports and know what the effects in Europe are. And it does seem that according to my own work,
Germany alone has shed over a million jobs in the manufacturing sector since 2021. So since we see that big shift in Chinese industrial policy, of course, it coincides with the energy crisis and that hits very hard too, because there's a different discussion, but European energy policy is appalling for many reasons and has damaged its its own prospects quite a bit. But I should say that these employment figures are also actually understated the extent of the shock because if you look at the chemical industry you mentioned earlier, Joe, which is one of the crown jeweled of the German industrial sector, among the biggest big five sectors employment has fallen the least there, even though it's most exposed to both the energy crisis and Chinese trade, I looked into it myself, we don't have a Chinese trade number for volume to then publish the appropriate pricing disease, but it seems that trade values for chemical exports have been sharply down in both Germany and China, while trade volumes for chemical companies have been sharply up from China. And of course down from
Germany and it corresponds also to the main export destinations of Germany. So China is exporting more to those destinations. Germany is exporting less to them, whereas Chinese imports from Germany and Europe are sharply down, exports to its sharply up in many other sectors as well. And in that sector employment has been studied but only because of labour market is so dysfunctional, so because the labour hoarding can't find qualified employees. So ingredients are sort of masking the extent of all of this and this has led to some pretty sharp divisions within Europe about how to respond to China and what will happen, especially off of the US. I think actually sought this confrontation
with China over trade and I think quite thoroughly had to concede defeat last year. Let's talk about like, okay, I don't know if you just talked to random trade ministers in Europe today about the global trade picture, maybe the optimal degree of openness, etc. What are they saying in September 26th that they, you know, versus what they would have been saying and say September 2016 or maybe or maybe maybe we should say September 27th or September 2017, since by that point, Trump had already been the president and sharply sort of changed the global conversation appalling to Europe in many ways. But how have they all become either a little bit more Trumpish or who is the guy that wrote Death by China, the, the economist Peter Navarro? This is the thing that's crazy. So Peter Navarro years ago writes Death by China and then 2016 and it was like, oh, he's a crank,
he can't be anywhere near the White House. And now I feel like everyone is a Navarroist on some level it feels to me like complete Peter Navarro victory in that there's so much consensus is basically, yes, this sort of his Death by China narrative. Maybe they put a little bit more spin on it to make it sound more, you know, more professional, but it feels like in both Europe and the US, everyone has become a Navarroist. Yeah, I mean, I think you could actually even say that the fact that this door was opened by Trump and his advisors first, it became politically a bit unpalatable for the people. So the actual evidence of the effects of China, the worsening of China's mercantilist turn in late 2010s and 2020s was ignored for a while because it was associated with them a different political camp. To put it, yeah, that's one way to put it, yeah.
I just had to put the Europeans also very much stuck in the past when it comes to thinking about trade. So so the US policy sector is much more open to changes in ideas, but in Europe, another friend, I think also a recent former guest on your show is Adam too, is the Europeans are the Taliban of neoliberalism, at least with regard to their attitudes towards trade and that has certainly inflicted their position on China. And it's one of the reasons why they took so long in actually doing something about this. A couple of my friends, Brad Setzer, whom you know, of course, and Todawa have, I think almost single-handedly responsible for pushing that consensus over the last 18 months, at least in Germany and elsewhere, towards getting people to recognize that. This is a problem, by the way, no, you can't hang on. It's too late to hang on to visions of, you know,
level playing fields in international trade. You have to do something before that gets out of control and it has, it has, it's now showing to have real political consequences in Germany, electorally, with regard to these regional elections in which the far right is doing very well in these elections. And the incumbents are going to go very poorly, because the far right has managed to frame the issue of industrial decline, not really around China, but around a failure of the incumbents and the failure of, you know, green policies and energy policy, which play a role certainly, but there's evidence to believe that this is mostly driven by the external trade shock at the moment. So people are doing something now. You may not be surprised to know that nothing really has happened, despite their being a lot of noise. So the main, the main, the core of the European efforts to counter
Chinese trade is the so-called industrial accelerator act, which is proposed, earlier this year, it's currently in review and it's, it might be implemented earlier, mid-late next year, that shows you how long the timelines are in Europe as well. It's suffering from internal division, so there was the more protectionist camp around France and initially more skeptical around Germany, because Germany is obviously, is also, you know, there's a lot of exporter interest in Germany that are opposed to any sort of trade restrictions, but they're quite conservative around these issues. They're also, internal divisions like the labor unions in Germany also don't disagree on these things. And of course, the problem with European politics, as opposed to the US and particularly China, is that it has this terrible sort of joint decision trap where domestically there are these aggregation problems where you have internal coalitions and of course at the European intergovernmental level, you have 27 countries that all sort of hate each other, but we'll have different, different veto powers and you operate in the situation where you have to have, sometimes you have to have unanimous voting or qualify majority voting and eventually you have a lot of consensus bargaining and you end up with very
sub-optimal policy outcomes that are often too little too late. The policy responses are slow, dysfunctional and even if they produce something, it regresses to the lowest common denominator. The Industrial Accelerator Act could have teeth that it has these by Europe provisions, it has certain provisions on, but essentially as formulated only, not in name, but they only really, only China clears those hurdles in terms of what exports are, imports are actually allowed, that's the idea that's the attempt to actually protect the German and the European order market in particular. Some people say it doesn't have enough scope, but China of course has immediately gone the offensive on this matter, immediately filed a request that a file that can complain with the European Commission. Very interestingly, actually outlining their own position saying our capacity utilization rate domestically is normal for economies that are still growing and that are not yet adjusting to being driven by internal demand. There's sort of concessions
that these imbalances domestically in China are real and I've seen as a real problem by Chinese authorities and I do agree with that and I think that it's a political economy obstacle for Chinese policy makers to do something about this. To sort of lower the temperature a bit, there's a separate mechanism in Europe called the trade and investment consultation mechanism, it's between the European trade chief, a chief and the corresponding minister in China. It's supposed to deliver, or supposed to deliver something now, ish, so I think in early October there's going to be a meeting in Beijing, nothing concrete has come of it really, apart from some assurances around rare earths which are quite vague and European something but unhappy about it and there's some sort of Franco-German thing about monitoring these imbalances. Nothing much has happened, my worry is that either the, because there's a separate part about the foreign exchange mechanism, so perhaps that rat setter again and how it's written about is really a separate issue that China
in addition to industrial policy is also really resisting any appreciation of the yuan and there's further contributing to the imbalances. The Europeans are also slowly thinking about countering China on revaluation. My theory is that strategically their their escalation, their willingness to escalate might outrun their ability to actually be resilient to Chinese responses, retaliations to whatever they end up doing and the Chinese have shown that they're, unlike the very dysfunctional European process that I just outlined, their retaliation has been institutionalized, rapid, really extensive and increasingly comprehensive. So for instance, I think in late July, the commission of the Europeans placed a few more Chinese entities in the sanctions list because they were supporting the Russian war efforts, but they asked for the Chinese response by immediately putting a whole bunch of major European industrial firms on the same
equivalent entities that they have and we don't have that kind of ability to respond. I think a likely scenario is that the EU does something eventually next year that's because of these problems in finding decisions will be too little, that we actually do something about the situation and that the Chinese will respond with some sort of concession because I think it's clear that because indeed they are dependent on export growth and the user of the very big markets or the only big market open at that moment, but as a concession will not be, will not pre-change the momentum behind the shift in industrial activity, but that the EU will accept it because it can't actually find a consensus at home for anything else they propose and that probably will not really change anything about this and that's the thing the best scenario, the worst scenario is a full-on trade war. Dominic, we could go on for a very long time.
We could talk a lot more about the 27 governments that all hate each other, we talk about how Eastern Europe and probably different perspectives than Central Europe and so forth, but that was fantastic overview. Really appreciate you coming on Odd Lots and let's do it again sometime. Thanks so much for having me, guys. It was a pleasure. Tracy, I thought it was really interesting conversation. You don't
really get, I thought it's cliche nuance, actual nuance that there is a lot of aspects of the conversation that are misunderstood or something like that. I feel like I actually learned something in that conversation. I like the line, the value of my leisure is above zero, because mine certainly is. But once you start framing it that way, then the set of economic choices that are being made start to look exceedingly different. I totally think that. If you actually take that idea seriously,
then that's really good. That's sort of the goal. We want to have high productivity or we want to have wealth so that we can enjoy life. It's kind of crazy how that's a good choice. What are we doing here? What's the point of all this? This brings me to a question I've been asking everyone when we
were out in LA and I'm sure, actually you're going to San Francisco soon. What exactly, there's going to be this huge wave of money hitting San Francisco, thanks to all these IPOs that are being found, just like general stock market points. What is everyone doing with that money? I get that they buy nice houses and maybe a nice car, but other than that, what's their decision? People who are in that are just going to, they're not going to do anything with their money. They're just going to
keep like, staying up on Chashibee P.T. Vibecoating, it's like it's still 3am or working. They're just talking about, oh, I'm working more than ever. It's a sort of, we need to coin a new paradox or something like that. But I do think, one thing I will say is a lot of this depends on your world view. Like your very deep, basic world view. And I think there is, you can argue that like,
okay, Europe has come up with this social welfare system where leisure is valued above zero, all of that in an era of absolute trade gains and in an era of neoliberalism. And I must say, only Adam twos could get away with. Yeah, that's Alabama neoliberalism. But now maybe things are changing and maybe priorities start to change too. And that I think is like an actual real vulnerability for some of the arguments being made here. Totally. And I think it'll be an interesting
sort of chapter for the history books. Yeah. If like, okay, there are these industrial giants in Europe that are core to wealth and the ability to have a welfare state, etc. And it turns out that they like sort of got obliterated by sort of open trade. And the reason they got obliterated is because everyone refused to recognize the competitive pressure because Donald Trump was the first person to really talk about it. And it was too much to stomach that to be on the same side of a sort of
perspective as Donald Trump. And therefore, like that would be a, you know, that's a good, that's a whole book. It's not just a chapter. It's a whole book. Trump was not the first person to talk about it.
Yeah. Okay. Yeah. In a very serious way. He knew the fight for sure. Yeah. All right. Shall we leave it there?
Let's leave it there. This has been another episode of the Oddlots podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway and I'm Joe Wysenthal. You can follow me at the stalwart.
Follow our guest Dominic Leister at New Left Evues. Follow our producers. Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Armin. Dash Obenet at Dashbot. Kale Brooks and Kale Brooks and Kevin Lozano at Kevin Lloyd Lozano.
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