What is it like to be a bat?

In this episode we discuss Thomas Nagel’s classic article “What is it like to be a bat?” in order to delve further into the question of reducing or naturalizing conscious experience by objective physical explanation. Nagel, like Chalmers, argues that phenomenality cannot adequately be accounted for by physical theory, though he remains open (at this point in his career, at least) to the possibility of an ‘objective phenomenology’ which might take care of the issue. Joshua and Jameson agree that Nagel makes a strong fundamental point, though they question his optimism about the prospects that physicalism might successfully reduce consciousness. Moreover, the notion of an objectivity which fully transcends the ‘human point of view’ is called into question. Jameson suggests that what Nagel really needs is not an ‘objective phenomenology’ which satisfies the criteria of a ‘view from nowhere’ but a transcendental phenomenology which might actually fulfill the task of accounting for the ‘objective’ structures at play in the conscious mind. In layman’s terms: Nagel asks, isn’t there something unique and somehow beyond description in seeing a beautiful sunset, tasting a sour lemon, or feeling bored with playing Monopoly? Explaining the motion of the sun vis à vis the earth, the chemical reactions of taste, and the rules of the game does not capture those experiences—in principle! We need to recognize the apparently intractable problem of grasping that unique ‘what it’s like’ inherent to conscious experience and fundamental to mind. And, in case there were any doubt, the ‘bat’ in question is the mammal not the bludgeon! This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit integralwordspodcast.substack.com