Ajmal Sohail Counterterrorism & Counterintelligence

The Transcript1 second Recent remarks by Kayas, the EU foreign policy chief, during his trip to Islamabad7 seconds have sparked a new wave of debate in political and media circles. In his blunt statement,14 seconds he referred to attacks by groups based in Afghanistan against Pakistan, saying that Islamabad has the right to defend itself against these23 secondsaggressions. This stance is significant for several reasons. First, it maysignal a shift in Europe’s — and even the world’s — discourse regardingAfghanistan’s security crisis after30 seconds theTaliban’s return to power. Second, has Pakistan succeeded in convincing theinternational community that Taliban-ruled Afghanistan has become a base forterrorism against its neighbors and beyond? This is the debate of the day.1:11 Greetings, welcome to “Debate of the Day.” I am Vaid Pekan, and my guests today are Mehrab Sarjoi, a Baloch political activist from London; Ajmal Sohail, counterterrorism expert from Germany; and Sang Siddiqi, political activist from the Netherlands.1:27 We begin with Mr. Sohail: where is the geography of terrorism?Ajmal Sohail’s Remarks1:36 It is very interesting, because today terrorism has no geography.1:43 Terrorism today is largely directed through cyberspace, so we cannot designate a specific geography for terrorist activities. But what is important is that, as youmentioned, the EU seems to have been influenced by Pakistan’s narrative — thatPakistan is defending itself against2:16 terrorist activities originating from Afghanistan. What pains me is that either theinternational community, the West, and Europe are turning a blind eye to thefacts, or they are being deceived by Pakistan. This is not new.2:40 In 2011, when Osama bin Laden was hunted down in Pakistan during President Obama’s term, despite the fact that the U.S. had pursued him for 11 years as the symbol of anti-democracy and anti-American values, he was found in Pakistan. And in that same year, Pakistan became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council.3:36 If anyone researches how Pakistan managed to secure that seat in 2011, they will see the irony. Regarding the EU’s statements, what is striking is that Pakistan isbehind much of what happens in Afghanistan and the region.4:07 If necessary, I can share written documents with you showing how Pakistan iscomplicit — not just complicit, but leading — in these matters, while trying towash its hands and blame Afghanistan. My aim is not to defend Afghanistan orthe Taliban, but to show that the Taliban are instruments of Pakistan, managedby it for tactical and strategic purposes.5:10 I have a letter from Pakistan’s military intelligence (ISI), dated February 5 of thisyear, about a meeting in Rawalakot. Representatives of groups such as “Network47” led by Mufti Asghar Kashmiri, and Taliban representative Ibrahim Sadr, wereinvited. The meeting discussed relocating Kashmiri and Hamas militants intoAfghanistan and opening training centers.6:20 The letter specifies provinces like Herat, Kandahar, and Helmand as locations for these camps. It was even confirmed by Afghan officials in Kandahar.7:32 So where are the terrorist camps located? Without doubt, some are in Afghanistan, used by Pakistan against other countries — for example, against India through Kashmiri militants, and in the Middle East through Hamas.8:28 Another letter from Pakistani intelligence refers to “Night Birds,” a codename forISIS-Khorasan. It states that ISI relocated ISIS fighters into Balochistan touse them against Baloch separatists and to pressure Afghanistan.9:34 With the Taliban’s return, have terrorist centers shifted from Pakistan to Afghanistan?Partly, yes — for Pakistan’s tactical and strategic interests, especiallyagainst India, China, and in the Middle East.10:32 Terroristgroups can be divided into three categories:· Global groups:al-Qaeda and ISIS.· Regional groups:ISIS-Khorasan, the Taliban, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Islamic Movement ofTajikistan, etc.· Local groups:operating between Afghanistan and Pakistan with state awareness and support.26:32 Now, why have the Taliban entered this game? What benefit do they see in supporting terrorist groups?26:41Professionally speaking, we must clarify the definition of terrorism. If weaccept the cliché definition — any non-state group that takes up arms forpolitical, economic, social, religious, or ideological reasons, killingcivilians and disrupting life — then even resistance groups fighting oppressiveregimes would be called terrorists.27:27 For example, Baloch liberation groups mostly target Pakistani military, notcivilians. If we apply the cliché definition, then even Ahmad Massoud’sNational Resistance Front fighting the Taliban would be labeled terrorist. Thatis incorrect.28:44 We must distinguish between groups fighting a legitimate government versus those fighting an occupying, illegitimate regime. The Taliban themselves areterrorists, so resistance against them cannot be defined as terrorism.30:07 Pakistan has succeeded in pushing its narrative diplomatically, through lobbying, so that EU officials echo its stance. Meanwhile, the Taliban have also lobbied to deny it. But the presence of terrorist groups in Afghanistan is undeniable.30:49 The Taliban allow these groups to operate, giving Pakistan a pretext to claim “legitimate defense” and attack Afghanistan whenever it wishes.31:15 Pakistan uses these groups as tools of influence — against Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and others. The Taliban lack deterrence power, so they use terrorist groups as a substitute for defense.32:01 Afghanistan has indeed become recognized globally as a center of terrorism.33:41 The Taliban’s strategy is not truly effective, but they use these groups to exertinfluence. Pakistan, however, has far greater freedom to threaten and attackAfghanistan under this pretext. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit ajmals.substack.com/subscribe

For this episode, I’m bringing you inside my latest presentation on counter–narco‑terrorism, where I break down the full architecture of the Golden Triangle’s production networks, the cross‑border trafficking routes, and the transnational actors who keep this illicit economy alive. CIA released another notorious Drug-trafficker and sole Sponsor of Taliban’s Haqqani Network from the US JailFrom state and non‑state facilitation to the financial pipelines that launder billions across continents, this talk exposes how narcotics, insurgency, and organized crime intersect to reshape regional security. Opium, Insurgency, and IntelligenceIt’s a deep dive into the mechanics of a shadow system that fuels instability far beyond its borders — and why understanding these networks is essential for any serious conversation about global security today. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit ajmals.substack.com/subscribe

Welcome back to the program. Today, we’re diving into one of the most complex security challenges in Afghanistan: the rise of ISIS‑K, its systematic targeting of minorities, and the Taliban’s struggle to contain the group.When we look at ISIS‑K’s pattern of violence, it becomes clear that their attacks on minorities are not random. They are rooted in a rigid ideological framework. ISIS‑K follows an extreme Takfiri interpretation of Salafi‑Jihadism, one that labels Shia Muslims, Sufis, Sikhs, and other minority communities as religiously illegitimate. In their propaganda, these attacks are framed as acts of “purification,” which gives the group both a theological justification and a recruitment narrative. Targeting minorities also provides ISIS‑K with high‑visibility operations that attract global media attention and help them differentiate themselves from the Taliban, who—despite their own history of violence—do not pursue systematic sectarian cleansing in the same way.But ideology is only one layer. Strategically, ISIS‑K uses these attacks to undermine the Taliban’s claim that they can govern and provide security. Every successful attack exposes gaps in Taliban intelligence, weakens their credibility, and fuels the perception that Afghanistan is far from stable. Sectarian violence also creates the kind of chaos in which ISIS‑K thrives, allowing the group to present itself as the most uncompromising jihadist alternative.Now, the question many observers ask is whether the Taliban are actually capable of curbing ISIS‑K. The answer is complicated. On one hand, the Taliban control the territory, the borders, and the state apparatus. They have long‑standing relationships with local communities, which gives them access to human intelligence networks. And ISIS‑K is a direct threat to their rule, so they are highly motivated to fight it.On the other hand, the Taliban face serious limitations. There is ideological overlap between the two groups, which makes it difficult for the Taliban to offer a convincing counter‑narrative—especially to radicalized youth. Their security structure is fragmented, lacking the professionalism and coordination needed for modern counterterrorism operations. Governance failures, economic collapse, and the exclusion of minorities create fertile ground for ISIS‑K recruitment. And in urban areas like Kabul, ISIS‑K operates through small, covert cells that are much harder for the Taliban to penetrate.External factors also play a role. Porous borders, regional rivalries, and the absence of international counterterrorism cooperation all give ISIS‑K room to maneuver. These dynamics allow the group to survive, adapt, and continue launching high‑impact attacks.In the short term, the Taliban may be able to suppress ISIS‑K in certain rural areas. But in the medium term, ISIS‑K will remain capable of symbolic, high‑visibility attacks. And in the long term, without political inclusion, economic stability, and credible ideological alternatives, the Taliban are unlikely to eliminate ISIS‑K entirely.This is not just a security issue — it’s a structural and regional one. And it will shape Afghanistan’s future for years to come. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit ajmals.substack.com/subscribe

Podcast Description:In this episode, intelligence analyst Ajmal Sohail unpacks the Istanbul attack with a practitioner’s eye: how the cell was formed, how coordination likely occurred, and what vulnerabilities were exploited. From encrypted communications to symbolic target selection, this conversation reveals the operational logic behind modern extremist attacks. It also explores how Türkiye’s complex geopolitical position shapes both the threat landscape and the counter‑terrorism response. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit ajmals.substack.com/subscribe

Europe’s antisemitism crisis is no longer just about hate crimes—it has become a national security challenge.On AnewZ Prime Time, I explained why security services across Europe are alarmed:* Attacks on Jewish institutions are not isolated incidents but part of a wider extremist ecosystem.* Counterterrorism units are now leading investigations because these threats often involve surveillance, financing, and online radicalization—classic hallmarks of terrorism.* The challenge is multidimensional: state actors, organized extremist groups, and self-radicalized individuals are all operating simultaneously, overwhelming traditional policing methods.I emphasized that simply arresting suspects is no longer enough. The real battle is in detecting networks before violence happens—tracking propaganda, monitoring financing, and closing security gaps around synagogues and schools.👉 This conversation is a wake-up call: Europe must treat antisemitism not only as a moral crisis but as a counterterrorism priority.🎧 Listen to the full discussion on my podcast, where I break down how intelligence agencies are adapting to this evolving threat and what must be done to protect vulnerable communities.#Antisemitism #Counterterrorism #Security #Europe #AjmalSohail #Podcast This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit ajmals.substack.com/subscribe

As the war in Ukraine eventually transitions toward ceasefire or settlement, the strategic challenge facing Kyiv and its partners will not be a simple shift from war to peace. Instead, the country is likely to enter a complex grey zone—one where violent extremist groups, criminal networks, and state-linked actors see opportunity rather than closure. Understanding this environment now is essential for shaping effective counterterrorism and security policy in the years ahead.1. Post‑War Ukraine: A High‑Value Environment for Extremist ExploitationPost‑conflict environments have historically attracted violent extremist groups, and Ukraine will be no exception. Three structural factors make such settings particularly vulnerable:* Weapons saturation: Years of conflict leave behind large volumes of military‑grade weapons, explosives, and trained personnel. Even with strong Ukrainian controls, the sheer scale of materiel increases the risk of diversion into illicit networks.* Psychological radicalisation: War normalises violence and entrenches grievance narratives. Extremist organisations routinely exploit these conditions, targeting disaffected veterans, traumatised civilians, and displaced populations.* Institutional strain: Prolonged conflict exhausts even capable states. Fatigue, resource depletion, and administrative overload create enforcement blind spots that external actors can exploit.This does not imply that Ukraine will become a failed state. Rather, it becomes a high‑value operating environment for actors seeking to seed instability or channel weapons into Europe’s criminal and extremist ecosystems.2. Ceasefires and Peace Transitions: A Period of Maximum VulnerabilityCeasefires are often perceived as stabilising moments. In reality, they create transitional vulnerabilities that militant actors understand well:* Demobilisation gaps: Fighters disengage faster than monitoring mechanisms can adjust, creating temporary vacuums.* Jurisdictional ambiguity: Control over territory, borders, and internal security is often unclear during transitions.* Reduced vigilance: Political pressure to demonstrate “peace dividends” can lead to premature force drawdowns.Extremist and criminal‑terror hybrid groups rarely strike during these periods. Instead, they embed quietly, build networks, and prepare infrastructure for future operations.3. European Troop Deployment: A Shift Toward Asymmetric and Deniable ThreatsAny future European military presence in Ukraine would reshape the threat landscape. Rather than direct confrontation, adversaries would likely adopt asymmetric tactics designed to raise political costs without triggering escalation:* Sabotage targeting logistics, infrastructure, and energy systems.* Attacks on soft military or civilian‑linked assets to exploit vulnerabilities while avoiding overt provocation.* False‑flag or proxy operations aimed at fracturing political consensus within Europe.The objective is not battlefield victory. It is narrative disruption, political pressure, and strategic exhaustion.4. Intelligence Coordination: The Decisive FactorIn a post‑war environment, intelligence coordination between Ukraine, Europe, and the United States becomes not just helpful, but decisive.* Threats will be transnational by design—weapons flows, online radicalisation, financing, and cross‑border travel.* No single service will have the full picture:* Ukraine understands the terrain and local actors.* European states see spillover effects.* The U.S. often tracks networks, enablers, and global linkages.* The greatest risk is not lack of data, but delays and silos. Classification barriers, political friction, and bureaucratic inertia can create dangerous blind spots.Effective prevention requires real‑time intelligence fusion, not post‑incident information sharing.5. The Most Likely Future Threat: Hybrid Actors Operating Below the Threshold of WarWhile lone‑actor attacks and isolated extremist incidents will occur, they are not the primary strategic concern. Nor is a large‑scale insurgency likely, given the territorial and social conditions required to sustain one.The most probable threat is hybrid actors—a blend of criminal networks, extremist groups, and state‑linked operatives. These actors:* Operate deniably and adapt quickly.* Exploit legal, political, and informational seams.* Seek destabilisation without openly declaring intent.Their goal is persistent disruption, not territorial control.Conclusion: The Grey Zone AheadUkraine’s post‑war challenge will not be a binary shift from conflict to peace. It will be the management of a grey zone where destabilisation is cheaper, quieter, and harder to attribute. The country’s resilience—and Europe’s security—will depend on recognising this reality early and preparing for a threat landscape defined not by open warfare, but by ambiguity, deniability, and hybrid pressure. This is a public episode. 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TranscriptToday, we examine a critical development in Afghanistan’s international posture.On the direct orders of Taliban Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada, the Interpol liaison branches within Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been formally dissolved. This decision, issued via an official decree dated 2 Muharram 1437, marks a decisive shift in the Taliban’s approach to international law enforcement cooperation.This move is widely interpreted as a retaliatory response to the continued non-recognition of the Taliban regime by the international community. It also signals internal efforts to shield senior leadership figures from mounting legal exposure amid growing international scrutiny.Strategic ContextHistorically, these liaison branches served as conduits for:· International criminal data exchange· Arrest warrant coordination· Transnational crime trackingHowever, the landscape has shifted dramatically. The International Criminal Court has recently issued arrest warrants for Akhundzada and Chief Justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani, citing gender persecution and crimes against humanity.Despite four years in power, the Taliban remain diplomatically isolated. They are unrecognized by the United Nations and most sovereign states, with sanctions and travel bans still firmly in place.Motivations Behind the DecisionA. Legal Shielding and Risk ContainmentThe dissolution of Interpol liaison offices serves to:· Minimize exposure to extradition mechanisms· Disrupt international tracking of Taliban officials· Block cooperation with foreign agencies enforcing ICC warrants or monitoring sanctioned individualsB. Ideological Rejection of Western Legal NormsInterpol operates within a secular, rules-based international legal framework—one that fundamentally contradicts the Taliban’s theocratic governance model. This move reflects a broader rejection of multilateral institutions and human rights frameworks.In essence, the Taliban are fortifying their internal sovereignty while severing ties with mechanisms of international accountability. The implications for transnational justice, diplomatic engagement, and regional stability are profound—and ongoing. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit ajmals.substack.com/subscribe

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Exclusive: Afghanistan has now become a sweet-home for about 22 terrorist groups, under the Taliban control, Foreign Fighters and International Terrorist Networks currently have three important Jihadi-military training Sites in the Country. 1: Sheikh Osama Training Center in Nuristan Province.2: Sheikh Jalaluddin Military Training Camp in Nangarhar Province.3: Tariq Bin Zaid Military Training Camp in Paktia Province.In addition, Taliban Defense Minister Mullah Yaqoob and Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani are paying monthly expenditure to four key leaders of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Central Council, including TTP leader Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud.1: $15,000 to Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud.2: $6,500 to Mufti Muzahim.3: $4,500 to Maulvi Faqir Muhammad.4: $4,500 to Mufti Muhammad Nadeem Darwish. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit ajmals.substack.com/subscribe

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Exclusive: According to information, as serious disagreements continue between the leader of the Taliban, Sheikh Haibatullah, and his ministers in (Kabul), ad his orders are not being obeyed. Therefore, the leader of the Afghan Taliban, Sheikh Al-Hadith Maulvi Haibatullah Akhund insisted on adapting his orders, on May 6, 2024, during his speech in Jamiat Ibrahim Al-Nakhee Madrasa, which is the master’s degree center of Islamic education of the Taliban, in the 11th security district, Ayno Mina town, Kandahar.The leader of the Taliban, Sheikh Haibatullah, addressed his ministers and governors and conveying especially the Ministry of Interior, led by Khalifa Sirajuddin Haqqani and the Ministry of Defense, headed by Maulvi Muhammad Yaqoob Mujahid, (if my order were against the Islamic Shari'ah, so you are not obliged to obey my order. It makes sense, if someone orders are against the Sharia, there is no obedience to that order, and then he recited the Qur'anic verses and said, "If the command of the ruler (Emir) is not against the Sharia, then it is not the command of the ruler, but the command of Allah, and it is obligatory upon you to accept it")… This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit ajmals.substack.com/subscribe

Exclusive: According to reliable sources, the leader of the Afghan Taliban, Sheikh Haibatullah Akhundzada, gave a speech for about 1 hour and 30 minutes yesterday late afternoon around 5:00 pm, on the 6th of May 2024, at Jamiat Ibrahim Al-Nakhee religious chool (Madrasa). The said Marasa is the main center of Islamic education of the Taliban, in the 11th security district, Ayno Mina town, Kandahar.Jamiat Ibrahim Al Nakhai Madrasa of Kandahar province is in the county called Ainu Minah in the eleventh district of Kandahar province. However, during the former republic government, the place was constructed, educating female undergraduates named after Ahmed Wali Karzai, the stepbrother of Hamid Karzai the so-called ex-president of Afghanistan.Counterintelligence & Counterterrorism is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.Latterly, in April 2022, the leader of the Taliban renamed the seminary thereupon it is called Jamiat Ibrahim Al-Nakhee Madrasa, turning it into postgraduate center for radical Islamic education. In this religious seminary, Sheikh Haibatullah's suicide bombers are indoctrinated added the sources.Although his speech has not been officially broadcast, but it is said that the main principle of Sheikh Haibatullah's speech was the obedience of the Emir's order, resolving differences, contributing to the security of internal security, and countering the Islamic State and other anti-Taliban groups. Due to internal strife, the Supreme leader of the Taliban is seemingly marginalized, his decrees and orders are contravened. The Kabul based Taliban ministers are simply disobeying his order. More importantly, Sheikh Haibatullah’s guidance regarding the ban on polygamy is openly violated and ignored. Furthermore, he has instructed the Taliban leaders several times to be cautious with the public treasury or exchequer (Bait Al-Mal). He emphases avoid exploiting equipment and materials linked to the Bait-Mal for private purposed. Despite his order, some Taliban leaders still deplete the equipment of the public treasury personally, which indicates the upsurge of internal power struggle. The disobedience from Sheikh Haibatullah's orders and demands are signaling the readiness for a coup against the leader of the Taliban, Sheikh Haibatullah. Presumably, replaced by Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar or Maulvi Muhammad Yaqoob Mujahid. That's why Sheikh Haibatullah is trying to redouble his military units. Meantime he endeavors to win hearts and minds of the students of the Islamic madrassas in Kandahar province the low-ranking and high-ranking Taliban fighters.There are also reports about likely attacks conspired by the Islamic State group against Sheikh Haibatullah. It is said that the Islamic State is planning suicide attacks on Sheikh Haibatullah and members of his extremist circle in the southwest region. Currently, Sheikh Haibatullah is troubled. In one hand, he tries to get rid of the group’s internal challengers on the other, the external threats posed by ISKP and other anti-Taliban groups. Hence, he is trying to get corroboration from the students at Islamic schools and madrasas and to increase his popularity and support among them through direct preaching and statements.Counterintelligence & Counterterrorism is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit ajmals.substack.com/subscribe

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Exclusive: This is the first time that the spiritual leader of the Taliban speaks out for launching global jihad and the establishment of Sharia across the globe. In fact, this narrative is derived from the admonishes or the systematic guidance of Al-Qaeda’s leader Sheikh Ayman Al-Zawahiri, which was widely disseminated through the Al-Qaeda Magazine the ONE UMMAH issue 4th published in September 2022. In the exhort, he touches the need of a Global Jihadi Army, which the Taliban can adjust the group Jihadists for a jihadi warfare worldwide. If the Taliban’s leader endeavors to promote the Al-Qaeda imperialistic agenda, it is clearly in opposition to what the group’s chief negotiators made an agreement with the US authorities in Doha, which undoubtedly indicates no more international terror engagement and promoting of global jihad doctrines.Counter Intelligence & Counterterrorism is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.Sheikh Haibatullah’s younger son Shaheed Hafiz Abdulrahman Khalid The keynotes of the Taliban Supreme Leader 1- During his remarks, he said that now all the obstacles in front of the Taliban group have been removed, so this is a good chance to implement Sharia law on the earth, In addition, he claimed that their war is not over yet and will continue.2- The government of the Taliban group will not be led by fighters because they do not know how to implement Sharia, but this group will be led by religious scholars and sheikhs, And they will try not only for the implementation of Sharia in Afghanistan, but also for the implementation of Sharia in the whole world.3- He clearly indicated in his remarks that he does not want an all-inclusive government, nor is the purpose of his public apology to place the officials of the previous republican government in the administration of the Taliban.4- In his remarks, he said that after this, no non-Islamic country or army would dare to attack Afghanistan, rather, after this; the war against them will start from Afghanistan.5- In his remarks, he also pointed to internal differences, which widened the rift between the Taliban.6- In his remarks, he praised the suicide bombers and mentioned his son Abdul Rahman Khalid, who committed a suicide attack in Helmand province.Consequently, by praising the suicide bombing act of his son, he obviously promotes violent extremism, which will definitely end up in terrorism and armed jihadism. Hence, there a need for the revision of the Doha Accord, otherwise the group’s international violent agenda will pose real threat to the world peace and democracy worldwide.Counter Intelligence & Counterterrorism is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit ajmals.substack.com/subscribe