Wilkinson v. Garland

Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Wilkinson v Garland. In this case, the court considered this issue: Is an agency determination that a given set of established facts does not rise to the statutory standard of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under 8 U-S-C § 1252(a)(2)(D), or instead a discretionary judgment call unreviewable under Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)? The case was decided on March 19, 2024. The Supreme Court held that an immigration judge’s discretionary decision that a given set of established facts does not satisfy 8 U-S-C § 1229b(b)(1)(D)’s “exceptional and extremely unusual” hardship standard for determining eligibility for cancellation of removal is a mixed question of law and fact, reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D)’s jurisdiction restoring exception for “questions of law.” Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the majority opinion of the Court. The application of the statutory hardship standard to an established set of facts presents a quintessential mixed question of law and fact. While this determination requires close examination of the facts, under the Court’s precedent in Guerrero-Lasprilla v Barr, a mixed question that requires factual analysis is still a mixed question and therefore a “question of law” that courts have jurisdiction to review. The Court rejected the government’s arguments that Guerrero-Lasprilla should be limited to judicially created standards, that the statutory history precludes review, and that a primarily factual mixed question is a question of fact. Nothing in § 1252(a)(2)(D) suggests “questions of law” is limited to only certain types of mixed questions. While courts still cannot review the underlying factual determinations, the application of the hardship standard to those facts is reviewable as a mixed question of law and fact, albeit under a deferential standard of review given the factual nature of the inquiry. The Third Circuit’s holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review hardship determinations was therefore erroneous. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, expressing skepticism that Congress intended the phrase “questions of law” in § 1252(a)(2)(D) to encompass all mixed questions of law and fact, as the majority concluded. However, she agreed with the majority’s judgment based on the controlling precedent of Guerrero-Lasprilla. Chief Justice John Roberts authored a dissenting opinion in which he agreed with Justice Samuel Alito’s dissent that while Guerrero-Lasprilla was correctly decided, the majority erred in this case by reading the language in that case too broadly. Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented, arguing that the Court’s broad reading of “questions of law” in Guerrero-Lasprilla defies common sense and would result in the exception nearly swallowing the rule, which Congress could not have intended when it enacted §1252(a)(2)(B) and §1252(a)(2)(D). He contended that the hardship determination is overwhelmingly a factual question that should not be classified as a reviewable “question of law.” The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.