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What We Got Right — and Wrong — in ‘Abundance’ episode artwork

Apr 28, 2026 2 hr 3 min

What We Got Right — and Wrong — in ‘Abundance’

from The Ezra Klein Show Hosted by New York Times Opinion

“Abundance” came out a little over a year ago. It’s been exciting — and a little disorienting — seeing how it’s rippled out into the world, and the ways it’s been embraced and debated and critiqued. So I wanted to take a moment to talk through what’s really happened in the last year – with Derek Thompson, my “Abundance” co-author, and Marc Dunkelman, whose book “Why Nothing Works” came out around the same time, and circles the same ideas. What has the abundance movement actually achieved in the last year? Where has it fallen short? And what have the three of us learned from our critics? Mentioned: Ezra is moderating a forum on housing and affordability with some of the top California gubernatorial candidates. The event is on Friday, May 8, in Oakland, CA. You can buy tickets here. Abundance by Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson Why Nothing Works by Marc J. Dunkelman Derek Thompson’s Substack The Power Elite by C. Wright Mills The Power Broker by Robert A. Caro “The Most Expensive Mile of Subway Track on Earth” by Brian M. Rosenthal “Why Are Palantir and OpenAI Scared of Alex Bores?” by The Ezra Klein Show “The Anti-Social Century” by Derek Thompson Bowling Alone by Robert D. Putnam The Permanent Problem by Brink Lindsey “Bernie Sanders: ‘There Ain’t Much of a Democratic Party” by Bernie Sanders and David Leonhardt Book Recommendations: Making a New Deal by Lizabeth Cohen Stuck by Yoni Appelbaum Cadillac Desert by Marc Reisner Mere Christianity by C. S. Lewis The Secret History by Donna Tartt Blood Meridian by Cormac McCarthy, Narrated by Richard Poe Thoughts? Guest suggestions? Email us at [email protected]. You can find transcripts (posted midday) and more episodes of “The Ezra Klein Show” at nytimes.com/ezra-klein-podcast, and you can find Ezra on Twitter @ezraklein. Book recommendations from all our guests are listed at https://www.nytimes.com/article/ezra-klein-show-book-recs. This episode of “The Ezra Klein Show” was produced by Annie Galvin. Fact-checking by Michelle Harris, with Annika Robbins and Kate Sinclair. Our senior engineer is Jeff Geld, with additional mixing by Isaac Jones and Aman Sahota. Our recording engineer is Aman Sahota. Our executive producer is Claire Gordon. The show’s production team also includes Marie Cascione, Rollin Hu, Kristin Lin, Emma Kehlbeck, Jack McCordick, Marina King and Jan Kobal. Original music by Pat McCusker. Audience strategy by Shannon Busta and Lauren Reddy. The director of New York Times Opinion Audio is Annie-Rose Strasser. And special thanks to Brianna Johnson. Subscribe today at nytimes.com/podcasts or on Apple Podcasts, Spotify and Amazon Music. You can also subscribe via your favorite podcast app here https://www.nytimes.com/activate-access/audio?source=podcatcher. For more podcasts and narrated articles, download The New York Times app at nytimes.com/app.

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What We Got Right — and Wrong — in ‘Abundance’

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Hi, I'm Juliette from New York Times Games, and I'm here talking to fans about our games. So you plan your times games? Yes. Do you have a favorite?

Connections. H's Scratch is an H in my brain. It's the other box thinking with that game. I play with my husband every night.

I refuse to let him play it without me. He will always get the purple first. And I always get the fun ones that he doesn't think about. I love that it's like a real live connection.

Yes. While you guys play connections. Very sweet. I promise I didn't play that.

You can play on New York Times Games at nytimes.com slash games or on our app. We've got an announcement before we begin the show today. I am going to be hosting a forum on housing and affordability with some of the top California governance candidates on Friday, May 8th. We're going to discuss why housing in California, my beloved home state, is so damn expensive and what each candidate hopes to do about it.

The event is being co-hosted by the New York Times, Housing Action Coalition and the Turnover Housing Innovation at UC Berkeley and the San Francisco Foundation. Tickets are on sale now, so get them while they're available. We'll include a link and a promo code in the show notes. It's been a little over year since Dar Thompson and I published the book of Bundets.

Now the book didn't begin, but I think of his abundance movement. But it did mark a kind of kick off of the idea as a both an object in the discourse, something people are fighting over and creating factional wars over. And actually something politicians are claiming and trying to think through how they turn into policy. Actually being part of this has been a bit of a wild ride on a bunch of levels.

It has created fights. I didn't expect opportunities. I didn't expect a very weird experience. But I've been really wanting to come back to abundance.

Been a little distracted from it by the million things Donald Trump is doing. But if this is to become something more than a synonym for efficiency, if it's to become part of a vision for a better world, I think there's some success to build on, but a whole lot more that actually needs to be done. So when I found some other folks from within this intellectual hot house to talk through what has happened, what we've learned from the arguments, the critiques, the coalitions that are forming and fracturing, and what we think needs to happen next. Derek Thompson is a contributing writer at the Atlantic, his course, co-author of abundance and the author of a great sub stack newsletter under his name.

Mark Dokkerman is a fellow at the Searchlight Institute and at Brown University. And the author of the book that came out around the same time, Why Nothing Works, which is about some very similar ideas with a much more historical perspective. So I'm going to add them on together to sort of talk through what we've seen and what we think is coming. There's always my email at mytime.com.

Mark Dokkerman, Derek Thompson, welcome to the show. It's good to be here. Throat to be here, yeah? So our books came out a little more than a year ago.

Congratulations, everybody. But just at the high level, where's your pet at? What are you feeling good about? What are you feeling worried about a year?

And Derek, start with you. So maybe one way to think about the reaction to the fallout of abundance is to think about its impact at three different levels, the level of vibes, the level of legislation, and the level of outcomes. At the level of vibes, this is a 0.1 percentile outcome given where I was March 1st or 2025, the degree to which the concept of abundance has reached something like full penetration of the political discourse, certainly the discourse of the Democratic Party. You look at the fact that governors, Kathy Hochl, J.D.

Pritzker are talking about how their solutions to the energy crisis and housing crisis must begin with a supply side policy. That tells me that this is not just a word that's being banded about. It's a concept. Look at problems.

Solve them on the supply side that is being actively talked about at the level of governors, at the level of Congress, at the level of the Senate. So when I'm Donnie has called out the concept of abundance and has paired his policy of rent freezes with the policy of helping developers build a New York City, so that's the level of vibes. I think it's clearly entered this level of memetic strength that is far beyond my wireless streams of 13 months ago. At the level of legislation, I'd say it's like a BB+, one bill that Gavin Newsom signed is literally called Abundant and Affordable Homes, near Transit Act.

Abundant is right there in the first word. There's legislation passed around the country that also has tried many times explicitly citing abundance to make it easier to build housing and easier to build clean energy. But then I think where the strongest criticism of our movement has to begin is that the level of outcomes. California should be commended for the law that is signed in the work that folks like Scott Wiener and Buffy Wicks have done to advance the concept of abundance in that state.

But if you have them as fortune of going to say Fred, the St. Louis data website and looking up housing starts in California between say 2021 and 2026, you do not see the publication of the book Abundants by Estercline and Derek Thompson in those statistics. It's even more worth it than me. You look at 2015 to 2026.

You don't even see the Yimbi Movement. That is exactly right. And that's pretty concerning. We said in our book, Judge Political Movements, by their outcomes.

The bright side is maybe you could say it's too early to counter outcomes successes, but the very fair criticism of our movement right now is where are the outcomes, especially in states like California, where the volume of abundance has been the loudest. Mark? So I think I have a slightly more optimistic perspective. More optimistic than that.

That's pretty optimistic. My view is that your book and the associated effort to rethink progressive policy is sort of a remarkable change in the sense that from the beginning of the progressive movement in the late 1800s through the 1950s, basically the progressive answer to most public policy questions was put the government in charge and it will make enormous strides, centralized power, and we will bring power to the Tennessee Valley, to the Tennessee Valley Authority. We will remake the banking system through the Federal Reserve. We had a whole series of ideas that were grounded in this notion that we were going to have strong centralized power do big things.

And then beginning in sort of the late 50s and into the 60s, a different idea, which had been there at the beginning, but had really been sequestered by this sort of idea that big government could do big things, emerges. And there are books like See Right Mills's Power Elite, and then the SDS puts out the Port-Euron statement. And the core notion that they are beginning to seed inside the progressive movement is actually centralized power is bad, and we need to take on the core elite that has been making all these decisions. And the progressive movement becomes about speaking truth to power in almost every form.

And you see that in the reaction to the civil rights movement data, that speaking truth to the power of Jim Crow, you see it in Second Way Feminism, you see it in the objection to urban renewal, to the highway program, Silent Spring, ultimately the power broker, which is my book is sort of in conversation with the power broker. But in all of these, all of these are strikes against the old progressive way of, governing. It is to push power down, to empower little people who have been bulldozed in the proverbial sense and in the literal sense to be able to stand up against centralized power. And that by the mid-1970s is the, speaking truth to power is the central idea of the progressive movement.

I think what abundance has done for the first time really since then is to open up a conversation about whether we need to rethink that core notion of what progressivism is about. In the old notion, the sense was that we needed to, in all cases, put more oversight on government rather than letting it cook. And now I think we're beginning to say, many of us on the far left and in more moderate circles, like we need government to function just sort of generally. And I think that was not a conversation we were having 18 months ago in nearly the same way.

All right, so both of you are speaking more in the grand march to triumph, register here. So I'm going to come in with things I'm more worried about. So I probably agree with a lot of what you said, Derek, but at the level of vibes, abundance has been more factually controversial in the Democratic Party than I would have expected and was cut into it in ways that I wouldn't expect it. So it was setting off a big populist liberal fight.

And I think whether or not that fight is constructive and whether or not the synthesies that come out of it are constructive is unknown as of yet. My absolutely biggest worry, though, is not the critiques of abundance outside the tent, but a kind of small ballness that I see emerging inside the tent. That when I think about failure modes for what this could be and what it could be becoming, it's that abundance ends up as a synonym for efficiency. That we've rebranded an agenda for state capacity that it's just always here.

People like, I don't disagree with cutting red tape as if like all abundance is about cutting red tape, as opposed to an actual radical vision of plenitude. And I think something that neither of our books ended up doing all that well was really describing what that vision of the future would look like. You imagine a candidate running for the Democratic nomination in 2028 or running for the presidency in 2028. What are the ways that they describe what this abundant future is to look like?

Is it you're promising to build just five million houses? Does that mean anything to anybody? Is it a clean energy abundance, a concept that people can actually feel? How is that something people are excited about?

And then this goes to another thing that I think is going quite poorly actually. The back half of abundance is better than anyone. It's about trying to build a progressive politics of technology. And I think the way particularly AI conversation is gone.

And the often quite merited anger that is building at AI leaders and AI companies, I see that as actually farther away than I did in the beginning of 2025. So with all that on the table, our book begins with housing. I think housing is the place where we see the most legislative action, the most governors and politicians talking about it. A lot of the examples in the book from California, where I'm from, where I was when we wrote much of the book, the governor of California, Gavin Newsom is very much embraced the abundance critique.

And so I want to play this clip of Gavin Newsom on Jimmy Kimmel. It's California over-regulated because it feels like there are a lot of well-meaning laws, rules, etc. that get in the way of building your house, of opening a restaurant. I've experienced this myself.

What do we do about that? No, we need a liberalism that builds and we have to own that. And I'm very much part of this new nomenclature we call this abundance agenda. And we've got to reconcile that.

We've got to be more focused on time to delivery, not just rhetoric, not just what we're for. We've got to actually deliver and manifest it. That's why this year we did the most significant housing reforms in our state's history. We did something that hadn't been done in decades.

We tried to dress land-use reforms, what we call secret reforms. We weren't able to get it done. We finally were able to get it done this year in a meaningful way. But this is a meaningful topic for Democrats to recognize.

We have to deliver on big and bold things. Trump breaks things. Democrats need to build things. But we have to actually deliver on that promise.

Derek, what do you think we need to hear that? I definitely don't want to get the same answer to every question. But I hear the governor of California describing a legislative victory. In terms that literally quote our book, A Liberalism that builds abundance.

He's being asked questions by late night host that are basically like LLM summaries of our book. But then you look at the outcomes and California still hasn't actually increased housing starts in the, what is it now, six months since that bill was signed, nine months after the debate over that bill really began. That's not the fault of that legislation necessarily. You can think in a couple ways.

You can think one, that there's a set of problems that have accumulated in California over the last 50 years that have made it harder to build housing. And this is one important step to un-gunk that process. That's maybe that's an optimistic way to frame it. Another way to frame it is that legislation is not the only ingredient when it comes to housing construction.

We're in an environment with an elevated interest rate where Trump is waging war against legal and undocumented immigration, which is complicating the fact that I think 40% of construction workers in California are foreign born. So the labor supply of construction in California is scarce and therefore very expensive, also raising the cost of housing. And you look around the country and there just aren't a lot of housing construction triumphs at all for a variety of macroeconomic reasons. I care about outcomes.

We care about outcomes. And if California, Illinois, New York, they're going to pass laws that hold up abundance as the inspiration or motivation or philosophy of those laws. And then three months, six months, two years later, we still don't have the fruits of abundance. Whether it's building more housing, building more clean energy, I am worried that that speaks to a gap between what I call the legislation vibes and the outcomes.

Well, here is, I think, also another way of thinking about this. And I've become more sensitized to in the article publishing the book that I'd like to hear your thoughts on. So whether a housing project gets built can depend on a series of things, but I think you can often break it into three things when there is demand for it. So one is just legally, can you get the damn thing built?

Can you get the permits? Can you get the agreements? Can you get through if it's a big enough project, the city council or the planning board or whatever? And we focus a lot on that.

And I would say when I look around, that there's been at least the intellectual victory where there is something getting closer to a broad consensus that you should be able to build legally. That should be possible in places where we need housing. But then there's a question of can you finance the build? And then there's a question of how much does the build cost?

What is the cost of construction in terms of materials, in terms of labor, in terms of how much you're paying labor, in terms of what kind of thing you need to build? And I think a good critique of the book that I've heard is one we don't talk very much about financing. And one thing that's been hard is that even as a lot of yes and my backyard bills are passing, as you mentioned quickly, the financing environment has gotten much worse because interest rates went way up after the inflationary period. And the second is that cost of construction in a place like California is a very fraught topic because nobody wants to see wages go down.

There's a big deportation agenda happening under Donald Trump, which as you mentioned is making labor more expensive. But even as there's been a lot of victories on zoning and exempting things from environmental reviews, the financing side has gotten harder. I've definitely talked to mayors and others who say, look, I've got all these projects. I want to see go forward.

And we've made it possible for them to go forward, but the financing, the projects are not penciling out and we don't have an answer to it. Yeah, the framework that I developed for this, which I think is a critique of that first chapter of that housing chapter, is that to really understand housing in America, you need to understand a 50 year story, which is mostly about rules, a 20 year story, which is about business cycles, and a five year story, which is about the incredibly weird business cycle that has followed the pandemic. Chapter one of our book, The Housing Chapter, does, I think, a very good job explaining the 50 year story of how a set of zoning and permitting environmental legislation and rules that accumulated around the 1960s and 1970s has slowed housing construction across the country, but in particular, in blue cities and blue states where there is very, very hot demand. I think it did a good job of explaining that 50 year accumulation of rules.

But there's also the 20 year story, which is that after the great recession, the construction industry in this country was decimated, and that led to the 2010s, being the decade with the fewest houses built per capita of any decade on record. That's not just a rules story. That's a story about macroeconomics. It's a story about the fact that after the great recession, there just wasn't demand or available labor or companies sufficient to build the kind of housing that we would need in the 2020s.

And then what happened in the 2020s was just one piece of mayhem after another. You had a pandemic. You had inflation. You have now, I think, a scarcity of construction labor, which makes it more expensive to build in many places.

And so I do think that to really understand the problems that states that governors and mayors face when it comes to housing, you do have to understand that there is this kind of like Russian nesting doll of problems, 50 years of rules, 20 years of macroeconomic crisis, and then five years of macroeconomic and financing crisis. And that's really put us where we are. And so I agree. I think, like you, I'm picking up the criticisms that I heard about financing, but the fact that if you want to build this level, this level, you're going to be able to build this level.

You need to be obsessed with the question of how do we actually finance that construction? How especially do we make loans to developers at a time of high interest rates possible for them to keep up with the level of housing construction that you want? Those are really, really strong critiques. I think they click into the story that we were telling the 50 years story.

But I do think that it is fair to argue that our book missed that very important ingredient. Mark, there's also a question of power here, but I know you've been very focused on. So I'm going to keep California in the front of my mind here just because I know it very well, but very recently using clashes between governor Newsom and cities across California, because all these big bills are passing the state level. And then the cities are using all kinds of often fairly innovative approaches to just making them not work to drag in their feet.

This is a big conflict between Los Angeles and the state at the moment, but not only Los Angeles. And this is hard. The question of who should have the right to say yes and who should have the right to say no. And I think even within conversations among people on the left, there's like a lot of contrasting intuitions here for good reasons.

How do you think about this? Well, housing to my mind is sort of an outlier within the abundance agenda because unlike in linear infrastructure, transit lines, train lines, electrical transmission lines, the challenge here is to empower someone who owns a plot of land to build housing or more housing on it. And I say that because in this circumstance in the world of housing, the challenge is that the state wants more housing and the person that has purchased a plot of land wants to build housing, but the neighborhood doesn't. Right.

So you've got it's sort of a sandwich and it's the peanut butter and jelly that's coming up the works. And in this case, in the case of housing, like what Buffy Wicks and Scott Wiener have largely tried to do is to push power down to the homeowner, which feels good to us as progressives who want to speak truth to power. We don't like it when some oppressive force sitting above us tells us we can't do the thing that is good. And so empowering someone who lives near a transit stop who has an underutilized piece of land in a city that they can build a bunch of housing on it feels good to us.

And that's largely what's passed. It's pushing power down to land owners so that they can do more. And then you reach into these challenges of financing and whatnot. I have to say, in the scheme of things, you guys are journalists and I served a long time in politics.

The idea that a year later you'd have a bunch of more housing built because of a book is seems a little far fetched to me. I agree. But you know, I like to stand and you're holding yourself. Well, let me add one thing on that because I think the way to think about why you should worry about this is that it's not like the last year was the first time California or any of these states passed a bunch of housing bills.

They were bigger and they were cleaner in that way. But there has been a decade of housing bills being passed in California. Dozens and dozens of bills, including many that were framed to me as transformative. They just weren't.

And so to what you're saying, and as somebody's worked in politics, you've seen this and some of these covered legislation, I've seen it, I think there's a tendency to assume when a bill has passed, it's done. If you've been fighting for the bill and you know, you're, you know, finally we've got the duplex bill or whatever it is. Well, it's passed. Great news everybody.

We're going to get our duplexes. And often it doesn't work that way. A lot of things don't work in practice the way you think they would. And that implies to me, particularly on housing, that when you don't have enough consensus on the ground for something, it can be very, very hard to implement it because cities and neighborhoods and planning commissions and so on use a lot of different tools to block the projects in other ways.

I mean, the core question you're asking here, and I think we're all asking is who should decide what housing is built when and where, how should that decision making process work. And so when I wrote, why nothing works, sort of the big, aha moment I realized was that for a lot of progressivism history, our view was centralized that power in the hands of one person who will decide what is built. And that's how Levitowns were built. That's that's how Robert Moses built housing all over New York City.

That's how the establishment built housing for a long time. And then we switched horses, right? We decided we didn't like that model because in many cases it was abusive to people who lived in communities that were bulldozed or they were discriminatory or they were not sensitive to what was happening in the environment. We created over the course of 50 years, a whole series of laws that put new checks on those who would build housing.

And we're now beginning to try to dial back the number of veto points in the process. And you're right, it's been 10 years of small board changes and now I think more substantial changes. But I do think that you're going to see, you know, I'm from Rhode Island, we've got a bunch of more housing starts than we had. And that, like, I understand that it's not the immediate satisfaction of suddenly we have 5 million more units across the country, but it is like, it's a different discussion among progressives.

And that feels to me like a sea change. So something that I wrote about in our housing chapter was the anger in the 60s and the 70s that America was just getting uglier. The term tiktaki comes from, you know, the song about the housing in Dailie City, like, you know, not too far south from San Francisco. You had the accurate view that a lot of forests and rivers were being despoiled and the growth machine, government construction, all of it, the public launched to kind of faith in it.

Because instead of this building making their surroundings more livable and more beautiful, it just became the soulless, grage, you know, mixed use, anonymous, you know, construction. And so actually one thing that has been very, very badly underplayed here is the centrality of aesthetics and whether or not people want to build. I don't want to have this idea at all. At least I think it's incredibly underpowered as an explanation.

So the claim on the table seems to be that Americans in the 1950s and 1960s turned against the growth machine as you described it, primarily out of an aversion to the ugliness of the world. Ugliness is not the word that I would use. The word that I would use is environmental degradation. I mean, the environmentalist movement in the 1960s and 1970s was about the fact that people were dying from the air and dying from the water.

That's not a question of aesthetics. That's a question of health. If you want to understand why it's easy to build in Texas, but difficult to build in California, and all you have is the beauty explanation. Well, then you're essentially saying that continued building in Texas is made possible because Houston is so damn beautiful.

Houston is not so damn beautiful. The reason that's easy to build in Houston, I think, has very little to do with like the aesthetic perfection of downtown. Houston and much more to do with the fact that there's a system of customs and laws and a lack of zoning regulation that simply makes it easier to build up and to build out. Same goes to Dallas, same goes for Austin, same goes to San Antonio.

I want us to build beautifully. I want to build things that people love in part because I want the growth machine in the 21st century to have democratic approval such that we build houses. People love them. They want us to build more houses.

I think that's a flywheel we should hope for. But if you really want to understand why Petaluma stopped building in the 1970s, why you can't build in San Francisco, why it's so much harder to build in blue cities and blue states than Texas, I don't think the beauty argument or the beauty paradigm gets you very far. I think that is probably right. I, I and somebody's want to put beauty closer to the center of politics or at least say it is more important than to get a credit for in politics and also I don't think it explains why Austin builds homes and you know Los Angeles doesn't.

But actually hold that on Austin for a second because one fight that still felt fairly live when we were writing the book is does building housing lower rents. Right. There was an argument that because demand is always so high, you can build homes but doesn't do anything. It just allows more kind of wealthy people to move into them and you know, maybe it's even like building freeways where it increases so much demand that you know, you don't get any vast travel time.

You've done some reporting on Austin. That's been the kind of hell of a story over the past year or two. What have we seen there? What have we seen essentially is that Austin built an enormous number of homes in 2010s and early 2020s and average rents have gone down down over the last 18 to 24 months.

Austin is like the canonical story here, but the story that I find more impressive in a way is Dallas, Texas. Dallas, Texas between 2019 and the early 2020s added a population equivalent to the size of urban Boston hundreds of thousands of people moved into the Dallas Metro. And if Dallas were like Los Angeles and San Francisco, the average price of a home in Dallas, Texas right now would be around $3 billion. But that's not what happened.

Yeah, it would be so absurdly high. You wouldn't have to calculate it like Bitcoin. But what happened instead housing prices in Dallas have actually declined over the last two and a half years. Dallas built so much that construction increased per capita throughout this period.

Dallas builds more housing today than any other metro in the country. That is a triumph of allowing the housing market to work. And that's because housing is not a special kind of good. It's a good that like so many other goods is responsive to supply and demand.

Given a steady level of demand, if you restrict supply, prices go up. If you add supply, prices stabilize. And if you add enough supply, prices can actually go down. That's why you have in so many places where people want to live, prices going through the roof because we've simply made it too hard to build.

It is really, really important to me that whatever explanation that people have this phenomenon, some people say, it's about billionaires are corporate interests. I say look to Texas. Texas has billionaires. Texas has corporate interests.

But Texas also has an entirely different set of rules and customs and permitting regulation that simply makes it easier for supply to respond to demand. And as a result, we have outcomes in Texas that are better than the rent freeze that Mamdani has promised New York and other left-wing politicians to promise their own cities and states. We have something better than our rent freeze. We have rents going down because we've made it easier to build.

So you mentioned Mamdani and the rent freeze. And of course, it's another side to agenda, which is to increase supply. Mamdani is attempting a synthesis, I think, which gives you much more often now on the Democratic side, which is price controls paired with supply increases. You'll sometimes even hear these argued as one creating support for the other, price controls creating political momentum for supply increases.

I want to play a clip of Mamdani here speaking in March. We're all here together today for an announcement where we launched the neighborhood builders Fast Track. What this means is that we are creating a pre-qualified roster of developers. And in doing so, we are going to cut down on pre-development time for new projects from 18 months to 10 months.

Now, when you couple that with the referendums that were passed just late last year, that means that we are cutting down on the time it takes to build affordable housing in the city by up to two and a half years. And I say that to you in a city where we know that time is money, where we know that too many of these kinds of press conferences have been followed by years of waiting. And New Yorkers cannot afford to wait any longer. And so what this means in a tangible sense is the creation of a thousand additional affordable housing units on city-owned land across our city.

Here's what I like about that clip, and that I think reflects something bigger happening across Democratic policymaking, which is a recognition that speed matters. And in a way that was, I think, not admitted, a lot of policymaking actually took the view that delay was good. The delay was good because policy is complicated, its effects are complicated. And what we need is a lot of process and time to surface information, surface objections, surface concerns.

You can mostly see some way environmental reviews are conducted. You can see this in the way that housing is built. And I don't think we often said like delay is good, but in practice we believe delay was good. I mean, there you have a Democratic social stuff they're saying as a applause on time is money.

And I think the sense that speed is progressive, it's more affordable, but also allows you to deliver at the time frame of elections and show government making a difference in people's life. That is a principle that I am seeing people take more seriously. I'm not saying that's just our fault or anything of that nature. But I think it's actually really important.

And recognizing that delay is corrosive to democracy because you can't feel government in your life is a really, really, really important shift for Democratic side policymaking to make. Mark, you've written about this explicitly. Among liberals, input was considered a costless virtue. It was considered costless to have long periods of input, to prize input, to say that the ultimate expression of democracy is people standing up and telling their city council don't build this thing anywhere close to me.

That was seen as more democratic in some places in the actual vote for the mayor who promised to deliver housing to that city and actually found that the people who showed up on Tuesday night at the city council meeting. Were the view point that prevented him from allowing housing? Yeah, I mean, my general view here is that people also use the term procedure fetish. Progressives just sort of like procedure for procedure.

Exactly. That's an exactly. And we're not looking for procedure just because we like it. We're not looking for delay because we like delay.

We have a fantasy. And we've had it now for several decades that if you get everybody in the room early enough in a planning process, you can create a product or an outcome that has no trade offs. And the truth is that we are facing and one of the major barriers to abundance is we're facing real trade offs here. It's I mean, I do want to point out, you know, the housing crisis in New York City has always been a housing crisis in New York City.

And we put all sorts of restrictions on what government could do. The abundance discourse has wanted, in many cases, to pit us or you guys against the left. And that's not an accurate portrayal of what's happening. You're seeing, Mom Donnie Elizabeth Warren is author of the, maybe the most pro abundant housing bill introduced it forever in the Senate.

And has passed the Senate. And I think, you know, to the degree that there seems to be tension about this, here's an idea where it seems to me that there's a growing consensus. The polling outfit Blue Rose recently did this survey where they asked people whether they liked abundance messaging or populist messaging. And it turns out that the most popular messaging was a synthesis of abundance and populism.

It was things like, quote, working Americans can't afford the basics. And it's because we stop building them, not enough housing, not enough energy, not enough childcare. And what little gets built goes to the wealthy first. Democrats will build America that works for everyone, not just those at the top.

That was the message that pulled the best. I don't think that that's just positive. I mean, testing messaging is not the be all end-all of politics. And there are philosophical differences between liberals and populist that we shouldn't run away from.

Like, they exist. But the fights often obscured the degree to which individuals could hold simultaneously both populist and abundance principles. And I've come to think of this somewhat cheesily as the abundance mullet, which is to say economic populism in the fronts and abundance in the back. So who's wearing the abundance mullet as horrifying as that might be to imagine.

Zoramandani ran on freezing the rent, but here he is talking about making it easier and faster for developers to build in New York City. That'd be very random, both. Yes, you're right. He ran on both.

But I think if you pulled people and asked them, what did you hear more about freezing the rent or accelerating the time with which developers could start getting building in Manhattan and Brooklyn? I think most people associate him with the memetic freeze the rent rather than the less memetic, shortening the permitting time from 18 months to 10 months. So he's one example. Another example, I think, is New Jersey Governor Mikey Sherrill, who ran on freezing utility increases, making it easier for people to afford electricity by talking about price caps.

But her second executive order was all about supply side renovations to encourage the construction of solar and storage in particular by making it easier to build energy in New Jersey. So there again, you have the promise of freeze the utility increase in the fronts with the promise of expanding supply in the back. Some songs that I've written, I started on a piano that happened with All In One For Christmas Is You? If you couldn't tell, that is Mariah Carey.

I'm John Caramanica, one of the critics behind the New York Times's 30 Greatest Living American Songwriters Project. We interviewed some of the songwriters on our list, including Taylor Swift, who hasn't sat for a video like this in a long time. These are not ordinary conversations. You're going to watch these videos and learn about intimate approaches to craft in ways that you rarely have access to.

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And let us know if you agree with our picks. I bet you won't. So I was going to do this later, but I think I'm going to do it now because I think one of the dangers of this conversation is that the three of us largely are Pearl Bondance and I have done previous episodes where I've had critics sitting at, in fact, this very table. But I want to try to offer up the critique.

So it is represented in the strongest way I can, which is that yes, of course, there can be a synthesis of populism and abundance. And you can see it in somebody like, you know, maybe I'm I'm Donnie, but that in fact, in practice, abundance has two huge problems from the populist perspective. One is that a lot of rich people and billionaires really like it and are funding things with abundance in the name and that they are going to use abundance as a mask or vehicle to push the Democratic Party, you know, back in their direction. And the other, which is like the big critique that gets made up certainly our book.

I don't know if it's true in the critique that gets made of yours. Is it abundance or isn't focused on the right enemies that what politics should be about is a confrontation with corporate power and what abundance is at least perceived as trying to make politics about is a more positive sum. We can all build. We can all get along.

It's a sort of more liberal approach to things that I think is like the strongest version I can give up. But you can hear Elizabeth Warren make a version of this argument in a speech he gave not too long ago. So yes, we need more government efficiency a lot more. But many in the abundance movement are doing little to call out corporate culpability and billionaire influence in creating and defending those very inefficiencies.

Instead, abundance has become a rallying cry, not just for a few policy nerds worried about zoning, but for wealthy donors and other corporate aligned Democrats who are putting big time muscle behind making Democrats more favorable to big businesses. That looks like the corporate tycoons have found one more way to stop the Democratic Party from tackling a rigged system with too much energy. She goes on to note that Reid Hoffman, who's a, you know, tech billionaire and influential tech figure has been sending the book around to people he knows. I want to ask this of both of you.

What do you understand to be the relationship between abundance and corporations and abundance and concentrations of wealth and income and power? Mark. I think there are certain cases where concentrated corporate power is a problem. We're coming off a week where there were a bunch of victories for the anti-monopolist movement, live nation and ticket master.

I'm not sure that any of the three of us would voice any objection to taking a strong stance on abuses of corporate power in that realm. Somebody goes to a lot of music shows. I really, really hate ticket fees. I really don't like them.

But my concern about that critique is that if you look at the stories, at least in my book and several stories in your book, like the problem in many cases is not created by corporate power. Like, you know, the last chapter of my book is about an effort to build a clean energy transmission line through the state of Maine, which is really just a string through a bunch of forests in Maine. It's proposed in 2016 and it's constructed in 2026. Like, not because there was some corporate behemoth that was standing in the way or trying to drive up its own.

Like, the fight there was about whether it was worth it to imperil some portion of a pristine forest in northern Maine with a wire and the way that people used the levers available within the government made it so that we could not replace something like 700,000 cars worth of carbon into the atmosphere through old fossil fuel generation with clean hydro power coming from Canada. Like, that's not a problem about corporate power. That's a problem with can government make an expeditious decision. I want to say something really clearly.

I think the people who focus on corporate power, being the most significant problem in America, have some very good ideas. I also think frankly that Peter's search for the Warren, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in a way is like kind of a very abundantly agency. I mean, it's consolidated. She says earlier in that speech that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which she helped found and ideate, is like an abundance before abundance.

Oh, great. Maybe I'm just totally ripping off her point here because I read it months ago, but I think she's right. I mean, it consolidated what used to be entirely dispersed regulatory authority in the government in order to bring it to bear to help consumers against corporate power. That strikes me as exactly what we were talking about when it comes to state capacity and your line, which you repeated so much on our book tour about deregulating government, getting government out of its own way, getting government to work faster and better for the public.

CFPB seems like an absolute unalloy triumph in that respect. At the same time, I think people who fix it on corporate power, while they have some very good ideas, have some not very good ideas. Last year, not going to open up this kind of rooms all the way, but I was engaged in a very protracted debate against anti-monopoly folks about the degree to which Dallas was a housing oligopoly. I don't think it is.

I don't think we should be fixated on punishing builders who are successfully adding housing that seems like taking this one lens of a way. It's taking this one lens and applying it where it shouldn't be applied. And that tells me that if the lens of corporate power leads to both some very good ideas and some not very good ideas, then it might not be the single best lens through which to see improving America. I am not a populist.

I am a liberal. I am concerned not about corporate power specifically, but about power. About how power can manifest in strange places. It can manifest absolutely at the level of corporations and monopoly.

It can also manifest at the level of the neighborhood, as Mark was just explaining. A group of neighbors stop a new apartment from going up by lobbying the city council and mayor to not build housing where it should be added. What is that if not the application of power? In 2017, the New York Times, where we are sitting, published this incredible piece, I think went back and forth between us and Notion, even if the final didn't make it in the book.

It was about the incredibly expensive, per mile cost of connecting Grand Central to the Long Island Railroad. Why was it so expensive to build? A train, a tunnel in New York. Partly it was about consulting fees, partly it was about construction.

Partly it was about the fact that public union staffing levels in New York City are like four times higher than they are in the typical city or state in Europe, France, Spain, UK, and that's why our construction costs are so much higher. So if I'm a populist sitting here, I'm going to do. If I'm a populist sitting here, I'm somebody who more believes in this critique. Here's my answer to what you just said.

Yes, it's all true. Yes, I think making the best argument I can make at least. Yes, that's all true. But you sure see more excited when you start talking about the power being misused by the neighborhood group or by the public sector union or by the poorly run government.

And you sort of yada yada yada your way past the quarter power. I think that some of the critique comes from a feeling, and I have my own answer to this one. I'm curious for yours, a feeling that yes, you can certainly have an abundance, a version of abundance that understood quarter power as one of the many blockages and, you know, and often a very central blockage. But in practice, a way abundance is written the way many of the people arguing for it seem to argue for it.

There's like a yeah, the corporate folks are right. Sometimes. Let's go back to talking about how government doesn't work. Right.

Let's go back to talking about where public sector unions increase costs and that it's in that where the real message, the real priority set is revealed. There's a way in which I'm not exactly sure how to answer that question. It's a really good question. Why am I more excited to make the point that I see more excited to make?

You know that feeling when like when you're in a room and everyone around you is like freaking out about something and a weird way that like calms you down because you're like, oh, everyone's freaked out about this thing. So I don't need to add my anxiety to like the median level of anxiety in this room. That's kind of how I feel about certain aspects of fearing the influence of corporate power in monopolies and energy and entertainment. I see it's being covered.

I see people writing about it. I see people getting agitated about it. I think it's good that the government is winning lawsuits against entertainment companies that are abusing their own power to raise ticket prices. I think it's good.

But that's not what the debate is. I'm excited about adding an impression that I think we introduced you and I to the conversation, which is that we are so used to seeing this version of power exist at the level of corporations and we're so used to seeing the way that that can have pernicious impacts on consumers that we miss other instantiations of power and a neighborhood can in strange way be an instantiation of power. It doesn't seem like some nefarious thing when a nice looking woman stands up at a city council meeting and says I would prefer to not build an apartment building behind my farm because I'm afraid of my horses being freaked out by the construction noise. But I want us to see that is power if it stops an apartment building from being built.

So it's always difficult, but important maybe to respond to a question about like affect. Maybe the first thing I should have said was I'm curious people to read the transcript where my affect is invisible rather than watch this on YouTube where my affect is visible. I really do think if I'm really reaching down into understanding why am I passionate about getting people to see these other ways that surprising accumulations of power can stop things from happening in the public good is because that's where I think we're missing the story. This is a conversation, this conversation among progressives between the populace and the abundance nicks or whatever we're called that is more than a century old.

If the turn of the 20th century, go through this in my book. The turn of the 20th century, the railroads have completely remade the American economy, power is accumulating and the people who are concerned about these monopolies have two wildly different ideas about what to do about it. One idea is anti-monopoly, it's brand easy and it's big as bad, small as beautiful. How do we carve these things up so that the old sort of 19th century kind of capitalism that Louis Brandeis had seen on the streets of Louisville, Kentucky, as we can run up could be reestablished.

But there was a second idea which was we should build up what was then like just a shadow of a government so that it could accurately and powerfully regulate with centralized power. Theodore Roosevelt proposed a Bureau of Corporations. We eventually get the Federal Trade Commission before that. We have the Interstate Commerce Commission, which is a big bureaucracy designed to regulate the railroads.

That's a different idea. That is taking power as it is and pushing it up into some big powerful, competent government bureaucracy that will do the things that ordinary people can't do for themselves. And I think sort of the misunderstanding here is that those who say, you know, we need to attack corporate power are just taking the Brandeisian notion of it. And the abundance ethos harkens back to the old ideas that existed from the turn of the 20th century through the 1960s that we should be building up government power so that government is capable of taking on these corporations.

That we have people in government who can make discretionary decisions about where we're going to build transmission lines, how we're going to improve transit, where we're going to build housing, how we're going to regulate this and that. We want bureaucracies to be able to move speedily and we want them to be able to make decisions in the public interest. And strangely enough, it is the reforms that we've seen since the 60s and 70s that have slowed government down so they cannot be responsive to the corporate challenge. And so to my mind, like there's some confusion here and that the idea that we should abandon abundance in the name of just sort of attacking corporations misses the point that government should be a competent institution that can.

That can accurately and thoroughly review and challenge corporations when they're doing wrong. Can I throw the base on that to you? Like, how do you how do you situate the corporate power critique in your current conception of abundance slash, maybe I'll turn it away to ask that question. A time machine materializes right next to us over here takes us back to December 2023, allowing us just enough time to add a chapter seven to the book called abundance and corporate power.

Do you write that chapter and what do you put in it? So I have a couple answers to this. One, which is more to the way we wrote the book of the question I asked you about affect is that I think we wrote the book with a couple of thoughts, but one was it was a book about blind spots of liberal and leftist governance. And interesting, this is actually an argument, right?

The populace often do think this to be a blind spot of liberal governance. But to me, corporate power is actually something that the left broadly speaking understands and is relatively attentive to. I mean, we were writing this book when Lena Kahn was the chair of the FTC. So one thing that it just wasn't that much about was things where I thought progressives kind of had the right idea, but that created the impression that it isn't concerned with that.

And so I think then you get into two things that are more substantive. One is that I think when you are talking about building things, and this is a book about building things. This is a movement about building things and typically building them in the real world. You are necessarily forced into a complex relationship with corporations and functionally everything else, because first things are built by corporations.

Most things will continue to be built by corporations, whether you're talking about drug development, where there's a mix of obviously public research, but then the pharmaceutical industry actually does do a huge amount of drug development and you're not. Nobody has a theory of getting away from that to when you're talking about building commercial buildings, often building housing, decarbonizing, almost anything you can think of that needs to be built at a large scale is going to be built in part by corporations. So you need to find a way to align corporate energy with your program, just sort of being anti corporate as an orientation isn't going to work. And so I think that's one other reason why I've always said that the theory of power in abundance is liberal in the sense that it believes power can concentrate poorly anywhere, can concentrate poorly among corporations, in government, among unions, in neighborhoods, that there is no safe concentration of power.

But here's where I think if I could add your chapter seven, I probably would. Yeah, Mark, I take your point that a lot of the things we focus on in the book, or frankly that you focus on in your book, corporate concentration isn't the reason the transmission lines aren't getting built. And it's not the reason that housing isn't getting built in this or that city. But one thing that we are at a principles level arguing for is that government should be stronger, more capable of being decisive, and then more capable of turning those decisions into actual concrete and steel and law and so on.

And the way money affects politics at its highest levels from state houses to the federal government, I would have really thought of a campaign finance reform chapter in the book the way we initially conceived of it. And also because I have a bunch on campaign finance reform in my first book, in my own hand, I'm like, I've covered this. But I think the place where I think you could have put in a chapter seven, I think the place where on the one hand, I think progressism already has like the right view on this, but it has not been able to instantiate this into policy is the more powerful government is the more worried you have to be about the distorting influence of money inside of it. And so a political system as porous to money as the one we have currently is becomes very dangerous.

So I just put out a podcast about or with this congressional candidate, Alex Boris, who is running for Congress in New York. And this kind of super PAC that is funded by co-founders, Palantir and OpenAI and Andreessen Horowitz is like dumping money to destroy him. And Boris is a former employee of Palantir. What's going on there is he wants to regulate AI and these companies and investment firms that are making functionally unimaginable amounts of money from AI are kind of trying to build like a death star to destroy anybody who might regulate AI in a way they don't like.

And so a system where you cannot trust there to be like a good structure of who has voice and who has influence because it is so dependent on donors is not a system where just saying, let's make government more powerful and trusted people running it are going to do the right thing really works because you have a like a fundamental corruption of the central decision making apparatus. And I think it's a sense of that being true and a cynicism coming from that that while I'm not trying to buy a bunch of the critiques, I think that the feeling that if the billionaires who have all this influence like this book and implemented it, you know, or not really behind it. In the system as it existed, it would just give them a really big voice because it's not specifically oriented towards taking some of their voice away. I think there's validity to that.

That's the version of it I would give credibility to. Yeah, I think I agree. I don't consider myself anti billionaire, TM, but I don't think you can look at what's happening with money in government right now. Any increasing role that billionaires have over campaign finance and not be a little bit concerned about the last 15 months.

And what we saw between 2024 and 2025 is that billionaires contributed by some estimations between 10, 15 and 25% of total campaign spending. And God President that cut taxes for the top 0.1% by an average of $300,000 and paid for it by the largest cuts to Medicaid, healthcare for low income people in American history. That is a terrifying vision of the future of Plutocracy, if that's an omen. And if you look at the direction of billionaire incomes made possible by the rise of technologies like AI, which are currently in private markets, which means that retail investors do not even have an opportunity to benefit from the tripling and triple quadrupling and decut coupling of anthropic and open AI's enterprise value, that clearly points toward a world in which billionaires have an enormous amount of political power.

And that scares me. And I don't have a perfect solution to it. If I'm thinking about a lot right now, I had a conversation on my own podcast with Gabriel Zachman about the feasibility of billionaire taxes, which are their own can of worms. But I think it's absolutely a problem we need to think about more than next few years.

I guess I'm sort of struck by the degree to which we're avoiding the sort of central question, which is who should be making big decisions, right? Like in the 50s, 60s, like there were these public figures like Robert Moses or like Robert McNamara, who were purportedly speaking for the public interest and progressivism turned against that model. We become culturally averse to power almost no matter where it is. And that means we don't like billionaires, but we don't like autocrats, we don't like powerful bureaucrats.

Like we're just, whoever is making the decision, our solution in every case is move the decision making power somewhere else without really thinking like, well, what is the system we think would be fair to get to an expeditious decision that actually does serve the public interest. And I think we can have conversations about the influence of money in politics, but like fundamentally what we need is government to be competent in small doses so that we can grow from that. The promise of abundance is that we will re-empower government to be able to make decisions expeditiously sort of across the board, and we should hold the public figures who are making decisions accountable through elections, but like ultimately the proof of the pudding is in the eating. And we need to have systems that allow some discretionary power to the people who are in powerful parts of government to be able to make decisions and then evaluate their.

I would hate for us to predicate our efforts to empower government to make decisions about housing, about clean infrastructure, about any of these issues on a change in the way we finance campaigns. I think we're going to figure out how people feel about AI more and more in the next few years, and almost no matter how much money they put up against Alex Boras or whomever. If AI turns out to be wildly unpopular, they're going to have a problem. So I think that actually gets us into AI, which you've been circling here a little bit.

And one other group of people you'll hear the word abundance from quite a lot are the people who run AI companies, for instance. AI and robotics will bring out what might be termed the age of abundance. Other people abuse the swear and that this is my prediction of being an age of abundance for everyone. I had the one interest of radical abundance and just what were the technological leverage points to make the future wildly different and better?

As we get closer to AGI and we make breakthroughs and we probably talked about last time material sciences, energy, fusion, these sorts of things help by AI. We should start getting to a position in society where we're getting towards what I would call radical abundance, where there's a lot of resources to go around. So that's Elon Musk, Sam Altman and Demisysovis. And one I think a lot of people are skeptical that these AI companies are going to bring anything that would feel to a normal person like abundance.

What they're instead hearing about is a scarcity of jobs that has come down the pike. We thought of having AI in the book. We mostly cut it out because it felt like it was moving too fast. It has gotten a lot further.

Now, how do you think about the ways in which AI could create abundance or other people create scarcity? I had an interesting conversation last year when I was simultaneously working on abundance and this cover story that I wrote for the Atlantic called the Antisocial Century. And for that latter story, I talked to Bob Putnam, Robert Putnam, the author of Bowling Alone. And he made this interesting point about technology, which he significantly blames for the rise of solitude in America.

He said, too often, we adopt a technology and then we adopt that technology's values without thinking about incorporating that technology into our values. And so one example of his was the television and we're going to get to AI in a second. He said, but television, you know, most people put a television in the room and then immediately started watching five, six hours of television a day. It was as if the human body were designed by evolution to do nothing but sit in the couch and watch streaming images on screen.

That's how immediately insinuated self in the modern life. That's different from, say, the Amish, which are very, very purposeful about almost screening a technology to ensure that it fit their values before incorporating it. So, for example, something like solar energy, which they say does fit their values, you can often find near Amish farms, whereas the television set, they said, it's going to interrupt the values that we have about family interconnectedness and time spent looking at other people in the face and so we're going to keep it out of our homes. I don't think that we should take the Amish approach to television with artificial intelligence.

I don't think we should ban it. But I do think we should take a kind of Amish light approach to thinking about incorporating this technology into our values rather than adopting the values of artificial intelligence, mindlessly. What the latter would mean is allowing data centers to be built absolutely anywhere, including in many places, at the Wall Street Journal reported, in places where residential developers are selling land that is needed for homeless people to data centers to build a house for computer chips. I don't want to data center moratorium in this country, but stories like that feel awfully close to allowing the values of AI to supplant the values of people, which is having a home to live.

I think there's a lot that I grew up there, but let me drop this down to as you put at the beginning here, the level of vibes. I think one of the vibes projects in abundance is to try to create a political vibe that is simultaneously progressive in the sense that it cares about social goals and equality and distribution and a bunch of things that progressives typically care about and pro-technology. I mean, right on the cover of our book, we have this somewhat solar, punky, you see technology and forestry and we talk about rewilding very much at the beginning because you have vertical farming, right? We are trying to create a vision of the way technology can be pulled into politics to make things possible.

They're not currently possible self. I would say the level of vibes that has gotten harder because one, there is a very, very reasonable sense that technology is concentrating power more narrowly in the hands of a more narrow group of people. Elon Musk is well on his way at the moment becoming the world's first trillionaire. You see the power of Sam Altman, wheels, Dario, wheels, Dario, people are scared of AI.

The way Jasmine's describes the populism is a sense that it's a leap project that is being shoved down people's throats, not something they want, but something they're being forced to accept and adapt to. At the level of vibes, this sort of politics that merges progressive goals and a kind of view that technology can be harnessed for them, it seems very far. GLP ones are very widespread, but I think the way the left feels about them is very unsettled. I'm curious to talk a bit about that level because I think it's very hard for a positive politics to grow out of a deep enmity and suspicion.

And yet I understand why the suspicion is there right now. Yeah, let me talk first about AI and then we get to GLP ones because I think they're quite different. I think the populist energy, the anti-tech energy that faces artificial intelligence is very different than the dispersed anxiety that people feel about some of the implications of GLP ones, despite this in many ways being like one of the most popular drug categories in the last few decades. So I think in that respect they definitely deserve a little bit of distinction.

The thing I just meant about that because I think you're right, I don't see any place where the left is excited about a new technology. Right. So I really like the two, three sentences that we had artificial intelligence in the sci-fi vignette that kicked off our book because while we don't have a fully fleshed out AI policy in that book, we say two things I think are are worth holding on to. The first is that the profits of artificial intelligence because it is a technology that is built on human achievement and human intelligence are taxed and redistributed to the public.

And number two, that the work week has shrunk and implicit in the idea that artificial intelligence allows the work week to shrink is the idea that to the extent that it reduces labor, that reduction of labor is not born on the backs of a dramatic increase in unemployment, but is rather distributed among a stable set of fully employed labor force that is working a bit less and earning more because of high productivity. So if I were crafting a sort of abundance AI message, what I would say is this is rapidly looking like it's going to become a trillion multi trillion dollar industry. We have to restore the ability to tax corporations that could be among the most profitable in the history of capitalism. That's part one.

We want to tax these companies and redistribute their income to the people. But also, I think we need to think about what kind of labor market policies we can begin to build to ensure that there isn't a displacement of workers so that if this technology makes people more productive, it results in something that looks much more like a four day work week than the equivalent 20% of the economy just being shunted onto unemployment. On GOP ones, I definitely get the impression that there is a left wing left wing. There's an aversion to the technology within certain aspects of media.

Like there are magazines and newsletter writers who are against GOP ones because they promote a new fitness culture or they might represent some kind of unnatural way of getting a nobody. Biohacking, optimization culture, peptides now, clavicular, which is a whole weird dystopic looks maxing. That it accelerates us towards some kind of transhumanist future with which we feel uncomfortable. And while enriching a small number of people.

While enriching a small number of people. But I also think it's important to look at the fact that this is by all accounts the most popular category of drug in the last 20, 30 years. I mean, the pharmaceutical companies can't sell it fast enough. The peptide makers with their relationships to Chinese or whatever labs, they can't sell it fast enough.

I mean, here you have an emerging technology that looks like it might have implications for neurodegenerative disease, for inflammation, for cardiovascular disease. These are diseases that are among the highest mortality burden in the country in the developed world. Why aren't we devoting even more public resources to studying this drug faster and finding new ways of bringing down the cost in the next few years for all Americans? What if the federal government spends a lot of money to promote a certain drug category, rewards certain companies with advanced market commitments, hundreds of millions, billions of dollars for companies to build these drugs, so that the government essentially is buying those drugs and then can distribute them.

What we did for COVID vaccines. Which is exactly what we did for COVID vaccines. And right now the federal government just sort of seems MIA on this in a way that I'm not sure I entirely understand. So if I were in government looking at this revolution, I would frankly be interested in something like an operation warp speed for GLP ones.

Marc, I want to pick up on something that Derek said a little bit earlier in the AI part of that, which I think is really pregnant, which is should abundance of time be a goal. And what I'm going to ask is that you've done a lot of thinking about the progressive movement, it comes up a lot in your book. And when I go back into the progressive movement, one thing I am struck by is how much broader its conceptions of human flourishing were than what I think liberalism tends to offer for that matter. Socialism or democratic social intent to offer today.

You have a lot of talk about parks. You have a lot of talk about public spaces. You have a lot of talk about the liberal arts and certain forms of enriching education. Obviously you have temperance movements and things like that.

And there's a lot of talk in that era of work in the role it should play or should not play in our life. And now we just accept it as so central. We have two inner families and everybody works all the time. But particularly if we do end up in this world where AI is a labor replacing technology, which to some degree will be, should the goal be that the five day work is in set in stone?

Maybe it should be four days. Maybe it should be three. I mean, Brink Lindsey is sort of abundant to Jason, you book the permanent problem is certainly some of these ideas. But I'm curious, like giving your more historical perspective, what you think of that and what you think of time is a thing that's a thing that's really important.

And you know, time is a thing, leisure time, you know, time that you have autonomy over as a long term goal for abundance. In the moment of every new technological transformation, we have had some notion, some dream that maybe we could have less work and more leisure for the same income. And in most cases, it's part of the American DNA to use the extra time to do more work, right? I think, you know, Keynes famously expected that we would be spending less time at work.

We are a 15 hour work week by now. Right. But we did create the weekend, right? The labor movement.

We have taken time back at times. We have taken time back. I suspect that we are going to find with the rise of China with the enormous challenges that we face and the various new technologies that we have in other realms, that there's going to be a demand for speedy progress on all sorts of other issues. And those who want to spend time doing that are going to spend all weekend, all weekend, working on those challenges.

So I'm less sanguine that we're going to have less time. I mean, I think what's so interesting about Derek's analysis of what happened with GLPs is that in situations like Warp Speed, we have clear delineations of who makes decisions, right? We are empowering people to take chances to make enormously conscious decisions about where money goes and to try things quickly. That is exactly what we don't have in these other realms of abundance, right?

It is very hard to figure out who makes the decision about where the transmission line is going to go, how we're going to build the new transit line, where the housing is going to go. And I think like that's an interesting model in these other realms. How are we going to how are progressives going to change decision making processes across the board so that we can make expeditions decisions? Did you know that India is the biggest adopter of crypto globally?

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Sign up now at nytimes.com slash The World to get it in your inbox each weekday morning. I think the transmission lines question brings up another area that both interfaces with technology, obviously, but also politics. For me, a lot of abundance comes out of thinking first about the ending movement and then thinking about climate change and decarbonization and the need for a really, really aggressive green energy build out, which was being conceived of and attempted in the Biden administration and became very clear that the laws we have and the permitting we have was not going to allow enough solar and wind and transmission lines and so on to get placed. Then Donald Trump gets elected, and I would say a couple things happen.

One is he guts into the inflation reduction acts credits for winning solar, trying to mess all that up and also makes it in some cases like harder to permit and harder to finance. There were hopes that you would see big level permitting reform. At least maybe that would happen under Republican presidency, but that has not happened in any real way. Nor is Donald Trump exactly doing fossil fuel abundance because he has gotten the straight up or moves into a complete mess.

Oil prices are really high, but most of the debate is how to make oil cheaper again. When you think of where we were talking about green energy a couple of years ago, and you think of where we are now, or can you even keep oil affordable? It seems like a total absolute disaster. I would add this and then turn it to you, Derek, which is one thing that worries me is that when people lose political fights, they sometimes backfill into saying, well, maybe they were wrong about everything.

I think we are acting like climate change. Science has somehow stopped being true because of politics of climate change and proven harder than people hoped. But we are just warming the world really fast, and there's no reason to think that that will not have all the terrible effects that people have feared. I don't think this politics has gone forever because they're going to have huge natural disasters and storms and things like that.

But we've gone from a place where the question is how fast we build out the decarbonization to whatever the hell this is now, and it's a real fall. It doesn't seem like an abject disaster. It is an absolute disaster. This is what you and I were talking about a lot with audiences in May and April of last year.

We're saying that Donald Trump wins this affordability election, where if you ask people who switched the Democratic to the Republican column, why did you switch? They said over and over again. It's cost of living. It's affordability.

It's the price of housing. What's happened to cost of living affordability under Donald Trump? All of it has gotten worse. It's not just that it's gotten worse because a comet came in from outer space that Donald Trump couldn't possibly change.

It's often directly because of Trump's policies. He's governed often very explicitly as a scarcity candidate. There's a scarcity of labor in large part because of the amount of legal and undocumented immigration coming into this country has fallen off a map such that the labor market is barely growing anymore. We have trade scarcity.

We've essentially made it illegal for all sorts of goods to be done and legal, but highly taxed. All sorts of goods to be sold in the country. Some of those goods are inputs into things like building transformers. If you look at why the cost of electricity and energy is rising, despite the fact that within the context of AI, it's often blamed on the data centers.

When you talk to energy experts, they will say almost to a person, it's not so much about the exciting reason of AI is driving up the cost of electricity. It's much more the slightly more boring reason, which is that the hardware guts of the electrical grid are getting scarce and more expensive in large part because we have tariff the inputs which makes it harder to build transformers and stations. He's made it difficult in so many different ways in order to allow him to achieve the very thing that he was elected to achieve. That is, I think, an absolute tragedy for America, for consumers, for families.

It is, however, and I do mean this on a separate plane, an opportunity for people who think of themselves as abundance liberals to refocus this question around how do we solve these problems on the supply side? How do we make it easier to build the housing that currently is not being built? How do we make it easier to build the transformers that currently aren't not only being built, but are also, in many cases, being tariff? So I think Trump is a disaster, but Trump's disaster is often instructive to the opposing party.

So this, I do think, is an opportunity for someone to run on the idea that, like, we know that, like, economics works in many of these industries, we know supply and demand works. There are supply side solutions to many of these problems, and if we implement them in a way that the Trump administration has not, we can begin to fix some of these problems. Okay, but this is a place where, to go back to something I was saying at the beginning of the conversation, I see a big difference between having a vision and not. So the big byword of the era right now is energy affordability.

We're all talking about affordability, and I also think energy should be affordable and people should be able to afford it. That is not, I think, a forward-looking vision of this. I want to see clean energy abundance described. I want to see a political party that actually has a vision of a world in which we have more energy and the fruits of that energy available to us, available to people in poor countries, and is able to describe why it wants that and how it's going to achieve it.

And this is a place where I think that we're sort of the intersection of a few things that people, I think, will come to believe have failed. One is that climate politics has proven very, very hard, and I think one reason it's proven hard is it over a long period of time endlessly trying to motivate people to avoid a disaster that they cannot feel day to day is very hard. Right? You're trying to create a tremendous amount of political motivation by warning people of a thing that has not for the most part happened to them yet.

And you can do that to some degree, but I think the politics of climate has proven hard, the degree to which the public doesn't really prioritize it, has been a difficult lesson to learn. Obviously, Trumpism has not taken the mantle of cheap energy away from the Democrats for all the reasons you just described. But I think what separates abundance and what is at least meant to be in my head from what we're really seeing in a lot of places is that you're supposed to have some vision of what energy, clean energy abundance is and what it looks like and what it can achieve. And that is just not a grammar.

I think that people are used to talking about. I think the left kind of has a like a worried relationship with energy. It just wants to avoid the problems of fossil fuel energy is right, decarbonization, et cetera. The right just wants energy to be cheap and plentiful and to drill.

And the idea that there's some other future we could attain. It is not just the present but without climate disasters or the present on the right with climate disasters but a longer period of cheap fossil fuel oil. Like I would like to see that like brighter future described. And that's a place where I think there's been a lot less by now than I would have hoped.

I might disagree with the way you're splitting out the economic case and the vision case. There's a way in which I think the last few months in particular have demonstrated that the case for clean electricity is also the case. For cheap energy in the long run. We just saw is the degree to which a totalitarian theocratic regime can use drone weaponry to control an artery of gas and oil in a way that can raise the cost of fossil fuels for the entire world.

One way to not rely on that one artery is to build more energy at home to in source your energy. What are some ways to do that? It's to take advantage of an unbelievable cost revolution in solar and storage. Not to mention I would like when geothermal nuclear but there's no alternative for now.

To use the cost revolution in solar and storage to build more in this country such that we have not only clean electricity but also clean electricity that isn't going to ride the sort of insurance spikes of a world in which there's war on the seas that every few months drives up the cost of hydrocarbons that are put on ships. I think that the distinction I am making though is between a world that is being described in terms of the present right we can have what we have now but it is not subject to Iran closing the state of hormones. And actually imagining energy and clean energy as a generator of future wealth and change. I think something that makes abundance distinctive from where a lot of democratic party progressive politics has been for a long time and you've written a lot about this as well is I think there's been a long running skepticism going back to the beginning of energy.

You want to reduce for use and recycle and you want to put on a sweater. And I think that abundance is distinctively pretty pro energy it believes that a world in which we all had access to much more energy would be a better world dramatically so right it would make possible all these technological innovations like vertical farming and things that we really want to see nasty salination and it believes that the technology is there or near there to do that cleanly and so if you really invest in that you know both in terms of things we know I built like when it's solar but getting better at you know batteries and the things that we are like we would like to sort of have revolutions in like geothermal and nuclear something really different as possible. And yes I agree that you could use a current moment to pivot to that. What I'm saying is I am not seeing people really do that and I think it is an actually important dividing line is what you're talking about just securing a better energy supply than we have now or is what you're talking about a world of energetic wealth clean energetic wealth that you can somehow describe.

But it is quite different than what we now live in. I just want to come back I think this is a perfect case for abundance in this sense to Derek's point we're now got incredibly expensive fossil fuel energy because of the current crisis but set that aside. We have at our fingertips technology that makes it possible for us to replace much of that with clean environmentally sensitive forms of electricity generation. The thing that we don't have the real cog in the wheel is transmission.

It is the fact that clean energy is created in certain places used to be that you would mind the coal or bring the oil or gas to a pipeline to the place where it was going to be actually converted into electricity and then it would be brought locally to the people who were nearby. Now we've got the problem of having the wind and the solar and whatever else is being generated in places that are far away from where the load is going to be expended and we need to build lines that connect the generation to the place where people want to use the electricity. We've got a solar farm here and you've got a city here and between the three of them are a wealthy neighborhood pristine forest and a you know a struggling more marginalized neighborhood. We have to go through one of those three places and abundant semicrass have not articulated the way that we're going to come to that decision expeditiously.

We have sort of given into our fantasy that if you just put these three groups some of whom were going to be affected by this new translation line into a room and have them articulate their problem. We will magically come to some sort of consensus but in most cases we don't and we often get tripped up by it. And I think this is the big coming challenge for abundance. We have to build a system that allows for us to make trade offs.

We need a system where everyone has a voice and no one has a veto and we get to a decision expeditiously and then it's not subject to endless litigation. And the challenge for our movement for abundance generally for progressivism is how do we make government work? You're right that abundance should be bigger than let's get rid of red tape. This is not getting rid of red tape.

This is metabolizing a whole series of conflicting interests so that we get to a decision. I agree with that. And so I think that's actually a good place to get to the final piece here which is at the core of abundance. You have a strong state, a state capable of making decisions, a state capable of executing on those decisions implementing them building things in the real world, getting things built in the real world.

The administration began with Dosh which on the one hand was enormously destructive of state capacity. On the other hand is proof that you could do a lot more to the state than people thought you could. The rules of regulations were not nearly as binding as people thought. And I am seeing Democrats begin to metabolize the idea that if they are put back in power, they are going to need to take some of those lessons and build something different.

And I want to play a clip from Pete Buttigieg just the other day. My word of warning to my own political party is that we would make a terrible mistake if we thought that our job was to just take power somehow and then put it back in power. And then put everything back the way it was. That's not what we're here to do.

We're not out to go around and just find all the little bits and pieces of everything that they smashed and tape it together and say, here you go, I give you the world as it looks in 2023. That's not going to work. It's not what we need. So much has changed.

And the truth is they are destroying things right and left. They're destroying a lot of good important things. They're destroying some useless things too because they're destroying everything. So now we get a chance to put things together on different terms.

So that Buttigieg clip is like a fan service for me. That's what I want to hear somebody saying. But I want to say he goes on to say what those different terms should be. And I think this is a really big unsettled question for Democrats, which is they know, you heard it also in the Newsome clip earlier, they know that after Doge, after all this destruction, and after all the recognition that things can work differently, they have to work differently.

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