International report

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is signalling a move to expand nuclear power cooperation with Russia, just as his country’s first Russian-built nuclear station prepares to go live later this year. The deepening partnership is likely to unsettle Turkey’s western allies. On the sidelines of a recent gathering of regional leaders in Kyrgyzstan, Erdogan told his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, that Russia and Turkey “will take steps together to open some new power plants, along with the opening of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant”. The Akkuyu nuclear power plant, built by Russia’s state nuclear company Rosatom on Turkey's Mediterranean coast, is due to go online later this year. Erdogan’s announcement comes amid strained ties with Russia, as the Turkish leader has deepened relations with United States President Donald Trump. Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, head of the Ankara office of US think tank the German Marshall Fund, describes Erdogan’s move as a “gesture” to Putin. “Although Turkey is competing with Russia geopolitically, and although Turkey is firmly anchored in NATO and is improving its relationship with the United States, it does not intend to sever all ties with Russia,” Unluhisarcikli explained. “Indeed, Turkey sees the Turkey-Russia relationship as a long-term strategic one. And this is, by the way, consistent with Turkey's balancing act.” Trump tests Turkey's energy dependence on Russia with lure of US power Nuclear lifeline For Ankara, nuclear energy promises to help it break free from its heavy reliance on imported power. Once operational, the Akkuyu plant in southern Turkey will supply as much as 10 percent of the country’s electricity. Rosatom owns the Akkuyu power plant and will recoup the estimated €21.5 billion construction costs by selling electricity to Turkey, generating annual income of around €2-3 billion. Such income could be a vital tool for Moscow to mitigate tightening sanctions by both the European Union and the United States. “The Akkuyu nuclear power plant allows Russia to build itself various state-to-state payment channels to store liquidity in Turkish banks without necessarily interfering with any sanctions regulations,” according to George Voloshin of Acams, a global organisation dedicated to anti-financial crime, training and education. Voloshin believes that, given the project's 60- to 80-year lifespan, Turkey’s commitment to Russian nuclear power will shape bilateral ties for the long term, with consequences. “It will be a source of scrutiny from western partners of Turkey. At the same time, nuclear energy has been so far shielded from any sanctions, so for Russia it is clearly a kind of lifeline,” he said. Turkey seeks Black Sea shipping deal as attacks threaten grain trade Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Ankara has maintained that it is not bound by EU or US sanctions on Moscow. Yet behind the scenes, it has quietly followed many restrictions and secured crucial waivers, especially for Russian gas. By leveraging its pivotal location near Syria and Iran, Ankara has walked a diplomatic tightrope between its western partners and Moscow. However, deepening nuclear cooperation with Russia threatens to complicate the already difficult balancing act. “It would reinforce the already existing distrust between Turkey and Europe and Turkey and the United States,” warned Unluhisarcikli. “But at the same time, Turkey is in talks with other countries, the United States and South Korea. These are the main two competitors for Russia.”  Mutual dependency Turkey’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels has stirred unease at home, and the idea of doubling down with Russian nuclear energy only heightens the sense of anxiety. “It is a dilemma,” Unluhisarcikli conceded. Yet with Russia willing to shoulder the hefty construction costs, cash-strapped Ankara has a strong incentive to continue the partnership. Russia expert Zaur Gasimov of Istanbul’s Turkish-German University points out that more than a decade of joint investment makes it tough for Turkey to turn to alternative suppliers. "It's quite a profound project,” said Gasimov, “Russia conducts the training of Turkish specialists in the field of nuclear energy, which started 15 years ago. We now have three or four waves of Turkish engineers who stayed for longer periods in Russia; they learn the Russian language for two years, and you have an infrastructure of specialists.” However, Gasimov stresses that, given the scale of investment by both sides, it has created an important mutual dependency. “Its importance makes the two sides, somehow, at the end, interested in preserving a certain level of the relationship,” he said. This shared reliance might help keep Turkish-Russian rivalries in check, from North Africa to the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Black Sea. Yet any step toward deeper nuclear cooperation is bound to invite sharper scrutiny and rising suspicion from Ankara’s western allies.

Turkey is racing to restore safe passage for cargo ships in the Black Sea as attacks on shipping disrupt grain exports and push up prices. Russia and Ukraine are major global wheat exporters, but Black Sea trade has been severely disrupted as both sides step up attacks on shipping and port infrastructure. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan announced this week that Turkey was working on a plan to ensure safe passage in the Black Sea for commercial shipping and said he was in touch with both Ukraine and Russia. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan confirmed that he raised the issue with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, on the sidelines of a gathering of regional leaders in Kyrgyzstan. The Turkish move comes as Ukraine and Russia have ramped up their attacks on shipping and ports in and around the Black Sea. In 2022, Turkey and the United Nations brokered a deal between Ukraine and Russia to ensure safe passage for Ukrainian grain exports through the Black Sea. The agreement lasted a year. While Turkey has maintained good ties with both sides, reaching another agreement will be much harder, warned international relations professor Huseyin Bagci of Ankara’s Middle East Technical University. “The tension is increasing more than ever before,” Bagci said. “It's not enough to have good relations, because the two sides – the Ukrainians and Russians – should sit down and talk about a common solution to this problem. Turkey cannot solve this problem alone.” What the SDF’s dissolution means for Syria’s Kurds and neighbouring Turkey Growing attacks In August Ukraine offered a ceasefire on commercial shipping, but the offer was rejected by Moscow, which said it wanted a broader deal. Ukrainian drones continue to strike Russian shipping, while Russia has continued missile attacks on Ukrainian ports and ships. This surge in attacks comes as both nations rush to export their grain harvests. Grain prices have risen sharply, by as much as 30 percent, international grain broker Can Atbasoglu said, even as both sides scramble to find new routes for their exports. “Russia will do their best to export as much as they can, both from Russian Baltic ports and EU Baltic ports like Latvia and Lithuania; they're also exporting,” Atbasoglu said. “Ukraine will also export as much as they can from Romania as well and through the Danube ports. But the export pace will be definitely lower. So it will definitely stay bullish for the markets. Prices are definitely going to stay like this or can have a further increase.” Fears of wheat price surge amid Ukraine-Russia clashes in the Black Sea Ships staying put At one of Istanbul's many shipyards, the docks are crowded with ships that once braved the Black Sea. One vessel bears the scars of a drone attack and is under repair. Others undergo routine maintenance as shipowners hesitate to risk new journeys into dangerous waters. The superintendent of one ship, speaking anonymously, says repairs are nearly finished, but uncertainty clouds the future. “We wanted to take the ship out to the Black Sea before entering the shipyard, but because of that risk, we didn’t enter the Black Sea and didn’t take on any cargo. We’ve been in the shipyard for 50 days for repairs, but we don’t know what will happen once the repairs are finished,” the superintendent said. Turkish shipowners warn that many are on the brink of bankruptcy, as idle ships rack up costs of up to 50,000 euros a month in mooring and crew expenses. Ziya Ustel, CEO of Turkish shipping company VI-ZA STAR, says high freight rates are being offered for Black Sea routes, but the risks are too great. “They are offering high freight rates, etc,” Ustel said. Without a diplomatic solution, few shipowners will be prepared to risk their vessels, Ustel warned. “The main thing is to find out a real solution,” Ustel added. “Otherwise, no one will try anything anymore.” Turkish diplomacy Ankara is expected to step up its efforts to find a solution. Grain brokers say hopes of a diplomatic breakthrough may be one reason prices have so far remained below the record highs seen at the start of the war. But if Turkish efforts fail and attacks on Black Sea shipping continue, higher grain prices could have a considerable impact, especially on the world’s poorest nations, many of which depend on Russian and Ukrainian grain.

Nearly a week after the Syrian Democratic Forces agreed to dissolve, the consequences are beginning to take shape for Syria's Kurds and neighbouring Turkey. As the former US-backed force is absorbed into the Syrian state, questions remain over what the country's Kurds have secured in return – from language and political rights to protections for women – and what the end of more than a decade of Kurdish-led autonomy means for Turkey's own conflict with Kurdish militants. SDF leader Mazloum Abdi announced the force's dissolution last Tuesday, saying its fighters would be integrated into the Syrian army. At its height, the predominantly Kurdish force numbered around 100,000 fighters and controlled nearly a fifth of Syrian territory in the northeast, including major oil fields and fertile land. Under SDF rule, Kurds gained cultural and political rights denied to them under previous governments in Damascus. “It means the end of Kurdish autonomy. After more than one decade of freedom, now they are under the control of Damascus,” said Syria expert Fabrice Balanche of Lyon University, who frequently visited the region. Kurdish rights “There are no guarantees for the Kurdish language because it's just a presidential decree: ‘let the Kurds use their language and teach Kurdish in schools,’ but there is nothing in the constitution,” Balanche said. The decree, issued by President Ahmed al-Sharaa in January, recognised Kurdish as a national language and allowed it to be taught in schools in areas with significant Kurdish populations. It also restored citizenship to Kurds who had been left stateless under measures stemming from a controversial 1962 census and made Nowruz, the Kurdish New Year festival, an official national holiday. The Education Ministry followed up on 27 August with rules providing for three Kurdish-language classes a week in public and private schools in areas with significant Kurdish populations, with marks counting towards pupils' final grades. ‘Words and promises not enough’ as Syria’s Kurds face uncertain future Abdi was also appointed as an adviser to al-Sharaa on Friday, days after announcing the SDF's dissolution. It remains unclear whether the role will be more than ceremonial. But questions remain over what the end of the Kurdish-led administration will mean for women. The SDF and affiliated institutions used a system in which governing bodies were jointly headed by a man and a woman. “During these 10 years of autonomy, men and women were equal,” Balanche said. “In the region’s administration. It was always a co-presidency. In Raqqah, for example, the mayor was Leyla Mustafa, a woman, and the co-president was a man. Now that is no longer the case.” Balanche also said the change could threaten restrictions on polygamy introduced under the Kurdish-led administration. Another unresolved question is what will happen to female SDF fighters as the force is absorbed into Syria's armed forces, which currently have no female troops. Shifting alliances For years, the SDF was Washington's main partner on the ground in Syria in the fight against the Islamic State group. But its position weakened as the United States built closer relations with Syria's new rulers. A Syrian government offensive in January seized large areas held by the SDF and pushed the Kurdish-led force back into negotiations over integration with Damascus. Washington, meanwhile, has increasingly embraced al-Sharaa's government, dismantling broad sanctions against Syria in 2025 and last week removing the country from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. Turkey has emerged as one of al-Sharaa's main foreign allies and has long pressed for the SDF to disarm and integrate into the Syrian state. Ankara considers the SDF a terrorist organisation linked to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which launched an insurgency against the Turkish state in 1984. The SDF has rejected Turkey's claim that it is an extension of the PKK. A year after Assad's fall, Syrian hopes for transitional justice are fading The United States and European Union designate the PKK as a terrorist organisation, but not the SDF. Turkey has carried out several cross-border military operations against the SDF in northern Syria since 2016 and still has thousands of troops stationed in the country. Ankara says those forces will remain until the security threats it faces have been eliminated. The SDF's dissolution therefore achieves a longstanding Turkish objective in Syria. Turkey's ruling AK Party welcomed the move last week as an important step towards strengthening Syria's unity. “Stability in Syria means Turkey perhaps being able to divert some of the resources it's been spending on counterterrorism into other areas of its defense that are absolutely necessary at a time like this, a time of regional turmoil,” said Turkey expert Asli Aydintasbas of the Washington-based Brookings Institution. Turkey's Kurdish conflict The SDF's dissolution could also remove an obstacle to the fragile peace process between Ankara and the PKK. The process is intended to end the PKK's decades-long armed campaign against the Turkish state through the group's disarmament and dissolution. Jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan called on the group to disarm and disband in February 2025, and the PKK announced three months later that it would do so. A group of militants symbolically burned their weapons at a ceremony in northern Iraq in July 2025. Turkey's parliament passed a law in August establishing a legal framework for the PKK's disbandment. Kurdish politicians have said broader democratic and legal reforms will also be needed for lasting peace. Macron to become first Western European leader to visit post-Assad Syria For Ankara, however, the process does not stop at Turkey's borders. It has repeatedly insisted that the SDF must also dissolve, because it regards the Syrian force as part of the same militant movement as the PKK. The SDF has disputed that characterisation, with Abdi saying in 2025 that the PKK's decision to disarm did not apply to his forces in Syria. The dismantling of groups Ankara regards as PKK affiliates across the region is essential to the process, said Middle East expert Serhan Afacan of Istanbul's Marmara University. “The PKK should not exist anywhere in the region. This is what Ankara has been saying for more than a year,” Afacan said. “If there is going to be any kind of peace process or reconciliation, the PKK is not supposed to exist anywhere in this region, in Turkey, in Iran, in Iraq, Syria.”

Tensions between Turkey and Israel have intensified after an Israeli airstrike targeted a Syrian military airbase near the Turkish border. The strike came days after Turkey’s new military pact with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Ankara swiftly condemned Tuesday's Israeli airstrike on Syria’s Abu Duhur military airbase, 70 kilometres from its border, calling it illegal and a breach of Syrian sovereignty. Ankara is a key ally of Syria's new authorities. Israel justified its actions, accusing Turkey of seeking to expand its military footprint in Syria, which it sees as a serious threat. “Israel is uneasy about the Turkish presence in Syria, and Turkish ambitions to play a major role in Syria’s future are unsettling from an Israeli perspective,” explains Turkey expert Gallia Lindenstrauss of Israel's Institute for National Security Studies. “There's concern that Turkey will establish its own bases in Syria,” she added. Israeli-Turkish tensions have risen over Israel’s war in Gaza and Lebanon, and Ankara’s support of Hamas, evolving into a broader regional rivalry. “In general, there's uneasiness [in Israel] about Turkey's assertiveness, both in Syria and in the Mediterranean and other parts of the Middle East and the greater regional arena," said Lindenstrauss.  Landmark agreement Earlier this month, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan made headlines by signing a landmark military accord in the Saudi city of Mecca. Known as the Mecca Accord, this alliance pledges mutual defence if any member is attacked, akin to NATO’s Article 5. Turkish international relations expert Soli Ozel claims the impetus for the agreement is uncertainty around Washington’s willingness or ability to protect its regional allies amid ongoing tensions involving Iran. “Undoubtedly, the United States is proving to be an increasingly unreliable partner. Countries worldwide, especially in the larger Middle East region, are looking for other ways to provide security for themselves,” said Ozel. Iran says ‘Muslim Nato’ pact reflects retreat from US security umbrella The Mecca Accord members view each other as bringing complementary strengths to deal with shared concerns. "Pakistan brings military capabilities and is a nuclear power. The Saudis have the money. Turkey has a budding defence industry and a large army. It claims not to be against any country, but I think those three parties agree that Iran is a destabilising actor, as is Israel,” explained Ozel. The Mecca Accord is set to boost defence and intelligence ties, with Saudi Arabia expected to bolster Turkey’s expanding defence sector. But many analysts see Iran and Israel as the accord’s principal focus. “The deal is meant to signal both to Iran and Israel that they will be isolated in the region if they continue with assertive, belligerent policies,” said Asli Aydintasbas of the United States-based Brookings Institution. Turkey steps up as Europe's indispensable and uncomfortable defence partner 'Two axes in the Middle East' Despite Iran’s recent attacks on Saudi Arabia, Aydintasbas argues that while the Mecca Accord has a mutual defence clause – meaning an attack on one member is an attack on all – Turkey and Pakistan will not be drawn into a conflict with Iran. “We know that they have no desire to get involved. But it does mean there will be greater military cooperation,” said Aydintasbas. Countering Houthi rebel attacks in the Red Sea on Saudi tankers could be the first real test of the alliance. But Aydintasbas cautions that the Mecca Accord will not replace the US as the “ultimate security provider” for the region. Instead, it's more about burden sharing, a move that fits well with Washington’s wider agenda. Washington has given its blessing to the accord, and expansion talks are already under way.  European Union slams 'inflammatory' Houthi Red Sea tanker attack Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan hinted that Egypt could be the next member, with Turkish media reporting that Egypt’s foreign minister will join his Saudi, Turkish and Pakistani counterparts for a meeting in Istanbul later this month. “Developments in Egypt are of major concern to Israel,” said Lindenstrauss. But she believes the Mecca Accord is an opportunity for Israel, given there are mutual concerns among its allies over the Accord. “Israel already has very close relations with Greece, Cyprus, the United Arab Emirates and India,” she noted. "And I do envision a deepening of this relationship. And so we have the formation of two loose axes in the Greater Middle East."

Turkey stands on the threshold of closing a conflict spanning almost 50 years, after the Turkish parliament this week passed a law allowing exiled Kurdish militants to return home and rejoin society. The legislation aims to end the war with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which has battled the Turkish state for independence since 1984. On Monday, legislators voted 468-88 in favour of a law detailing how the PKK will lay down arms, disband and guide most members back into civilian life. Many see this legislation as a turning point after decades of bloodshed. “This law in question is going to make a giant contribution,” predicts sociologist Mesut Yegen of the Diyarbakir-based Kurdish Studies Center. “If the PKK militants are convinced that they can be safe in Turkey, it's estimated that some 15,000 people in Europe, in Syria, in Iraq and in the prisons in Turkey are going to be either released or are going to be able to come back home.” The PKK leadership, based primarily in Iraq, is not covered by the legislation. Nor is the group's founder and leader Abdullah Ocalan, imprisoned since 1999 in a Turkish jail. He initiated the peace process and last year called for the disarmament and dissolution of the PKK. Hope, caution Istanbul, now the city's with the world’s largest Kurdish population, became a sanctuary in the 1990s as hundreds of thousands fled the violence raging in Turkey's southeast. At the conflict’s peak, the Turkish army destroyed villages in relentless scorched-earth campaigns. In Istanbul's Bagcilar district, home to a vibrant Kurdish community, conversations reveal a fragile mix of hope and caution. “This law seems good for the honour of the Kurds and to stop bloodshed,” said 31-year-old Ahmet, who only wanted to be identified by his first name. “Mothers should not shed tears anymore.”  But others were more wary. “The state has been delaying our rights for decades; I do not believe this process will be different,” said Kava, who also preferred not to give his full name. “I do not trust an arrangement in which Kurds do not have legal status.”  Kurds make up around a fifth of Turkey’s population, but are not legally recognised as a minority. Emotions appear equally divided among Turks. “If they’re agreeing to live under the Turkish flag and love our country, that’s fine – let them,” said 51-year-old Mehmet Tas. But 40-year-old Ertugral Zengin is unconvinced. “They committed a crime – and now they are to be pardoned? Do I want something like that? No, I won’t accept it.” PKK ends 40-year fight but doubts remain about the next steps Political momentum The decades-long conflict has claimed 40,000 lives and forced more than 3 million people from their homes. While major political parties support the peace process, hardline nationalist groups remain staunchly opposed, insisting it rewards a PKK they see as already defeated. The process hinges on the laborious task of disarming the PKK and verifying its weapons are gone. Maintaining the current political momentum is vital, warns Asli Aydintasbas, a Turkey expert at the Brookings Institution, a think tank in Washington DC. “If this drags on, political support for the legislation and for the return of former PKK members, seen by many Turks as terrorists, would become politically problematic for the government. Timing and moving fast is very important to achieve reconciliation,” she says. The government is expected to face growing pressure to address Kurdish rights, including Kurdish-language education in schools and local autonomy, along with broader democratic reforms. Social media buzzes with questions: how can PKK members walk free while critics of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan remain behind bars? Peace or politics? Turkey’s fragile path to ending a decades-long conflict Yegen warns that since the new legislation fails to address Kurdish rights and democratisation reforms, the government needs to move swiftly. “The fact that these two issues are not touched upon by the law has created many doubts on both Kurdish and Turkish sides about whether disarmament will be the government's only agenda,” he says. For Erdogan, steering the peace process to success could secure the vital Kurdish vote in the 2028 elections. Yet extending Kurdish cultural rights risks alienating Turkish nationalists, and relaxing pressure on the opposition brings its own perils as their electoral strength grows. For now, the negotiations present a rare window for reconciliation and lasting peace.

The launch of the Yeni Party in Turkey promises to energise the country's struggling opposition. But while some polls show it leading, it remains vulnerable – already beset by arrests it says are "politically motivated".  In a glitzy video, set to pumping music and shared widely across social media, Ozgur Ozel launched the Yeni Party – "New Party" – vowing to usher in a new era in Turkish politics and end President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s long rule. Ozel founded the New Party after a court removed him from leading the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP). His rival, former party leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, 77, who lost every election during his decade in charge of the CHP, replaced him. Many in the country believe Erdogan played a role in the removal of Ozel, as his popularity grew thanks to tireless campaigning. Riding the wave The New Party is settings its sights beyond the CHP’s usual supporters. "It covers the whole political spectrum in Turkish political life," explains Ozel's advisor Ilham Uzel. "There are critical elements like democratisation, rule of law, secularism and a pro-Western approach, so we maintain these main pillars. But it is not confined to social democracy; we reach out to every section of Turkish society, including Islamists and conservatives, nationalists and liberals. We have Kurdish supporters." The New Party is riding a wave of excitement. Ninety-one out of 135 CHP parliamentary deputies have defected to its ranks, joined by dozens of mayors and it is swiftly becoming the main opposition in parliament. Turkey opposition worries that Europe is sacrificing democracy for security Some polls show the party soaring above 30 percent, leaving Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party behind, while the CHP’s support has collapsed. The New Party’s broad approach is finding fertile ground. "Even those who still support the governing coalition, the AK Party and MHP, are unhappy with how things are or how politics is practised, especially regarding economic issues. So there is a push towards change," says political commentator Sezin Oney. "There is a yearning to change things at the grassroots, and the New Party may be the only party that can represent a new way of doing politics. But they have to live up to it, of course." Corruption charges Erdogan has remained in power for more than 20 years partly by exploiting divisions within the opposition, which is made up of conservatives, hardline secularists, and both Kurdish and Turkish nationalists.  The New Party has a key advantage over the strongly secular CHP, whose history is linked to past policies targeting Turkey’s large Kurdish minority and religious conservatives. "CHP is identified with many bad experiences that the Kurds and conservative people had in past decades," said Mesut Yegen of the Diyarbakir-based Kurdish Studies Center. "If you look at what Ozgur Ozel says during his speeches, you may clearly see the Yeni Party doesn’t have the baggage of CHP." Erdogan has also often exploited the CHP’s history, painting it as anti-religious and hostile to Kurdish minority rights. The New Party faces the tricky task of keeping CHP loyalists on board while reaching new supporters. But for now, simply staying out of jail may be the most pressing concern for its representatives.  Turkey marks a decade since the coup that never was, but never really ended Several mayors who joined the New Party have been arrested on corruption charges, widely seen as politically motivated. In the past two years, 26 opposition mayors and hundreds of officials have been imprisoned on corruption allegations, compared to two mayors from Erdogan’s AK Party. "They are cracking down on our party – every other day, mayors are arrested," says Uzgel. "They filed another charge against our leader. Nobody is safe in this authoritarian regime. So Mr Ozel is on the spot, definitely." Ozel is protected by parliamentary immunity, but Oney warns he may be running out of time. "Ozgur Ozel might be imprisoned himself once his immunity is removed by a parliamentary vote, that's a possibility. The only immunity he can have is the immunity bestowed upon him by the people. So only public opinion is protecting him. How much can it protect him? We'll see." With parliament about to break for summer until October, Ozel has a brief window to strengthen his party and rally public support.

Intensifying clashes between Ukraine and Russia in the Black Sea are threatening a crucial trade artery responsible for nearly a third of the world's wheat supply, stoking fears of soaring prices and shortages. Earlier in July, a Russian cruise missile struck the grain carrier Golden Leo, claiming ten lives. This marked the deadliest blow yet in a mounting campaign by both Russian and Ukrainian forces targeting cargo ships in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. "This is a new development in recent months," claims shipping analyst Yoruk Isik, who runs the Istanbul-based Bosphorus Observer consultancy. Isik warns that cargo vessels are caught in a deadly tit-for-tat. "Ukraine has been targeting Russian seaborne bulkers in particular, the ones transporting stolen grain from the occupied territories of Ukraine," explains Isik, "Russia retaliated and hit Ukraine's civilian port infrastructure in Odesa; a mid-sized vessel carrying corn out of Odesa was totally sunk, other vessels were damaged, and sailors died," he adds. Turkey’s Shipowners’ Association, having logged 136 incidents involving commercial vessels in recent months, is now urging its members to avoid the Black Sea altogether. Beyond its role as a key channel for Russian oil, the Black Sea is a lifeline for global grain exports, with Russia and Ukraine among the top suppliers. "It is very important to note that most of Russia's agricultural commodities are exported through the Black Sea, and that almost all of Ukraine's agricultural commodities are shipped via Ukraine's ports," warns Isik. Bad timing for harvest  Around a third of the world's wheat moves through these waters. The surge in attacks across the Black Sea and the neighbouring Sea of Azov has brought exports to a near standstill. "No port is officially closed, but almost no shipowner wants to go there, so trade is close to zero," claims Istanbul-based international grain dealer Can Atbasoglu. "Sellers want buyers to handle the vessels, and buyers want sellers to handle the vessels, but shipowners don't want to risk it." This deadlock arrives at the worst possible moment: harvest time. "Normally, Russian sellers would have sold all their August cargoes by now; I don't know if anybody has any sales on their books at present," says Atbasoglu. Turkey agrees deal to clear Black Sea of mines that threaten Ukrainian exports Wheat prices are already reacting. "The price in Romania is, say, 20-25 percent higher – that's the clearest effect we're seeing. But everybody is waiting for some kind of intervention, and soon," adds Atbasoglu. Turkey now leads a NATO mission, along with Bulgaria and Romania, to safeguard navigation in the Black Sea. However, former Turkish ambassador and navigation rights expert Mithat Rende believes Ankara will be wary of any effort to enforce passage for commercial ships. "It's very important that the Ukrainian war should not be transformed into a regional war," cautions Rende. "Where would it stop? Would you fire missiles and intercept Russian missiles in the Black Sea? They (Russia) already accuse all of us of fighting Russia as NATO. It's very important to avoid such operations," he adds. Full impact yet to be felt Rende argues Ankara’s priority is diplomacy, having played a pivotal role in brokering the 2022 United Nations-backed grain export deal after Russian forces blocked Ukrainian shipments. "Turkey maintained a dialogue with both the Russian and the Ukrainian sides at the same time," says Rende, "But is there political will for a ceasefire now? I don't see it at present." Grain trader Atbasoglu warns the full impact of the disruption is not yet reflected in prices. "Buyers are still not fully reacting. It's seen more as an August, or at the latest a September issue, and the markets still want to believe both sides will get together and talk," he says. However, Atbasoglu cautions that time may be running out. "In 2022, Ukraine was completely closed off, and there was a major panic. We saw the effect: wheat prices jumped 50 percent in 2022, and we could expect something similar if this continues," he concludes. Africa and the Middle East, which are heavily reliant on Black Sea grain, are beginning to seek pricier alternatives. Europe, too, may soon feel the strain, as drought-hit wheat harvests threaten to push global food prices even higher.

The Israeli parliament's decision to postpone a vote on recognising the Armenian genocide by Ottoman Turkey is being seen as a triumph for regional diplomacy, as Azerbaijan in particular seeks to avert a further escalation in tensions between its close allies. The Israeli government gave no official reason for postponing the vote to formally recognise the Armenian genocide by Ottoman Turkey during World War I, which would have ratified a motion approved by the cabinet last month.  Ankara strongly denies the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Armenians constitute genocide. While the motion's architect, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar, called recognition a “moral duty”, critics say the move took aim at Turkey amidst rising tensions. Based in Tbilisi, Israeli defence and security expert Eugene Kogan claims Israel badly miscalculated. “Foreign Minister Sa'ar could have waited and not just dropped a bomb that led to different repercussions coming from different sides,” he said. Armenia, which is seeking to normalise ties with Turkey, reacted coolly, with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan saying he saw no need to comment. Meanwhile, Israel’s close ally Azerbaijan reportedly lobbied Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to drop the motion. “At the end of the day, it might be either dropped or dismissed, and it will not come again to the new parliament agenda,” predicted Kogan. The Knesset dissolved on 17 July and won't reconvene until after elections scheduled for 27 October. Israel's recognition of the Armenian genocide unsettles Turkey and Azerbaijan Azerbaijan's influence The Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that pressure from Azerbaijan tipped the scales, though officials deny it. Azerbaijan supplies nearly 40 percent of Israel’s oil and is a major customer for Israeli arms. The two countries’ partnership involves frequent Israeli ministerial visits and strong military cooperation, especially crucial for Israel given Azerbaijan’s border with Iran. Baku also maintains a deep alliance with Ankara, summed up in the phrase “one nation, two states”. As Israeli-Turkish tensions flare over the Gaza conflict and Ankara’s support for Hamas, Azerbaijan is walking a diplomatic tightrope. Zaur Gasimov, a Caucasus expert at Istanbul’s Turkish-German University, believes Baku viewed the Israeli genocide motion as a direct threat to its difficult balancing act. “I can imagine that there were negotiations and talks on various levels between political elites of both countries,” he said. “For Israel, Azerbaijan is still of paramount importance. I would even say it's much more significant than it used to be with regard to the situation in and around Iran. So Baku was and is maybe the key intermediary between Israel and the Republic of Turkey.” In what may be a calculated move to turn up the heat on Israel, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev welcomed Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa this month. It was the first visit by a Palestinian leader since 2011. “They [Israel] perceive it with a great sense of caution,” claimed analyst Kogan. “They don't know exactly what came out of this particular meeting between Aliyev and the Palestinian prime minister. And so there is a lot of guessing games right now taking place in both Tel Aviv and Jerusalem about the outcome.” Such ambiguity over Baku’s intentions could strengthen its diplomatic hand, he suggested: “If Aliyev is involved in this Palestinian issue directly and no longer indirectly, it makes the situation very different for the Israelis.” Turkey warns it could be Israel's 'next enemy' as tensions escalate Syrian precedent Baku is already leveraging its strong relationships with both Israel and Turkey to cool tempers. “We have organised meetings between Turkey and Israel in Baku, specifically at the very beginning of the change of the Assad regime in Syria, where both parties had their own legitimate concerns,” said Hikmet Hajiyev, chief foreign policy adviser to the Azerbaijani president. Syria is viewed as a potential flashpoint, with Israel and Turkey having a military presence. One tangible outcome of Azeri-brokered talks was the establishment last year of a military hotline in Syria, providing a rare glimmer of hope as tensions continue to mount. “It's not unavoidable that Israel and Turkey will reach confrontation. I think we can stop this process,” argued Gallia Lindenstrauss, a specialist in Turkish foreign policy at Tel Aviv University's Institute for National Security Studies. “They have a hotline between the Israeli Air Force and the Turkish Air Force, making sure that we will not have a collision in the skies of Syria, because we know both air forces are operating there. And the hotline has managed to keep the situation quiet. If I'm trying to find some anchor of reassurance that Turkish-Israeli relations can be controlled, it's Syria.” As Israel approaches elections, a temporary lull in Turkish-Israeli tensions is anticipated. Still, since the main opposition shares the government’s concerns over Turkey, relations are set to remain fraught.

On 16 July, Turkey marked a decade since the failed coup that shook the nation. Its defeat is widely viewed as the final curtain on military meddling in politics and as the moment when President Erdogan cemented his grip on power, yet the aftershocks for human rights and foreign relations still reverberate. On 16 July, Turkey marked a decade since the failed coup that shook the nation. Its defeat is widely viewed as the final curtain on military meddling in politics and as the moment when President Erdogan cemented his grip on power, yet the aftershocks for human rights and foreign relations still reverberate. A decade ago, factions within the Turkish military, composed of rebellious officers and followers of the Islamic cleric Fethullah Gulen, launched a dramatic attempt to topple President Erdogan. "I remember, as a soldier, those who started the coup," recalls Murat Aslan, an army officer at the time. "I had no idea that there were members of this organisation (Gulen followers); they were very secretive." Erdogan tightens his grip Now a security analyst at SETA, a pro-government think tank, Aslan describes the failed coup as a turning point that reshaped the course of Turkish democracy. "The message was very clear. Turkish society collectively rejected it," said Aslan. "Thousands took to the streets; that's more than challenging, because you see tanks rolling and people trying to stop them, trying to capture the soldiers with their rifles. It takes more than courage." More than 250 people died resisting the coup. In the aftermath, Erdogan imposed emergency rule and expanded his presidential authority through a sharply contested national referendum. "This military intervention actually consolidated the Erdogan-led government," Aslan added. Turkey's military, relations with US to survive failed coup, ruling party vice-president Hundreds of soldiers and officers faced prosecution as the government declared an end to the army's long history of political interference. Since 1960, the military had orchestrated three coups, the most recent in 1980. A decade of purges and closures In the wake of the failed takeover, tens of thousands were purged from state institutions, many never returning even after being cleared. More than a thousand NGOs were shut down during two years of emergency rule. Milena Buyum, senior Turkey campaigner for Amnesty International, acknowledges the grave threat to democracy posed by the attempted coup: "The state has a responsibility to ensure the safety and security of its citizens and to investigate criminal acts like the ones carried out that night," said Buyum. Turkey's Erdogan warms to Russia after West coup response However, Buyum warns that many of the measures introduced under the state of emergency have since been written into ordinary law, permanently curtailing fundamental freedoms: "The right to freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association: the impact on civil society was felt very sharply and starkly in the immediate aftermath of the coup, but that impact continues," said Buyum.  Ankara's alliances The failed coup also drove a wedge into Turkey's long-standing alliance with the United States. "Ankara saw the hand of the United States behind the failed coup attempt," claims Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, who leads the Ankara office of the German Marshall Fund. Even before the attempted coup, Erdogan's relations with President Barack Obama had been tense. Obama's belated support, offered only after the coup had failed, fuelled Ankara's suspicions of US complicity, particularly as Washington refused to extradite Fethullah Gulen, whom Erdogan blamed for orchestrating the plot. Gulen denied the accusation until his death in 2024. Turks in France divided on failed coup Unluhisarcikli observes that US-Turkish relations remained strained for years, while Erdogan gravitated towards Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose rapid show of support stood in sharp contrast to Washington's hesitation. "Putin was among the first leaders, I believe even the first, to extend political support to the elected government in Ankara, and in those days I believe that support mattered greatly to President Erdogan," Unluhisarcikli said. Rumours still persist in Turkey today that Moscow warned Erdogan on the day of the failed coup. Unluhisarcikli says it was only with the election of President Donald Trump, who shared Erdogan's animosity towards Obama and Joe Biden, that US-Turkish relations began to thaw, a shift highlighted at this month's NATO summit in Ankara. Yet the wave of mass arrests during the summit, enabled by post-coup emergency powers, served as a stark reminder that the shadow of the failed takeover still looms over Turkey.

US President Donald Trump made headlines this week at the Nato summit in Ankara by declaring an end to all sanctions against Turkey, paving the way for the sale of the F-35 stealth fighter jet to the alarm of Greece and Israel. 'We are going to be taking the sanctions off; it's time to do that, OK. We don't want to sanction friends; it's very simple,' declared Trump to the international media, sitting next to his host, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Trump lifts Turkey sanctions Trump was referencing the sanctions imposed on Turkey after Ankara acquired the Russian S-400 missile defence system. This move led to Turkey being barred from purchasing the American F-35 stealth fighter. Washington argued the deal jeopardised sensitive technology. However, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu condemned any sale of F-35 jets to Turkey, warning it would adversely affect the balance of power in the region. Summit host Turkey eyes major weapons deals with NATO allies 'We are in a crisis between Israel and Turkey,' warns Gallia Lindenstrauss of Tel Aviv's Institute for National Security Studies. 'I still would not characterise them as enemy states,' added Lindenstrauss, 'But the threat perception in both countries is growing, and there's a security dilemma evolving between the two countries. What each one thinks it's only doing for its defence is perceived by the other country as offensive.' Turkey is pushing hard for the immediate delivery of six F-35s it has already paid for. Yet despite Trump's promises, the shadow of Turkey's S-400 missile system purchase still looms large: 'This is not a political decision; that is actually a legal question,' claims Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, head of the Ankara office of the German Marshall Fund. Unluhisarcikli is referring to the US National Defense Authorization Act, which prohibits the sale of the F-35 until Turkey relinquishes 'possession' of the S-400. 'He (Trump) will, one way or another, need Congress's approval, and this is what Israel and Greece are trying to prevent,' said Unluhisarcikli. However, Turkish and international media reported on Friday that Ankara will sell the S-400s to the United Arab Emirates. Moscow, which reportedly has a veto on any resale of the missile, has reacted cautiously. Kremlin spokesman Dmitri Peskov described the issue as 'extremely sensitive' and said they were in talks with Ankara. F-35 sale faces resistance If Ankara manages to sell the S-400, it still faces headwinds in securing the F-35 jet. Netanyahu is reportedly preparing to visit Washington this month, where he's expected to ramp up his campaign against any F-35 sale to Turkey. The Israeli ambassador in Washington has also been in talks with Greek and Cypriot counterparts, forging a united front against Ankara. Greece and Cyprus share Israel's concerns, having their own disputes with Turkey. Aaron Stein, president of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a US think tank, predicts a tough fight for Ankara. 'This is about politics, and the politics of Turkey in the US Congress remains sour and not very good,' warns Stein. 'There are vested interest groups — the Israelis, the Greeks and others — who don't want to see an F-35 sale to Turkey and are pushing hard against it.' Turkey’s mediator role in the Ukraine war faces growing US pressure Time is also an enemy of Ankara, warns Stein, with looming November Congressional midterm elections. 'Even if you get some movement on this (sale of F-35s), you will probably see a change of power in Congress, with the new government seated in January. So there is no pathway, in my opinion, for the F-35 to get through,' predicts Stein. Before departing the Nato summit, Trump seemed to soften his stance on the F-35 sale, saying he was inclined to sanction the sale but hadn't totally made up his mind. However, Ankara might be content with Trump's symbolic backing. 'I don't believe that these are mere empty words; they are expressions of political will to find a solution to the S-400 problem and to bring Turkey to the very centre of the transatlantic alliance,' claims analyst Unluhisarcikli. 'In a matter of a couple of years, Turkey moved from its position as being basically contained by both the United States and the European Union, to becoming a key ally for NATO and for Europe's security,' he added. Greece and Turkey look to revive rapprochement amid Aegean tensions Erdogan may well savour this symbolic victory, especially since even if the F-35 sale moves forward, experts predict it would take years for the jets to be ready for action due to the need for pilot training and support infrastructure. By that time, Turkey hopes to have its own stealth jet, the Kaan, soaring through the skies.

China recenly test-fired a nuclear-capable missile from a submarine into the Pacific, the first such launch from a nuclear-powered vessel and the first submarine-based test since 1982. The missile, identified by Taiwan as a JL-2 with a range of some 7,000 kilometres, came down near the Solomon Islands, drawing swift condemnation from Washington even as global attention remains fixed on the war between Israel and Iran. Analysts see the test as a show of strength aimed at multiple audiences at once: Pacific nations wary of Beijing's growing influence, a United States whose alliances in the region are under strain, and a domestic military establishment as Xi Jinping approaches a pivotal moment in his leadership. The launch also comes as Chinese and Russian naval forces hold joint exercises off Qingdao, feeding into wider concerns about deepening military cooperation between the two powers. Submarine missile test puts China's Pacific ambitions on display In this edition of International Report, RFI speaks to China specialist Michael Dillon of King's College London and Clive Hamilton, author of Hidden Hand, about what the test reveals, and what it means for the balance of power in the Pacific.

Israel's government voted on 28 June to recognise the 1915 Armenian genocide, breaking with decades of official reticence on the issue. RFI spoke to three regional experts to unpack the politics behind the vote and its fallout: Gerald Steinberg, professor at Bar-Ilan University in Tel Aviv; Richard Giragossian, director of the Regional Studies Centre in Yerevan; and Ilter Turan, professor at Bilgi University in Istanbul. Israel's belated recognition of the Armenian genocide illustrates its deteriorating relationship with Turkey, rather than a reassessment of history, as the real driver behind the timing. Ankara's hosting of Hamas officials and its criticism of Israel's conduct in Gaza are seen as the backdrop, with the decision viewed in Israeli policy circles as a rebuke to Turkey. In Yerevan too, the recognition has been met with scepticism, seen as overdue and politically motivated. Still, it is regarded as setting a precedent that will be difficult for any future Israeli government to reverse. As the move triggered a sharp deterioration in Israel-Azerbaijan relations, the question arises: did Israel score an own goal?

Next week's NATO Summit in Ankara is expected to showcase Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s rising influence within the alliance, as he aims to use the gathering to overcome resistance to crucial arms deals and highlight the rapid growth of Turkey’s defence industry. Boasting NATO’s second-largest army and sharing borders with flashpoints from Ukraine to the Middle East, Turkey is at the heart of the alliance’s future amid doubts about the United States' commitment to European defence. “It is a paradigm shift,” says international relations professor Huseyin Bagci of Ankara’s Middle East Technical University. With European and North American leaders attending the summit, on 7 and 8 July, Bagci predicts Erdogan will use the opportunity to cement Turkey’s pivotal role.  “The NATO summit will be a good instrument for Erdogan to show Turkish domestic politics, as well as international politics, that he is one of the medium-power leaders in the world with whom you have to deal." Europe, Asia driving surge in global military spending: report Defence deals Major arms deals are expected to make headlines at the summit. US President Donald Trump – attending out of what he calls respect for Erdogan – is not likely to come empty-handed. "The administration is eager to deliver something to Erdogan," says Aaron Stein, president of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a US-based think tank. Trump and Erdogan are expected to sign a $700 million deal for the sale of around 80 GE F-110 fighter jet engines. The sale would be a major breakthrough for Ankara in its ambitious Fifth Generation fighter jet project.  “The Kaan fighter jet, Turkey's domestic fighter, is powered at least in the first iteration by the F-110. And so getting these engines would be important for the development of that fighter,” explained Stein. Ankara is investing billions of euros into the Kaan jet, but without enough engines critics have mockingly called it the world’s priciest glider. Congressional roadblocks, fuelled by influential Israeli and Greek lobbies, have stalled the engine deal, but Trump has vowed to use executive power to push it through. “Turkey has become a domestic political football in the United States, kicked around,” says Stein. “The administration wants to push forward on these agreements and is willing to use leverage to do it." Turkey opposition worries that Europe is sacrificing democracy for security Ankara is also looking to the NATO summit for a breakthrough in its goal to secure the French-Italian SAMP-T anti-missile system. Until now Paris has blocked the sale, but French media has hinted that an agreement could be within reach.  “That would open maybe a new chapter in European-Turkish relations,” says International relations expert Zaur Gasimov of Istanbul’s Turkish German University. “That would bring key European members of NATO – France, Italy – closer to Turkey. And would maybe forge a new core group within NATO." Exclusion from SAFE Ankara is using the summit to spotlight Turkey’s booming defence industry, showcasing its cutting-edge weaponry and highly coveted drones, used in conflicts from Ukraine to Africa. “Turkey has quite a developed field of drone production, which is of paramount importance in modern types of warfare,” explains Gasimov. “So all that makes Turkey a very, very special member of NATO from the point of view of European leaders." However, Turkish arms sales to Europe face a major hurdle: exclusion from the EU’s €150 billion Safety and Assistance for Europe (SAFE) arms procurement programme. EU members Greece and Cyprus continue to block Turkey’s participation in SAFE due to unresolved disputes in the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas. Turkey expands influence in Africa through military training Bagci predicts Erdogan will use his meeting with European leaders to try to break this deadlock. “SAFE is the grand strategic decision of the European Union, so it cannot be stopped or prevented by such a small country like the southern Republic of Cyprus or Greece. The Greeks and the southern Republic of Cyprus, they have to stop or shut up and not prevent [Turkey’s participation in] SAFE," he says.  Turkey is the only country that recognises the Turkish Cypriot administration in Northern Cyprus, refusing to recognise the Republic of Cyprus as the sole sovereign administrator of the island, as international law does. 

Turkey's main opposition says its Western allies are failing to respond as a widening crackdown by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government targets its leaders and elected mayors. The latest arrests this week followed a court decision to remove Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Ozgur Ozel and reinstate former leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu in an unprecedented move that was widely condemned by Turkish and international human rights groups. The European Union's response has been far more restrained. "There are some visits, there are some letters sent to us," said Ilhan Uzgel, the CHP's former deputy chair. "There are some public statements regarding the situation in Turkey, but the wording and language used is quite mild. [There's] no action." The CHP has faced more than a year of arrests targeting its mayors on corruption charges. This week, two more were detained, adding to a list that already includes jailed Istanbul mayor and presidential candidate Ekrem Imamoglu. HRW denounces Turkey arrests ahead of NATO summit Strategic partner Uzgel said the European Union can no longer stand by and should take a firmer stance. "Mr Erdogan has to be told, 'you're destroying democracy and what you're doing is against the rule of law,'" said Uzgel. "There could be some kind of a diplomatic isolation," he added. "So whenever Mr Erdogan meets a foreign leader, he's selling it to his own audience, the Turkish public, that he's a world leader. At least this opportunity could be taken from his hand." Yet Erdogan is expected to reinforce his international standing at next month's Nato summit in Ankara. "The two big allies of Turkey have decided not to make human rights an issue in the bilateral relationship," said Asli Aydintasbas, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington. She notes that the EU and Washington have found rare common ground over Turkey. "For President Trump, this comes naturally; he doesn't care about human rights advancement globally," she said. "But now Europeans are also looking for some type of functional relationship with Turkey and wanting to disregard human rights as an impediment to bilateral relations." Turkey steps up as Europe's indispensable and uncomfortable defence partner Federico Donelli, an international relations expert at the University of Trieste, said the European Union's restrained response reflected Turkey's growing strategic importance. "The restraint of EU reaction is closely linked to an increase in recognition of Turkey's structural importance for European security." With Nato's second-largest army and a rapidly expanding defence industry, Turkey is increasingly seen as an important security partner as Europe faces the threat from Russia and uncertainty over the United States' long-term commitment. "The US is definitely less stable than in the past, so in this context Turkey is increasingly seen less as a [EU] candidate country and more as a strategic partner," said Donelli. Pressure on Greece and Cyprus Donelli said this shift could increase pressure on Greece and Cyprus, which have long used their vetoes to slow closer EU defence ties with Turkey because of disputes in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean. "We know how much the two countries have conditioned EU-Turkey relations for many years," said Donelli. "These two countries cannot constrain broader EU strategic choices in the next few years, in the next decade." Amid the Russian threat and uncertainty over America's resolve, Turkey's opposition worries it is being sacrificed in the name of Europe's security.  "Historically, Turkish EU relations were working for the democratisation of Turkey, but the equation has been reversed. The EU-Turkey ties have been working against Turkey's democratisation," said Uzgel. "The closer Mr Erdogan gets to the EU, [the more] we are losing democracy in Turkey." He nonetheless warned that Europe's approach is short-sighted and could have wider consequences. "Turkey is a country of 86 million, so if democracy fails here, it has to have some implications for other countries as well."

Ten years after the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union, Brexit supporters still see this as a historic act of sovereignty, while critics point to the resulting economic damage and political division.  This week RFI examines the legacy of the 2016 Brexit referendum through the sharply contrasting views of three analysts: Federico Fabbrini of the Brexit Institute in Dublin, Robert Oulds of the London-based pro-Brexit Bruges Group, and John Barry of Queen’s University Belfast. Their assessment reveals a country still deeply divided over what Brexit has achieved, what it has cost and what it means for the UK's future relationship with Europe. For Brexit supporters, the desired "control" has been achieved. For its opponents, the economic consequences and divided political landscape loom ever larger.  Between those positions lies a complex reality shaped by trade, immigration, Northern Ireland and the much vaunted idea of “Global Britain”.

Ten years on, the UK's decision to leave the European Union is increasingly seen as more than a single referendum result. Critics argue it reflected a wider crisis of political imagination, with Brexit supporters misreading both Britain and the world, while the promised future never arrived. The referendum held on 23 June 2016 remains one of the defining decisions in modern British history. Supporters promised sovereignty, control, lower red tape, new trade deals and a more dynamic “Global Britain”. Critics are unequivocal that Brexit has left Britain poorer, weaker and less able to deal with global shocks 10 years after voters chose to leave the European Union. Opponents argue that many of those promises have not been met. Britain is more constrained, less attractive to investors and still divided over what Brexit was supposed to mean. Nevertheless, the vote marked the moment Britain “changed track”, Colin Hay, professor of political science at Sciences Po in Paris, tells RFI. “Its relationship with the European Union and its relationship with the rest of the world has changed fundamentally from this moment onwards,” Hay said. “And 10 years on, we can see that very clearly now.” Two years after Brexit 'got done', poll shows many Britons want new referendum A changed Britain Brexit is hard to judge as a normal policy decision, Hay argues, because voters were asked to choose a direction without knowing what form leaving the EU would eventually take. “People didn’t know what the Brexit that they were voting for, if they voted for it, would turn out to be, and now they can see, and there’s a certain amount of buyer’s remorse, I think,” Hay says. One of the strongest attacks on Brexit has come recently from Michael Heseltine, the former Conservative deputy prime minister, who called it a “self-imposed disaster” and a “con”. He also said those who sold it should “hang their heads in shame”. For Hay, Heseltine was pointing to a real problem in British politics – especially the way Europe moved from a low-profile issue to the central question shaping political life. “The question of Britain’s relationship to Europe was – until UKIP came along and until the Brexit referendum – a relatively low salience issue,” Hay said. “Since 2016 and since the campaign, it has been the single dominant issue, which has influenced everything else.” That change helped Nigel Farage, UKIP and later Reform UK become powerful forces in British politics, while also damaging the Conservative Party. 'Rogue state' UK stands by new Brexit legislation which breaks international law Economic costs The economic impact of UK's departure from the European Union is now clearer than it was at the time of the referendum, Hay tells RFI, though he adds that Brexit cannot be separated entirely from the other shocks Britain has faced over the past 10 years. “I think it’s as clear as it could be, but there’s a caveat in that, and that is that a lot’s happened in Britain over the last 10 years, lots happened in the world over the last 10 years, and to identify and to isolate the Brexit effect is actually quite tricky,” he says. The Bank of England has tried to measure the impact, estimating “a drop of 6 percent of GDP lost, as it were, to Brexit”. But the wider cost may be greater because Brexit also affected Britain’s ability to deal with later crises, including Covid and the Ukraine war, he argues. Five years on, has Brexit put Britain at a disadvantage in EU talks? “Britain is less well placed to deal with those shocks and challenges today than it would otherwise have been in the absence of Brexit,” Hay continues. The idea of a newly liberated “Global Britain” was always weak, because the UK already had many favourable trade terms through its EU membership. “I think the idea of a kind of new ‘Global Britain’ liberated from Europe was always a bit of a myth, frankly,” Hay says. The promise of “Singapore-on-Thames” also failed to deliver. Britain was already a relatively lightly regulated European economy and had long been highly deregulated in financial services. “There’s been a marginal move in the direction of light regulation, but it’s not really achieved any positive gain for the British economy overall,” Hay said. Countdown to Brexit: Polls predict Leave campaign wins Campaign arguments However, the Leave campaign was highly effective in attacking warnings from economists, diplomats, businesses and officials with “Project Fear”. That tactic weakened the role of evidence in the debate, while the Leave side also used the promise that Brexit would free up money for the National Health Service. “I think the Brexit campaign was most effective in a sense, because it was able to discredit and disable any evidence, any expertise that was brought on the remain side of the debate to the table,” Hay says. The campaign, led in part by Farage and his populist message, encouraged voters to reject not only the EU but also “the form of expert technocratic governance associated with that”, he argues. At the same time, Leave campaigners used a simple financial promise. “They plastered a big number on big red buses and implied that a vote for Brexit would liberate the public finances and allow high levels of investment in the NHS, amongst other things,” Hay says. The result did not match that promise, he adds. EU and UK clash in first post-Brexit legal battle over North Sea fishing ban “Anyone who’s tried to be treated in a British hospital in the 10 years since 2016 knows that that didn’t turn out very well,” Hay says. Brexit supporters often argue that the vote was not mainly about economics but about sovereignty and control. Farage and others have also claimed that Brexit failed because it was never properly implemented. Hay explains that argument was easy to make and had been repeated since Theresa May’s time as prime minister, when she faced pressure to deliver a harder and more economically costly form of Brexit. But public opinion has shifted over the past decade. “I think the argument that Brexit was not properly implemented, and that’s why it’s not turned out as well as it could have done, has not particularly been accepted by the public,” says Hay. Around 20 to 30 percent of those who voted for Brexit would now vote remain if given the chance again, he estimates. Burnham wins key UK poll, paving way for bid to challenge PM Starmer Uncertain future Meanwhile, Keir Starmer’s government has been trying to rebuild bridges with the EU while avoiding a return to the divisions of the Brexit years. The debate inside Labour is also becoming more complex, with questions over how far any future leader could go in rebuilding Britain’s relationship with the EU. For Hay, Britain’s uncertainty 10 years after Brexit is closely tied to economic weakness. “It’s much easier to be confident about Britain if it has a stronger economy,” he says. “The Labour administration assumed it would have more fiscal space to do positive things every single time it looks at the books,” Hay said. “It finds there’s no money in the coffer, and if there’s no money in the coffer there’s not much you can do.” Ten years after the vote, Brexit remains more than a question of treaties, borders and trade. It is also a question of what Britain was promised, what was delivered and how much control the country really gained.

Lebanon is emerging as the newest flashpoint in the increasingly strained relations between Turkey and Israel, with the former's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan issuing a stark warning that Turkish security begins in Beirut. Earlier this month, Erdogan addressed his parliamentary deputies with a forceful condemnation of Israel’s strikes on Lebanon and Syria, warning that Turkey’s security now stretches beyond its borders, reaching as far as Damascus and Beirut. Tensions between Israel and Turkey have been steadily escalating, with Erdogan vocally supporting Hamas and leading the chorus of condemnation against Israel’s military campaigns in both Gaza and Lebanon. “Lebanon is a new area of competition or dispute between Israel and Turkey," says Gallia Lindenstrauss of Tel Aviv’s Institute for National Security Studies think tank. “There was definitely concern in Israel after hearing Erdogan's speech. The fact that he speaks about Syria and Lebanon as part of Turkey's security is, of course, a problem for Israel….I think this adds complexity to already a very tense relationship between Israel and Turkey." Shifting influence  In recent years, Turkey has quietly but steadily expanded its soft-power presence in Lebanon, dispatching aid and broadening the reach of its humanitarian groups. This comes as Iran’s influence in the region loosens, signalled by the collapse of the Tehran-backed Assad regime in Syria and growing pressure on Iranian proxy Hezbollah in Lebanon. “Turkey is concerned about Lebanon because it can create new venues of Israeli zone of influence, when the power of Iran is on the decline,” said international relations professor Ozlem Tur, of Ankara’s Middle East Technical University. Tur notes that Turkey is eager to seize the opportunities created by these shifting dynamics: “Turkey feels a vacuum of power – and who is going to fill it? And all of this is part of a larger geo-strategic position that Turkey wants to put itself in." Turkey expands influence in Africa through military training Erdogan has frequently accused Israel of trying to assert dominance across the region, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean, which is believed to hold vast untapped energy reserves. Ankara suspects Israeli influence was behind Lebanon’s November 2025 landmark maritime demarcation deal with Cyprus, paving the way for potential exploration of offshore gas fields and energy cooperation in the Mediterranean – a deal Turkey argues undermines its interests, as well as those of the Turkish Cypriot administration and Syria.  “Lebanon joining the competition there is of course worrying [for Ankara]”, Tur added. "This maritime dimension adds to an already competitive environment, and it makes Lebanon a partner in this competition." Trump card Meanwhile, Turkey-Israel rivalries continue to escalate.  “The Israelis, especially the hard-liners, have been really working hard to get the United States on board with their plans to take Turkey as their next target,” said international relations professor Serhat Guvenc of Istanbul’s Kadir Has University.  However, Guvenc suggests that Erdogan retains a trump card. so to speak.  "The personal rapport between the two leaders, Trump and Erdogan, has been an impediment to the materialisation of such American backing to whatever plan Israelis might have in regard to Turkey." Trump’s recent criticism of Israel’s bombing of Beirut and Israel’s ongoing attacks on Lebanon after a peace agreement with Iran, will likely further strengthen Erdogan's hand with Trump, at a time when Washington is increasingly viewing Ankara as key to its regional goals. Turkey steps up as Europe's indispensable and uncomfortable defence partner “For stability, for mediation, for assistance... in these aspects definitely the US is looking for Ankara and looking for the role Ankara can play in relaxing tensions in the region,” said Lindenstrauss. "But Ankara itself is raising tensions and, of course, Erdogan's inflammatory rhetoric to Israel is not stabilising anything.” Trump is set to visit Ankara for next month’s NATO summit, where Turkey’s regional role will likely dominate discussions between US and Turkish leaders – a meeting poised to deepen Israel’s unease and growing sense of isolation.

Nikol Pashinyan’s sweeping re-election in Armenia has raised fresh hopes that the border with Turkey could finally reopen after three decades of closure. The Armenian prime minister campaigned on restoring ties with Turkey and Azerbaijan, as well as moving Armenia closer to Europe – but constitutional reform remains a major obstacle. The vote on 7 June gave Nikol Pashinyan a clear victory over the opposition. But his success could prove bittersweet after he fell short of the parliamentary majority needed to change the constitution. Changing the constitution is part of Pashinyan’s peace efforts with Azerbaijan, brokered last year by United States President Donald Trump. “This government is committed to passing what the Armenian opposition would refer to as 'the Aliyev referendum',” said Eric Hacopian, a Yerevan-based political consultant. “The problem is, now they have no votes to bring it up because you need to get a two-thirds vote to change the constitution.” Armenia PM Pashinyan wins vote, cementing pro-Western shift Constitutional hurdles On the back of the Washington peace talks, “Armenia and Azerbaijan had an understanding that, after the election in Armenia, there would be certain constitutional amendments”, explained Hikmet Hajiyev, chief foreign policy adviser to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. Baku insists Armenia must remove claims to Nagorno-Karabakh from the preamble to its constitution. The two countries have clashed repeatedly over the contested territory. In 2023, Azerbaijan retook the breakaway enclave, causing more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians to flee. “We are looking forward to Armenia completely eliminating elements of its territorial claims,” Hajiyev said. “Then we will not have any stumbling blocks or hurdles on our agenda to move forward.” Constitutional reform is also seen as important for normalising Armenia’s ties with Turkey, according to Hajiyev. “It's not directly linked, but indirectly,” he said. “Once the Azerbaijan-Armenia agenda is solved, then Turkey will also act in a synchronised manner, opening the borders and also establishing a closer relationship.” Armenia election: what the vote could mean for Russia, the West and Azerbaijan Border hopes Turkey closed its border with Armenia in 1993, siding with Azerbaijan after ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence and seized Azerbaijani lands. Efforts to restore ties are now gathering pace, said Zeynep Alemdar, an international relations professor at Dogus University in Istanbul. “They've already declared in May 2026 that the border is going to be opened up, and all the bureaucratic, paperwork-type obstacles are actually being dismantled,” Alemdar said, noting that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is believed to get on well with Pashinyan. Pashinyan’s Turkey visit signals new chapter as Ankara eyes Caucasus shift But energy-rich Azerbaijan remains crucial to Ankara, Alemdar said. “Economically, comparing Azerbaijan versus Armenia for Ankara, of course Azerbaijan always wins... Of course Azerbaijan is going to be more influential,” Alemdar said. Erdogan congratulated Pashinyan on his re-election, while the Turkish foreign ministry urged Yerevan in a statement to embrace “bold reforms” – seen by many as a call for constitutional change. Cautious steps Pashinyan’s lack of decisive parliamentary support and uncertainty over a possible referendum mean Ankara’s role could be important in securing lasting peace, said Richard Giragosian, director of the Regional Studies Center think tank in Yerevan. “For Turkey this is a slow, gradual process of retaking the initiative with Armenia, away from Azerbaijan,” Giragosian said. “Because in many ways, at every round it's been the Azerbaijan factor that's the key determinant. And according to sources in Ankara, they only have a yellow light of caution from Azerbaijan – it's not a red light, but it's not yet a green light to proceed.” Reopening the Turkish-Armenian border would be welcomed by the European Union and Washington, as Ankara seeks to deepen its ties with both. But with Azerbaijan acting as a major investor and economic lifeline, Turkey is moving cautiously to avoid upsetting its powerful neighbour.

As Armenians vote in a parliamentary election seen as a test of Nikol Pashinyan’s pro-Western course, RFI asks two regional experts what the result could mean for peace with Azerbaijan and relations with Russia. Eight years after the street revolution that brought him to power, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is asking voters for a fresh mandate built around the promise of lasting peace with Azerbaijan and a reduced dependence on Russia. His opponents say he has conceded too much to Baku and damaged Armenia’s traditional alliance with Moscow. To understand what is at stake, RFI spoke to Joshua Kucera, an analyst with the International Crisis Group, and Richard Giragossian, director of the Regional Studies Center in Yerevan.

Turkey is expanding its military training programmes across Africa, with soldiers from Mali and Niger graduating from a special forces camp as Ankara seeks to deepen ties across the continent. The soldiers completed training this month at Turkey's special forces camp in Isparta. The approach, known as the "Somalia model" after Turkey's largest overseas base, has become central to Ankara's strategy in Africa. "The Somalia model is one of the Turkish military ideas to educate, train certain African states that are very much interested in military cooperation with Turkey," said Huseyin Bagci, an international relations professor at Ankara's Middle East Technical University. "Turkey has done it to Central Asian countries in the 90s, in the 2000s. So now the African is on the line, and this is the new development and is good for Turkey." Turkey has signed more than 20 military training cooperation deals across Africa in recent years. Turkey courts Libya's rival factions in bid to further Mediterranean ambitions Growing ties "Somalia and Libya are central where Turkey does have training bases," said Nebahat Tanriverdi Yasar, a defence expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. "But also, we are seeing growing ties with Sahelian countries, especially Niger, Mali, Nigeria." Turkey sees military training as a cost-effective way to increase its influence in Africa. "It is a relatively low-cost way to present itself in sensitive theaters, with fewer operational costs and risk of direct intervention. So in a way, those relations serve as a tool for defense diplomacy," Yasar said. Turkey has moved swiftly to capitalise on the vacuum left by France's retreating military and fading diplomatic sway in West Africa and the Sahel. Meanwhile, African nations increasingly view Turkey as a counterweight to the rising influence of Russia and China. Turkey expands military footprint in Somalia as regional rivalries intensify Libya's role Turkey's training of Libyan forces linked to rival administrations also serves European interests because Libya has become a crucial gateway for people smugglers heading into Europe, said Aya Burweilla, a Libya expert at the Athens-based Center for Hellenic and Mediterranean Studies. "Libya with an army that can secure its borders is good for Europe, too," Burweilla said. "Libya has two seas, one in the desert and one on the Mediterranean. And you need a properly organized army that can keep the border safe." Turkey's military training programmes are also helping the country's booming defence industry. "If you train them, they should use Turkish weapons; this is very normal. When you look at the export of Turkish arms to the world, you see mostly to African countries," said Bagci. Turkey's growing defence ties are helping to bring African military and political leaders to industry events in Turkey. "It is not easy to make business, of course, with African countries, with the military leaders there, it is not easy. But when you look at military fairs in Istanbul, you see how many African countries' military and political leaders visit," Bagci said. Turkey boosts Mali defence ties after separatist and jihadist attacks Defence links Turkish arms sales, such as military drones now found across Africa, often include extensive training, intelligence sharing and diplomatic engagement. Training junior officers in countries like Somalia, some destined to become future generals, could also help Turkey build long-term relationships, said Omar Mahmood, East Africa analyst at the International Crisis Group. "You invest in the up and coming of the Somali security force, and you'll have some sort of long-standing ties going forward," Mahmood said. "Some of them are trained in the Turkish language as well, so that creates these sorts of bonds. So, absolutely, I think that's part of their strategic plan. It kind of shows a longer-term vision as well."

Turkey's main opposition CHP was thrown into fresh disarray Saturday as court-installed leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu made his first visit to party headquarters since a controversial court ruling scrapped a 2023 party primary. Ozgur Ozel, the CHP leader ousted by the decision, called for an urgent congress, telling thousands at an Ankara rally that the party "cannot be run by an appointed leader". The 21 May court ruling has plunged the CHP, Turkey's oldest political party, into a crisis. Three days after the order, riot police forced their way into the party's headquarters in Ankara, armed with pepper spray and batons, to remove CHP leader Ozgur Ozel – a key rival to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The court said Ozel's 2023 election as party leader was marred by irregularities, and restored the former leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu. In Turkey, elections are overseen by the Supreme Election Council, which certified Ozel’s win, and its rulings are constitutionally final. It is just the latest move against the CHP, which scored a major victory over Erdogan's ruling AKP in the 2024 local elections and has since gained ground in the polls. Party primary Kilicdaroglu visited that party headquarters on Saturday to mark the final day of Eid, with a photo shared by his team on social media showing him seated at his desk with a copy of the party's bylaws placed prominently in front of him. "I will bring a ballot box for party congress before you as soon as possible," Kilicdaroglu said in an address, without providing a precise date. Ozel renewed his challenge to Kilicdaroglu to contest a party primary, saying he was willing to run "with whatever delegates he wants". With crowds chanting "Traitor Kemal!", Ozel said the party congress must be held "immediately", urging Kilicdaroglu to "hold a congress at once, with whichever delegates you wish. Give the party an elected leader without delay. The CHP does not accept appointments." He also demanded a primary election, saying that he would give up the party leadership if he received less than 85 percent support. Turkey expert Gonul Tol, a senior fellow at United States think tank, the Middle East Institute told RFI that Kilicdaroglu is "a convenient opponent for [President Recep Tayyip] Erdogan, because he "lost every major election during his 13 years at the helm of the party." Turkey riot police use tear gas to take opposition party HQ 'A broader campaign' Ozel, 51, was elected leader at a party convention after 77-year-old Kilicdaroglu lost the 2023 presidential election. Ozel has revitalized the CHP, which now leads many opinion polls. Tol suggests Ozel's removal is part of a wider campaign. "This is the latest step in Erdogan's broader campaign to weaken the opposition," said Tol. “Last March, in another unprecedented move, authorities jailed Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoglu – he is Erdogan's top political rival. And since then, the government has systematically targeted CHP mayors through court cases and corruption investigations,” she added. Crackdown on Turkish opposition intensifies, with further arrests of mayors Addressing protesters, Ozel vowed to flood the streets and squares in defiance of what he calls a judicial coup, while also appealing his removal. Kilicdaroglu, meanwhile, is promising to restore order to the party and cleanse it of “corrupting forces”. The government insists the judiciary is independent and denies any political agenda. Erdogan has remained silent on the issue. Still, some observers see the opposition’s upheaval as part of Erdogan’s grander vision for Turkey’s future. Political commentator Sezin Oney from independent Turkish media outlet Politikyol notes that Erdogan is eager to shape the post-Erdogan era. "He wants to design the succession, most probably to have a close family member replacing him. So he wants to shape the whole [political] terrain accordingly." 'Opposition psyche' Erdogan has ruled Turkish politics for almost 25 years, buoyed by both his political acumen and a fragmented opposition. But in the past year, Ozel’s energetic leadership has powered over 100 mass rallies nationwide, even in Erdogan’s strongholds, as Ozel taps into rising public frustration over crackdowns on dissent and skyrocketing food prices. The removal of Ozel as CHP leader is seen as a pivotal moment for Turkish democracy. “Turkey is moving closer to a Russia-style system where the leader decides who the opposition will be and ensures no real surprise can emerge at the ballot box,” predicts Tol. “Why is Erdogan taking such a massive political and economic risk? Erdogan knows he cannot win genuinely free and fair elections anymore." With Erdogan enjoying close ties with US President Donald Trump and the European Union increasingly looking to Turkey as a security partner, under the looming Russian threat, international reaction has been muted over the latest move against the opposition. Turkey steps up as Europe's indispensable and uncomfortable defence partner Speaking to tens of thousands of people at a rally in Izmir on Tuesday, Ozel vowed to escalate protests. Rumours are swirling that he could launch a new party. One opinion poll found only 11 percent of respondents approved of the removal of Ozel. Yet the legal noose appears to be tightening, with reports suggesting his parliamentary immunity could be stripped and that he may soon join other top party members behind bars. “We don't have the opposition in political representation form, but the people are there. The opposition psyche of the people is still there. So you cannot absolutely nullify the people or their political views,” said Oney. “We don't know what's going to come out of it. We can make predictions, but it's something totally novel and new in Turkey, and Turkish history as well."

In a bold move by Ankara, Turkey this week brought together Libya’s two rival militaries for international exercises. While firmly supporting the Tripoli-based regime, Turkey is now extending an olive branch to the Benghazi administration, aiming to steady Libya and broaden its sway across the region. For the first time, Libya’s two military forces participated internationally together under one flag. According to the Turkish defence ministry, 501 personnel from both Libyan armies joined Turkey’s Efes 2026 military exercises. “There needs to be one unified army in Libya, one unified military force,” said Libya expert Aya Burweila of the Athens-based Centre for Hellenic and Mediterranean Studies. “I think these joint exercises help with that. They help facilitate closer cooperation with both sides, and that can only be a good thing.” Libya has been split since 2014, with the Government of National Unity ruling the west from Tripoli and the Government of National Stability holding the east in Benghazi. While Ankara has long championed Tripoli, analyst Burweila suggests that May’s joint exercises signal a new Turkish push to engage with Benghazi. “This is a huge, practical pivot towards the east [by Turkey]. It has huge implications for Libya’s stability. Turkey’s position now is that it has good relations with both sides,” said Burweila. “It’s not just joint military exercises. There are business interests, there are sales of weapons and drones, and so forth.”  Turkey and Italy boost cooperation in bid to shape Libya’s political future Energy reserves For Ankara, courting the Benghazi administration, led by military commander Khalifa Haftar, is all about expanding Turkey’s influence in the eastern Mediterranean, argues Jalel Harchaoui of the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based defence think tank.  Harchaoui said Ankara needs Haftar’s support to enforce a 2019 memorandum of understanding that Turkey signed with the Tripoli administration to create a joint exclusive economic zone in Libyan waters.  “Now, if Ankara wants to enforce it, which it does, it needs to have the Haftar family on board,” Harchaoui explained. “The Haftar family can deliver on two very necessary things: the parliamentary ratification, because the parliament happens to be controlled by the Haftar family, and also the part of the coast that is involved in this arrangement is eastern Libya, not western Libya.” However, the Turkey-Libya exclusive economic zone, believed to have large untapped energy reserves, is strongly opposed by Greece and Cyprus, who claim it violates their territorial waters. Neighbouring Egypt and Israel have also voiced concerns. Haftar’s eastern Libyan government shares their reluctance. “Eastern Libya has very good relations with Egypt and has cordial relations with Greece as well. And this memorandum, at least from their side, violates their rights,” explained Libya analyst Burweila.  She added: “I think what lots of Libyans feel is: 'this fight is not our fight. We don't want to be involved in this kind of dispute.' So while this is a big priority for Turkey, it is not a priority for Libyans, and I think everybody there would prefer to kick this can down the road.” Egypt and Turkey's closer ties spark hope for peace among Libya’s rival factions Carrot and stick Throughout 2025, Ankara wooed Haftar and his son Saddam, chief of staff of the Libyan National Army, but saw little progress. According to analyst Harchaoui, Turkey has since toughened its stance, zeroing in on Haftar’s late-year military backing of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Turkish-made combat drones have been pictured on airbases in southern Egypt, which like Turkey backs the Sudanese army in its fight against the paramilitary RSF. According to a New York Times investigation, they have been used for strikes in Sudan. “This was a new development,” said Harchaoui, “It was basically Turkey saying, 'I smiled for most of 2025, and you did nothing for me. And you will have seen two faces. You will have seen the carrot, obviously, but also the stick.'” In April, Turkey delivered a new batch of military drones to Haftar’s army, continuing this carrot-and-stick policy. The Turkish defence ministry says it aims to hold further joint military exercises with both Libyan armies. While Turkey is stepping up its efforts to stabilise Libya, its goal of securing joint control of a huge swathe of the eastern Mediterranean threatens to drag the country further into an increasingly bitter regional rivalry.

Turkey’s role in Somalia is under growing scrutiny, with the East African country embroiled in controversy over elections and Israel stepping up efforts to challenge Turkey in the region. Over the last two years Turkey has ramped up its economic and military presence in Somalia, building on decades of development. The East African country is home to Turkey’s largest overseas military base and this year it bolstered its military presence, deploying F16 fighter jets and tanks. Turkey is also constructing a space port for its rapidly advancing missile programme, and the two countries have signed agreements to exploit potentially vast energy reserves. But the deepening partnership is proving increasingly controversial, says Omar Mahmood of the International Crisis Group. While five or 10 years ago there would have been "quite high praise" for Turkey's role, that's changed over the last two years. "Some of these [Turkish] contracts and projects have tipped into [a much] greater scale and that has raised questions" he noted. Turkey boosts Mali defence ties after separatist and jihadist attacks Election dispute A looming constitutional crisis is adding to the scrutiny of Turkey’s role in Somalia. The Somali government is insisting it has one year left of its electoral mandate, while the opposition claims elections should be held in May. "The core issue is that the political elite are infighting about the system,” explains Mahmood. “So anytime that happens, those who are against the government wind up complaining and then also looking at who is supporting the Somali government." Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s authorisation of $30 million in cash aid to the Somali government, which coincided with an April visit to Istanbul by his Somali counterpart, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, drew criticism from both the Somali and Turkish opposition. Famine looms in Somalia amid drought, dwindling aid and Middle East war “Turkey providing cash aid to the Somali government sparked the debate,” said African studies professor Elem Eyrice Tepeciklioglu, of the Social Sciences University of Ankara. “It seems some people think Turkey supports the ruling government, and provides support to the ruling government because they benefit from the relationship.” Ankara has strongly refuted accusations of interference in Somali politics. However, it could be paying the price for being too focused on Mogadishu in the past, given the diverse nature of Somalia's regions. “Turkey has started to learn from its mistakes,” said Tepeciklioglu. “They have started to increase their involvement with different states, with different regions, and have started to increase their engagement with local people as well.” Rivalry in the region Turkey is also facing a growing challenge in the region from Israel, which in April appointed an ambassador to Somaliland – becoming the first country to recognise the breakaway republic, which seceded from Somalia in 1991. “It’s been useful probably for [Israel] to assert themselves against Turkey in an area where Turkey has firmly planted its flag,” said Norman Ricklefs of geopolitical consultancy, the NAMEA Group. Israeli-Turkish relations remain strained over Ankara’s support of Hamas and Israel’s war against Gaza and Lebanon. The Israeli government has indicated it is considering a military presence in Somaliland, to counter the threat posed by the Houthis in Yemen.  “I don't think we're at that stage yet,” said Ricklefs. "But any Israeli military presence in Somaliland is going to raise angst amongst the neighbours – Somalia, Egypt, Turkey and potentially Saudi Arabia. Obviously, it's going to be destabilising.” The risky calculations behind Israel's recognition of Somaliland The Horn of Africa could be a potential new flashpoint if Israel deploys military assets in Somaliland, agrees international relations professor Serhat Guvenc of Istanbul’s Kadir Has University. "The potential for conflict between Israel and Turkey is really high, because they're pursuing diametrically opposed objectives. If relations further deteriorate, then we may see tensions running high between the two countries because they would be in almost physical contact. Their military assets may run the risk of having dangerous encounters with each other." Israeli-Turkish rivalry in the region threatens to exacerbate existing tensions in an already volatile area. For Turkey, which has invested more than €1 billion in development in Somalia over the past decade, and is also eyeing major financial returns from its energy exploration in Somalian waters, the stakes are high.

Ankara has voiced alarm at Cyprus’s announcement that France will deploy soldiers on the Mediterranean island. The move has fuelled Turkish fears of encirclement, as Cyprus and Greece continue to deepen defence ties with Turkey’s rival Israel. Turkish officials have strongly criticised France’s plan to send soldiers to Cyprus, warning it could escalate tensions. Cyprus has remained divided since 1974, when Turkey invaded following a coup backed by Greece. The north is governed by a Turkish Cypriot administration recognised only by Turkey. Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides stated that the French deployment is part of a Status of Forces Agreement to be signed in June. France increased its military support, sending forces to the area after Iranian missiles targeted the island. But Ankara sees the move as part of a growing rivalry with Paris. “Turkey and France are geopolitical rivals. They have been competing with each other in Africa and the eastern Mediterranean,” explains international relations professor Serhat Guvenc of Istanbul’s Kadir Has University. “France is inclined to view Turkey as a potential revisionist power, pursuing hegemonic aspirations in the region,” he said, adding that Cyprus is a small island and a concentration of military power without unified command could lead to unwanted escalation. Cyprus’s EU presidency: seeking resilience in a new world order Christodoulides downplayed Turkish concerns, stating that any French deployment would serve “humanitarian purposes". However, former Cypriot ambassador Euripides Evriviades argues that Turkey’s military presence is the primary security threat in Cyprus. “These things are happening because we feel very insecure – it is 40,000 Turkish troops on the island in an aggressive posture,” said Evriviades. “The insecurity on the island stems directly from the continued occupation and violations of human rights that come with any occupation." French backing Macron’s support for Cyprus echoes his strong backing of Greece. During a recent visit to Athens, he said there was “no room for doubt” about France’s military support for Greece against any threats, a statement widely interpreted as being aimed at Turkey. France’s increased support for Greece and Cyprus coincides with Athens and Nicosia strengthening security ties with Israel. Cyprus urges EU to agree plan for defence of member states ahead of summit “The Cyprus problem is no longer the Cyprus problem per se, but has become a part of the wider geopolitical rivalries in the region,” said Guvenc. Turkish-Israeli relations remain tense, with both sides viewing each other as a threat. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan warned that the alignment of Cyprus, Israel and Greece is an attempt to “encircle Turkey". Ankara fears that such a military alliance could be used to advance Greek and Cypriot claims over the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas, where Turkey and Greece have multiple territorial disputes. “If they combine their military and naval capabilities, they may attempt to deny Turkey access to the Eastern Mediterranean. So this is a danger,” said Guvenc. Cycle of distrust The upcoming Washington summit involving Greece, Cyprus and Israel is likely to intensify Ankara’s concerns about isolation. Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, head of the German Marshall Fund office in Ankara, warns that the region is caught in a growing cycle of distrust, and any new military deployment to Cyprus is likely to prompt a reciprocal response. “Turkey could make new deployments, drones, even fighter jets,” he said. Turkey steps up as Europe's indispensable and uncomfortable defence partner Unluhisarcikli also cautions that renewed tensions over Cyprus are a dangerous distraction from the ongoing Russian threat. “At a time when the transatlantic community at large is facing much larger external threats, NATO allies should not be posturing against each other, and that's what we are seeing. This is unacceptable." “The risk of a real confrontation is very limited, but it will lead both sides to double down on their current positions,” he added. Turkey, which has the second-largest army in NATO, is viewed by some in the European Union as a potential answer to concerns about the United States’ commitment to Europe's defence amid the ongoing Russian threat. However, renewed tensions over Cyprus may undermine these expectations.

Turkey’s efforts to expand its influence in West Africa could be threatened by attacks on Mali’s military regime, as Ankara pledges support while its growing security cooperation with Bamako faces new pressure. Ankara has strongly condemned attacks by Tuareg separatists and Al Qaeda-linked jihadists on Mali’s military government. The attacks began last weekend, killed the defence minister and handed over control of key territory. Turkey has built ties with Mali over the past two decades, but since Mali’s military rulers took power in 2021, that relationship has shifted sharply towards security. “Since 2010, that expansion has been much more rapid,” said Professor Sedat Aybar, director of the Asia Pacific Africa Studies Centre at Bahcesehir University in Istanbul. “It starts on humanitarian grounds and then evolves toward economic cooperation, followed by security and military aid, and capacity building for the Malian military, particularly against terrorist activities in the north.” Russia vows to keep forces in Mali despite warning from separatists to withdraw Security expansion Turkey has signed several security and defence agreements with Mali’s military rulers, mainly focused on training and logistics. Defence sales have also increased, including advanced Turkish drones. Turkey’s role has grown as Mali sought new security partners after expelling French forces in 2022. Russia remains Mali’s main security partner, but Turkey is becoming more important as Bamako seeks to reduce dependence on Moscow. “We did see the late defense minister [Sadio Camara] going to Ankara on several occasions to sign bilateral agreements, but also to acquire drones and other equipment that would support the Malian army,” said Beverly Ochieng, senior analyst at Control Risks, a global risk consultancy. Turkish firms have sold Mali advanced drones, including the Akinci, she said, adding that Russian paramilitary forces in Mali have also acquired equipment through Turkey, “It's also by proxy, because the Russian paramilitaries, they have been acquiring equipment on their own behalf, but also for the Malian army via Turkey,” Ochieng said. Malian official accuses Russian forces of 'betrayal' after Kidal falls to rebels Regional ambitions Turkey’s expanding security role in Mali is part of a broader Sahel strategy that also includes Burkina Faso and Niger. “Not just Mali, but the Sahel is very important. Cooperation with Burkina Faso and Niger is very important too,” said Melis Ozdemir, a PhD candidate at Galatasaray University studying Turkish-Malian relations. The military governments in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, all of which cut defence ties with France, have opened new opportunities for Turkish diplomacy and defence exports. “It's given Turkey a chance to increase its footprint, not just politically or diplomatically, but also it can show its military power, its drones, and its new military vehicles and equipment,” said Ozdemir. “I think Turkey is also testing its own military equipment in these regions.” Direct Turkish military intervention in Mali appears unlikely, Aybar said, but Ankara could still send military advisers if requested. “Nigeria requested Turkish military advisors to enhance Nigeria's capacity to fight Boko Haram, the terrorist organization in Nigeria, so Turkey is engaged in doing this,” said Aybar. “If the Malian government invites Turkey to do a similar thing in Mali, then Turkey will consider sending in experts and advisers to the military in Mali.” Turkey is also offering diplomatic support. “There could be a route through negotiations,” said Ochieng. “Turkey is one of the middle powers that is also trying to look for dynamic ways of resolving conflict. It’s not just within the Sahel, but you've seen them try to be involved in the DR Congo, calling for dialogue between the warring parties,” Ochieng said. “Ankara and Istanbul have also become a point where armed groups are able to hold talks and to find mediated ways out of political and security crises."