Why Dairy Futures Seem Irrational
from The Milk Check
Dairy futures have been anything but calm. In just three weeks, prices across Class III, Class IV, cheese, butter and nonfat have surged, then whipped back and forth enough to exhaust even full-time market watchers. In this episode of The Milk Check, Ted Jacoby and the T.C. Jacoby & Co. team break down why dairy futures can look irrational, even when the underlying fundamentals haven’t changed much. What’s driving the chaos (beyond fundamentals) Short squeezes 101: how a crowded short can turn into a domino effect Flow first, narrative second: why the buying often hits before the story shows up Realized vs. implied volatility: what the market did vs. what the options market is pricing in Why nonfat may be the center of the storm: the team debates whether this is a true regime change Why butter and cheese moved too: how spread relationships and algorithmic trading can drag correlated dairy contracts higher Spot market feedback loops: how NDPSR-linked spot markets can amplify futures moves (tail-wagging-the-dog dynamics). What usually happens next: why squeezes rarely park at the top Plus: stick around for a director’s cut featuring the unedited, behind-the-scenes debate the team usually leaves on the cutting room floor. Got questions? We’d love to hear them. Submit below, and we might answer it on the show. Ask The Milk Check Ted Jacoby III: [00:00:00] It has been wild and crazy every day for the last three weeks. Welcome to the Milk Check from T.C. Jacoby and Company, your complete guide to dairy markets, from the milking parlor to the supermarket shelf. I'm Ted Jacoby. Let's dive in. We've got a special treat for you this week. We're gonna drop the director's cut of this podcast where we include some of the conversations that usually get edited out: how we debate internally about some of these market dynamics. So, stay tuned after the end of the podcast and listen to the off-takes. My name is Ted Jacoby, CEO of T.C. Jacoby & Co., and joining me today is Jacob Menge, our Vice President of Risk Management and Trading Strategy, Josh White, our Vice President of Dairy Ingredients, and Joe Maixner, our Director of Sales. We are in week three of a very high level of volatility in the dairy markets. We've had a very interesting last few weeks. It's February 9th, and since January 15th, our Class III March futures are up 18%. Our [00:01:00] March cheese futures are up over 15%. Butter futures are up over 26%. nonfat futures up 37% and Class IV milk futures up 36%. These markets have not gone up in a straight line. There's been a massive amount of volatility, a lot of green, a lot of red, and then a lot of green, and then a lot of red again, enough to make all of us who talk these markets on a daily and an hourly basis to be flat out exhausted. The question becomes, what's causing this level of volatility? We are gonna talk a little bit about market psychology. Why can markets do what they've done in the last three weeks, and why our actual fundamental market analysis hasn't really changed that much. To quote the famous British economist, John Maynard Keynes, "Markets can remain irrational far longer than you and I can remain solvent." And I'll tell you that the last three weeks reminded me repeatedly of that phrase. It serves as a warning against over leveraging or trying to fight the tape, trading against trends, suggesting that just because you are right about a trend's [00:02:00] long-term direction, it's useless if you run out of capital. Ted Jacoby III: And I have a feeling that based on what we've been experiencing lately, there's probably a few people out there that exactly that happened to. It has been wild and crazy every day for the last three weeks. Jake, why do markets do this? Jacob Menge: You threw out your little soundbite anecdotes. We will pull out some more of 'em during those podcasts, I'm sure, because those are all written by people that have been burned by short squeezes like we're seeing, right? One that sticks out to me is: volatility is the tax you pay for liquidity and leverage, and that's what futures markets are, right? They are a way for people to express their opinion on price action. Obviously, even a hedger is in some way expressing an opinion using futures or options. They're highly liquid. You don't even have to pay full price for 'em because you only gotta put up that margin upfront. And again, volatility is usually the tax that you pay for that. When you have this easy leverage, and everybody can get on one side of the boat you can't have your cake and eat it, too. You can't [00:03:00] have tight spreads, you can't have the leverage and smooth prices all at the same time. And that can result in things like short squeezes. We were primed for one. You're right, we had low volatility. We had a lot of people that were short the market because that was the prevailing narrative. As a result, all it took was one little spark to set some pretty dry kindling ablaze. That's exactly what we saw, especially on the nonfat side. I'll pull out my second anecdote. I've always heard: squeezes are flow events first, narrative events second. That's exactly what was going on with nonfat. Meaning we get this massive bullish order flow coming in. The market goes up 30%+ in a few week period, and it's only after that happens that all of a sudden we start having these conversations of, well, what was everybody missing in nonfat? I think the market probably was missing something on the nonfat side. But at the end of the day when you have volatility near lows, volume that was [00:04:00] fairly average, it makes sense that really the only way to go is gonna be up. If there's any kind of news. And the news this time turns out there's a whole lot less nonfat out there than people probably expected. And away we go. And it turns into this snowball where there's the first people to see that and start wanting to buy, and the second they start wanting to buy, turns out there's not a whole lot of sellers there, because everybody that wanted to sell already had sold. You get that first nice air pocket jump higher. That really is that first domino where if you're a market maker, say, and you need to hedge your book, you're trying to run a delta neutral trading book as a market maker, you might say, "Okay, well hey, I need to go get some long delta myself." And you might go try to buy some options, to buy calls, to offset that. And then all of a sudden the market maker that is selling the calls want more for the calls than they wanted just a day ago. Ted Jacoby III: A day ago? Try an hour ago. Jacob Menge: Yeah, an hour ago. Truly. And so [00:05:00] that would be what we call implied volatility. Right. And I think that's one important distinction here is we have volatility, what we call realized volatility, which is what the market actually did, like how crazy the market is, and then implied volatility, basically what the market is charging for options usually and implying what the market thinks the volatility will be in the future. And that's where it gets really fun because even though we didn't have a lot of realized volatility, if the market thinks it's gonna become volatile and starts charging more for these options, it can almost be a self-fulfilling prophecy, right? Because now you have to pay more to buy that insurance policy, and you can see how that snowball really can grow fairly fast. We have one other really fun part in dairy markets that I can't help but mention, and that is that we also have spot markets. Those spot markets indirectly are linked to the futures prices because of our National Dairy Products Sales Report (NDPSR) system. And so we [00:06:00] can really wind up with the tail wagging the dog in our futures markets and in our spot markets where, say the spot markets were driving the ship on the way down. People had a lot of products, they're selling them. Well, all of a sudden, if we start getting a little bit of a squeeze in our futures markets, now if you have product, you don't wanna sell it on the exchange, you wanna just hold onto it and capture the carry in the futures curve. And so you're not gonna sell. And so any bidder on the spot auction has to bid it higher. And guess what? Now the futures see the spot auction being bid up and they say, "Well, well, we are right to be panicking. We need to go higher." And that's just pouring gasoline on the fire. We've already got a raging inferno at this point, but that adds the final pour of gasoline. Ted Jacoby III: You remind me of one of my learning moments 20 some odd, almost 30 years ago, when I was watching these markets, as the futures markets were just becoming relevant to the dairy industry. And it was the realization that futures markets and spot markets are [00:07:00] two different markets with a different set of drivers of supply and demand. On the spot market, supply is, let's talk about butter, is the supply of 80% bulk butter. Demand is the demand for that 80% bulk butter. The futures butter markets, it may settle to that NDPSR price of the bulk butter market, but the reality is the supply is the number of people who are willing to sell those futures, and the demand is the number of people that are willing to buy those futures. And so you can have people coming into the market that really don't care at all about how much block butter are out there because they're actually trying to hedge cream cheese or a chocolate shake or something completely different that has butter in it, but they need to own those futures, and that futures market can move quite a bit and has nothing to do with the actual supply and demand of the market it's based on. Jacob Menge: Anecdote number three. I always have heard squeezes feel irrational because risk systems are mechanical....
Embed this episode
No transcript yet.