From the Center for a New American Security, this is Stories from the Back Channel, the podcast about pivotal moments in national security is told from the inside. I'm Ylang Gollumber. Today, American Diplomacy and Middle East Peace. This week, CNAS and the Brookings Institution are releasing a new report titled Ending Gaza's Perpetual Crisis, with yours truly as one of the co-authors.
The title of the report says it all. The situation is grim. People aren't talking much about negotiating in Middle East Peace. Right now, Israelis and Palestinians seem as far apart as ever.
Mahmoud Abbas said Palestinians are facing the most dangerous state in their history after Donald Trump recognized juris of the Montthouza Israel's capital, but the Patis Union President added that Trump's action. Things were very different 26 years ago. Political realities aligned to make multiple agreements possible. And at the center of it all was a guy from Australia of all places.
His name is Martin Indic. I happen to know Martin very well, as our paths cross later in his career. I was Martin's Chief of Staff at the State Department when he and Secretary of State John Kerry brought Israelis and Palestinians back to the negotiating table. But that's skipping ahead.
Indic's story of thinking about Middle East Peace starts when he was just out of college. Well, I was very taken by international relations as an undergraduate. But the formative experience for me was I had just graduated and gone to Israel and was kind of planning doing a PhD in international relations and was studying Hebrew and was going to a masters at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem when the 1973 October Yom Kippur War broke out. Thanks to under thousand other guns pouring tons of high explosive onto the Bala headline.
While an airstrike, it is really positioned to be in Sinai. And so I was there in Jerusalem, kind of at ground zero for that war. Close quarters in Jerusalem is in blackout and the workers have volunteered and moved down quite close to the front inside. Screened from Israeli eyes, 8,000 Egyptian infantry began crossing the canal in rubber dinghis at midpoints between the ports.
What are you doing as a volunteer and taking puts at that point? Sorting carrots. All the male population of Israel at any reasonable age was all at the front. The reserves were mobilized.
The Israelis heard the call to arms on the radio and from rabbis and their synagogues. And they just had no labor. And so we were just doing the tuss that the men would normally do. They were mobilized for like eight months.
So that was a real lack of labor for quite a long period of time. And I can remember being struck in those days by two things, one that just a horror of war. Behind the front lines, Israel's general staff was in a state of New York panic. Reserve units were being hastily mustered together and battalions in a rear were rushed to the front.
And number two, the role that Henry Kissinger, as Secretary of State, played first of all in ensuring the resupply of Israel. And I was down in the negative on a Kippur, listening to this massive C5As, firing in to deliver tanks for Israel to prosecute the war. It was the American airlift of military equipment to Israel that finally convinced Sadat of the gravity of his position. Material losses have been organized.
And then afterwards, as he applied his diplomacy to the effort first to get a ceasefire and then to get negotiations going. We will talk again tomorrow and then we will present the minister's ideas to the Syrians. And it deeply impressed me. I was an Australian student at the time that the role of the United States was critical both in war and in peace.
At this point, Kissinger is still at covert wing, and Syria and Israel refuse to need place to place. That's kind of an epiphany and I decided that I was going to divide my life to helping resolve the Arab Israeli conflict. Eventually, come to the United States, what inspires you to sort of move in that direction? You know, I'd really spent a lot of time focused on the international relations of the Arab Israeli conflict, learning about it and writing about it and ended up serendipitously in Washington and found myself engaged in a policy debate here that I never imagined was possible.
And nobody asked one as an Australian doing, telling us how to run our foreign policy. In fact, my accent turned out to be a great asset because I'm jumping ahead in the story. But when I met now the opportunity to brief Bill Clinton when he was running for president, the first thing he said to me was he liked my accent. So how do you meet Bill Clinton?
By that point, I was running the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, which was a think tank, which I had found it. And a friend of mine was working with Clinton in his presidential campaign. And they needed somebody to do the middle-aged stuff and he introduced me to Clinton. If you vote for Bill Clinton in Al Gore, there'll be a lot of nights when we worked at 10 o'clock looking into your promise, your future, your America, building people up, not tearing them down, and lifting people up.
What was your initial impression of Clinton? Look, he was very smart and charismatic, charming. So I pretty much fell in love from the get-go. Hillary was there in that first meeting.
I remember it because she was cruising me on BB Netanyahu and what was BB Netanyahu about. And I was giving a little kind of amateur psychological analysis and she was very taken by that. But the most important opportunity I had was in the heat of the election campaign. And Clinton had just come in from the rally and he was all pumped up, red-faced, and piled up his plate with food.
He sat there eating away out of a race as appetite. And I told him, look, if you become president, you'll have the opportunity with Rabin to get four-piece agreements in your first time between Jordan, Palestinian, and Lebanon. Because he has a mandate to make peace and you'll have that opportunity. I just remember he stopped eating.
He looked up. He looked at me and he said, I want to do that. And he was true to his word for eight years. He was deeply involved from day one in trying to achieve peace.
That's amazing. That's an amazing story. Was this your first time eating Rabin as well? No, I'd known Rabin quite well from my days, traveling to Israel, taking people to Israel.
So I knew him fairly well. What was your impression of him? He was really smart but reserved, very different to Clinton and Africa. Clinton was outgoing and very engaging.
Rabin was shy and reserved, but with a laser mind and a strategic thinker. I, military ID number 30743, retired general in the Israel Defense Forces in the past, consider myself to be a soldier in the army of peace today. He was always very impressive when he would do his strategic review of the situation. I remember one sitting with him at dinner.
He would have a double scotch on the rocks in a tall tumbler. The waiters always kept on filling up. He liked his scotch and a cigarette in his mouth. And he would be eating, talking, smoking and drinking at the same time was an amazing performance.
Always brilliant. Well, that him and Clinton did do together with Clinton's reputation for eating. Well, they did build a very close relationship, but it wasn't on that basis. I think Clinton was quite intimidated by Rabin at first because he was this war hero general politician who had gone from fighting the Arabs to decide to make peace.
Then, Clinton went through the experience of the Oklahoma bombing. The chaos in downtown Oklahoma City did indeed resemble Beirut after a police belief of a 1200 pound car bomb ripped through the nine-story federal building shortly after nine o'clock this morning. That was his first really searing experience with terrorism. And I remember Rabin came to town maybe a month afterwards, and he praised him.
I think very sincerely for the way that Clinton had handled the Oklahoma bombing. We felt the blast in Oklahoma City in Jerusalem. The shockwaves of this barbaric act were felt in our hearts and in our minds. Mr.
President, we stand today shoulder-to-shoulder with the American people in total rejections of any kind of their own. That was the moment I felt that transformed that relationship. They kind of had become equals in terms of politicians dealing with adversity, extreme adversity. I have been very concerned with how the children in Oklahoma City and indeed the children throughout America must be reacting to a horror of this magnitude.
And my message to this over the day. At that point, I think Clinton felt a lot more comfortable with him. I want to ask you, Oslo. The last minute negotiations went on for a day and a half non-stop.
But when the haggard Norwegian mediator arrived in Tunis, he said he had the historic documents of recognition in his bag. The US isn't really engaged in the Oslo process or at least negotiating it originally in Norway. When do you start to hear something big is happening? We're going to actually break through here.
We were really engaged at the time in trying to keep the negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians that were occurring in Washington on life support. Our fatt basically had control of this group of West Bank and a dozen Palestinians who were negotiating. And he was blocking them from doing anything because he had this negotiation with Robin and Perez unbeknownst to us. What we knew was there was some kind of track-to negotiation going on in Oslo.
So we knew something was going on. But we didn't take it seriously. I remember though very distinctly we came back from a trip to Damascus to Jerusalem. This is a secret state.
Christopher Dens Ross and myself. And then I remember sitting in the van as we waited for Christopher to get in the convoy. Dan Kurtzer looking at me and saying, you know, I just heard they have an agreement on the track too. Israeli cabin ministers reported for duty today and prepared to write history.
Inside his cramped government office, they officially recognized the PLO. Transforming Yasser Arafon's organization from arch enemy to worthy partner and changing the political landscape of the Middle East. Palestinian friends today may mark the end of our country in our long days and nights. We also with great love about our children who is still there.
They can dedicate this platform. We went off for some holidays. I remember I went to Australia for my nephews by mitzvah. And I'm down there and I get called by Dennis Ross.
And Dennis called me and said you're going to have to come back because we're hosting a ceremony at the White House in 13 days. I was like September 1st. So you better get back here. The path ahead will not be easy.
These new understandings impressive though they are will not erase the fears and suspicions of the past. But now the Israelis and the Palestinians have laid the foundations of hope. So I never got together by their fus play and came back and I was thinking, you know, bloody hell. I was outraged that they'd done this behind our backs and outraged at the thought that yes, Arafon was going to be coming to the White House.
Rubbins advisors didn't want him to go wanted Paris to be the one to go and wanted to avoid Arafon being there as well. So it was going to be Paris and Abu Mazin who was then our answer number two who we got inside the agreement. And that's what we went in the first opportunity to brief Clinton. That's what I told him.
Had been organized. And he said, well, I want to speak to Robin. So we got Robin on the phone. And Clinton says to him, you know, this is such a big deal.
I really think you need to be here. I'm listening. I'm in the Oval Office listening to you know I'm a speaker. And Robin instead of saying, no, no, no, I'm standing Paris says, well, that'll be difficult for you, Mr.
President. I want to create difficulty for you. Clinton's looking at me. And he says, it won't be difficult for me.
I think you need to be here. And it says, no, I don't know. It'd be difficult for you. He says, no, you need to be here.
He says, well, I don't know. So he gets off the phone. He looks at me. He's now he's angry.
And he says, you told me he wants to send Paris. I'm telling you he wants to come. And you get on the phone and tell his people that the President of the United States wants him to be here. And I said, well, you know, that means that yes, I'll be here.
They've got to be here. If they don't embrace it, it's not going to work. Had you met Arafat before? I worked with him.
No, this was your first. On our terrorism list. That was law that prohibited any official contact with the PLO. And that was all done on Israel's behalf.
And here, when the Israeli Prime Minister was going off and making a deal with him. So we had to take him off the terrorism list in order to get him to the White House. As a result, and in light of this week's events, I have decided to resume the dialogue and the contacts between the United States and the PLO. The White House today, the Israeli and Palestinian leaders have signed an agreement setting in motion the second stage of their peace process.
We are today giving peace a chance and saying to you and saying again to you enough. Let us pray. What wasn't negotiating Arafat like? He was the artful dodger.
He could never pin him down. He was quirky. He was eccentric. He would wear this safari uniform.
It wasn't a military uniform because the Anawani. He had little broaches that he tried to put out there as medals. That was my Mr. Caesar.
Please, broach, I don't remember. I make it look like he was a general. And he had pieces of paper in every pocket that he pulled out on the medication. And he would go off into these flights of fantasy where he would tell you that he was the engineer that built all the ports in Kuwait.
He just seemed to be out of touch with reality. But he wasn't. It was all a performance on his part. He was a great actor.
On the other hand, he had the support of his people. He had the legitimacy that came from having put the Palestinian cause on the map through the terrorism that he was responsible for in the 1960s. And so he could make decisions. And when you got him to make a decision, it would hold.
But what was critical to him making that decision was a trust in the Israeli side. And he had grown to trust Robin, partly because Robin understood that Arafat had certain needs to support his legitimacy, including what Robin called walking around money. So Robin was quite content for Arafat to pick up funding from doing deals on concrete sales with Israelis. And you know, Robin turned a blind eye to that because he wanted Arafat to have some walking around money.
Well, Arafat always used to refer to it as my money, my money. So he grew to trust Robin. And when Robin would send him an emissary to tell him, look, I've got a problem here. Politically, I need you to not object to this settlement or this activity that I'm going to have to do that's going to hurt you.
Arafat was ready to say, okay, he loved it, actually, to be conspiring with Robin. And so they helped each other politically. And in doing so, they built a relationship of trust. So then you go through the negotiations for a couple of years and you're making progress.
At this point, you're the ambassador to Israel. You move to Israel. Well, by that time, we already had the Oslo Accords, which we had embraced, had got a agreement which provided for Arafat to come back to Gaza. Then we had the Israel Jordan peace treaty, which we helped to negotiate and they'd be signing ceremony in the way after almost half the century of animosity at best and three major wars, Israel and Jordan enthusiastically agreed to live in peace.
So things were really moving at that point. And we were working quietly with Assad to get the Syria deal because Robin had committed that he would withdraw from the Golan Heights. So that was all secret at the time that we knew that we could taste it. We thought at the time and Clinton sent me to Israel to work with Robin on the Syria deal.
In order for peace to be completed, it still lacks two people, the president of Syria and the president of Lebanon. And five months later, he's assassinated. We've been at a rally of tens of thousands of his supporters. A rally called to say yes to peace, no to violence.
Rabina had asked me not to come to the rally. So I was at home. I was actually in a bath. I don't normally take a bath, but I'd come with my son on a 10k run and I was really in bad shape.
And he had to harbor his bureau chief, revenge bureau chief, call me on the phone. And he just sent to me. Rabina has been shot, make me an echo of Hosmeh in hung up the phone. The good-natured crowd was going home.
Rabina stepped off the stage. The gun man slipped through and fired at point blank range. At least half of the apparent assassin in custody. He described as a law student in his 20s and has affiliated with radical Jewish settlers.
So I raced down to the hospital, which was in the heart of Tel Aviv. I remember it really being quite eerie. There was no traffic. I got in there and walked down to the basement where the emergency rooms were.
And the first person I saw was Aetan Harbor. And he was sitting at this booth writing something. And I kind of said, Aetan, and he wouldn't look up nothing. And then another political aid of Rabina came up to me and embraced me.
And he said, Rabina kind of whispered to me, Rabina. So that's how I found out. Aetan was writing the announcement. He then went out two minutes later and announced to the world that Rabina assassinated.
There was just one phone there. And I was trying to get a line. I hung up the phone. Suddenly it rings.
You know, I picked up the phone. It's the White House situation room. And I got the president calling. Not for me, but for somebody.
He just wanted to speak to somebody. So I got on the phone with him. And I said, would you like to speak to Leia? And he said, yes.
So I kind of carried her over to the phone. And I just remember picking up the phone and saying, Bill, he said, the idiot, the idiot, he shot our Yitzhak. And Clinton said, I'll be there. I'll be there for the phone.
Then he went out and he made a statement. The world has lost one of its greatest men, a warrior for his nation's freedom. And now a martyr for his nation's peace. And he was choking up.
He said, and words that will always be associated with him in the minds of Israel. He said, Shalom Ha'Vere, goodbye friend. Because words cannot express my true feelings. Let me just say, Shalom Ha'Vere.
I thought that really captured the deep admiration and affection that Clinton had for Robin, and therefore a very, really profound commitment after Robin's assassination to do whatever he could to preserve the peacemaking legacy of his Ha'Vere, his friend. And now you look back at it. Do you think we would have had his really Palestinian peace if he hadn't? You know, I was at first convinced that we'd gone so far already that it was irreversible.
With Paris taking over, you know, it just felt like we'd be able to move on. So I was in denial for a long time about the impact it would have. It was not him once Netanyahu won the elections, which took place a few months later, and he won by half of one percent of the vote. But he campaigned against Oslo.
As head of the conservatively coup d'bari, Netanyahu himself became the face of the opposition to Oslo. Netanyahu said he would live up to the commitments made by the previous government, even though he had run against the Oslo agreement. And he met with Arafat. The Prime Minister Netanyahu and the chairman Arafat will speak, and they will say a few words, and after they will take the election.
The end of the White House a few months later, and negotiate two agreements with Arafat. Observe that both parties reiterate their commitment to the interim agreement. But it was really, really heavy. We were in effect dragging and screaming.
However, I'd like to emphasize that we have to take into account the needs and the requirements of both sides on the basis of reciprocity. And just doing our best, keep the process alive until out of the blue, after Netanyahu does the Y agreement with Arafat, in which Clinton managed to persuade him to give up a whole 13 percent of the West Bank. And his government collapsed. The right wing brought his government down.
His own coalition, the coalition of the Russians, the Orthodox, actually turned against him. And the elections are suddenly Barack is elected. Oh, that we are the first step for unity change and new hope for Israel. And we've got a new chance.
Barack is determined to finish the deals with the Palestinians and the Syrians, and therefore the Lebanese Syrians controlled them in those days. And we thought he's our second chance. I'm very glad that Barack is going to be our prime minister of Israel, because I think he's going to change a lot of things in this country, especially in the peace with the Arab country and peace inside the country. Barack, like Robin, wanted to try to do the Syria deal first.
So he went off and worked very hard on that. And it's important for people to remember this, because I think conventional wisdom is now solidified around the idea that at Camp David, we came close to an Israeli Palestinian deal. And that when we failed on that, that was the end of the peace process. But in fact, where we really came close was not on the Palestinian because we didn't have a workable solution on refugees or on Jerusalem at Camp David, where we really came close was with Syrians.
So that's the good news. Our side coming to the end of his life decided he was going to do the deal. Yes, this is a fight. Yes, this is a fight.
Her father, half as a lassad. He decided he wanted to do the deal. He sent his foreign minister to negotiate with Barack. We had this intense negotiation at Shepherdstown.
I think they broke a lot of ground, but it's tough. I told you it was tough in the beginning. I still think we can get there, but they're going to have to come back here to do so. And then a meeting, a summit meeting between Clinton and Assad in I think it was April of 2000 in Geneva, when Barack offered full withdrawal from the Golan Heights, like prepared a map with him of what the line would look like.
And there was some minor adjustments that all the security arrangements and the normalization arrangements were all in place. It was only a matter of getting Assad to say yes. And he I think he felt at that time was too late. And he said no, he died a few months later.
One of the region's longest serving leaders, Assad died Saturday at his home in Damascus after battling heart trouble for years. He was 69 years old. Funeral services are planned for Tuesday. Assad's death raises serious concerns about serious stability and the future of the Mideast peace process.
For three decades, President Haf al-Assad played a critical role in the Middle East. His passing doesn't alter the compelling logic for all parties to pursue a comprehensive peace nor America's willingness to work with all parties to achieve that goal. And when we failed there, that put Clinton and Barack in the situation in which they started to run after Arafat. Arafat had gone from the situation in which he thought Assad was going to make a deal.
And if Assad had made a deal, Syria had made peace, and Lebanon would have followed, then Arafat would have been left chasing for what he could get. Instead, when we failed with Assad, he was in the cap of a seat. And that changed the whole political dynamic completely. So then we do move on to Camp David, the last sort of final hurrah in the least in this effort in the 90s or 2000s at that point.
Why this summit and why now? While Israeli and Palestinian negotiators have made real progress, crystallizing issues and defining gaps, the truth is they can take the talks no further at their level. What's it like preparing for something like that? I mean, in retrospect, do you think it was a good idea, or did we sort of push it too soon?
There's all kinds of different arguments that are made about this question. Well, time was running out for both Clinton and Barack. There'd been some months of final status preparations, but when you look back at it, none of the parties were really ready, and that included us. We were touching issues that had been long postponed and never really seriously considered.
Barack came and Camp David and offered to give up the Arab suburbs in Jerusalem. We thought that was absolutely stunning. We thought maybe we could get one or two Arab suburbs for the Palestinians, but he was ready to give them all up. We thought that was huge.
Well, it didn't even come close to solving the problems of Jerusalem. Where were you when you sort of realized this is going south? This is not going to end well. Arafat was looking for an exit, so he drove the negotiations to Jerusalem, basically said to Clinton and Barack, we can work out the other things, security, territory, and refugees, if we can get a solution on Jerusalem.
The hardest, most complicated and symbolic issue, and so we went off and started to try to figure out how we come to solution on Jerusalem. And it was then that I realized, well, it's just like a very, very far apart on this one. We'd had to decide before going into Camp David that we were going to go for something less than a deal full deal. But Barack was insisted on a full deal, Clinton wanted a full deal, and there was no way in retrospect we could have gotten a full deal, but that's what we went for.
Having gone for it, it was no way that we could drop back to something less than that. This is one of the photos in the New York Times from Camp David yesterday. No deal says the cut line. A Hubert of Israel, President Clinton, and Yasser Arafat in a subdued mood yesterday at Camp David as their summit meeting concluded without an agreement.
Gary Ackerman is our guest, Democrat from New York. Mr Ackerman, good morning. Morning, how are you? I'm doing fine.
When you see a picture like this, participants hardly looking at each other, if not at all, as things ended. What does that make you think? Well, first they look exhausted. They look like they had wanted to do something and they're kind of depressed about it, not happening.
That sounds actually somewhat similar to some of our experiences in 2013 and 2014. It seems like a constant dynamic. The second use signal as the mediator that we're pulling back and we're not going for the full deal, both the party is like, okay, that sounds a lot easier. Let's go there and so you're sort of stuck going for it all and swinging for the fences.
There's a much higher likelihood that you strike out at that point. Exactly right. But then if you don't swing for the fences, your mind in interim deals by the time that we got involved in 2013, the whole idea of interim steps, small steps would be completely discredited as well. The Arab League has backed US Secretary of State John Kerry's Bush to revive Israeli-Palestinian peace talks at a meeting in Jordan.
Israel needs to look hard at this initiative, which promises Israel peace with 22 Arab nations and 35 Muslim nations, a total of 57 nations. I think that the mistrust was so great between leaders and between people that the whole process and like arteries hardening had just become really impossible. What is it like working with John Kerry as opposed to Bill Clinton having a different champion who's trying to lead this effort again with I think full energy? Yes, John Kerry is like the energizer.
Bunny, he's just going whole time. We all appreciate, believe me, we appreciate the challenges ahead. If shear willpower and determination was enough to do the deal, we would have gotten the peace. But unfortunately, you need leaders, Israeli and Palestinian leaders like Yitzhak Rabin or Anwar Sadat, who are not only willing to take risks and to the Coast to take risks, but also have the political savvy to bring their people along with them.
Without that, you know, American media has come to succeed with that peace is possible. I think everyone involved here believes that we cannot pass along to another generation of responsibility of ending a conflict that is in our power to resolve in our time. They should not be expecting to bear. That's Martin Indic, the former US ambassador to Israel, our conversation with him coincides with an important event here at CNAS.
As this week, we're releasing a new report with the Brookings Institution on how to address the petrol crisis in Gaza. On the next episode of Stories from the Back Channel, after 9-11, CNAS senior fellow Paul Shari was an army ranger scouting the mountains of Afghanistan and his team encountered a young girl with a QA radio. She had been sent by the Taliban to report back on their position. One of the things I can tell you never came up was the idea of shooting us on the court.
That was not a topic of conversation. But what might a machine have done? If you program a machine to comply with the laws of war, they would have killed us on the court. Now I think that would be morally wrong, even if it were legal.
I don't think that's consistent with American values or the values that I was brought up with or the folks on my team. But I think it raises this challenging question of, you know, how would machines know the difference between what's legal and what is right? What autonomous weapons means for the future of our military and the world on the next Stories from the Back Channel. Coming next Tuesday.